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Introduction 
Whereas studying the eighteenth century in order to understand developments 
towards modernity is certainly important, focusing on conceptualisations 
among eighteenth-century Englishmen who were experiencing a transition 
from a traditional polity — in which the uniformity of political values formed the 
ideal — towards a more diverse polity is also of particular interest to an historian. 
This latter approach is to study past thought via the terms of eighteenth-century 
people themselves and not merely on terms set by what late twentieth-century 
observers conceive as having had a significant role in later intellectual change. 
Historians studying intellectual history now generally agree that reactions to 
political innovations should be studied by analysing the language of politics and 
conventions of political discourse, political discourse being a series of mostly 
written and published utterances addressing a public question in a given time 
period.' The political discourse which forms the subject of this study concerns 
increasing diversity of political values within early eighteenth-century English 
society. This plurality of political values meant a break with the ideal of unity 
which had been characteristic of traditional early modern societies. Pluralism in 
thought was connected with pluralism within the polity: the connected 
structural developments include the emergence of perpetual party divisions, a 
possibility for the political elite and even the public at large to choose between 
alternative political groupings, the extension of public political debate and the 
rise of parliamentary opposition. Instead of such structural developments, 
however, this study focuses on how the early eighteenth-century political nation 
experienced and conceptualised the plurality of values in general and the 
plurality of political parties in particular. With political pluralism is meant: (i) 
the existence of rival value systems in political thought, and (ii) the open 
competition of party organisations for power within one polity. With discourse 
on political pluralism is meant early eighteenth-century utterances addressing 
the phenomena (i) and (ii). In some utterances, the existence of rival value 
systems in political thought and rival party organisations within the polity were 
recognised and even approved, but a genuinely pluralistic society did not yet 
emerge. A pluralistic society, which was only in formation, can be defined as 
one in which groups of people holding differing political values can coexist and 
cooperate with other groups in some political issues while continuously 
differing in others. In a pluralistic society, it is commonly believed that the 
1 	 According to Wilson, discourse stands for public and organised ways of speaking about 
constituted subjects — politics, medicine, science, society — in a specific historical period. 
Wilson 1995, 15-16. 
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existing political differences are of a lasting, not of a temporary kind.'- In this 
study, the concept political pluralism is used simply as a way of translating two 
connected early eighteenth-century phenomena to modern language. This study 
does not claim that the early eighteenth-century English thinkers possessed 
some modern concept of political pluralism. They were using their own 
terminology to discuss developments that we connect with political pluralism. It 
is the purpose of this study to determine what that terminology consisted of and 
what kind of alternative meanings it carried. Indeed, the discourse on political 
pluralism in early eighteenth-century England concerned much more than 
merely the possibility of recognising political parties.3 
The growth of political pluralism was a development that could not escape 
the attention of the political elite even if many of its members wished to close 
their eyes to such an undesired transformation. Indeed, pluralism was a major 
factor distinguishing eighteenth-century England from other early modern 
nations.4 For conceptualising their experiences of an emerging political 
pluralism, participants in political discourse could only use terminology they 
had inherited from previous centuries. Of course, they had possibilities for 
innovation when using language to describe contemporary developments. Still, 
the associations and connotations of the available terminology set strict limits to 
such possibilities. Indeed, it is obvious that, in the early eighteenth-century 
context, what we would call `political discourse' could not be purely `political' 
in the late twentieth-century secular meaning of politics. In a parallel manner, 
`political pluralism' could not be a purely `political' issue in the late twentieth-
century meaning of the term. 
Why can political discourse in early eighteenth-century England not be 
defined in the same way as political discourse today, knowing that the concept 
even today remains far from strictly defined? Why can it not be said for sure, for 
instance, that a text discussing political parties belongs to political discourse 
whereas another discussing the right of religious communities to exist side by 
side in a country does not? Why must early eighteenth-century political 
discourse be approached from a different perspective? 
The reason is plain: the present understanding of various discourses being 
political or religious dates from a far later period than the early eighteenth 
century. In the seventeenth century, religion and politics had been deeply 
intertwined, and political debate had been conducted by appeals to Scripture.5 
Still in the early eighteenth-century context, religion is as difficult to separate 
from politics as economics is from late twentieth-century politics. The general 
understanding of politics differed from that of today. For us, `politics' can 
signify any actions or opinions expressed in the public sphere that have a 
2 	 For a useful definition of a pluralistic society, see Martin 1990, 67. 
3 	 An historian is obliged to make use of modem concepts in order to make the past 
understandable from the point of view of the present. But when using a modem concept with 
reference to the past, an historian must make it clear that these tools of his are themselves 
historically conditioned. For applying modem concepts to the past, see Van Horn Melton 
1996, 26, Pocock 1996. 55. and Skinner 1998, 116. 
4 	 For the speciality of English pluralism, see Bradley 1990. 36. 
5 	 For the seventeenth century, see Bennett 1975, 3, Ashcraft 1995, 75, and Hill 1995, 58. 
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potential effect on public policy. `Religion', as we understand it, belongs to the 
private sphere of each individual with which the state has nothing to do. In the 
early eighteenth century, however, `religion' was far from a private matter; it 
was necessarily a public matter of first importance, as a fundamental unity 
between Church and state was generally held and the public significance of 
religion widely maintained. For early eighteenth-century English thinkers, 
`religion' concerned matters such as public morals and ideology which today 
we would readily define as political discourse. Therefore, the wide twentieth-
century conception of politics, when applied to the early eighteenth century, 
must also include religious issues.6 As an example of this interplay between 
religion and politics is the suggestion that political parties and religious sects 
were for long intimately linked.' Political pluralism was connected with 
ecclesiastical pluralism, and the conceptual aspects of this linkage are of 
particular interest to this study. 
Furthermore, in the study of early modern political thought, religion must be 
understood as a much wider phenomenon than simply theology or religious 
beliefs which may have been ambiguously defined and indifferently followed 
and may indeed have had little direct impact on politics. At the same time, 
religious conventions and customs had a considerable influence on political 
behaviour and thought.' In early modern England, religion was an identity 
comparable to gender or socio-economic status, and such a religious identity 
was not necessarily based on either theological knowledge or active piety .9 It is 
the significance of religious conventions to the debate of political pluralism that 
must be placed in focus and not the potential political meaning of abstract 
theological tenets. Religion should be seen as an umbrella concept. Even if its 
political dimensions may have been secondary to its main purposes, several of 
its aspects necessarily had connections with political life, as spiritual beliefs had 
a fundamental impact on people's conceptions of the purpose of life and their 
understandings of their real interests.10 In those circumstances, it was natural to 
practise political theology, that is, to use religious symbols to justify or to 
criticise political events and systems. The discourse on political pluralism was 
frequently based on such political theology. 
In early modern England, political discourse was not the dominant area of 
6 	 Phiddian 1989, 66-7. 
7 	 Mansfield 1965, 10, took up the suggestion that the toleration of political opposition was the 
secular product of religious toleration. This suggestion goes so far as to claim that political 
parties were secularised sects. Religious parties became parties in party government when 
the idea of toleration was extended from religious to political freedom. Mansfield did not 
carry this suggestion much further, and it has received little attention in subsequent research. 
Recent revisions in the study of the intellectual history of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, however, give reason to reconsider the mutual dependence of the 
spheres of politics and religion in this respect. The linkage between sect and party is also 
visible in Sommerville's point that Protestant Dissenters were pioneers in the primary 
secular form of power, that is, in political party organisation. Secular parties were to copy the 
techniques developed by early eighteenth-century Quaker and dissenting religious 
organisations. Sommerville 1992, 124. 
8 	 Bradley 1990, 4. 
9 	 Albers 1993, 319-20. 
10 Hole 1989, 3. 
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discourse but, instead, was dominated by more powerful areas of discourse. The 
powerful areas of discourse include, in addition to the religious discourse of 
Anglican" Protestantism, martial language, the legal discourse of common law, 
and, to some extent, even the discourse of traditional medicine. An entirely 
independent terminology of politics hardly existed. Whenever terminology was 
needed to discuss what we would call politics, religious, legal and medical 
vocabularies were there to provide useful analogies and concepts already 
familiar to large audiences. 
By the early eighteenth century, the language of politics was being 
increasingly influenced also by secular, or at least heterodox, elements of 
discourses such as those of classical republicanism and Lockean Whiggism. 
The growth of classical republicanism and secular, progressive and potentially 
modernising discourses has received much scholarly attention in Anglo-
American research, particularly among the prevalent Anglophone history of 
discourses, languages or ideologies. The two dominant interpretations of 
eighteenth-century political thought in English-speaking countries have been 
that of `liberalism' and that of `English republican, classical republican, 
republican, or civic humanism'. The former has focused on Lockean concepts 
such as rights, consent, liberty, equality and reason. By the 1990s, however, this 
Lockean natural rights paradigm has been almost totally replaced by the neo-
Machiavellian civic humanism as the most conventional means of 
interpretation. The latter, advocated by John Pocock and Quentin Skinner 
among others, has considered concepts of the classical tradition, which were 
revived at the Italian Renaissance and applied by the opposition to Walpole in 
its criticism of those in power, as worth particular attention. These concepts 
include virtue, corruption, patriotism, empire, arms and property, and they are 
seen to have formed a dominant meta-discourse of politics. Classical 
republicanism was particularly concerned with civic virtues of individuals and 
their active participation in the government of their communities. It viewed 
with suspicion trade and vindicated agrarian values, cared for political morality 
and criticised corruption, and emphasised the importance of the ancient 
constitution. Standing armies, luxury, placemen, electoral bribery and long 
Parliaments were its main objects of criticism.12 
The influence of this tradition of civic humanism on ideas of pluralism, 
however, was inconsistent. Whereas, in principle, ideas of equality and 
openness within a republic would seem to have justified diversity, a typical fear 
of privatism as a threat to the commonwealth contributed to calls for 
uniformity. Though classical republicanism underscored the need of men 'to 
come together in a union of an honourable and mutually beneficial kind if they 
are to succeed in realising their highest potentialities',13 its advocates generally 
rejected parties. Hence classical republicanism did not offer a discourse 
11 	 It should be noted that Anglican is an anachronism but a widely used one with reference to 
the history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pocock 1995, 36. 
12 Colley 1982, 90; Hamowy 1990, 273; Greene 1994, 28; Klein 1994, 145, 150; Kramnick 
1994. 56; Matthews 1994, 14; Miller 1994, 102; Skinner 1998, ix. 
13 Skinner 1996, 2, paraphrasing Cicero. 
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unambiguously supporting political diversity. Neither did pluralism form a 
dominant theme within the tradition of civic humanism in the early eighteenth 
century. 
Both the discourse of natural rights and that of classical republicanism were 
undoubtedly present in early eighteenth-century England. However, this study 
does not aim at examining the already much studied concepts of `liberalism' or 
`republicanism' which rarely appeared in the discourse on political pluralism. 
The concepts of classical republicanism were not the only dominant concepts in 
contemporary political discourse. Isaac Kramnick, for instance, has referred to 
the continuous importance of the discourse of `political' Protestantism." The 
dominant traditions of historical interpretation have not, until very recently, 
seen this underlying religious discourse as one deserving critical analysis in the 
study of the history of political thought. Recent studies suggest, however, that 
religious concepts were of the utmost importance to the early modern political 
discourse. This study focuses on the use of religious concepts in the discourse 
on political pluralism while it also takes the secular aspects of that discourse 
into consideration. 
Even though the achievements of the history of discourses, languages or 
ideologies are considerable, they should not prevent an historian from asking 
slightly different questions, from applying alternative methods and from 
consulting more varied sources. This possibility for an alternative approach 
becomes particularly worthwhile when it is taken into consideration that the 
republican paradigm, despite the best of the historians' intentions, may have 
involved a tendency to overemphasise the role of canonical authors. An 
emphasis on the rising secular discourses may also have led to linguistic 
continuities and transformations within what may be considered more 
traditionalist discourses being ignored simply because such continuities and 
transformations appear as essentially non-progressive, non-secular and non-
modernising.15 
While excellent research has been devoted to the secular character of late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth-century political discourse, the influences of 
traditional religious discourse, for instance, have thus far received only 
marginal attention. Instead of focusing on the well researched secular areas of 
political discourse, this study addresses the rather more traditionalist religious 
influences in political discourse. Though potentially less significant for later 
developments in political thought, religious terminology as applied in political 
discourse may reveal essential features about patterns of thought that were 
important to early eighteenth-century English thinkers themselves, including 
collectively shared assumptions about the character of the political system. 
14 Kramnick 1994, 59. 
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Pocock himself has recently pointed out that historians all too easily consider the orthodoxy 
of any given moment as essentially static and look for changes only from heterodox thought 
opposing it. Orthodoxy or traditionalism as such is not usually conceived as worth studying, 
whereas its destruction is. In his recent writings, Pocock has argued in favour of studying the 
history of orthodoxy as well. Pocock 1995, 35; In previous research, traditionalist thinkers 
such as Robert Filmer have, of course, been taken into consideration. 
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Indeed, everyday applications of religious terms in political discourse, which 
was so characteristic particularly in the first two decades of the eighteenth 
century, may tell more about the then prevalent assumptions about the political 
system among Englishmen at large than do secular contemplations of abstract 
philosophers that later generations have come to consider as particularly 
significant figures. 
This study hopes to contribute to current debates within the history of 
political thought by providing an alternative approach. This approach builds, to 
a great extent, on the results of previous work within this school but asks 
different questions, employs a greater variety of sources, and applies an 
overlooked methodology, which might lead to new findings. In this study, the 
method of the history of concepts — a methodological approach developed by 
continental researchers of conceptual change — has been applied to English 
source material which have conventionally been studied through other 
methods. This present study, rather than representing an attempt to repeat the 
methodological approaches followed in the history of political thought, 
represents a modified version of the history of concepts. 
In the history of concepts, the results of the work always remain somewhat 
preliminary, as by increasing the amount of sources and limiting the number of 
concepts the analysis could be extended into more and more detail. As John 
Pocock has pointed out, modes of discourse may change and fragment, and a 
historian can never argue that he has reconstructed a complete picture of them 
in any given period.16 In this study, the concepts analysed have been limited to 
ones which appear to have been closely connected with the major theme: the 
early eighteenth-century discourse on political pluralism. Yet it has been 
considered necessary to study several politico-religious concepts instead of 
merely concentrating on some few, as changes in the meanings of a concept are 
likely to have caused changes in the meanings of other concepts. In the case of 
most of the concepts analysed below, source material has been so wide that it 
has started to `repeat' itself. In other words, the introduction of new sources has 
not brought about differing senses of the concept. 
The history of concepts is inherently contextual, although the relationship 
between structural and conceptual changes can be difficult to prove. Also the 
variety of source material serves to diminish possibilities for detailed 
contextualisation. In order not to suggest simplistic connections between 
political and religious change and changes in the meanings of political and 
religious concepts, a separate chapter has been dedicated to summarising the 
major features of early eighteenth-century contexts; whereas conceptual 
developments are discussed in detail in the body of the study. Should the reader 
be unfamiliar with the major features of early eighteenth-century English 
history, it is advisable to consult chapter four before proceeding to chapters two 
and three (which discuss the state of research, methodology and sources). An 
informed reader, however, may well skip the first half of chapter four. 
16 Pocock 1988, 161. 
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Political and conceptual change often have different paces, and the time 
limits of a conceptual study cannot be decided strictly on the basis of 
momentous historical events. The timing of this study between 1700 and 1750 
is a fluid one and could, with good reason, be extended to both directions. 
Therefore, texts written in the 1690s and dictionaries first published after 1750 
have also been consulted for this study. However, fifty years can be considered 
an optimal length for a conceptual study, as it is long enough to reveal 
noteworthy linguistic change but is not excessively long to prevent proper 
contextualisation of the source texts. In the course of the study, the 1720s 
appeared as a period of accelerating change in the concepts of political 
pluralism, and, therefore, it was considered necessary to study both the 
preceding and following decades. As will be shown in the discussion on the 
state of research in chapter two, the beginning of the eighteenth century has 
often been considered a turning point in the secularisation of the language of 
politics. The late seventeenth-century language of politics has been discussed in 
recent scholarship, whereas less work has been done on the early eighteenth-
century political discourse. The early eighteenth century was, however, the time 
of a considerable intensification in party division and discourse on political 
pluralism. 1750 as another time limit may also appear as arbitrary. Yet it finds 
justification not only in the need of limiting the scope of the study but also in the 
fact that late eighteenth-century English society already differed considerably 
from that of the early century. The fall of Walpole's government (1742) 
brought about no sudden conceptual changes, and some of earlier language was 
revived in connection with the crisis of the mid-1740s, but the concepts of 
political pluralism had already experienced some noteworthy changes by the 
end of the 1740s. The question of the time limits will be recalled in chapter three 
when the thesis of a conceptual transition to modernity is discussed. 
In the history of concepts, quotations of primary sources are essential to 
clarify the exact formulations of contemporaries when applying given concepts 
in their texts. The content of a past statement can usually be expressed through 
paraphrasing, but this involves the risk of slight nuances of meaning being lost. 
Quotations have been used in abundance because some key points in primary 
sources may be difficult to explain exhaustively without giving the complete 
citation for the reader's consideration. When quotations are used in this study, 
their initial capitalisation and spelling have been modernised in a way that is 
unlikely to have caused any shifts in meaning. The changes that modernisation 
requires are modest, as the standardisation of English had proceeded far by the 
turn of the eighteenth century. Punctuation has been reproduced unchanged, 
whereas the numerous italics that were fashionable in early eighteenth-century 
texts have been omitted. Short titles for primary works have been used, as early 
eighteenth-century titles tend to be particularly long, often summarising the 
major points of the work itself. The place of publication for each title is London 
unless otherwise indicated. 
Before discussing the differences of the methodological approach and source 
basis in more detail, and in order to show that this study attempts to contribute 
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to actual research questions within Anglophone historiography, it is necessary 
to place this study in the context of the current debate on the role of religion in 
early eighteenth-century political culture. By combining this relatively novel 
approach to eighteenth-century history and some features of a methodology not 
yet applied to early eighteenth-century source material, the following 
discussion wishes to bring new light to questions addressed by several English-
speaking historians within the last decade or two. 
18 N INTRODUCTION 
Religion in Early 
Eighteenth-Century English 
Political Culture: State of 
Research 
A country of privatised religiosity or the second Israel? 
The late twentieth-century world provides examples of societies in which a 
strong union between religious and political institutions is strengthened by the 
denial of religious alternatives. This continual interconnection between religion 
and politics in some contemporary states should facilitate a realisation of the 
potential importance of religion to early modern political culture; political 
culture understood as referring to the sphere of political values and ideologies, 
the forms of their expression, and the mechanisms of their communication and 
transformation) The linkage between spiritual and temporal power may also 
have survived in western European societies for much longer than many 
twentieth-century historians have been ready to recognise. 
Historians are spokesmen of their own time and wish to discover the roots of 
the modern world in the past. Late twentieth-century historians consider — and 
with good reason — contemporary western societies highly secularised and 
regard religion as a marginal personal matter with little connection to dominant 
areas of public life such as politics or economics. When they wish to determine, for 
instance, which factors explain the uniquely progressive character of eighteenth-
century English society when compared with her continental counterparts, they 
not infrequently focus on radical change and apply twentieth-century categories 
in interpretation. Among these categories, religion has no, or has, at best, only a 
very limited role. 
The history of Anglo-American research into late seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth-century political thought forms no exception to the tendency to 
teleological interpretations of the past. Wishing to underscore the relevance of 
the writers of that period to subsequent developments, above all to Britain's 
rise to greatness and the American Revolution, Anglophone historians have 
often focused on thinkers who seem to have brought radical novelties to 
political discourse. Attempting to make past political thought more accessible 
to twentieth-century readers, historians have applied twentieth-century 
conceptions of politics, characterised by the secular nature of political activity 
and thought, to the history of political thought. The problems that arise from 
such an approach include an excessive emphasis on change at the cost of 
1 	 For a useful definition of political culture, see Wilson 1995, 12. 
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continuity of much of political culture, and the tendency of twentieth-century 
secular conceptions of politics to distort our picture of a period when 
conceptions of politics as independent of religion may not have existed. 
However, distortions of eighteenth-century history caused by twentieth-
century interpretative categories have become increasingly rare in Anglophone 
historiography as, since the mid-1980s, the prominence of the religious context 
for much of early modern political thought has achieved growing attention 
among historians. A new type of revisionist historian wants to appreciate the 
fundamentally different character of early modern societies and has expressed 
the need of historians to endeavour to understand the past on its own terms 
without anachronistically imposing conceptions that only developed later. A 
wider, and, some would argue, ideologically motivated division in Anglo-
American historiography can be detected here: Whiggish, Marxist and liberal 
schools, with emphasis on progress, change and revolution, have been 
challenged by a new generation of revisionists, who consider continuities and 
the evolutionary character of transformations equally valuable objects of 
research. 
What follows is a review of the current historiographical debate on the 
relationship between religion and politics in late seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth-century England. The purpose of this review is to offer suggestions 
on how scholarship could proceed to find fresh approaches to the political 
culture of a society that certainly was, in a number of ways, a forerunner to 
modernity. The review will begin by summarising works that defend the thesis 
of a secularisation of English politics and the privatisation of religion by the 
dawn of the eighteenth century. The discussion then proceeds by reviewing 
works that challenge simplifying secularisation theses and, instead, suggest that 
no decisive decline in the importance of religion in political life occurred in the 
course of the eighteenth century. Finally, the review will discuss such recent 
interpretations of the character of politics and political thought in which 
religion has been allowed its due status in a gradually modernising society that 
willingly considered herself an elect nation, the second Israel. These studies 
date the start of decline in the impact of religion on English politics differently: 
According to some, it declined rapidly after the ascendancy of a new German 
dynasty to the English throne in 1714. Others regard the 1730s as a decisive 
point. Some consider the impact of religion on politics having continued well 
into the nineteenth century. In this study, the continuous significance of religion 
to English political culture all through the early eighteenth century is asserted, 
yet its gradual decline taken into consideration. 
Vindications of the secularisation thesis 
The secularisation thesis, based on an assumption that the significance of 
religion in society decreases as a consequence of modernisation, has been a 
major object of research for sociologists. Such a theoretical framework with 
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reference to a universal, linear and unavoidable decline of religion has been 
criticised by some historians who have pointed to continuous religiosity in 
western societies. The supporters of the thesis have answered by distinguishing 
between two secularisation developments. They have argued that a decline in 
the political and social role of religion does not necessarily entail the 
disappearence of private religiosity.' It is the diminishing public role of religion 
in which researchers of secularisation are mainly interested, and not so much 
the personal beliefs of past individuals. This division is followed also in this 
study: the emphasis is on the continuity and gradual decline of the public role of 
religion in political discourse, not on the religiosity of individuals. 
The thesis of extensive secularisation in most areas of life and thought in 
early modern England has been strongly defended by C. John Sommerville in 
his study on what he has called 'the change from a religious culture to religious 
faith'. For Sommerville, secularisation was a revolution within religion itself 
and a fundamental transformation in the character and position of religion in 
society during which several areas of life and thought were separated from 
religious values. According to Sommerville, in an entirely religious culture, a 
number of activities do not need to be translated into religious concepts because 
they already belong to the sphere of religion. Importantly, he warns us not to 
take some areas of life in traditional societies as inherently secular. However, in 
an entirely secular culture, it makes little sense to link various autonomous areas 
of life to spiritual concerns.' Sommerville's definitions suggest that, in a 
traditional political culture, religious concepts might be used to describe 
politics because politics was considered to belong to the sphere of religion, 
whereas, in a secularised culture, political theology would have appeared as 
dubious. 
Sommerville has insisted that the secularisation of English society was 
complete by the end of the seventeenth century. The major arguments on which 
such a claim rests are the appearance of objective explanations of what was 
really behind religion, spreading indifference towards religion, and the rise of 
critical questions about Christianity and even religion in general. Interestingly 
Sommerville suggested that transformations in conceptions of religion were 
reflected in conceptual shifts. The only true `Christian faith' became first 
replaced by the term `religion', though in dictionaries the terms `true', Christian 
and religious were continuously represented as synonymous expressions. In the 
next phase, Englishmen started to speak about `religions' in plural, and finally 
they began to refer to their own religion as 'Christianity'.4 While the 
terminology of religion was transformed, vocabulary for expressing religious 
2 	 Wallis and Bruce 1992, 8-9, 11, 21; Sommerville 1988, 76; For criticism of social scientific 
theories on the secularisation of politics after the Reformation, see Clark 1994, 223, 225. 
3 	 Sommerville 1992, 3, 9, 11; See also Sommerville 1988, 77, 79-80. 
4 	 Sommerville 1992, 12, 16, 53; Harrison, in turn, has pointed out that the modem concepts of 
religion and the religions emerged in the English language at a relatively late stage, starting 
from the early seventeenth century. Still in the late Middle Ages, the term religion had 
referred to a monastic order. In the course of the seventeenth century, attention changed from 
faith to religion, and the term religion came to refer to the external aspects of religious life. 
Harrison 1990, 1, 11, 39. 
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doubts started to emerge. On the basis of the Oxford English Dictionary, 
Sommerville has referred to the `first' appearances of the terms libertine (1563), 
atheism (1587), sceptic (1587), atheistical (1603), deist (1612), sceptical 
(1639), scepticism (1646) and deism (1682). Without having carried out basic 
conceptual research on early eighteenth-century sources, he has claimed that, 
by 1700, religious discourse had already become dependent on vocabulary 
borrowed from other areas of discourse. The year 1700, the final point of his 
own study, thus appears as a decisive watershed between dominantly Christian 
and secular political culture. Religious writing after 1700 was, according to this 
secularisation thesis, a product of personal faith and not of a universal religious 
culture.' 
Nor has Sommerville been alone in arguing in favour of a profound linguistic 
transformation in the relationship between religion and politics by 1700 yet 
failing to provide adequate conceptual evidence for the claim. In a parallel 
manner, Kevin Sharpe and Steven N. Zwicker have maintained that one of the 
most consequential shifts in the language of politics in the seventeenth century 
had been the gradual recognition of politics as a distinct sphere independent of 
ethics and religion. This transformation, they have suggested, was reflected in 
linguistic usage by the early eighteenth century.' However, their study on this 
issue has not been conclusive, as it has been based on seventeenth-century 
literary sources, whereas a conceptual study of early eighteenth-century 
political literature is also needed. 
As to implications for political culture, Sommerville's interpretation of 
secularisation would mean that religion had lost its dominant position over 
politics and had instead become a contested political issue. He has seen the 
Restoration of 1660 as a triumph of popular sovereignty in religious questions, 
emphasised the extension of religious toleration after the Revolution of 1688, 
and interpreted the dominant Whig party as essentially secular. Any early 
eighteenth-century attempt to restore religious culture he has seen as the futile 
designs of secular politicians. Even if much of politics still concerned religious 
matters, secular politicians were already making decisions concerning religion 
and agreed in attempts to keep the truly religious out of power. For Sommer-
ville, this secularisation of political structures appears as a conscious choice 
within society. The state was its primary force and preceded the change in 
prevailing attitudes when, in spite of requests for religious uniformity, its 
legislation allowed religious diversity. It abandoned the traditionalist idea of an 
essential connection between the health of an organic society and religious 
uniformity, concluding that religious faith was no more a matter of political 
order but rather of private choice. Diversity was expected to exist in a secular 
5 	 Sommerville 1992, 44, 53-4; Sommerville 1988, 77, 85-6. 
6 	 Sharpe and Zwicker 1987, 5; According to these historians of literature, before the Civil War, 
politics had referred strictly to the Aristotelian-Christian tradition, whereas after the Civil 
War, political manoeuvrings and programmes had become an actuality in everyday life; 
Another advocate of an increasing secularisation in early eighteenth-century English politics 
has been Jacob 1981, 6; A further assertion that the Bible lost its position as an authoritative 
political guide by the end of the seventeenth century can be found from Christopher Hill. Hill 
1995, 63, 65. 
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state. Sommerville has further suggested, that some politicians may even have 
wished that extended religious liberty in an `enlightened' society would 
contribute to greater agreement in political opinion.' 
A parallel interpretation of secularisation in politics has been provided by 
David Zaret. Zaret has suggested that the mid-seventeenth-century sectarian 
attempts to apply Protestant tenets to politics had given rise to instability which 
the political elite attempted to counter by changing conceptions about the 
relationship between religion and politics. Individual utility, instead of religion, 
was made a major motivation in politics. This project was based on natural 
religion and on what Zaret calls a liberal-democratic ideology'. Appeals to 
reason also entered religious discourse. For 'the liberal-democratic ideologues', 
natural religion provided a means to legitimate tolerance as a precondition for a 
pluralist search for utility. As natural religion gave no support to claims that 
some form of religion or government was divinely sanctioned, the separation of 
religion from politics became possible and religion might even be presented as 
irrelevant to politics.' 
Yet the separation between religion and politics was more complex than that. 
Zaret has also argued that, in the seventeenth century, religious discourse was 
probably the primary way of defining and debating issues in the political public 
sphere. The popular character of Protestantism provided a model and 
justification for the emergence of a parallel public sphere in politics. However, 
religious ideas on spiritual equality were not simply transformed into 
democratic models of politics, as politics may also have given a pattern for 
democratic ideas in religion. Zaret's interpretation probably goes too far when 
it suggests that, before long, appeals to reason and utility made divinity 
completely irrelevant to political discourse. His claim that the model for 
rational discourse in religion and politics was derived from empirical science 
may also be an oversimplification .9 
There is no reason to question the existence of a long-term process of 
secularisation. However, the major problem connected with these various 
versions of the secularisation model of seventeenth-century history is that they 
easily lead to an excessive emphasis on non-religious aspects of thought, 
particularly as far as the eighteenth century is concerned. Change in the history 
of early modern thought is likely to have been much more complex and gradual 
than the secularisation model, based on twentieth-century perspectives, 
suggests.10 
7 	 Sommerville 1992, 15, 111, 121-7, 137. The opposite assumption of the linkage between 
religious and political party strife appears in most early eighteenth-century discussions 
concerning religious toleration. Furthermore, it is anachronistic of Sommerville to talk about 
genuine tolerance in the sense of indifference of religious belief in this context. It is also 
questionable to claim that clergymen had no more say in political discourse. Indeed, 
clergymen dominated at least the discourse on political pluralism long into the eighteenth 
century. It would be a grave mistake to ignore that discourse as merely theological. 
8 	 Zaret 1989, 165, 172-6. 
9 	 Zaret 1992, 213, 220-1, 224-7. 
10 	 For parallel views, see Force 1981, 221-3. 
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Revisionist interpretations 
In recent research, the ideological indispensability of religion, and Anglicanism 
in particular, for the eighteenth-century English political system has been most 
vigorously advocated by Jonathan Clark. According to Clark, the established 
Church was not merely abused for political purposes but rather provided the 
basic framework of loyalty within which the activities of the state were 
understood. The sphere of politics remained far from separate from the sphere 
of religion. Clark has also pointed to a connection between heterodoxy and 
radical political thought, arguing that the intellectual foundation for criticism of 
the established political system was theological, the critics of the state building 
their arguments on religious heterodoxy. It was only the extension of religious 
freedom in the late 1820s that, according to Clark, enabled the emergence of a 
new political discourse in England." 
Clark's study on eighteenth-century English social and political thought 
(1985) initiated an intense debate on the basic character of eighteenth-century 
English society. Every writer on the Hanoverian period has ever since been 
compelled to take a stand in relation to Clark's revisionist programme. Out of 
numerous reactions to Clark's thesis of England's ancien regime as a 
`confessional state' can be mentioned that of Joanna Innes, who has been 
irritated by Clark's criticism of explaining intellectual transformations on the 
basis of economic changes. In Clark's work, ideological and above all religious 
disagreements form major forces explaining political conflicts. In Innes's view, 
historians have increasingly depicted eighteenth-century England as a society 
where traditional and modern elements were mixed. The question is, which 
elements the historian allows to dominate the interpretation. Innes has 
welcomed the revival of interest towards the importance of religion in political 
ideology but has rejected Clark's views on a universally traditionalist English 
society where progressive socio-economic developments or Britain's rise to 
great-power status had little effect on contemporary thought. She has also 
questioned a causal relationship between religious heterodoxy and political 
radicalism, the limited extent of religious toleration, and Clark's suggestion that 
English society did not differ considerably from eighteenth-century continental 
societies.12 
In his replies, Clark has continued to applaud what he sees as the destruction 
of the assumption that `traditional' society rapidly withered away 'just after the 
last chapter' of books written by historians.13 He has stayed firm in his 
determination that twentieth-century historical writing has overestimated the 
modern features of the eighteenth century while failing to consider its 
traditional elements. A more authentic picture of change can be constructed by 
including what he has called the hegemonic status of Anglicanism — not 
monopoly as the established Church was challenged by religious alternatives — 
11 Clark 1985, 87, 277-8, 281-2, 318-19, 348. 
12 Innes 1987. passim. 
13 Clark 1989, 458. 
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into the history of political theory. According to Clark, studies in economic 
history, which have demonstrated that structural change in eighteenth-century 
England was gradual and evolutionary rather than revolutionary, support his 
hypotheses of political discourse and theology as inseparable and of the 
survival of the ideal of a unitary state until well into the 1830s.14 
Clark's own recent work on Anglo-American political discourse in the long 
eighteenth century contains further arguments against a simplified thesis of 
secularisation of politics. Some of Clark's major hypotheses will be taken into 
serious consideration also in this study. He has argued that (i) growing 
denominational diversity was a characteristic feature of Anglo-American 
Protestantism ever since the Reformation; (ii) religion retained its status as a 
primary concern for those eighteenth-century Englishmen that were involved in 
political discourse; and (iii) pluralism in eighteenth-century Anglophone 
political discourse was closely linked to sectarian diversity. When listing 
sources for commonly used idioms of eighteenth-century Anglophone political 
discourse, Clark has mentioned the everyday phenomena of trade and war yet 
emphasises the dominant, though by no means uncontested, position of law and 
religion. According to Clark, there were few concrete alternatives in political 
discourse for the dominant discourse of Anglicanism which had played a 
central role in the formation of the English state. Whereas the languages of 
commerce, ancient constitution and natural rights were used, in varying ways, 
by most participants in political discourse, real differences in political discourse 
can be found in denominational religious discourse. Religion continued to 
provide definitions and symbols for group identity among people whose 
religious awareness was high. Denominational polities created the limits of and 
potential for political mobilisation, theological developments often gave force 
to such mobilisation, and everyday problems such as religious discrimination 
further increased its intensity.15 
Clark's hypothesis of the influence of religious language on political 
discourse finds some support in Conal Condren's recent work on the 
seventeenth-century language of politics, particularly in his discussion on the 
semantic field of politics. According to Condren, the seventeenth-century 
English were generally aware of differing spheres of politics, law and religion, 
and some of them were concerned about metaphorical transference between the 
different spheres and the instability that involved. The reason for the concern 
was that, in such transference, politics was most likely to lose its independent 
identity to either law or religion. The vocabulary of politics developed through 
14 	 Clark 1987, 201, 207; Clark 1989, 450-2, 458, 461-2. 
15 	 Clark 1994, 4, I1, 22, 35-6, 41, 141-2, 190, 224. Clark's hypothesis on the connection 
between pluralism in political discourse and sectarianism is problematic in a sense that, for 
centuries, Protestantism had also worked as a uniting and not simply a separating force in the 
English political culture. As to the centrality of Anglicanism in English political culture, it 
should be born in mind that the sixteenth-century break with Rome and the formation of the 
Church of England had been led, to a great extent, by the reigning monarch and his/her 
ministers. Pocock sees religion and law as the leading modes of political discourse among 
the ruling elite of the mid-seventeenth century, whereas Clark wishes to extend this to 
concern the eighteenth century as well. See Pocock 1988, 161. 
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constant manipulation, the political remaining ambiguously defined, as 
political activity could always be expressed in terms that twentieth-century 
historians may not comprehend as political. This ambiguity of the seventeenth-
century sphere of the political was caused by the lack of independent and 
standardised political terminology, by the traditionally imprecise character of 
political concepts, and by constant metaphorical loans from close and often 
stronger areas of discourse. The most authoritative of these areas of discourse 
were religion, law and, to a much lesser extent, science. Lawyers dominated the 
Parliament, priests preached and wrote much of the texts discussing politics, 
and, one might add, physicians applied medical metaphors in their numerous 
political treatises. It was natural to all these professional groups to interpret 
politics in their professional terminology. 
The legal and theological interpretations of politics had been major rivals in 
seventeenth-century internal conflicts. Even after the Civil War, public 
discourse continued to be dominated by religious issues such as toleration. 
Religious terminology continued to be applied in political discourse, as religion 
was universally associated with the rules that held society together. By pointing 
to a library catalogue from the 1690s that lists texts which we would easily 
define as `political' under the self-marks for `theology' and 'law' instead of 
`politics', Condren has drawn the significant conclusion that the political had 
remained unstable and dependent on other areas of discourse, lacking 
standardised vocabulary that would have distinguished it from other areas of 
discourse, till the end of the seventeenth century.16 
This dependence of the political discourse on other discourses may have 
continued well into the eighteenth century. The political was not essential for 
understanding public activities, as these could be understood through other 
discourses. The implication is that, in order to understand the political, one 
should study `political' discourse which employed legal, religious and even 
medical vocabularies as well. Much has already been said in previous research 
about the part played by law in English political thought. Yet early eighteenth-
century lawyers seem to have had only a limited interest in questions of 
pluralism. Compared to the attention that the law of nature and ancient 
constitution have enjoyed in historiography, political discourse through 
religious terminology has been neglected. 
Rise of a new history of religion 
After Clark's interpretation of eighteenth-century England as a confessional 
state, British scholars seem to have become increasingly aware of the extent to 
which religious sentiments continued to affect political identities of the period. 
Out of several writers on the subject can be mentioned Justin Champion, Tony 
16 With semantic fields of politics, Condren refers to relatively cohesive and interdependent 
groups of terms within the hypothetical totality of political vocabulary; Condren 1994, x, 1, 
4-7, 32-3, 39, 47-8, 71; Compare with Clark 1994, 11; See also Nenner 1993, 191. 
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Claydon, Linda Colley, John Walsh, Stephen Taylor and David Hempton. Their 
scholarship is highly relevant also from the point of view of the discourse on 
political pluralism. 
Champion has emphasised the significance of religious disputes for late 
seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century political culture. He has declared 
religion 'a culturally dominant language, a co-ordinating matrix in which ideas 
about social reality were conceived and debated' and criticised the 
interpretation of the period as an age of a transition from faith to reason, of 
secularisation and the start of modernity. Deviating from previous research, 
Champion has argued that excessive emphasis on classical republicanism and 
the secular political has obscured the fact that it was often religious reform for 
which the radical thinkers of the period campaigned. Religion and politics were 
continuously conceived as branches of the same discourse, and crises at least up 
to the 172Os can be interpreted as religious, the relationship of Church and state 
being at stake. Champion has suggested that no conceptual separation between 
religious and political matters were drawn;" yet his study does not supply a 
detailed examination of the conceptual interdependence of the spheres of 
religion and politics. 
Claydon, who has studied the political languages of the 169Os, has also 
questioned interpretations of the period as a time of rapid secularisation of 
political discourse and has regretted concentration on secular concerns such as 
constitutional, economic and social questions at the cost of religious languages, 
which were far from declining. The principal language of the royal court, for 
instance, remained that of 'a deeply Christian ideology, which rested upon a set 
of Protestant and biblical idioms first developed during the Reformation'. Even 
though constitutional issues concerning succession to the throne were debated 
at times of crisis, confessional issues such as the status of the Dissenters were 
more decisive in creating division between political parties and motivating their 
nationwide support. Whatever infrastructural changes society experienced, it 
remained dedicated to religion. Even if there was less apocalyptic rhetoric in 
political language and even if discourses such as classical republicanism 
challenged the early Protestant interpretation of history, the traditional 
ideological thought patterns did not disappear. The political elite of late Stuart 
England continued to make use of early Protestant concepts in their discourse.'8 
Claydon's study implicitly suggests that the early Protestant worldview 
continued to influence English political discourse also after the 169Os, as there 
were no signs of its immediate disappearance at the turn of the century. 
Colley has argued that Protestant religion played a central role in the 
formation of a British understanding of politics in the eighteenth century. Much 
of political thought was based on commonly shared beliefs such as the one 
considering England the second Israel, which made thinkers turn to the easily 
accessible popular religious literature for answers to acute political questions 
and apply biblical language in descriptions of political events. This Protestant 
17 Champion 1992, 3-6, 13, 15-16, 18-19, 170-2. 
18 Claydon 1996, 1, 3-4, 15, 42-4, 229-31. 
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worldview was so dominant in that it influenced British thought no matter how 
little individuals were devoted to Christianity '9 and it unquestionably shaped 
experiences of domestic politics as well. The high number of religious 
publications illustrates how England continued to be a religious nation. It is 
noteworthy, however, that religion no longer gave rise to open violence like it 
had done in the seventeenth century. Disagreements were stridently expressed 
in print, and attitudes towards religious dissent were also moving in a more 
positive direction.2° 
Among recent interpretations of the relationship between religion, politics 
and pluralism must also be mentioned that of Walsh and Taylor. They have 
argued that the change in the Church-state relations brought about by the 
allowance of limited religious pluralism in the Toleration Act (1689) remained 
a traumatic experience for a considerable number of Englishmen. Many still 
longed for an authoritarian government in both Church and state that would 
restore the lost religious uniformity and unitary state. Those recognising the 
growth of religious pluralism often did so reluctantly. Many were unable to 
regard religion and politics as independent spheres, as the Church continued to 
be linked with those political interests with which people identified. As popular 
Anglicanism was not particularly theological but rather constituted a general 
worldview shared by almost every Englishman, the Church remained an 
important metaphor for political allegiances. Walsh and Taylor have seen the 
1730s as the period when this symbiotic relationship between religious and 
political issues started to wither away as party rivalry calmed down both in 
Church and state.2 ' 
A useful summary of the role of religion in eighteenth-century English 
political culture has also been provided by Hempton, according to whom, the 
Anglican Church continued to be an inseparable part of the eighteenth-century 
political system. The English almost universally considered the well-being of 
Church and state interdependent. Attacks against this basic assumption 
remained unrepresentative minority opinions and hardly led to any immediate 
reconsiderations of the shared truths among the majority of Anglicans. Indeed, 
they may have strengthened orthodox traditions. It should also be noticed that 
anticlericalism, or criticism against shortcomings among the clergy, was by no 
means identical with criticism of the Church herself. Among the strengths of the 
established Church in the sphere of politics Hempton lists a powerful 
providentialism based on English history and the role of the Church as the 
major mediator of the traditions of the nation. The Church was the institution 
for cultural and communal identification, offering continuity with the past and 
influencing the common usage of language. To put it briefly, the Church 
appeared as the sole institution that could supply a religious foundation to what 
the English generally — and also a growing number of continental Anglophiles — 
considered the best constitution in the world.2'- 
19 Colley 1992, 19-21, 26-7, 31-2, 34-5. 
20 Colley 1982, 12-13, 112, 116. 
21 Walsh and Taylor 1993, 16-17, 21-2, 27, 29, 34, 46, 54, 61. 
22 Hempton 1996, 2-4, 12-14, 17-18. 
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Modified defences of secular politics 
Clarkean revisionism and new religious history have found some defenders in 
research literature, but these alternative approaches have only gradually entered 
textbooks of the long eighteenth century written by historians such as Geoffrey 
Holmes, Paul Langford, H.T. Dickinson. In studies of the history of political 
thought, secular interpretations of early eighteenth-century politics have 
continued to appear, though with some modifications. 
Holmes has argued that, in the period 1690-1720, which was otherwise 
characterised by innovation and change, politics and religion were both marked 
not so much by novelties but by continuity. Religion remained a major concern 
for the contemporaries. The unusually high publication rates of religious texts, 
for instance, can be considered an indicator of a continuous significance of 
religious ideals and phobias. An intensification of High-Church preaching in 
this period was a reaction to the threats posed to a traditionalist political theory 
and an entire religiously motivated concept of state by the alteration of the line 
of royal succession by parliamentary decisions. The inherited ideals of a close 
alliance between the Church and state were revived, and the period experienced 
'the climax and final subsidence' of a religious conflict that had continuously 
influenced English politics ever since the Reformation. However, Holmes has 
suggested that the nature of religious controversy changed decisively after this 
High-Church revival. In the early 1720s, religious debate became calmer and 
more restricted to an ecclesiastical and academic public.'-3 Even though 
disagreements on religious principles remained a major concern for several 
politicians, and religious issues still caused political tensions in the 1730s, the 
status of religion in society was changing. A crisis of confidence among the 
Anglican clergy caused by late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century 
intellectual rationalism contributed to this change which could be seen in 
declining rates of religiously motivated political activism.24 
The transformation in the status of religion in public discourse, to which 
Holmes refers, has been dated in various ways. John Gascoigne has dated the 
turning point to the reign of George II (1727-1760) during which theological 
disputes within the Church started to lose intensity.25 William Speck and Tim 
Harris have both placed the fundamental change in the relationship between 
religion and politics to a slightly earlier period, distinctly within a few years of 
the Hanoverian Succession in 1714. Religious enthusiasm that had still been 
typical of the reign of Anne suddenly disappeared after 1714, to be followed by 
a new relationship between religion and politics. After the ascension of the 
German dynasty, religious issues were much more seldom seen in political 
23 Holmes 1993, 350-1, 357-8, 362; Compare with Holmes 1975, 4. 
24 Holmes and Szechi 1993, 7, 46, 48, 80, 112-14; Ronald Stromberg suggested that the early 
eighteenth century was a period of transition during which the strong habitual association 
between religion and politics only very gradually waned. Religion remained related to 
politics for as long as the contemporaries felt that the principal forces uniting them were 
religious. However, by 1750, religion had become increasingly secondary to political 
discourse. Stromberg 1954, 124-5, 135. 
25 Gascoigne 1989, 140. 
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debates. The Hanoverian Succession has thus been presented as the starting 
point of decline, both in party strife and in religious conflict.26 But as studies 
reviewed above illustrate, religious issues do not seem to have evaporated 
suddenly after 1714. 
Langford has laid the emphasis on other changes such as the conventional 
thesis on the rise of the middle class. Though he has discussed the influence of 
religious issues on politics of the 1730s, referring to the Dissenters' 
disappointment with the failure to extend toleration, the debate on deism, the 
growth of Methodism and party disputes within the established Church, he has 
presupposed that political issues dominated, and argued that religious toleration 
was enhanced through the decline of political tensions in religious disputes. On 
the other hand, however, Langford has pointed to the reluctance among 
eighteenth-century Englishmen of accepting change and their tendency to 
emphasise issues that had remained unchanged in order to feel secure in a 
changing world. Importantly, he has referred to preferred terminology as 
`significant of the potential strain between the inherited mentality of the age and 
its material progress'.'-' 
Among historians who have modified their previous interpretations 
emphasising secularisation yet who have retained focus on change, Dickinson 
appears a prominent figure. He has underscored the economical, social and 
political transformations experienced by the English, arguing that it was the 
growing manufacture, commerce, middling sorts and urbanisation that were 
decisive in questions such as the acceptance of religious toleration. Dickinson 
has acknowledged the use of religion to support established political authority, 
but he has laid the emphasis on religious liberty, on the unwillingness of 
governments to get involved in religious disputes and to intervene in religious 
issues. 
For Dickinson, eighteenth-century England with her divided Church, 
Dissenters, sects and awakenings was already a pluralist society. Yet it was a 
society where religion on the lines of Anglicans versus Dissenters was probably 
the strongest ideological force dividing the voters. It was a society where the 
established Church formed one of the most powerful interest groups with 
considerable political influence at every level. The machinery of the Church of 
England for propagating values, if mobilised to oppose any extensions of 
toleration for religious minorities or other `innovations', was exceptionally 
efficient. The common people remained prejudiced in favour of the established 
order in Church and state as opposed to all alternative religious groups. And to 
enjoy the full support provided by the alliance between Church and state, most 
26 Speck 1972, 25: Harris 1989, 53. 
27 Langford 1989, xi, 7, 9, 38, 235, 238, 258, 271, 292, 679, 723; Langford's study, when 
combined with results of revisionist studies, suggests that religious language may have had a 
continuous role in political discourse. The influences between religion and politics may also 
have functioned in an opposite direction so that the relaxation of religious tensions in politics 
led to an increasing toleration of political parties. What Langford could have added is that 
religion was seen by many as the safest source of stability as opposed to constant change, and 
it was often religious terminology that most strongly reflected the prevalent traditionalist 
patterns of thought among Englishmen experiencing change. 
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governments refrained from violating the favoured position of the Church. The 
ideological importance of the Church was based on the shared assumption that 
government was, after all, ultimately commissioned by God. Suggestions that 
public morality or political duties could exist independently of Christianity, or the 
established Church, simply made no sense to the majority of contemporaries.28 
Among historians of political thought, an emphasis on secularised politics 
enjoys a firm status. For instance, in his much cited Machiavellian Moment 
(1975), Pocock suggested that interpreting English politics in terms of grace 
declined rapidly after the Restoration. Only some of it survived in preaching, in 
parts of published literature, and also in the public mind 29  In later scholarship, 
however, the linkage between intellectual developments in politics and religion 
have become increasingly recognised. Pocock himself has modified his inter-
pretation by arguing that some issues in English history have been inherently 
political, ecclesiological and theological at the same time,30 and he has 
conceded the continuous significance of traditionalist Anglicanism. But his 
own work has focused rather on the creation of a `civil religion', that is, the 
reduction of religion by deists to a function of society, a function that no more 
dominated the entire society.31  
Historians of political thought have often discover purely secular political 
motives behind late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century religious 
developments. J.R. Jones, for instance, has recognised the political importance 
of the gradual development from limited acceptance of religious diversity 
towards unambiguous religious liberty. He has suggested that cautious 
pragmatic changes facilitated the adaption of the prevailing mentalities to such 
transformations brought about by modernisation processes.32 Cautious changes 
probably also contributed to a gradual transformation in attitudes towards 
pluralism, whether religious or political. 
Another interpretation underscoring the political nature of religion has been 
offered by R.K. Webb who has argued that the Anglican ideal of unity was, to a 
great extent, politically motivated. Anglican preachers used calculated 
language in sermons for political purposes. Even if political party division 
reflected diverse mentalities in spiritual affairs, the primary causes for their 
emergence were secular. The influence of religion was decreasing, while 
politics dominated and contributed to a gradual widening of religious toleration 
and liberty.33 
Likewise, Gordon Schochet has considered the existence of religious dissent 
outside the Anglican Church and the entire Church of England as funda-
mentally political phenomena. The established Church was, in a state where 
the governing elite considered religious diversity a threat to the established 
political order and to the entire organised society, the major propagator of 
28 Dickinson 1995, 1-6, 55, 81-2, 84-5, 97, 132, 140-1, 190-1, 219, 261-3. 
29 Pocock 1975, 403. 
30 Pocock 1995, 38-40. 
31 Pocock 1993, 59-61. 
32 Jones 1992a, 8-9. 
33 Webb 1992, 158-60, 165, 167, 169, 191. 
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political obedience and unity. Anglican attitudes towards dissent were 
politically rather than theologically motivated. For any religious group, 
alternatives are difficult to approve, and to confront threatening rival 
doctrines, the Anglicans turned to political power. A union between religion 
and politics was also welcomed by those holding political authority, as it 
established the strongest possible orthodoxy. According to Schochet, religion 
was not necessarily reduced to politics, but the closeness of religion and 
politics was self-evident. For instance, religious dissidents may have been 
accused of `schism' or `heresy' simply to hide the accusers' political motives, 
their uncertainty about the state of the world, and their incapability of 
accepting diversity. The cautious widening of religious liberty in the 
Toleration Act of 1689, which reflected political concerns and had political 
effects, weakened and, in the long run, gradually destroyed these links 
between the spheres of politics and religion. 
In the eighteenth century — Schochet's argument continues — the debate 
concerned what the state should or should not do in religious issues, such as the 
treatment of religious heterodoxy. The state was not yet considered 
`conceptually' incompetent to intervene in religious practices. No sudden break 
in value structures could occur, as commonly shared religious beliefs formed a 
central element of the personal values of each individual, and questioning these 
beliefs was apt to provoke reactionary attacks and irrational adherence to 
inherited values. According to Schochet, religious and legal discourses were 
transformed towards a self-conscious and even quarrelsome secularism, which 
had an effect on political discourse. Whereas many `political' issues were 
continuously of religious origin, the form of debate was becoming increasingly 
legalistic. However, the `meaning in use' of the inherited vocabularies of 
religion, law and humanism, when applied to political discourse, did not 
necessarily turn secular.3; 
Appreciation among historians of political thought towards the significance 
of religion is also visible. Mark Goldie has lamented the concentration on 
constitutional theory, natural law, country ideology and classical republicanism 
at the cost of religion. The model of a sudden change from a religious world-
view to rational, scientific, secular and modern forms of thought has distorted 
much research. It has all too often been assumed that post-revolutionary 
England already enjoyed a religious toleration envied by the rest of Europe, 
possessed a controlled Church that had suffered a defeat at the hands of rising 
religious pluralism, and was inhabited by people whose religious enthusiasm 
had turned into cynicism towards all matters religious. Goldie himself has 
argued that the establishment Whigs of the early eighteenth century created a 
civil religion, supportive for public life, through both a traditional language of 
Protestant reform and the secular languages of law and republicanism.35 
34 Schochet 1990, 85, 87; Schochet 1992, 126-9, 135, 156; Schochet 1993, 4, 7; Schochet 
1995, 129, 139-40. 
35 
	
	
Goldie 1993c, 31-3, 35; Goldie sees the revival of interest in the history of religion, to some 
extent, as the reverse side of the decline of class as the explanatory model for early modem 
society and the decrease in interest in radicalism as a major object of research among 
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An awareness of the importance of including religion in the study of 
intellectual history can be detected also in the works of Lawrence Klein and 
Peter N. Miller, who otherwise follow the republican paradigm. Klein has 
characterised early eighteenth-century England as `post-godly', meaning 
neither secular nor secularised but a system in which religion had been 
subjected to intellectual discipline and political control. Religious spirit had not 
disappeared, but the dominance of religion in public discourse had declined 36 
Miller has paid attention to the impact of religious discourse on definitions of 
key republican concepts, conceding that a divine moral code had been 
traditionally conceived an indispensable part of all spheres of life. Hence 
religion was continuously considered necessary for the preservation of political 
society and the functioning of everyday politics, and an alliance between 
religious and political rulers appeared as self-evident. In questions of toleration, 
however, Miller has emphasised the role of Locke, ignoring much of early 
eighteenth-century discourse on the phenomenon. As to political discourse, he 
has concentrated on continuity in the language of `common good' and the rise 
of arguments defending commercial interests. Without a doubt, economic 
matters also became frequently involved in political discourse.37 They did not 
dominate the discourse on political pluralism, however. 
Religious terminology in study of the discourse on political 
pluralism 
The relationship between religion and politics in early eighteenth-century 
England has been interpreted in varying ways within the last decade of intense 
historiographical debate on the issue. Some historians have maintained that the 
influence of religion on political life ceased after the Restoration or at least by 
the end of the seventeenth century. Others have placed the transition towards a 
secular political culture at the Hanoverian Succession of 1714, or the 1730s, 
when the debate on the question of religious dissent started to calm down. Some 
have claimed that there was no sharp decline in the significance of religion for 
political life before the early nineteenth century. In most studies, the early 
eighteenth century appears as a transformatory period in the relationship 
between religion and politics. Thus far, this complex process of secularisation 
of politics does not seem to have been approached by the means of a conceptual 
analysis. 
In the history of political thought, the importance of ancient secular traditions 
of political thought, natural rights, and the rise of the language of commerce for 
eighteenth-century political discourse have been frequently discussed. This 
scholarship is, however, of limited applicability for conceptualisations of 
conservative historians, yet points out that parallel interpretations critical of an easy 
secularisation have emerged among Marxist historians. 
36 Klein 1994, 9-10. 
37 Miller 1994, 28-9, 34, 73, 153. 
38 Mentioned in Skinner 1998, 12. 
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political pluralism, as political pluralism was most commonly discussed in 
terminology that was not of secular origin. Even though the adoption of 
classical republican discourse by the opposition to Walpole played a role in the 
transformation of attitudes towards political opposition,38 it is obvious that 
political pluralism was usually discussed in language that was either openly 
religious or at least pseudo-religious. As the purpose of this study is to 
understand contemporary experiences of political pluralism, it is essential to 
focus on the language with which these were discussed. In early Hanoverian 
England, politics still was, to a great extent, `religious'. Any political issue 
could have religious aspects, and the language describing political conflicts also 
reflected the primary importance of religious questions.39 The prevalent trends 
of thought continued to be linked to religious interpretations of society, and 
they tended to abhor diversity in both politics and religion. 
The need for emphasis on conceptual developments has also been indirectly 
recognised in recent Anglophone historiographical discourse. Sommerville has 
referred to significant shifts in religious terminology, to decisive changes in the 
relative weight of religious and political terminologies, and to the rise of the 
vocabulary of scepticism. Condren has demonstrated the dependence of 
seventeenth-century political vocabulary on the continuously dominant 
religious discourse; yet early eighteenth-century political language has not been 
studied in a corresponding manner, and Condren himself has focused 
predominantly on secular political terms. Champion has maintained that early 
eighteenth-century Englishmen did not generally draw conceptual distinctions 
between matters political and religious, but his own work offers no conceptual 
analysis. Claydon's suggestion that early Protestant concepts continued to 
influence the political discourse of the 1690s raises the question of their 
potential effect on the early eighteenth-century discourse on political pluralism. 
Hempton has pointed to the influence of the Anglican religion on the English 
language without specifying such influence. Holmes has referred to an 
important change in both the status of religion in society and in religious 
discourse, yet he has not problematised the potential reflections of these 
changes in contemporary conceptualisations. Langford has referred to the 
importance of inherited terminology in the continuation of traditional values at 
the time of accelerating structural change, yet he has failed to specify of what 
that inherited terminology consisted. Jones has mentioned the political 
importance of the development of religious diversity but has left conceptual 
connections between religious and political pluralism unexplored. Schochet's 
work leaves open the question of how the state gradually became `conceptually' 
incompetent to control religious issues. Finally, Clark's hypothesis of the 
confessional character of the eighteenth-century English state, though 
controversial, suggests that it might be worthwhile to focus on the part that 
concepts of the discourse on religious heterodoxy played in the early 
eighteenth-century discourse on political pluralism. A conceptual approach 
39 For statements connecting religion and politics explicitly, see Harris 1993, 8, and Clark 
1994, 22. 
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might also be a good way of testing Clark's hypothesis on the key status of 
religious idioms in political discourse in general. 
In spite of these recognitions of the importance of considering the conceptual 
dimension of political discourse, concrete attempts in that direction have not 
really emerged. More particularly, no study appears to have focused on the 
application of concepts of religious origin in political discourse as a way of 
conceptualising contemporary experiences of political changes, such as the 
plurality of political values becoming a constant part of political life. The 
slowly changing meanings of major politico-religious concepts have not been 
systematically analysed through the study of a variety of sources. 
This study attempts to fill some of the gap in our understanding of early 
eighteenth-century experiences of political pluralism and changes that occurred 
in these experiences. All of the open questions introduced above cannot be 
answered within the confines of a single monograph, but most of them will be 
addressed in what follows. This is done by focusing on developments in the 
meanings of religious concepts that were applied in the discourses on pluralism, 
both religious and political. Particular attention is paid to estimating the 
potential influences of the use of religious concepts on common understanding 
of plurality in political values. In most cases, of course, such influences entail 
continuity in shared conceptions, but, in some cases, developments in the 
meanings of religious concepts may also have facilitated change in political 
conceptions. 
This study proposes that the more traditionalist early eighteenth-century 
languages of politics should not be ignored by historians on the basis of our 
present understanding of what constitutes political discourse. The following 
discussion demonstrates the continually close links between the language of 
religious rivalry and party conflict and the implications these links had for the 
possibilities of recognising and approving a society with a plurality of political 
values. Attention has been focused on a selection of concepts that originated 
from religious contexts but were employed in polemic on public affairs that 
twentieth-century observers could well interpret as `political'. It is another 
basic assumption of this study that not only revolutionary change but also 
continuity deserves to be studied. It is suggested that interesting conceptual 
changes may be discovered in traditionalist languages of politics if they are 
approached without excessive weight on politics as a secular affair. 
Terminology of religious origin still played a considerable role in eighteenth-
century political discourse and deserves to be studied in its own right. As 
politics and religion were highly intertwined, caution is needed in estimating 
the extent to which English political discourse was secularised by the early 
eighteenth century. It can be argued that, in early modern value systems such as 
those still prevailing in early eighteenth-century England, in spite of gradual 
structural changes in politics, `political toleration' in the form of recognition 
(and at a later stage acceptance) of elite involvement in competing political 
parties became possible only after a considerable extension of religious 
toleration. 
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After defining the objectives of the present study and its relation to previous 
studies in the field of early eighteenth-century political discourse and political 
culture, it is now time to proceed to a more detailed and critical introduction of 
the method applied in this study. 
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Methods and Sources for a 
Conceptual Approach to 
Political Discourse 
State of research in the history of concepts 
The history of concepts is a branch of the study of past thought which takes the 
changing meanings of concepts as major units of historical analysis. Concepts 
thus replace alternative objects of historical study such as authorial intentions or 
long-term political languages. In the history of concepts, conceptual change is 
taken as a register of change in political and social history. The genre is based 
on the assumption that the concepts that people use, their beliefs and their 
practices are related to each other and change together, though not necessarily 
at the same time. Some historians have also suggested that conceptual change 
might be an active contributor to political and social change, but this 
interpretation remains controversial. 
The history of concepts typically focuses on contemporary experiences of 
change during what has been called a transition to modernity between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Its purpose is to gather reliable 
information about semantic change and to discover how contemporaries 
experiencing changes in political realities understood and conceptualised them. 
In practice, the conceptual method, not unlike the study of historical semantics, 
involves a systematic collection of numerous citations containing key concepts 
from a wide variety of primary sources and a careful analysis of these concepts 
within their proper semantic fields and social and political contexts.' 
Conceptual history, or contextual history of concepts, which is the preferred 
translation, has achieved remarkable results within the German cultural sphere. 
Ever since the late 1960s, a project known as Begriffsgeschichte has produced 
massive dictionaries of historical, political, social and philosophical concepts, 
the eight-volume Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe being the major illustration of 
its potential. No matter how comprehensive the achievements of the history of 
concepts may have been, however, the genre may not be familiar to an English-
speaking audience and thus deserves closer discussion below. 
Writing histories of words in the English language is not, of course, a new 
idea. Much of accumulated knowledge of semantic change in English was 
gathered in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) already in the nineteenth 
century, and a revision of the national dictionary is currently in progress. 
Dictionaries such as Raymond Williams's Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture 
1 	 Koselleck 1985, 76, 84; Some of these basic purposes of the history of concepts have also 
been summarised in Richter 1996, 10-11; For the linkage between conceptual and political 
change, see Fan 1988, 21, 23; For the study of semantics, see Ullman 1964, 61, 67. 
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and Society'- and the Dictionary of the History of Ideas have also been 
published; and some recent collections of articles have paid attention to 
conceptual change. However, scholars are agreed that no adequate dictionary of 
English historical semantics, as far as the development of political and social 
language is concerned, has yet been compiled.' 
In the last ten years, the necessity of applying the conceptual method also to 
English history has been most visibly advocated by Melvin Richter, who has 
considered it a major deficiency in the historiography of the English-speaking 
world that no comprehensive account of the formation of its main conceptual 
categories exists.' In his recent book, he has provided an introduction to the 
genre of the history of concepts for English-speaking audiences. He has 
informed his readers about differences in the theoretical objectives, research 
programmes and practical approaches of German and Anglo-Americans 
reseachers, but he has also stressed the compatibility and common background 
of the two traditions in that both have derived from the `linguistic turn' of 
historical research and from the growing interest in the study of meaning. 
Referring to research that the history of concepts has motivated in other 
European countries, Richter has pointed out that the methodology is applicable 
to the history of any country and any language. He has argued strongly in 
favour of applying these methods also to the history of political thought as 
practised in English-speaking countries, which could learn much from the 
approaches, systematic methods and variety of sources of the German genre.' 
Summarising work already done in the history of concepts, Richter has 
stated that its points of focus include continuities, shifts and innovations in 
major political and social concepts, particularly in times of crises. He has 
pointed to the German historians' interest in groups rather than in individuals, 
to the effects of the reception theory on their emphasis on audience rather than 
on authorial intentions only, and to their focus on the question of modernity. He 
has also found innovative use of linguistic techniques, historical contexts, and 
combinations of synchronic and diachronic analyses in the German history of 
concepts and has called attention to its method of studying both conceptual and 
2 	 Williams pointed out that the history of language is full of 'conscious changes, consciously 
different uses: innovation, obsolescence, specialisation, extension, overlap, transfer', as well 
as inconspicuous changes of meaning. Williams 1983, 15. 
3 	 Not all the explanations given for the small number of English conceptual histories have 
been very convincing. Geoffrey Hughes, for instance, has proposed that the lack of 
comprehensive studies of semantic change in English has been caused by the heterogeneous 
and abundant character of its vocabulary when compared with the more homogeneous 
German language. Hughes 1988, 3. Yet it is difficult to believe that the method of studying 
past thought that has proved so successful in German historiography could not be applied to 
English even though there are differences between the two languages. 
4 	 Richter's writings have provided this study with a number of new ideas, but, above all, they 
have encouraged the study of the history of concepts in English. The choice of a conceptual 
approach to early eighteenth-century English history in this study predates reading Richter's 
recent thought-provoking writings but has been in a significant way motivated by his thesis 
on the applicability of the history of concepts to English source material. See Richter 1996, 
18. 
5 	 Richter 1995, v, 3-7; Reviewed in Ihalainen 1997a, 142-51; Richter has previously 
developed analogous arguments in Richter 1986, 632-4; Richter 1987, 248, 263; Richter 
1989a. 71; and Richter 1990, 39; See also Pocock 1996, 69. 
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structural change. He has underscored the prominent position held by the social 
history of structures or mentalities in conceptual research and emphasised the 
need for simultaneous study of both conceptual change and transformations in 
political, social and economic structures. Such a combination of the history of 
concepts and social history, Richter argues, should reveal both the intentions of 
a particular text and illustrate various conceptualisations of contemporary 
experience.' 
Comparing and combining the history of concepts with the 
history of political thought 
Richter has compared the methods of Skinner and Pocock on one hand and 
those of the history of concepts on the other, suggesting that the two could be 
combined,' as both are interested in the history of political languages and study 
political vocabularies in contexts. What the Anglophone historians of political 
thought have been most interested in has been the interrelations between 
political language, thought and action. Wishing to create appropriate 
methodologies for studying these complicated issues, they have identified and 
analysed various alternative early modern political languages. The political 
languages that have received most attention from Pocock include the ancient 
constitution, classical republicanism or civic humanism, and the various forms 
of Whiggism. The followers of Pocock and Skinner have been interested in 
these political languages, which have also been called discourses or ideologies, 
and not so distinctly in concepts as such. According to their approach, each of 
the available political languages has made use of concepts in a way that 
produces particular meanings.' 
In anticipation of opposition to his suggestion of combining the history of 
concepts and that of political thought, Richter has also discussed Skinner's 
methodological writings that seem to question the very foundations of writing a 
history of concepts.' Even if Skinner has emphasised the necessity of knowing 
the concepts an individual writer possessed so that his values and attitudes can 
be understood, he has also stated that `there can be no histories of concepts as 
such; there can only be histories of their uses in argument.' i° Skinner's students 
have found it difficult to accept an idea of the history of concepts being as 
significant as the history of political argument or political ideologies. It has 
6 	 Richter 1986, 619-20; Richter 1995, 10-11, 17, 28, 35, 44; Richter 1996, 10-11. 
7 	 Richter 1995, 138. 
8 	 Richter 1996, 16; Richter 1990, 50, 56; Importantly, however, the political languages that 
have interested Pocock have not included, until very recently, that of Anglican religious 
discourse, a discourse which is more likely to provide the key to changing conceptions of 
political pluralism than any of the above-mentioned. The central role of religious discourse 
is explained by the fact that no completely secular political discourse yet existed in early 
eighteenth-century England; For Pocock summarising the method of the history of 
discourse, see Pocock 1986a, 21-2, 30, and Pocock 1986b, 9, 13, 18. 
9 	 Richter 1995, 133-4. 
10 	 Skinner has discussed the role of concepts in Skinner 1980, 62; He has built on the same 
argument in Skinner 1988a, 120-1, and in Skinner 1987, 20; Skinner 1988b, 283. 
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been pointed out that the synchronic studies of language produced by the 
history of concepts needs to be supplemented with 'more traditional historical 
methods to be assembled into anything meaningful at all'." Pocock also seems 
to share the assertion that intellectual historians should write history of several 
linguistic phenomena from which concepts cannot be separated and made 
independent objects of research. Pocock, Skinner and James Fan have all 
emphasised the need for studying what has been done with language in the past, 
as they consider a concept an effect of the use of language. They have pointed 
out that, when writing the history of a concept, an historian comes across a high 
variety of contents and uses of language from which conceptualisations cannot 
be separated.''- 
A major methodological disagreement between Anglophone history of 
political thought and German history of concepts thus seems to concern the 
unique character of speech acts, or written or spoken uses of language with which 
something particular was done with language. Pocock and Skinner remain 
dedicated to the view that each speech act is unique and appears in a specific 
context. Consequently, they assume that each occurrence of a concept is also 
unique. This assumption, when applied to conceptual change, was condensed by 
Terence Ball and Pocock when they stated that `conceptual innovations are 
brought about by action, practice, and intention, rather than by unintended 
structural change occurring in the historical context.' In other words, conceptual 
changes are results of arguments used in order to achieve a temporary goal.13 
In contrast, Reinhart Koselleck, the leading theorist of the history of 
concepts, maintains that political concepts cannot simply be reduced to speech 
acts of individual participants in discourse because such concepts have 
accumulated long-term meanings which do not disappear as a result of 
changing circumstances. The long-term meanings of a concept cannot be freely 
changed by individual users of the language. Koselleck has suggested that 
conceptual change in the language of politics is generally more gradual than 
political change, and these two types of change do not necessarily correspond. 
Koselleck does concede the necessity of viewing specific language in specific 
linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts, but points out that the habit of 
`recycling"4 inherited political concepts in texts changes their contexts and 
meanings. What the history of concepts does is to study the translation of past 
concepts for the use of the moment of writing a text and the consequent changes 
and continuities in the meanings of concepts. The history of concepts 
endeavours to discover which meanings of a concept endure, which of them can 
be translated, which ones are rejected, and what kind of new meanings are 
introduced. It also studies those long-term structures contained by language 
which set the conditions for conceptualising events.'5 
I 1 Rayner 1988, 496-8; Compare with Richter's reply in Richter 1989b, 297-8. 
12 Pocock 1996, 53; Fan 1988, 16. 
13 Ball and Pocock 1988, 1-2. 
14 	 'Recycling' language is, of course, a metaphor very much connected with its time of writing. 
Where else could one expect such a metaphor emerge than in Germany of the 1990s? 
15 	 Koselleck 1996, 62-8; Burke has paid attention to this contention in Burke 1997, 57; For the 
tendency of a semantic field to conserve ideas, values and attitudes by passing them to new 
40 • METHODS AND SOURCES FOR A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH... 
There is clearly a decontextualising tendency in the Koselleckian conceptual 
method when used in diachronic comparisons to reveal long-term conceptual 
changes.16 When applied to very long time spans, it may fail to contextualise its 
source texts properly. Some scholars whose research interests come close to the 
history of concepts have gone so far as to suggest that it is only words in texts 
that remain for an historian to study. These scholars maintain that the lost reality 
of the past cannot be a direct object of study and can only be reconstructed by 
summarising heterogeneous sources. Some of them also assert that words and 
concepts in historical texts cannot be interpreted only by references to contexts 
that the historian has declared — somewhat arbitrarily — `relevant' to a particular 
text." 
But when used synchronically for the study of a relatively short period, the 
history of concepts, as understood in this study, pays as much attention to 
contexts as is reasonable; the high variety of sources and number of authors 
limiting, of course, the possibilities of contextualising a single use of a concept. 
Yet any adequate conceptual study must be somewhat contextual. Contexts 
should be made use of, even if they were constructed on the basis of existing 
research literature, even if they must be reduced in a research report to 
background information, and even if causal relationships between historical 
events and conceptual shifts cannot generally be proven. On the one hand, the 
history of concepts cannot be studied without considering the contexts in which 
the texts were written and read, above all changes in political structures. On the 
other hand, an excessive emphasis on various contexts or some particular 
context reconstructed by a historian may not only lead to misinterpretations but 
is also likely to make the application of a large range of sources — an essential 
feature of the conceptual method — impossible. The history of concepts must 
find a balance between the one extreme of writing decontextualised history and 
the other of becoming a prisoner of a context imposed upon the sources. 
The dominant Anglophone line of methodological thought, which sees 
intellectual history as the history of what has been done with language, seems to 
reject the possibility of writing a history of concepts. This is partly because 
Skinner's research interests differ from those of the practitioners of the history 
of concepts: he is interested in contextualising political theories, in showing 
how linguistic conventions both make legitimations of politics possible and also 
set limits to them. He wishes to make these individual political theories 
understandable as intentional speech acts.18 Skinner's purpose and method are 
valuable and fit perfectly to the study of individual authors. However, it should 
be clear by now that they do not aim at providing answers to questions 
concerning contemporary experiences and conceptualisations of change in a 
society as a whole. The research strategy to be followed must be chosen on the 
generations and by thus setting the limits for conceptualising the world, see Ullman 1964, 
198, 202, 211, 250. 
16 Palonen 1997, 46. 
17 See Condren 1994, 9-12, 21, 29, for instance. 
18 Richter 1996, 17; Skinner has explained his method in Skinner 1969, passim., and Skinner 
1996, 7-8. It is also discussed in Boucher 1985, 200-1, and Tully 1988, 9-10. 
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basis of the focus of the study. This study does not concern microhistorically 
the political theory of some individual(s) but rather more macrohistorically the 
question of how the early eighteenth-century English political elite at large 
understood the growth of political pluralism. Whereas Skinner's method does 
not seem to provide answers to questions this study wishes to address, 
Koselleck has argued that it is the major feature of the history of concepts that it 
is capable of analysing a variety of divergent usages of concepts typical of a 
chosen period.'9 The history of concepts thus seems to offer at least some of the 
proper tools for answering the questions this study wishes to address. 
Reception of the history of concepts in the Anglophone world 
Like previous attempts to introduce the history of concepts to Anglophone 
audiences, Richter's theses may meet with limited success in convincing their 
readers. Even if some Anglophone historians lament the tendency to study 
British history in isolation from Europe and would welcome a dialogue between 
the English, German and French approaches to the history of ideas, many more 
still prefer studying England as an exceptional case without references to 
continental contexts. Even methodologies may be interpreted as culturally 
restricted. As Richter himself has suggested, few may be prepared to apply a 
'German' methodology to British history.20 Also in the future, the work of 
fitting British history into the European context, which is undoubtedly a 
worthwhile project, may remain a task for non-native English-speakers.'-[ 
Concrete examples of writing the history of concepts in English are few, Ball 
being a solitary figure who has attempted something parallel with his `critical 
conceptual history'. Following the lead of the Cambridge School, Ball has seen 
'the ways in which speakers shape and are in turn shaped by their language' as 
the research objects of conceptual history. What is particularly interesting in 
Ball's approach is his statement that conceptual changes can take place through 
the entrance of concepts and metaphors of specialised discourses — such as the 
discourse of religion or that of medicine — to the field of political meanings. 
When religious terms enter politics, they may alter the terms of discourse and 
contribute to conceptual changes. This may have been particularly true of the early 
eighteenth century, when we take into consideration that religion was then not 
merely a specialised discourse but a dominating one.22 
19 Koselleck 1996, 65. 
20 Richter 1995. 144. 
21 The Gescldc/tt/ie/te Grundbegriffe frequently refers to developments in English history of 
concepts but its handling is restricted to major thinkers. This German interest in Anglo-
American history has also been illustrated by Willibald Steinmetz, who has recently 
discussed English political discourse during the early 19th-century debate on parliamentary 
reform in Steinmetz 1993. What he has suggested to have done is, however, neither the 
writing of a history of ideas nor the history of concepts but an 'analysis of elementary 
sentences': The latest project to compare conceptual developments in English and 
continental political cultures has been launched by Kari Palonen. 
22 Ball 1988, 6-10. 12, 15; See also Ball and Pocock 1988. 
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No Anglophone writers focusing on conceptual change seem to have 
declared themselves followers of German models in the history of concepts. 
Conceptual studies have rather been presented as modifications of the history of 
political thought which allows some variety as to whether the emphasis is 
placed on historical context or conceptual innovations. It is also noteworthy that 
Ball's reviewers have rightly pointed out that Anglo-American conceptual 
histories continuously seem to be based on canonical texts rather than on a 
wider conceptual context.23 
Some of Condren's work also resembles the history of concepts due to its 
focus on semantic fields of seventeenth-century politics. The major difference 
when compared with the German history of concepts is that Condren regards 
the words themselves rather than the past socio-political reality as the major 
explainers in the study of political thought.24 In other words, Condren maintains 
that it is not political history but merely the concepts that deserve the attention 
of the historian. 
Concrete work on the history of concepts in English is scarce, but some 
commentary on the genre is available. Peter Burke, for instance, has referred to 
the diverse traditions of intellectual history in the Anglophone world, France 
and Germany, pointing out that neither the French history of mentalities nor the 
German history of concepts have been taken very seriously in Anglo-American 
historical writing. The alien status of these approaches is reflected in the 
application of foreign terminology, English-speaking historians, if familiar 
with the genre at all, talking about Begriffsgeschichte rather than the history of 
concepts. The language barrier cannot be the sole explanation of unawareness, 
as Koselleck's essays on the history of concepts were translated into English in 
the mid-1980s, but, still in the late 1990s, Burke points out that they `cannot be 
said to be well known among English-speaking or at least among British 
historians'.25 Some interest towards the history of concepts has occurred, 
however. Favourable comments include, of course, those of Keith Tribe, the 
translator of Koselleck's essays, who has seen the Koselleckian history of 
concepts as such a wide and detailed project that the theoretical and historical 
traditions of the Anglophone world would hardly have given rise to anything 
comparable. Burke himself has seen the history of concepts as a type of social 
history of ideas which makes use of sources that illustrate everyday conceptual 
practices and also focuses on the ways that conceptual changes affect ordinary 
life. Furthermore, Burke has considered it important that, in the history of 
concepts, words are placed in a wider semantic field which includes opposite 
expressions as well as synonyms.26 
23 These commentators on conceptual history in English include Strong 1991, 1437-8, and 
Manicas 1992, 402-3. 
24 Condren 1994. 
25 	 Burke 1997, 55. Some British universities do, however, include Begrii frgeschiehte in their 
courses of methodology. 
26 	 Tribe 1989, 180, 182, 184; Burke 1997, 56; Furthermore, Irmline Veit-Brause - obviously of 
German origin - has seen it as one of the major aims of the history of concepts to compare 
and reveal differences between what really happened during the transition to modernity and 
the subjective experiences of the contemporaries as expressed in the concepts they used. 
Veit-Brause 1981, 63, 66-7. 
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The most notable Anglophone commentary on the history of concepts has 
been that of Pocock, who has stated that the history of political languages is in 
no need of innovative methodological solutions from the history of concepts. 
For him as well as for Skinner, a language or discourse is 'a complex structure 
comprising a vocabulary; a grammar; a rhetoric; and a set of usages, 
assumptions, and implications existing together in time and employable by a 
semi-specific community of language-users for purposes political, interested in 
and extending sometimes as far as the articulation of a world-view or ideology'. 
Political language thus appears to them as much more than simply a group of 
concepts, and, therefore, they do not willingly dissolve languages into concepts 
and study their change through time. As several political languages may exist 
side by side, affecting each other and being simultaneously available to the 
users of political languages, the writer of a text may base his use of concepts on 
several and even contradictory languages, and hence it may be difficult to find 
instances of a concept being used in an uncontested way. Because of this 
complexity of political languages, these historians willingly focus on short-
term analyses in which a particular text of an individual author is interpreted in 
its proper contexts.'-' However, notable long-term analyses from this genre also 
exist.'$ 
Pocock's starting points differ clearly from those of the history of concepts, 
but he does not rule out the study of linguistic change in historical concepts 
presented in their changing contexts. The study of political languages can also 
find an interest in 'the slower, multi-authored, and socially or historically 
induced processes of change that take place within and among the languages 
available in specific societies and cultures over specific and variously 
prolonged periods of time'. In fact, Pocock has expressed his conviction that a 
method studying each concept separately would most probably produce 
interesting findings because of differing questions that would be asked and 
differing ways of organising practical research work.'-9 A difference in 
emphasis would still remain: whereas historians of concepts would do some 
sort of supplementary work when studying change by focusing on concepts, 
Pocock would rather focus the study on one or more of the political languages. 
Anglophone reception of Begriffsgeschichte has varied from enthusiastic 
admiration to questioning the very basis of conceptual research. Scholars seem 
to agree that the German history of concepts has such particular features that it 
is difficult to incorporate in the discourse within the Anglophone history of 
political thought.30 As Pocock has stated, the two genres can affect each other, 
but they remain historically, culturally, and nationally specific, so that they 
cannot be applied as such to the other cultural sphere.31 Yet several historians 
believe in the potential in the history of concepts of bringing new points of view 
to the historiography of English-speaking countries. 
27 Pocock 1996, 47-50; Ball and Pocock 1988, 4-5. 
28 See Pocock 1975, Skinner 1980 and Peltonen 1995, for instance. 
29 Pocock 1996, 48, 50. 
30 Junker 1996, 6; Richter 1996, 16-17. 
31 Pocock 1996, 58. 
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Modifying the history of concepts 
It is argued in this study that an application of a modified type of the history of 
concepts to English history indeed leads to interesting findings. It has become 
clear by now that the conceptual method, when applied to English history, 
cannot be purely Koselleckian. Introductions to the history of concepts and 
Anglo-American commentaries on the Koselleckian methodology give rise to 
several points worth closer critical attention. 
The first reservation concerns the applicability of some of the basic 
hypotheses of the German history of concepts to English history. In fact, the 
German form of the history of concepts has not aimed merely at compiling 
reference works on conceptual change through time; it has also aimed at 
demonstrating the validity of a particular theory of history developed by 
Koselleck. Koselleck's theory on the different ways of experiencing time in 
different historical periods maintains that German concepts became 
increasingly future-oriented during a Sattelzeit or Schwellenzeit, a period of 
accelerating conceptual change and transition to modernity between 1750 and 
1850. `Transition to modernity' refers to several simultaneous long-term 
structural changes in politics and related areas of life that gradually transformed 
a pre-industrial, traditional society towards more modern forms of political 
culture. Koselleck's hypothesis assumes that, in this period, conceptual changes 
in Germany followed certain general patterns. The French equivalent of 
accelerated conceptual change has been dated between the years 1680 and 
1820.32 Inevitably, a question concerning the existence and timing of an English 
Sattelzeit, or a period of fast conceptual and structural transition to modernity, is 
also raised. 
Sattelzeit can be translated into English by metaphors such as `watershed'33 
or 'threshold' .34 In England, structural transformations connected with such a 
`watershed' might include the growth of religious diversity, the introduction of 
less eagerly controlled printing, financial and agricultural revolutions, 
accelerated urbanisation, secularisation and rationalisation of thought, and 
progress in empirical sciences.35 As to structural transformations in politics, one 
might add the emergence of political parties after the Civil War, the gradual 
secularisation of politics, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the ensuing 
debate on its significance, the settlement of the succession to the crown on a 
parliamentary basis, the rise of an organised parliamentary opposition in the age 
of Walpole, and the increasing popular involvement in public discourse. 
However, the timing of an English `watershed' remains obscure. Koselleck, 
who has done little research on English history, has not taken a definite stand in 
this question but has suggested that England experienced the `democratisation 
of linguistic usage' approximately a century earlier than Germany, that is, in the 
32 Junker 1996, 5; Richter 1996, 7-8, 11; Koselleck 1996, 60-1; Koselleck 1997, 16; See also 
Palonen 1997, 56-7; The timing of the French Sattelzeit is based on Richter 1987, 249. 
33 Burke 1997, 56. 
34 Koselleck 1996, 69. 
35 For the concept modernisation in historiography, see Ritter 1986, 273-5. 
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late seventeenth century. With such a transformation, he has referred to an 
emergence of a possibility for speaking to the entire population at the same time 
not only in theological but also in political issues. Through the growth of 
publishing, Koselleck argues, political language was extended to encompass 
the entire political elite and later on the public at large.36 Like Koselleck, Richter 
has contended for a rather ambiguous timing of an English `watershed' some 
time between the seventeenth-century revolution and the early Industrial 
Revolution.37 Burke has suggested that the mid-seventeenth century is probably 
the most proper period for searching for an English 'watershed',38  and, likewise, 
Ball and Pocock have seen the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution as 
periods when rapid changes in the meanings of English concepts occurred 39 
Elsewhere, Pocock has suggested that England experienced a `watershed' also 
between the early 1780s and the early 1830s, when the Whig discourse, which 
had dominated the scene since the Civil War, was replaced by a novel Victorian 
discourse. Clark has also argued that, by the early Victorian period, an early 
modern political discourse, that had remained relatively unchanged ever since 
the 1660s, started to give way to a modern one. According to Pocock, this 
`watershed' is not analogous to that of Koselleck's. English society differed 
from German society particularly in its degree of centralisation, and, therefore, 
no analogous conceptual transition from an ancien regime society to a modern 
one is traceable.50 
In spite of the revolutions of the seventeenth century, England is unlikely to 
have experienced an irreversible conceptual transition to modernity by the end 
of the seventeenth century. Indeed, England may have experienced several 
slight `watersheds'. If there had been a `watershed' in the seventeenth century, 
as statements of several historians suggest, there may also have been a reversion 
after the Restoration to traditional political languages. The early eighteenth 
century as a whole was a period of slow transition in political structures and in 
the language of politics. In spite of these transformations, it does not deserve to 
be called a `watershed'. It was only towards the end of the century that another 
`watershed' emerged. Even that may have been less fundamental than the 
German Sattelzeit. 
In fact, the helpfulness of the concept of the `watershed' in connection with 
early eighteenth-century history is questionable, particularly as the Sattelzeit 
hypothesis is not an inevitable part of the methodology of the history of 
concepts.4' The history of English concepts can be studied without 
concentration on a period of revolutionary conceptual change. It is equally 
important to reveal conceptual continuities and slight conceptual trans-
formations during periods of evolutionary development, such as characterised 
early eighteenth-century England. Furthermore, it is arguable that conceptual 
change was accelerating in the period under study. 
36 Koselleck 1997. 22-3. 
37 Richter 1995, 146-7. 
38 Burke 1997, 57. 
39 Ball and Pocock 1988, 1. 
40 Pocock 1988, 177; Pocock 1996, 56-8; Clark 1994, 142. 
41 Koselleck 1996, 69. 
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Together with the Sattelzeit thesis must be rejected artificial applications of 
connected hypotheses to English history, as they might lead to serious 
distortions of interpretation within another linguistic sphere and another 
historical period. Commentators have been cautious not to take stands on the 
significance in English history of what Koselleck has called historicisation, 
democratisation and politicisation of concepts and the increasing incorporation 
of concepts into ideologies.42 These hypotheses are not applied in this study, 
and their applicability to English history requires closer illustration in future 
work. Pocock has questioned attempts to test these hypotheses derived from 
German history against British history, because British society and political 
discourse differed considerably from those of Germany.43  
Another reservation to the Koselleckian approach to the history of concepts 
concerns the application of social history to the study of the history of 
concepts.44 Social history, whether that of mentalities or structures, has been 
rarely used as a major explanatory component in Anglophone studies of past 
political thought, even though there are studies in which changing social 
circumstances contribute to explaining shifts in political attitudes. In the 
German history of concepts, social history has been variably incorporated. A 
sceptical approach to the actual possibilities of studying all the assumed 
`relevant' structural contexts of the great variety of sources typically consulted 
by conceptual historians is indeed realistic. In a study based on hundreds of 
diverging texts, the contextualisation of a single text is necessarily restricted to 
some basic facts concerning the writer's intentions, motivations and his other 
works — if traceable — and on the genre of the text, as well as its political and 
cultural contexts. In most cases, of course, these contexts have to be 
reconstructed on the basis of existing research rather than an analysis of 
particular historical documents. A further problem remains: relating changes in 
meanings to structural transformations is difficult if not impossible. Attempts to 
explain conceptual shifts with simplistic references to some particular historical 
events are, therefore, open to criticism. 
Special features of writing the history of concepts in English 
Even if the idea of applying the methods of the history of concepts to the history 
of the English-speaking world has met with sometimes well-founded criticism 
from Anglophone scholars, the potential of a history of concepts has not been 
fully refuted. A history of concepts remains a noteworthy option that may be 
capable of producing results that can be interestingly different or at least 
supplementary to those provided by the history of political thought. However, 
when its methodology is applied to early eighteenth-century English history, it 
is important to take into consideration some special features of such a study. 
These concern the status of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) as an 
42 See Richter 1995, 36-8, for instance. 
43 Pocock 1996, 52, 57-8. 
44 Richter 1995, 18, 125. 
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authority of English word history, the possibilities for extending the source 
basis in the study of political discourse, the usefulness of electronic sources for 
conceptual reseach, the necessity of studying networks of concepts or entire 
semantic fields instead of a single concept, and the need to focus on 
contemporary conceptions of the nature of language. 
The criticism which Richter has directed against the authoritative status of 
the Oxford English Dictionary can be considered justified. Many Anglo-
American scholars depend on customary references to this source despite the 
fact that its emphasis on literary sources has made numerous entries on political 
terminology inadequate.45  Eighteenth-century usages and the language of 
politics in particular have been neglected by earlier compilers of the dictionary. 
A considerable time may have passed before political neologisms entered those 
literary texts which the compilers have used, and a linguistic analysis may not 
have reached all the alternative political senses a word could have in various 
contexts. Richter has questioned the reliability of the current version as the only 
source of information on the senses and first appearances of political 
vocabulary, but he has correctly seen the existing corpus of historical semantics 
as a good starting point for a computerised history of concepts in English, once 
it is supplemented by previously neglected genres.46  This study wishes to make 
a contribution, even if a modest one, to the direction of creating reliable 
accounts of semantic change in the political vocabulary of the English language 
in the early eighteenth century. 
The great variety of sources studied by German historians of concepts 
should make English-speaking intellectual historians also consider the 
possibility of extending their source basis. In addition to classics, newspapers, 
journals, pamphlets, documents, memoirs, letters and diaries, they could also 
make use of dictionaries of various types. When the source basis is extended, 
problems may rise, as levels of abstraction and potential for linguistic 
innovations vary from text to text. However, a balanced account of conceptual 
developments requires that diverging sources and texts of both familiar 
canonical authors and forgotten anonymous writers are consulted.47 
In passing, Richter has touched the question of constructing textbases for 
research in the history of concepts, without carrying the point any further. Thus 
far, historians studying concepts have generally rejected databases consisting of 
historical documents and criticised attempts via computer-based political 
lexicology.4$ This scepticism has been well-grounded, given inadequacies in 
technology, the amount of work required by the compilation of textbases, and 
the sheer impossibility of measuring ideas numerically. Calculating frequencies 
of words should always be supplemented with a qualitative analysis of the 
sources. Of course, opportunities for partly computerised analysis of political 
concepts may be increasing with the creation of new electronic text corpora and 
45 Burke has agreed with Richter on this in Burke 1997, 57. 
46 Richter 1995, 45, 147-57; Richter 1986, 622; Richter 1987, 263: Richter 1990, 41. 
47 Richter 1995, 34, 45, 50-1, 139, 157. 
48 Richter 1995, 47, 87, 99. 
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with developments in text analysis programs.49 One application of electronic 
sources is unquestionably useful and does not need to lead to a neglect of 
contexts: readily available electronic texts can be used in tracing additional 
occurrences of concepts. This study aims at no breakthrough on the field of 
electronic conceptual analysis but draws some benefit from existing textbases 
and text analysis programmes.5o 
Several commentators on the history of concepts have taken up the 
limitations connected with studying the history of merely one concept. As 
changes in one concept affect other concepts, it is advisable to reconstruct entire 
networks of concepts within a genre to reveal which concepts remain 
unchanged, which disappear, and which replace earlier concepts.51 In this 
present study, entire networks of concepts are analysed. Vocabulary used in 
discussions on political pluralism forms a loose semantic field, or, a group of 
words connected with each other. This semantic field can be divided into 
several semantic subfields which can be analysed synchronically. 
Finally, this study wishes to take into account an additional context that 
contributes to research on conceptual developments. This context is formed by 
disagreements on the proper use of language among participants in past 
discourses52 and by the prevailing theories about the nature of political 
language. 
Sources for the conceptual study of political discourse 
In this study, methods from the history of concepts have been applied to several 
hundred early eighteenth-century English texts concerning the desirability of 
pluralism, particularly in political values and party organisations. In principle, 
any contemporary text can reveal aspects of political language. The major 
criterion of the selection of sources has been that the found text can be 
considered a contribution — though not necessarily a conscious one — in the 
discourse on pluralism. Another criterion is the representativeness of the source 
material. To ensure representativeness, a high variety of genres and writers 
have been consulted. The sample of sources includes dictionaries, political 
treatises, periodical essays, pamphlet literature, political sermons, liturgical 
texts, political catechisms, minor genres of political writing and popular 
literature, and edited manuscript sources such as diaries and correspondence 
from the entire period 1700-1750. 
Dictionaries provide definitions of contemporary politico-religious 
terminology and have been systematically consulted for this study,53 although 
49 See Olsen and Harvey 1988,449-52. 
50 As to compiling a special corpus and application of linguistic computer programmes to it, 
these cannot be considered worthwhile because of the lack of adequately homogeneous 
series of sources and defects in technology for scanning early eighteenth-century sources. 
51 Richter 1995, 103, 108. 
52 Richter 1995, 89-90. 
53 	 For details on lexicographers and dictionaries as well as references, see Appendix A. 
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availability has had some effect on chosen editions. Little is known about most 
lexicographers other than that many were practical men such as teachers, 
physicians or minor authors rather than scholars. Some were mathematicians or 
found an interest in navigation, astronomy and geography. The dictionaries 
themselves were in most cases compiled for everyday purposes rather than for 
scholarly use. 
As some of the dictionaries reprinted in the early eighteenth century had been 
compiled much earlier, they hardly followed in detail all semantic 
developments. For instance, John Bullokar's and R. Browne's English 
Expositor (shortened Bullokar-Browne) had been originally published already 
in 1616 and continued to be reprinted in fourteen editions until 1731. This 
continuous reprinting can be taken as an illustration that the use of seventeenth-
century definitions in a dictionary on sale did not overly annoy early 
eighteenth-century Englishmen, which in turn tells us about the slow pace of 
linguistic change. Furthermore, many lexicographers based their work on 
earlier dictionaries. For instance, Edward Phillips's New World of Words (1706, 
1720), re-edited by John Kersey, and the anonymous Glossographia Anglicana 
Nova (1707) were originally based on Thomas Blount's Glossographia (1656). 
Even though the sources of this study have usually been limited to English 
ones, Pierre Bayle's Dictionary, first published in the late seventeenth century, 
has also been included, as evidence exists of Englishmen welcoming the work. 
The English elite became well aware of Bayle's work by the 1730s. Though 
many of its ideas were condemned as heretic, the work as a whole was 
acknowledged as useful.56 Another dictionary translated from French was that 
of Louis Moreri, the second English edition of which appeared in 1701, edited 
by Jeremy Collier. 
Dictionaries first compiled in the early eighteenth century are most likely to 
reflect contemporary usages. Many of them had a long life. For instance, 
Kersey's New English Dictionary (1702) sold continuously for seventy years. 
Nathan Bailey's Universal Etymological English Dictionary (originally 1721, 
the consulted edition 1733) was more comprehensive than any previously 
published and appeared in thirty editions throughout the eighteenth century. 
Bailey also revised George Gordon's Dictionarium Britannicum before 
publication in 1730. Particularly authoritative, though hardly used by a wide 
public, became Ephraim Chambers's Cyclopaedia, first published in 1728. 
Other consulted dictionaries include those of Thomas Dyche and William 
Pardon (1735, the consulted editions 1740 and 1750), Benjamin Norton Defoe 
(1735, the consulted edition 1737), Daniel Fenning (1741), which was probably 
compiled only a short time before its first publication and thus introduced 
several up-to-date definitions,55 and Benjamin Martin (1749), which already 
took particular care to distinguish between various senses of words. 
54 Redwood 1976, 33, 35. 
55 
	
	
Some library catalogues suggest that Fenning's dictionary was only published in 1761, not 
1741 as printed in the book, which would mean that Fenning was copying from Samuel 
Johnson and not the other way around. This timing is also supported by the fact that Fenning 
is not mentioned as a source for Johnson in Reddick 1990. 
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The only lexicographer still remembered today was Samuel Johnson, whose 
dictionary of 1755 (compiled between 1746 and 1755) achieved authority as a 
major step in standardisation of the English language. Johnson's dictionary is 
interesting for the tendentious nature of many of its theological and political 
entries. However, many of its definitions for the vocabulary of pluralism were 
not particularly original but were based on earlier dictionaries such as Bailey 
and Chambers and thereby on Kersey and Phillips. What was new was the use 
of quotations from famous authors to illustrate the specific meanings of words. 
Johnson also increased the number of senses that were discussed separately in 
the entries. In addition to Johnson, I have included three other dictionaries 
published after 1750 to increase the possibilities of discovering conceptual 
changes. A popular dictionary of the early 1750s is represented by the 
anonymous Pocket Dictionary from 1753. John Wesley's Complete English 
Dictionary (1753, the consulted edition 1764) appears to have been directed to 
the general public, whereas John Trusler's wordbook from 1766 is interesting 
because of a rare concentration on questions of synonymity. 
Another integral group of sources have been treatises. These include 
canonical works such as Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan and writings of Halifax, 
Bolingbroke, John Locke, Shaftesbury and Bernard Mandeville. Out of 
canonical authors, David Hume's treatises have been excluded because most of 
his writings were published after 1750, also because he represented the Scottish 
Enlightenment which differed considerably from English developments, and 
because his original thought is rather unrepresentative of the age and thus 
deserves specialist discussion. Less known treatises with a focus on 
constitutional issues include those by Roger Acherley, Peter Paxton, John 
Toland, Sackville Tufton, William Warburton and William Whiston. Some 
interesting anonymous treatises were also consulted. Treatises connected with 
the deist controversy were those written by Anthony Collins and John Toland. 
Occasional medical treatises that shed light on aspects of political thought 
include ones by Richard Blackmore and George Cheyne. 
A considerable proportion of sources consists of periodical essays, a 
favourite genre among the political elite, which are usable because of their 
compact nature, their tendency to focus on current problems such as `party-
spirit', and because of their availability on microfilm and in recent critical 
editions. The leading early eighteenth-century titles, the first discursive essay 
journals of their type, have been consulted. Whig periodicals written by Richard 
Steele, Joseph Addison, Ambrose Philips, and other famous authors include the 
Tatler (T) (1709-11),56 the Spectator (S) (1711-12, 1714), the Guardian (G) 
(1713), the Freeholder (F) (1715-16) and the Free-Thinker (FT) (1718-20). 
Daniel Defoe's Review (R) (1709-10) contains views of Whig governments, 
while Jonathan Swift's Examiner (E) (1710-11) represents the views of leading 
Tory ministers. Importantly, Defoe and Swift were both employed to appeal for 
the cause of the government against `partisan' opposition of all kinds 57 
56 The abbreviation used in the study and the years consulted are given in the brackets. 
57 Rogers 1978, 90; Downie 1979, 12, 64. 
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The leading periodical titles of the period after 1720 include the Independent 
Whig (1W), Cato's Letters (CL), the Craftsman (C) and the Gentleman's 
Magazine (GM). The Independent Whig (20 January 1720 to 18 June 1721) and 
Cato's Letters (5 November 1720 to 27 July 1723) belong to the most widely 
read and influential polemical works, which were reprinted a number of times 
after their first publication. The papers, the tone of which was explicitly 
anticlerical, criticised traditionalist orthodoxy and clerical malpractices in the 
Church and corruption in the state. Many of the essays were motivated by the 
financial shortcomings of the Whig rule as revealed by the South Sea Bubble 
crisis of 1720.5$ 
The Craftsman, started in 1726, was a common project of opposition leaders 
William Pulteney (Whig) and Bolingbroke (Tory). It published satire against 
`corrupt' government policies, advocated the abandonment of party names, and 
called for a `coalition of parties' in the name of a `patriot' ideology. It was 
capable of blackening the reputation of Prime Minister Walpole as a betrayer of 
the inheritence of the Glorious Revolution but could never fully bring together 
the diverse interests of rival opposition groupings. The opposition remained a 
quarrelsome coalition which the public came to know only through essays 
published in its main organ. Though the Craftsman was not representative of 
the whole 1730s, its effects on political discourse have been estimated as 
considerable. The paper experienced its heyday in 1734-5, when up to thirteen 
thousand copies were sold weekly. Thereafter, the popularity of the paper 
declined, as Bolingbroke's contributions became rarer.59 
The Gentleman's Magazine, which first appeared in 1731 with Edward Cave 
as its editor, collected and republished news and commentary from other 
newspapers and periodicals but also published some articles and reviews 
written particularly for the magazine. What makes it an especially valuable 
source is the uncomparably high variety of topics the magazine discussed 6° 
Through reprints in the Gentleman's Magazine, it has been possible to read a 
number of papers published in the 1730s and 1740s that are hardly accessible 
elsewhere. These include both governmental and oppositional publications as 
well as the High-Church Weekly Miscellany.61  
Early eighteenth-century periodicals forgotten by posterity were Thomas 
Gordon's Hunnourist (1720), Matthew Concanen's Speculatist (1725-28) and 
Henry Fielding's True Patriot (1745). Furthermore, some papers in the Burney 
Collection of the British Library such as the Daily Gazetteer, the Westminster 
Journal and the London Evening Post have been checked for political discourse 
in the 1740s. Newspapers of the period have not proved particularly useful in an 
analysis of the discourse on political pluralism because of their avoidance of 
commentary and concentration on foreign news. 
58 Robbins 1959, 115-17; Champion 1992, 174-5; Wilson 1995, 118; The Bubble Crisis led to 
a stock market crash in connection of which malpractices in the public finance came into the 
public sphere. 
59 Goldgar 1976, 28, 42-4; Langford 1989, 47: Wilson 1995, 123; Hill 1996, 75. 
60 Langford 1989, 91. 
61 On the Weekly Miscellany, see Walsh and Taylor 1993, 33. 
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Political pamphlets and tracts were written primarily for higher orders, but in 
coffee houses and taverns they were available to readers and listeners of various 
backgrounds.62 Their strength as sources for the history of concepts is their 
immensely high number. Pluralism was discussed in hundreds of pamphlets and 
tracts during the first half of the eighteenth century, out of which over one 
hundred have been referred to in this study. The most productive pamphleteers 
on questions of pluralism include Francis Atterbury, Daniel Defoe, Charles 
Leslie, Jonathan Swift and Matthew Tindal. The major problem involved with 
this group of sources is its heterogeneous nature and the variety of its themes. 
Furthermore, the majority of pamphlets are anonymous or pseudonymous,63 
which means that possibilities for their contextual interpretation are severely 
limited, and the historian often has to focus on textual evidence when placing 
the author among the politico-religious groups of the period. Importantly, a 
considerable proportion of pamphleteers were clerics, which calls for attention 
to the role of the clergy in political discourse. Many of the pamphlets were also 
written for some specific purpose such as an election campaign or a current 
debate in Parliament or Convocation, and this ephemeral character of the texts 
easily led their writers to ironical exaggerations that may sometimes confuse an 
historian, particularly as some of them made use of dialogue form or other 
forms of satire. In spite of these interpretative difficulties, pamphlets form a 
valuable group of sources for a history of concepts, particularly as many of 
them have been ignored in previous research. 
Political pamphlets have an analogous genre in political sermons which 
gathered large audiences and formed a significant genre of political 
commentary. Sermons probably continued to be the most common genre of 
printed literature. Their prices were low and they were expected to sell well, 
which meant that publishers willingly printed them. Many sermons containing 
political arguments were remarkably popular, some sermons becoming the 
best-sellers of the late Stuart period.64 Given the impact a single political sermon 
could have, this group of sources may be the most seriously neglected in the 
study of the history of political thought. For an understanding of 
conceptualisations of pluralism, however, the consultation of political sermons 
is indispensable. This study contains references to approximately twenty 
printed sermons preached both by minor clergymen in parish churches and 
leading bishops in front of the monarch. The influential sermons of Henry 
Sacheverell (1702, 1709, 1713) and Benjamin Hoadly (1717) are included. 
Many of the sermons were originally preached in connection with political 
events such as assizes, elections or a national anniversary of a major historical 
event. Such major anniversaries included the coronation of the reigning 
monarch, the `martyrdom' of Charles I, and the `double deliverence' of 
Gunpowder Treason and William of Orange's invasion. Most political sermons 
62 Wilson 1995, 110. 
63 
	
	
For the popularity of anonymity, see Richards 1972, 7. Richards has explained anonymity by 
referring to the consequences of offending the authorities and to a public distaste for 
partisanship. 
64 Claydon 1996, 87. 
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date from the two first decades of the century, but, interestingly, political 
preaching on pluralism experienced a revival after the Jacobite rising of 1745. 
Liturgical texts are represented by the most authoritative of all, by different 
editions of the Book of Common Prayer. In addition to being a service book, it 
was used universally as a manual for family and private devotion.65 As to 
specifically theological treatises, few references have been made to them; yet 
many of the analysed texts contain considerable theological elements. An 
interesting intermediary genre was made up of political catechisms and creeds. 
They combined the resources of authoritative religious language and form with 
political themes in order to create political persuasion that most orders could 
understand. Heterodox authors such as Bolingbroke, Gordon and Tindal 
favoured this genre, but the political catechism of Charles I also continued to be 
reprinted. 
Several other genres of political writing are also represented among the 
sources of this study. Political plays, novels, historiography, manuals, poems 
and popular literature such as ballads can reveal some of prevailing political 
feelings and at least much of the methods of political persuasion. These genres 
also illustrate to what extent the major concepts of pluralism reached a larger 
public. Indeed, the themes of eighteenth-century chapbooks — often the only 
reading for the lower orders — suggest that the concepts of pluralism did not 
necessarily reach the general public through popular literature. Though the 
themes of the chapbooks varied, they hardly ever concerned contemporary 
politics.66 Sermons may have popularised the concepts more efficiently. Ballads 
and news-sheets had also become a noteworthy form of political propaganda, 
presenting simplified issues in a limited vocabulary that avoided developed 
abstractions.67 Ballads in particular were directed to large audiences, and 
political poems and plays could be taken much more seriously than a twentieth-
century observer may at first realise. For this study, the representatives of these 
genres have been chosen purely on the basis of their titles, and their number 
among the sources is restricted to a few instances. The literary form of the 
genres complicates conceptual analysis, but a quotation from a play, poem or 
ballad can sometimes be revealing as to prevalent ways of understanding 
political pluralism. Historiography, which played an important part in political 
culture, is an easier source in this respect. 
As the emphasis has been on public discourse, originally published literature 
constitutes an overwhelming majority of the sources. In addition to published 
texts, however, edited manuscript sources such as diaries and correspondence 
of members of the political elite have also been consulted. The authors of these 
sources advocated various political and religious views and represented 
different sectors of life. The diaries read in search for the key concepts of 
pluralism include those of John Evelyn, David Hamilton, Thomas Hearne, 
Thomas Naish, William Nicolson, Dudley Ryder, John Wesley, Adam 
65 Walsh and Taylor 1993, 25. 
66 	 Chap-books af the Eighteenth Century, ed. John Ashton. 1995 (1882). 
67 Condren 1994. 75. 
54 O METHODS AND SOURCES FOR A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH... 
Williamson and James Yonge. Correspondence has been used in samples from 
writers such as Joseph Addison, John Byrom, John Locke, Jonathan Swift and 
Horace Walpole. As the number of diaries and correspondence collections 
printed posthumously is high, there has been no need to use private papers in 
manuscript form. This group of sources could, of course, be easily extended in 
future research. Another excluded group of sources are pictures. The history of 
concepts conventionally focuses on written texts, and a detailed analysis of 
visual material would have demanded a special methodology which the history 
of concepts cannot provide. 
At a preliminary stage of this study, two computer-based historical corpora 
were also used. The Century of Prose Corpus (COPC) contains text selections 
from 120 eighteenth-century English authors representing numerous genres. 
The Helsinki Corpus of English Texts (HCET), which terminates around 1710 
and includes several genres as well, has contributed to a search for seventeenth-
century usages. Texts in these corpora are mere samples chosen by specialists 
on the basis of their assumed representativeness. The corpora should be seen as no 
more than anthologies of primary sources which can be used for tracing the fixed 
or changing state of the language. This technique enables a more extensive use of 
sources, but it can never provide more than supplementary material to the 
conventional reading of sources. The texts in the corpora are limited samples, but 
the number of writers and the variety of genres make interesting discoveries 
possible. The corpora reveal both long-term shifts in the meanings of the terms and 
the diversity of contexts in which a term could be used in any one period. 
Whenever a corpus text has been cited in this study, the reference has been given 
both to the corpus and to the writer and date of the original work. 
The number of consulted identified authors is high, exceeding one hundred, 
and introductions of individuals cannot be given here. However, Appendix A 
lists the identified authors with information on their professions, social status 
and political and religious sympathies (whenever available from secondary 
sources) and thus provides some data for considerations of authorial intentions. 
Among the authors, some loose groups are discernible. The authors can be 
categorised roughly into `traditionalists'68, `moderates'69 and `radicals'70, if an 
68 Among traditionalists can be listed the sub-groups of Nonjurors, Jacobites and traditionalist 
Anglicans (Charles Leslie, Jeremy Collier, John Sage, Francis Atterbury, William Shippen, 
George Lockhart, Henry Sacheverell, Thomas Hearne, Henry Stebbing, John Byrom), 
Anglican bishops (Edward Synge Jr., Edward Tenison, Matthias Mawson), Anglican divines 
with a special status (John Strype, Samuel Pycroft, Edmund Chishull, Thomas Dawson, John 
Middleton, William Warburton), ordinary Anglican churchmen (William Baron, Elisha 
Smith, William Stevenson, James Bramston, William Gilpin, Zachary Grey, Randolph Ford, 
John Giffard, Matthew Hole, John Lawrence, James Miller, John Needham, Thomas Naish, 
John Shuttleworth, J. Borrough, Langhorn Warren, Thomas Rennell, John Plaxton, Conyers 
Place) and Tory writers (William King, Edward Ward, James Drake, George Sewell, 
Jonathan Swift, Joseph Trapp). 
69 Among moderates one would willingly include Low-Churchmen (Gilbert Burnet, Samuel 
Bradford, William King, William Nicolson, White Kennett, Benjamin Hoadly, John Lewis, 
John Balguy, Zachary Pearce), Whig writers (John Dunton, Abel Boyer, Joseph Addison, 
Richard Steele, John Oldmixon, Ambrose Philips, Eustace Budgell, Thomas Tickell, 
Matthew Concanen), and writers with obvious Whig connections (Roger Acherley, Simon 
Clement, Adam Williamson, Henry Fielding, Horace Walpole). 
70 Most historians would agree on classifying the following writers as radicals or republicans: 
METHODS AND SOURCES FOR A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH... ® 55 
important reservation is taken into account: an application of twentieth-century 
political terms such as `conservative', `moderate' and `radical' to an analysis of 
political arguments expressed before the French Revolution is problematic, as 
such anachronistic interpretative vocabulary can mislead both the historian and 
the readers. In this study, the term conservative is rejected in favour of the term 
traditionalist, that is, one defending inherited values such as monarchy and the 
established Church. The term moderate refers to those whose attitudes were 
neither extreme nor vehemently dedicated to the defence of traditional values. 
This does not mean that they were committed to change or represented an exact 
middle position between the traditionalists and radicals. They were merely 
looking for a compromise between the extremes of Catholicism and absolute 
monarchy on one hand, and radical Calvinism and anarchy on the other. The 
term radical, although appearing frequently in twentieth-century scholarship, 
did not occur in a political sense in the early eighteenth century. In this study, 
this well-known anachronism is used to refer to extreme religious and political 
doctrines such as deism or popular sovereignty, which might later be named as 
radicalism, but not to someone `democratic', `progressive' or `socially 
innovative', as the modern sense might suggest." This classification into 
traditionalists, moderates and radicals also receives support from some 
contemporary categorisations. Chambers's Cyclopaedia (1728), for instance, 
divided the `state Tories' into violent and moderate and the `state Whigs' into 
republican and moderate, adding that the moderate wings of both parties were 
close to each other, which would suggest a tripartite division into violent 
defenders of absolute sovereignty, moderate advocates of the ancient 
constitution, and republican advocates of commonwealth.72 In addition to 
traditionalists, moderates and radicals, there are approximately a dozen 
seventeenth-century authors73 who have been included for conceptual 
background, writers who cannot be categorised according to the used 
classification74, Nonconformists75, and other authors participating in the 
Whig philosophers (John Locke, Shaftesbury), Country Whigs (Thomas Gordon, John 
Trenchard), and deists (Matthew Tindal, John Toland, Anthony Collins, Mathias Earbery, 
Peter Annet). Freethinking ideas were also held by Ephraim Chambers. 
71 
	
	
For the terms conservative, moderate and radical in the historiography of the early modern 
period, see Clark 1985, xiii, 278, 347, and Condren 1994, 140-1, 143, 149. 
72 The entry for Tories in Chambers 1728. Chambers based this division on Monsieur de Cize, 
a French officer. 
73 The consulted seventeenth-century writers can be categorised as royalists, republicans, 
sectarians and politically ambivalent authors. Royalists include the politicians Clarendon 
and Thomas Osborne, and the diarist John Evelyn. Edmund Ludlow was a radical republican, 
while Henry Parker belonged to sectarian circles. Politically ambivalent authors were 
Thomas Hobbes, John Dryden and Halifax. Other seventeenth-century writers include 
Nathanael Carpenter, William Temple and John Tillotson. 
74 Writers whose identity in contemporary divisions was variable include Charles Davenant, 
John Dennis, Bolingbroke and Daniel Defoe. Defoe, for instance, was a dissenter and a fierce 
critic of traditionalist Anglicanism but could write both for the Whigs and the Tories. He 
endeavoured to make his living out of writing, which explains some of the inconsistencies 
that can be found in his texts. In 1710, for instance, he changed sides purely for employment. 
Downie 1979, 13, 124; The political background of Robert Ferguson, Edward Cave, John 
Henley, Sackville Tufton, Narcissus Luttrell, Bevil Higgons, William Keith and Benjamin 
Griffin has remained obscure to this writer. 
75 Nonconformists not mentioned in connection with other categories include Protestant 
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discourse on pluralism.76 
The academic and professional background of the writers can be summarised 
as follows: Most had a Cambridge or Oxford degree. Nearly half had studied 
theology, and as priests they often propagated the religious values of their 
university. Oxford graduates and teachers such as Henry Sacheverell and 
Francis Atterbury became famous for defending traditionalist values. Almost 
twenty per cent of the consulted writers had studied medicine. Several had 
pursued law studies as well. Members of the elite usually studied common law 
at the Inns of Court in London where the atmosphere was more secular than at 
the universities.77 A few of the writers had also studied in dissenting academies. 
Many of the writers were academics in the mentioned subjects or in classics; 
only a few found a professional interest in the new natural philosophy. A couple 
of writers can also be characterised as businessmen or as professional soldiers. 
Few of the writers made a living by writing;  many held minor government posts 
often granted as rewards for successful propaganda. 
A new history of religion and the history of concepts combined 
In this study, descriptions of the plurality of political values and the existence of 
rival political parties within the early eighteenth-century English political 
system are analysed. These descriptions were produced by members of the 
political elite who attempted to conceptualise their experiences of the 
phenomena. The recognition — and, in the long run, approval — of political 
pluralism refers to the gradually spreading conception that rival political 
groupings could be allowed to exist continuously side by side without this 
leading to a serious threat to the entire political system. This recognition 
entailed an abandonment of the inherited idea of the necessity of unity and 
uniformity within society. 
In everyday usage, most of us regard political pluralism as a self-evident state 
of affairs, recognise it, and approve it. We are aware of the breakthrough that 
political pluralism has made in western history, even though we may not be 
aware of the painfulness of that breakthrough. By contrast, for the early 
eighteenth-century English, the idea of the necessity of political pluralism was 
far from self-evident. They conceptualised emerging political pluralism in a 
way that at first appears as foreign to us because the concepts, and the 
associations and connotations of the concepts they had at their disposal differ 
Dissenters (John Billingsley, Benjamin Grosvenor, Dudley Ryder), and sectaries (Thomas 
Story). John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, could as well be classified as a 
traditionalist. 
76 These consist of philosophers following Locke and Newton (William Whiston, George 
Berkeley), physicians who wrote on politics (Peter Paxton, James Yonge, Richard 
Blackmore, David Hamilton, Bernard Mandeville, George Cheyne, John Trusler), and 
French writers whose texts were translated into English (Pierre Bayle, Louis Moreri, Jean 
Leclerc). 
77 Bennett 1986b, 360-1. 
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considerably from those used today. In order to understand those conceptualisa-
tions, we must focus on the senses, associations and connotations of concepts 
used in that time period. 
Most of us also consider the separate character of political and religious 
questions as an indisputable fact. For a great majority of early eighteenth-
century people, however, it was a completely unfamiliar and senseless idea to 
separate political issues as independent from religious matters. The sphere of 
the political remains indefinite today, but it was particularly so in the beginning 
of the period under study. The distinction between politics as concerning public 
affairs and religion as a private matter had not yet emerged, or was only in the 
process of emerging. In the deficiency of specialised political terminology, 
`political' phenomena were interpreted through religious, legal, martial and 
medical concepts and metaphors which were understandable for almost the 
entire reading audience. The applicability of religious, legal, martial and 
medical terminologies for discussing `politics' was further enhanced by the fact 
that most active participants in political discourse had been educated in some of 
these dominant areas of life. 
This study focuses on the importance of religious terminology in descriptions 
of political pluralism simply because that was the most widely used 
terminology. There is nothing surprising in this predominance given the long 
history of fragmentation within Christendom. The late seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth-century English nation experienced a simultaneous and, as they 
understood it, analogous fragmentation of unanimity in both religion and 
politics. Another reason for focusing specifically on religious terminology is 
that, unlike legal and classical terminologies, it has until very recently been 
neglected in historical research. In this study, medical terminology is discussed 
only in passing, as the relationship between medical and political terminologies 
deserves to be studied in its own right. 
When early eighteenth-century political discourse is approached from a 
conceptual point of view, the interconnection between religious and political 
pluralism appears as distinct. Given the continuously dominant status of 
religious discourse in relation to political discourse, it is obvious that continuity 
in religious terminology supported continuity in political discourse. The 
availability of inherited religious concepts facilitated contemporary 
conceptualisations of political changes which were generally experienced as 
negative, as concepts of religious origin provided an ideal starting point for 
arguments critical to change. Given the continuously influential role of religion 
in society, it can be assumed that many of the writers, when applying religious 
concepts in descriptions of political pluralism, honestly believed in the 
interconnection between religion and politics. 
This study suggests, however, that shifts in the meanings and applications of 
religious concepts of pluralism also facilitated changes in concepts of political 
pluralism. As James Bradley has pointed out, the influence of religion on 
politics can work two ways: whereas religion often strengthens the established 
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order, the same religion may also contribute to change.18 We should seriously 
consider the possibility that it was changes in the use of religious terminology 
by elitist writers for describing political pluralism that contributed to a gradual 
change of attitudes among the public so that the multiplicity of political values 
began to appear as a potentially positive phenomenon. A small but vociferous 
minority within the political elite did not necessarily need to reject traditional 
religious discourse but could rather exploit it for propagating views that point 
towards an increasing, if not yet complete, approval of political diversity. If an 
early eighteenth-century political writer wanted to introduce changes in the 
English polity, he had to manipulate the dominant politico-religious discourse 
in a convincing manner. A successful manipulation can change political 
discourse and thereby even the actual structure of the society. The most obvious 
sign of a success is that the new formulations are accepted into common use and 
become understood as descriptive and no longer argumentative.79 
Furthermore, as Shelley Burtt has argued, traditionalist Anglican modes of 
political thought, when encountering pluralism, may have been gradually 
modified. Modifications in traditionalist concepts and language may have 
contributed to change to such a degree that change cannot be explained merely 
by challenges outside of the established Church.80 In other words, 
transformations in political attitudes may have occurred as a result of changes 
within Anglican political discourse. Innovative applications of familiar 
religious concepts reflected changes in attitudes and facilitated expression of 
positive attitudes towards pluralism in a way that was easier for contemporaries 
to understand and to accept. The slow transformation towards the recognition 
and later approval of political pluralism became possible, at least partly, 
through changes in the meanings and applications of terms of religious origin. 
The study of traditional terminology borrowed from religion thus offers a key to 
an understanding of much of early eighteenth-century thought patterns 
concerning political pluralism. 
The objective of understanding past experiences of political pluralism has 
called for a reconstruction of networks of concepts that appeared in a variety of 
sources during the first half of the eighteenth century. A reconstruction of 
alternative senses, associations and connotations of relevant politico-religious 
concepts reveals assumptions and presuppositions of the character of the 
political system. My purpose has been to reach an understanding of both the 
negative and positive reactions to the growth of diversity in political values. I 
have paid attention both to continuities and changes in these reactions. 
The structure of this study follows the above-mentioned networks of 
concepts, each concept or a pair of counter-concepts forming a topic for each 
subchapter. The major contexts in which the analysed concepts should be 
placed are introduced in chapters four, five and six, though references to related 
contexts are also made in the body of the work in chapters seven to twelve. 
78 Bradley 1990, 32. 
79 Skerpan 1992, 3. 
80 Burtt 1995, 151. 
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Chapter four focuses on the general contexts of political events and cultural, 
intellectual and religious developments. Contemporary theories of language 
and the terminology of change are briefly discussed through conceptual 
analysis. Chapters five and six concentrate on early eighteenth-century 
understandings of the spheres of religion and politics and their mutual 
relationship. Chapters seven to twelve form the major `empirical' part of the 
study. They discuss general concepts of uniformity and diversity, 
unambiguously religious concepts of pluralism, terminology of party and 
faction, associations of the prevalent party denominations, concepts of 
fanaticism and toleration, and associations between freethinking and political 
pluralism. The final chapter provides a summary of the major findings, focuses 
on later developments, and considers possibilities for future research. 
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H The Contexts of the 
Discourse on Political 
Pluralism 
Structure of politics 
The English political system had experienced dramatic changes in the 
seventeenth century: an open civil war; the execution of the monarch; 
republican experiments; the restoration of the monarchy; a longstanding strife 
between emerging political parties on the possibility of altering the succession 
to the throne in case of a Catholic successor; and finally a foreign invasion and 
removal of a Catholic king, which came to be glorified as the best of all 
revolutions. This inheritance of instability was still present in early eighteenth-
century political discourse which, despite change in the political system, had 
not adopted radically new directions. 
The effects of the Glorious Revolution on the discourse on political pluralism 
were limited and indirect. Even though the revolution settlement weakened 
theories of the divine origin of monarchical power and contributed to a gradual 
secularisation of the political system, the Revolution as a whole had been 
traditionalist rather than radical. The continuously confessional character of the 
political system, or at least its rhetoric, is illustrated by the willingness of the 
new Protestant monarch to present his wars against Louis XIV as a continuation 
of the wars of religion. The most significant change, as far as pluralism is 
concerned, was that Protestant Dissenters were granted a limited freedom of 
worship. Furthermore, the Revolution can be seen as a starting point of cautious 
and evolutionary change towards an increasingly parliamentary limited 
monarchy, as the permanent presence of Parliament and a considerable increase 
in the frequency of parliamentary elections made political life more dynamic. In 
the period 1695-1715, general elections were held on average once in every 
two years. Constant warfare that followed the Glorious Revolution also 
moulded the political system by strengthening bureaucracy, leading to the 
creation of public credit, and increasing public participation in discussion, as 
papers started to report on the events of the day after the abandonment of pre-
publication censorship in 1695. A Cabinet Council emerged, and the status of a 
prime minister became more distinct. 
In the development of party government, the Revolution brought no 
breakthrough, as the new monarchs remained suspicious toward the entire 
phenomenon of political parties and consequently favoured coalition 
governments. The strengthened and regularised status of Parliament, frequent 
elections and intensified political propaganda, however, all contributed to the 
growth of political parties during the first two decades of the eighteenth 
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century. The development led to a situation where, from the turn of the century 
to the mid-1720s, practically the entire political nation was divided into two 
parties engaged in constant rivalry. The period 1708-17 in particular saw the 
emergence of a two-party system which only started to disintegrate after the 
Hanoverian Succession when the Whigs gained a monopoly of power and the 
maximum length of Parliament was extended to seven years. 
Most contemporaries conceived the unparalleled nationwide party rivalry as 
a serious threat to unity. Such a concern was reasonable given the extent to 
which party views could play a role in almost any aspect of life: in religion, 
business and social life, including coffee houses, taverns, clubs, newspapers, 
periodicals, theatres and even hospitals. Yet English social customs seem to 
have changed after the Revolution of 1688. Violence declined while continuous 
discussion on public matters was gaining ground — open violence was being 
substituted by 'the ritualised antagonism of party politics'.1 
From the 1690s onwards, the conflict between Whigs and Tories, the parties 
that had been developing since the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-81, concerned 
competion for office, religious issues such as the status of the Dissenters, and 
constitutional questions such as whether the Revolution of 1688 had meant 
legitimate resistance to a tyrant and how the Protestant succession to the throne 
after William, Mary and Anne should have been arranged. While most Whigs 
were ready to alter succession to the throne with parliamentary decisions, some 
of them advocating a contractual monarchy, the Tories continued more 
sympathetic to divine right theories of government, which accepted no changes 
in succession. 
Religion was, however, the key factor dividing the English into Whigs and 
Tories. The intensification of party rivalry in the beginning of the eighteenth 
century had an important religious connection in the High-Church and Tory 
campaign, which declared that the Church of England was threatened by the 
Protestant Dissenters, and in the Low-Church and Whig counter-campaign 
disputing any such claims. The Tories' anxiety about the suspected hostility of 
the Williamite and Whiggish governments to the established Church made them 
struggle to conserve Anglican dominance by safeguarding its privileges and by 
opposing toleration. The Whigs were less concerned about the privileges of the 
Anglican clergy and expressed sympathy towards the toleration of dissent, as 
they were not at all as convinced as the Tories about a breakdown of the 
Anglican monopoly leading to social and moral anarchy. 
In an era of constant war and rising trade, foreign policy and a conflict of 
interest between landowning and trading orders also added to disagreements 
between the parties. The isolationist Tories disliked involvements in European 
conflicts, while the Whigs wished to see England as a major power resisting 
France. In financial issues, the Tories advocated the interests of the great 
landowners, who paid much of the landtaxes, whereas the Whigs had close 
contacts with the new financial establishment, which profited from lending 
1 	 Jones 1961, 3-4; Jones 1992b, 35; Holmes 1993, 212, 220, 322, 324-8, 331, 334; Hill 1996, 
15-16, 20-1. 
62 a THE CONTEXTS OF THE DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL PLURALISM 
money to the state for the costs of the continental wars.' 
The ascendancy of the House of Hanover in 1714 did not remove domestic 
political conflicts or lead to disappearance of the universal party division. The 
change of the royal family solved none of the religious or even the dynastic 
questions that had troubled the nation ever since the 1680s. The Whig seizure of 
power in 1714 was successful, but it was followed by pro-Stuart rioting and an 
open rebellion in late 1715. Dismissals of Tories from office caused bitterness, 
and repeated Jacobite plots also added to continuous partisan divisions. Whig 
propaganda endeavoured to convince the audience that the Whigs were the only 
defenders of the Protestant Succession, English liberties and religion. It 
maintained that, to demonstrate one's hostility to the enemies of the Church, the 
new monarch and the ideal constitution, every loyal subject should have 
adopted a Whig identity. However, the Tory party continued to enjoy 
popularity based on its much emphasised role as the defender of the monarchy 
and the Church against the dangers caused by a union of Whigs, Low-Church 
Anglicans and Dissenters. The Tory party wished, above anything else, to be 
identified with the established Church, whereas it represented the Whigs as 
heirs to the king-killers and Church-abolishers of the mid-seventeenth century. 
The Whigs it identified with Dissenters and especially the Presbyterians, who, 
the High Churchmen feared, were continuously plotting with republicans to 
destroy what remained out of the ideal English union of Church and monarchy.' 
The Early Hanoverian society experienced several crises and developments 
with considerable consequences to its structures. Colley has listed among these 
the two Jacobite invasions of 1715 and 1745, the Excise Crisis which reflected 
the rise of trade into a central political issue, Britain's rise as a colonial power, 
the beginnings of Methodism, the growth of provincial newspaper press, rapid 
urban growth, more active business life, and population growth.4 Speck and 
Holmes have argued that the pattern of politics was completely transformed by 
1720-1722 with the fall of the Tories, the emergence of divisions among the 
Whigs and the disappearance of issues that had caused the split into Whigs and 
Tories. The stockmarket crash of 1720 hurt both Whigs and Tories. In political 
polemic, accusations of the Church being in danger were replaced by charges of 
widespread corruption. In government, the growth of bureaucracy contributed 
to the growth of political stability.' It has also been argued that, after 1720, party 
strife was moving towards a more tolerant direction, towards an acceptance of 
an opposition party.6 
Even though estimates of a momentous change in the structure of politics by 
the early 1720s may be exaggerations, some transformations certainly 
2 	 Holmes 1993, 338; Hill 1996, 10, 15; Claydon 1996, 149-52; See also Plumb 1967, 64, 131-
2, 138-140; Speck 1970, 1-3, 6; Richards 1972, 154-6; Hill 1976, 26; Speck 1978, 81-9; 
Speck 1988, 149-50, 152, 159-60; Jones 1991, 5; Han-is 1992, 701-2; Harris 1993. 108-9. 
3 	 Wilson 1995, 84-5, 96-7, 101, 107. 
4 	 Colley 1982, 5; For Excise Crisis, see Wilson 1995, 124-5, 130. The association of trade 
with patriotism and the national interest created a distinctly secular political discourse on 
trade and empire which started to provide an alternative to politico-religious discourse. 
5 	 Speck 1970, 2-3, 8; Speck 1978, 92-3, 96, 99; Holmes 1987, xiii, xv. 
6 	 Hill 1976, 231. 
THE CONTEXTS OF THE DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL PLURALISM ® 63 
occurred. A major transformation in the structure of politics in the period 1715-
42 was the shift from a clear two-party model to a system characterised by a 
contrast between Prime Minister Walpole and his opponents. Governments 
were consistently Whiggish, whereas opposition consisted of Tories and 
various Whig factions. Starting from the 1720s, Walpole's hegemonic 
government encountered new opposition in the form of these `patriots'. The 
opposition campaign against Walpole in the late 1720s and early 1730s led to a 
transformation in the terms of political debate in a way that gave the opposition 
an increasingly important role in setting its tone. However, the opposition 
remained divided, and neither did the traditional party strife disappear with the 
fall of Walpole's government in 1742. The Tories remained an opposition 
party, whereas various Whig cliques could thereafter expect to be accepted into 
the government. 
By the 1750s, the parties were already weaker, constant Whig governments 
having led to the rise of factions within the Whigs and to the decline of the 
Tories to a status of a secondary party. The party identities of both the Whigs 
and Tories, however, continued strong throughout the 1740s and 1750s. In 
connection with the Young Pretender's invasion in 1745, the majority of Tories 
demonstrated their loyalty to the House of Hanover. By the mid-eighteenth 
century, the division had changed so that the Tories once again felt sympathy 
towards the monarch while the Whigs grew increasingly worried about a 
politically active monarchy. The major religious sympathies of the parties, 
however, did not change. Also important is the fact that the Jacobite rising of 
1745 revived much of politico-religious stereotyping characteristic of the early 
years of the century. This sort of polarisation seems to have continued at least 
until 1750.' 
Cultural, intellectual and religious contexts 
The early eighteenth century, though neither the time of the most spectacular 
breakthroughs of the Scientific Revolution of the late seventeenth century or the 
Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century, was a period of intellectual 
ferment, at least as far as the informed elite was concerned. Restoration England 
had already experienced the rise of intellectual trends that tended to weaken 
some basic assumptions both in religion and politics. These trends unavoidably 
concerned religious issues, as religion, and particularly the relationship 
between religion and politics, remained probably the most central topic of 
intellectual debate. One of the basic assumptions that became disturbed was that 
political stability would have been best achieved by uniformity in politics, 
religion and intellectual inquiry. Such an assumption was challenged by 
diversity in party ideologies, flourishing sectarianism and the methods of the 
new natural philosophy. By the early eighteenth century, English intellectuals 
7 	 Albers 1993, 329; Wilson 1995, 85, 134-5; Hill 1996, 11, 15, 58, 89, 91-4. 
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were well aware of the problem of global religious pluralism. At home, even 
though persecution had cut the number of religious dissidents, the elite had been 
unable to create such religious uniformity where alternative denominations 
would not have questioned the status of the established Church. Fundamental 
ideological disagreements of religious origin, or at least with intimate links to 
questions of religion, also led to the emergence of the political parties.8 
The reality of religious diversity was indisputable. Ever since the 
Reformation, English Protestantism had been characterised by diversity in 
belief and practice, moderate and radical elements disagreeing about the 
direction of the Reformation. Religious pluralism had proved capable of 
producing serious political instability, and `diachronic pluralism', or the 
changing relationships between the crown and Church characteristic of post-
Reformation England, may have enhanced secularisation and at least facilitated 
comparisons between different forms of Christianity. The Church of England in 
its Elizabethan form had been presented as a middle path solution between 
religious extremes, but political factors had made the governments cautious in 
the persecution of religious dissidents, which contributed to the continuation of 
sectarian divisions in the seventeenth century. Full religious uniformity was 
hardly ever achieved. Particularly during the Civil War, the English had 
experienced a dissolution of the established Church and a rise of an 
unparalleled amount of religious alternatives.9 The Civil War also demonstrated 
to most Englishmen that religious division was a primary cause of rebellion 
against political authority.10 Such civil strife had a longstanding effect on the 
attitudes and prevailing mythologies of the nation. Like civil wars in general, 
the English conflict generated misleading historiography, deep-rooted bitter-
ness, and often irrational emotions and loyalties. The Civil War gave rise to 
such mistrust, suspicion and readiness to believe the worst of fellow subjects 
that could not evaporate together with the generation who had fought the war." 
Protestant Dissenters became major objects of mistrust as alleged anti-
monarchists and enemies to the Church.12 
Restoration England inherited from the republican period a state of religious 
pluralism in the form of flourishing sectarianism and religious diversity. The 
religious conflicts that followed can be seen as a continuation of the Reforma-
tion which was brought to at least a partial end with the Act of Toleration (1689) 
that gave legal recognition to most excluded Protestants and thus removed their 
willingness to rejoin the Church.13 The dominant Protestant dimension of 
religious diversity in post-Restoration England was the Church of England, the 
Presbyterians — most of whom also wished for a unified but differently 
organised Church — and the separatist denominations including the Inde-
pendents or Congregationalists, the Quakers, the Baptists, and a number of 
small, often extremist, sects. A further religious alternative was offered by the 
8 	 Harrison 1990, 10; Champion 1992, 227; Holmes 1993, 143. 
9 	 Martin 1990, 67; Harrison 1990, 3, 28; Grell, Israel and Tyacke 1991, 2-6. 
10 Pocock 1995, 42. 
11 	 Rupp 1986, 72. 
12 Haydon 1993, 246. 
13 Schochet 1995, 121, 123; Schochet 1996, 183. 
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rare Catholics who were feared by all Protestant denominations. 14 Because of 
the marginal role of Catholics in the reality of politics — depending on their 
small number and the prevalent anti-Catholic attitude that saw Catholicism as 
necessarily treasonous and denied political rights from its supporters — 
Catholics have been excluded from this analysis of politico-religious debate, as 
the debate mainly concerned the desirability of diversity among the Protestants. 
Anti-Catholicism had a momentous impact on political attitudes15 but rather 
influenced national identity than the question of political pluralism. 
In spite of such diversity, however, less than ten per cent of early eighteenth-
century Englishmen frequented services other than those of the established 
Church. Catholics were few and scattered, whereas the Dissenters were most 
numerous in the developed areas of southeastern England, where most of the 
publishing also took place. Furthermore, the number of Dissenters was 
declining quite dramatically between 1720 and 1750 from approximately 
350,000 to less than 250,000. Dissent declined spiritually as well when the 
initially zealous sects turned into alternative Churches providing formal 
worship to urban audiences whose interests were increasingly commercial 
rather than religious. Active members became fewer as reason was 
strengthened at the cost of revelation, as scepticism won new ground, as some 
Dissenters assimilated socially with the Anglican establishment, and as 
`rational' dissent failed to attract support from the common people.16 
Religious dissent had several political dimensions as well. In general 
elections, the Dissenters regularly campaigned in favour of Whig candidates, 
and, throughout the eighteenth century, the local and parliamentary Whig party 
was defined through the alliance of the Low-Church Anglicans and Dissenters. 
The Dissenters also formed their own organisations designed to defend their 
rights. For instance, in 1715, a club of lay Dissenters was founded for the 
purpose of gaining greater toleration. In 1734 and again from 1736 to 1739, the 
Dissenters campaigned nationwide for the repeal of discriminatory legislation. 
The common theological background and experiences of political 
discrimination united various dissenting Churches and enabled this kind of 
cooperation." In the 173Os, however, the Dissenters failed to achieve any 
concessions because of the lack of cooperation from some dissenting circles 
and the Whig government. Walpole's government was unwilling to provoke 
religious hostilities by insulting the privileged position of the Church. 
Concessions to Dissenters were unnecessary also in the sense that the 
Dissenters were likely to support Whigs anyway.'$ After the 173Os, dissenting 
political activism declined. In warfare and domestic rebellions Dissenters 
supported the Whig governments, and their declining numbers and economic 
welfare decreased motivation to campaign for extended civil liberties.19 
14 Schochet 1992, 123-4. 
15 Haydon 1993. 
16 Harris 1990, 21-2; Bradley 1990, 91, 93, 95; Spun 1991, 378, 387. 
17 Bradley 1990, 29, 52-3, 106, 113; Trevor-Roper 1991, 397-8. 
18 Stromberg 1954, 135. 
19 Miller 1994, 297. 
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Declining numbers also meant that Dissenters were increasingly regarded as a 
politically insignificant group. 
The response of the political elite to religious dissent was conflicting. In fact, 
attitudes toward dissent became the major and most consistent factor dividing 
the political elite throughout the early eighteenth century. 
After the years of Interregnum, a great majority of Englishmen longed for a 
reintroduction of the traditional monarchy and established Church in a form that 
presupposed that every loyal subject would adhere to its doctrines. Both the 
monarch and Parliament considered religious diversity a political threat. The 
leaders of the Church of England wished to remove religious pluralism which 
they understood as a continuation of that sectarian violence and civil unrest the 
country had recently experienced. It was generally considered the mission of 
the established Church to work as a principal unifying force in the restored 
political order: whereas the state would support the Church in its work as the 
teacher of the nation's religious traditions, the Church would do its best to 
strengthen the cause of the restored monarchy. The monarch would have been 
ready to test the effect of indulgence for taming religious dissidents, but 
Parliament instead passed several repressive laws to eradicate them altogether. 
Subjects were divided into the established Church and Nonconformists who 
were to be compelled into conformity. Those unwilling to conform were 
excluded from the membership of the national Church and therewith from the 
full membership of the political society. Certain freedoms of worship allowed 
during the Interregnum were denied, which, of course, created a threat of open 
resistance.20 
The reintroduction of the confessional monopoly of the Anglican Church at 
the Restoration meant that England remained a divided nation where legislation 
legitimated persecution of dissident sects and where religious and civil 
authorities cooperated to enhance Anglican uniformity through compulsion. 
Persecution was a reaction to the collapse of orthodoxy and to the rise of 
heterodox and heretical sectarianism. It was a consequence of the failure of pure 
coercion in achieving religious uniformity. Persecution was based on the denial 
of pluralism and became justified by the assumption that religion was essential 
to the public good and could not thus be merely a private matter.21  
The Act of Uniformity, passed in 1662, demanded that every divine and 
teacher had to acquiesce to the Book of Common Prayer. The Corporation Act, 
passed a year earlier, aimed at excluding potentially rebellious persons such as 
Dissenters from municipal offices by requiring all candidates for office to take 
an oath of allegiance and the Anglican communion before election. The Test 
Act of 1673 brought the same discriminatory conditions to elections for the 
offices under the crown. The 'Act of Toleration' (1689), which was passed after 
the Glorious Revolution to bring some relief to Dissenters, did not repeal 
former penal legislation and thus exclude the possibility of its reintroduction, 
20 Miller 1992, 58; Holmes 1993, 37, 41-2; Spellman 1993, 36-7; Schochet 1990, 86-7; 
Schochet 1992, 130; Schochet 1995, 123, 126. 
21 Goldie 1991, 331; Schochet 1992, 123; Schochet 1995, 121, 128. 
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but suspended some laws designed to prevent nonconformist worship on the 
condition that the Dissenters took the oaths of allegiance introduced by the 
Williamite regime. This suspension concerned only `loyal' Dissenters, whereas 
Catholics and anti-Trinitarians were denied any such relief. Even Trinitarian 
Dissenters were continuously denied access to political offices and university 
posts. Freedom of worship was granted to them on the condition that the 
preacher accepted most of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, 
that meeting houses were not locked during worship, that tithes were paid 
properly, and that the meetings were registered with the ecclesiastical 
authorities. The 'Act of Toleration' was not aimed at giving any sect a 
possibility of becoming a serious alternative to the established Church. The law 
provided no confirmation of a principle of freedom of conscience, and the 
entire concept of toleration remained absent. In the connected parliamentary 
debates, it was specifically denied that the law granted religious toleration.2'- 
Some historians have characterised the Act of Toleration as revolutionary 
because it brought a legal recognition of England as 'a pluralist society'. It has 
also been suggested that fundamental changes in attitudes must have taken 
place before Parliament could pass such an act, the political nation abandoning 
the idea of religious unity and adopting instead a pluralism that the state 
guaranteed. In contrast, it has been pointed out that contemporaries did not 
necessarily conceive the process as a de facto recognition to religious diversity 
in England. At least, they did not enunciate their recognition of pluralism.23 
Indeed, when formulating the Act, the legislators expected that it would be 
followed by a Protestant comprehension that would enable most Dissenters join 
the national Church. The Act was thus initially assumed to concern only a tiny 
group of Dissenters unwilling to join the Church but actually came to concern 
half a million Dissenters.24 
Interpreting the Act as a conscious recognition of pluralism is apparently an 
exaggeration. The Act did give a legislatively unparalleled amount of religious 
freedom to Protestant Dissenters, but its limitations remained considerable, few 
contemporaries were dedicated to genuine toleration, most expected a return to 
unity, and neither did they consider the Act as irreversible. The effects of the 
Act were felt only gradually as a result of what W. M. Spellman has called the 
destruction of the idea of the Church as the embodiment of moral authority in a 
society sharing basic values. Half a million people could thereafter live outside 
the disciplinary control of the national Church. In that sense English liberty of 
worship was unique.'-5 
Caution in estimating the meaning of the Act of Toleration is necessary, 
because several Anglican Members of Parliament only very reluctantly voted 
for it. Many supported the bill merely because they considered it a temporary 
measure to be repealed once circumstances allowed, that is, after most 
Dissenters had joined the Church. There was no talk about scepticism or the 
22 Martin 1990, 71, 78; Bradley 1990, 49-52; Trevor-Roper 1991, 391. 
23 Martin 1990, 67-8; Tyacke 1991. 41; Schochet 1996, 177, 186. 
24 Bennett 1975, 11; Holmes 1993, 358-9. 
25 Spellman 1993, 137-8. 
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ineffectiveness of persecution that would have rendered universal toleration 
sensible. The validity of honest religious differences was acknowledged only 
by the most moderate of churchmen.26 Hardly any Englishman was ready to 
allow an anarchic plurality of separated sects.27 Some historians have suggested 
that Dissenters were tolerated just because persecution had proved inefficient 
and had even produced the opposite of the desired effect. A considerable 
proportion of the members of the established Church, however, continued to 
oppose toleration as a solution to religious diversity.2s 
Support for the law can also be interpreted as purely political: the purpose of 
the Act was to advance political unity by making some concessions in the 
direction of religious diversity. A limited toleration seemed to make sense, as 
persecution had brought no result and as a limited toleration might as well bring 
one, provided the political rights of the Dissenters remained restricted. 
Schochet has argued that the passage of the Act was merely politics of self-
interest, there being hardly any genuine intention to enhance tolerance at the 
cost of prejudices. The Act of Toleration was a continuation of previous 
attempts to exclude Dissenters from political life. Schochet has suggested that 
most leading politicians were indifferent to religious considerations, and thus 
Tories voted for the bill in order not to lose seats to dissenting Whigs, which 
would have been probable if the Dissenters had been allowed to enter the 
Church of England. The Act may also have been motivated by the need to 
protect the Church of England, as a limited toleration or indulgence remained 
the only available means for controlling religious dissent after comprehension 
and persecution had failed and real toleration remained out of question.29 
It is important to notice that the passage of the Act of Toleration was no 
reflection of a rapid transformation in attitudes toward religious diversity. It 
rather represented a very slow development from official persecution of 
religious dissidents to official indifference towards them.30 In the long run, of 
course, granting legal status to religious dissent fostered demands of genuine 
religious liberty. Even though Dissenters were discriminated against for 
another 140 years, legalised religious dissent provided an important precedent 
which could later be extended to dissent in other areas of life,3' including 
dissent in politics. 
After the passage of the Toleration Act, attitudes towards religious dissent 
developed in different directions within the religious and political elites. Two 
parties were formed within the Church, and they felt increasingly alienated 
from each other. The lower clergy and their influential allies among country 
squires found the reasons for a crisis within the Church in the actions of the 
moderate Anglican divines. Therefore, they established the High-Church party 
to counter the so-called Latitudinarians. The High Churchmen continued to fear 
26 Spellman 1993, 136-7. 
27 Goldie 1993b, 157. 
28 Grell, Israel and Tyacke 1991, 12. 
29 Martin 1990, 71, 78; Schochet 1990, 95-6; Schochet 1995, 121-2; Schochet 1996, 166, 
181-2. 
30 Schochet 1990, 95; Schochet 1992, 154; Schochet 1995, 121. 
31 Martin 1990, 78-9; Schochet 1996, 186-7. 
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the `fanaticism of the sects' no matter how irrational such a fear may have 
been.32 The politically motivated assembling of the Convocation again in 1701 
meant that they received a forum in which to express their frustration with the 
legalisation of dissent and the potential threat of heterodoxies spreading among 
parishioners. During the next ten years, the High Church criticised Whig 
governments for setting the Anglican Church in danger and Tory governments 
for the failure to promote the interest of the Church vigorously enough." 
In 1702, the High Church and Tory party started a campaign against 
toleration and more particularly against the detested practice of occasional 
conformity. The campaign, which aimed at excluding Dissenters from all 
offices and thus eliminating their political influence, was also directed against 
the political allies of Dissenters, the Whigs. In 1702-4, three bills against 
occasional conformity were passed by the Tory-dominated Commons but were 
defeated in the Whig-dominated Lords. It was only in 1711 that a bill of 
Occasional Conformity passed both houses, and it was followed in 1714 by the 
Schism Act directed against the school system of the Dissenters.34 
The new discriminatory legislation remained short-lived. At the end of the 
1710s, religious strife was once again intensified, as the leading Whig minister 
James Stanhope proposed the repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism 
Acts and the invalidation of the Test and Corporation Acts to relieve the status 
of the Dissenters and to strengthen Protestant interest in the country. As most 
Whigs were prepared to accept only a compromise restoring the legislative 
situation of 1689, the acts of 1711 and 1714 were repealed but the rest of the 
legislation left intact. Importantly, the legislative measure enabled Dissenters to 
hold office in local government. 
Governments realised that the popularity of the rival Tories could be best 
restricted by limiting the intensity of the sectarian conflict, and that was best 
done by avoiding radical reforms in religious questions. The suspension of 
Convocation in 1717 also diminished possibilities for ecclesiastical contro-
versies. Instead of extending toleration, Whig governments started to speak in 
favour of the established Church to gain its powerful support. Sympathy 
towards the Anglican Church naturally caused criticism among Whigs with 
dissenting sympathies, which contributed to the rise of Whig factions. On the 
other hand, the pro-Church attitude of the government decreased the relevance 
of religious issues in everyday politics, as Church leaders began to see the 
Whigs not as a danger but as the most influential defenders of the privileged 
status of the Church. In the 1720s, a shift in discourse occurred as religious 
controversy calmed and became gradually replaced by discourses such as the 
oppositional criticism of corruption. The relative calm did not mean, however, 
that religious disagreements ceased to influence political identities. Whereas 
the opposition of the 1730s might have agreed in opposing new taxation and 
criticising foreign policy, the attitude to dissent was still a divisive issue capable 
32 Spellman 1993, 138-9. 
33 Spurr 1991, 381-2; Webb 1992, 162-3. 
34 Bradley 1990, 52-3; Trevor-Roper 1991, 392-3. 
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of reviving old party feelings.35 
From the 1720s onwards, religious freedom in England was considerable. 
Dissenters could have their own religious meetings, which may have increased 
relaxed attitudes towards religion also amongst conformists. Though 
acceptance for toleration may have grown, particularly as the number of the 
Dissenters decreased, the Anglicans, who dominated Parliament, agreed in their 
attempts to maintain at least some of the spiritual monopoly of the established 
Church. The amount of toleration increased only de facto, not de jure. In 
practice, however, punishments were not applied to preachers who denounced 
Catholicism and approved most of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the established 
Church. Repeated Acts of Indemnity, passed from 1726 onwards, and the 
dissenting habit of attending Anglican communion to qualify for any office also 
brought relief to the principally strict legislation. Furthermore, by 1750, a 
gradual transformation in favour of toleration emerged as the English religious 
life — following continental pietistic trends — turned increasingly devotional 
and, as tensions between faith and reason became all the more distinct, thus 
leading to a deeper crisis of authority. On the other hand, it should be born in 
mind that the picture of England as a tolerant society is misleading in the sense 
that open hatred of religious minorities survived.36 
Together with the permanent existence of religious dissent, England 
experienced the intellectual consequences of the Scientific Revolution, the 
spokesmen of which advocated an empirical method of research. Importantly, 
however, the new science did not become a particular problem to the Church of 
England, as the Church, in order to counter enthusiasm of sects, soon started to 
defend Christian doctrines on the basis of selected findings of the Newtonian 
natural philosophy. This adaptability produced a rather harmonious 
relationship between the Church and secular science, which remained an 
essential feature of eighteenth-century English society.37 However, the rising 
experimental philosophy, though seemingly orthodox, wished to discuss even 
questions of faith without constraint, which entailed the danger of a conception 
of belief or even religion as mere debatable opinion. The paradox was that 
religion as a set of debatable opinions was certainly not what orthodox 
Anglicanism was looking for.38 
Unavoidably, Anglicanism was undergoing a crisis which culminated in the 
1690s and again in the 1720s and 1730s. The 1690s was a distressing decade to 
the Church for a number of reasons: The Church had only recently lost its 
spiritual monopoly as a result of the passage of the Toleration Act, the 
Episcopal Church had been deprived of its established status in Scotland, and 
35 Trevor-Roper 1991, 393-4; Albers 1993, 330; Walsh and Taylor 1993, 54-5; Wilson 1995, 
121-2; Hill 1996, 58, 63-4, 83. Hill and Wilson have interpreted the role of religious 
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36 Colley 1982, 12-13, 112; Langford 1989, 291, 293; Bradley 1990, 69-70; Webb 1992, 174, 
176, 179-81; Haydon 1993, 245, 259; Miller 1994, 296; Hill 1996, 202. The Indemnity Act 
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37 Gascoigne 1989, 2, 4; Holmes 1993, 145-6. 
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the clergy were expecting an intensified dissenting challenge also in England. 
In England, deism and Socinianism appeared to be gaining ground, sometimes 
questioning revelation and the sacred doctrine of Trinity. Clerical censorship of 
theological writings came to an end, and the lapse of prepublication censorship 
led to an increase in the number of heterodox titles. Open anticlericalism 
seemed to be becoming popular, and some of the populace showed signs of 
religious indifference by failing to attend services. As a consequence, all 
segments of the clergy could agree that the England of the 1690s was 
experiencing a wave of profaneness, immorality and danger.39 The period saw 
the publications of innumerable titles expressing anxiety about the rise of deism 
and atheism, as numerous Christians, both divines and laymen, feared the rise 
of a licentious society where everything could be freely discussed and where 
even atheist ideas could go uncontrolled 40 
Another period of intense challenge was experienced by churchmen in the 
1720s and 1730s, as deism seemed to be gaining popularity to a worrying 
degree among the political elite and became expressed as open anticlericalism 
in Parliament. Christianity appeared to be under attack and, paradoxically, 
defended by writers such as Matthew Tindal, commonly known for his 
advocacy of natural religion. At the same time, some theological positions 
proved difficult to defend, Whig governments wished to subordinate the 
Church to secular control, as many of the bishops showed more interest in 
temporal than spiritual affairs, and the Hanoverian court was suspected of 
heterodoxy. Some Tories also suspected that the Church might be promoting 
spiritual apathy and declining morality. In spite of repeated attempts to revive 
Convocation to resist new intellectual trends, it continued to be suspended. On 
the other hand, the deist challenge also did much to unite the previously hostile 
parties within the Church against a common enemy. In fact, Anglican 
orthodoxy was revived once the deist movement lost its vigour by the end of the 
1740s. From the late 1730s onwards, the established Church also experienced 
the rise of a new threat to uniformity, this time in the form of the `fanaticism' of 
the Evangelical Revival which called for a return to Reformation theology4'  
The rise of new science, deism and anticlericalism has been customarily 
linked with the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment offers a potential inter-
pretative context also for this study. It is a sympathetic concept used by 
historians to denominate not only an eighteenth-century intellectual movement 
characterised by secularisation, individualism, anti-traditionalism, emphasis on 
reason and belief in progress, but also a whole historical period,42 the 
Enlightenment being often used as a synonym for the eighteenth century. In this 
study, however, the synonymity of the two is questioned. The helpfulness of the 
universal term Enlightenment in connection with early eighteenth-century 
English history is not self-evident, as its use involves a danger of simplistic 
39 Bennett 1975, 45; Tyacke 1991, 44; Spellman 1993, 132-3; Rose 1993, 177; Walsh and 
Taylor 1993, 17; Holmes 1993, 219-20. 
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42 Ritter 1986, 133, 135. 
72 o THE CONTEXTS OF THE DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL PLURALISM 
generalisation. The term Enlightenment may make its user overlook the variety 
of early eighteenth-century political thinking and declare minor, often 
traditionalist, writers of the period unimportant and unprogressive, unable to 
introduce innovations, and hence difficult to fit to the universal picture of the 
Enlightenment.43 These overlooked writers, however, no less than canonised 
thinkers, endeavoured to conceptualise their experiences of change in political 
structures. In fact, their texts may be more revealing as to the then prevalent 
frames of mind among the political elite and even the people at large than those 
written by canonised figures of the Enlightenment. As Holmes has pointed out, 
in early eighteenth-century England there flourished numerous lines of political 
thought that diverged radically both from Lockean theories of natural law and 
from classical republicanism. Furthermore, many of the prevalent thought 
patterns are hard to fit into any progressive pattern of the European Enlighten-
ment.44 
In English historiography, it is usual to define the Enlightenment rather more 
restrictively: to progressive continental and Scottish philosophes of the later 
eighteenth century.45 References to 'the English Enlightenment' have remained 
few. One reason for this rarity of use may be the illusion that, in a country far 
advanced in secularisation, the Enlightenment could have been only a modest 
imitation of the real French movement 46 In contrast, it has been pointed out that 
hardly any Enlightenment thinker was an atheist, whereas much of the 
European Enlightenment aimed at reforms within Christianity rather than 
abolishing the established religion for good. Goldie has proposed that the 
possibility of an English Enlightenment should also be studied, as the 
eighteenth-century Church of England may also have provoked criticism of a 
corresponding kind.47 
Out of the many critical views toward the concept of Enlightenment can be 
mentioned that of Clark who has maintained that neither of the dominant 
sources of eighteenth-century English political discourse, law or religion, were 
characterised by features conventionally associated with modernisation. Given 
the strong support among the political elite for the Anglican Church, the term 
Enlightenment appears as an anachronistic and overwhelmingly positive 
explanatory model, particularly if considered identical to a process of 
secularisation and modernisation. In Clark's view, political texts of the 
Enlightenment conventionally interpreted as secular often contain arguments 
43 Enlightenment scholars have conventionally concentrated on mid- and late eighteenth-
century thinkers. Late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century thinkers they have often 
interpreted as predecessors of the Enlightenment proper. This approach may have entailed 
complexities and continuities of the earlier period having not been fully appreciated. See 
Kors 1987, 2. 
44 Holmes 1993, 377. 
45 Gascoigne has pointed to the rare use of the expression `English Enlightenment', the 
Enlightenment being considered primarily a French phenomenon that had some influence in 
Germany, Scotland, and also in some other parts of Europe but hardly England. Gascoigne 
1989, I; According to Pocock, the term can justifiably be used with reference to Scotland, 
but it is not necessary for describing eighteenth-century England. Pocock 1988, 174. 
46 Hill has suggested that no eighteenth-century English Enlightenment emerged because that 
had already taken place in the seventeenth century. Hill 1995, 67. 
47 Goldie 1993c, 31-2, 45. 
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derived from religious discourse.48 Likewise, Champion has questioned the use 
of the term Enlightenment which is rooted in the need to understand the French 
Revolution. The need to find the roots of the `real' continental Enlightenment 
may distort historical interpretations of early eighteenth-century England, as it 
encourages a search for such links between it and the later continental 
Enlightenment that remain questionable, including a progressive breakthrough 
of rational Christianity, rival radical materialism, and `democratic' thought. As 
a consequence of the use of the term Enlightenment, the vitality of traditionalist 
Anglicanism is easily overlooked.49  
An interpretation of 'the English Enlightenment' as a prelude to the later 
continental Enlightenment is, to some extent, based on French eighteenth-
century anglophile literature which typically admired England's liberty and its 
constitution. Even if such admiration may have reflected the values of the 
writers themselves rather than the realities of early eighteenth-century England, 
much of it has been taken as evidence of a close connection between early 
eighteenth-century England and the rise of the Enlightenment. To avoid the risk 
of being mislead by the employed terminology, however, it is best not to adopt 
the Enlightenment as a major explanatory device in this study. Particularly so, 
when the explicit purpose of the study is to focus also on what could well be 
called counter-Enlightenment, that is, thought that resisted secularisation and 
modernisation processes. Indeed, for the purposes of this study, it might be 
most helpful to ask how the contemporaries themselves understood expressions 
such as modernity, innovation, change and novelty. 
Modernity, innovation, novelty and change in early eighteenth-
century understanding 
Historians are naturally interested in the emergence of modernity, particularly 
in eighteenth-century England, a country with a reputation as the forerunner in 
modernisation. Views on the importance of focusing on modernity diverge, 
however. Whereas Richter has regretted the way in which Anglo-American 
historians have paid only limited attention to the emergence of modernity,50 
Burke has pointed out that such a variety of meanings has been connected with 
the adjective modern that the helpfulness of the term as a tool for historians is 
questionable.5 I 
Even if this is not merely a study on the rise of modernity, it is important to 
discuss how the early eighteenth-century English thinkers themselves under-
stood the `modern' vocabulary. They did not possess the expression modernity 
in the form used by twentieth-century scholars; yet they made use of terms 
related to things modern as opposed to things ancient. This vocabulary of 
modern consisted of terms such as modern, innovation, novelty and change, the 
48 Clark 1994, 12, 14-16. 
49 Champion 1992, 13-15. 
50 Richter 1995, 125. 
51 Burke 1997, 57. 
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senses of which are revealing as to contemporary attitudes towards change and 
modernity. These attitudes, in turn, were crucial to conceptual continuity and 
change, including the conceptualisations of political pluralism. 
The early eighteenth century was undoubtedly a period of significant 
changes. It has been argued Englishmen experienced unprecedented changes in 
many areas of life, no country, economy or society having lived through 
parallel transformations before. The major changes included a rapid expansion 
in administration and finance caused by massive warfare. The speed of change 
has been suggested to have risen further after 1700, changes becoming 
continuous. Pocock has argued that political thought also became occupied by a 
conscious recognition of change in the economic and social foundations of 
politics, and the language of trade, connected with the concepts of foreign 
policy, entered political discourse.5'
Even though the trend existed, for an overwhelming majority of the early 
eighteenth-century English, continuity of traditions remained a priority concern 
and any change appeared as a painful phenomenon even to recognise.53 No one 
was prepared to advocate openly change; even those entertaining radical ideas 
usually called for a return to the golden past, not progress through reforms 
towards a better society. It has been pointed out that, in seventeenth-century 
rhetoric, everyone wished to depict oneself as a defender of authentic tradition, 
and those alternative interpretations of tradition competed in public discourse 54 
The same rhetoric continued well into the eighteenth century. Continuity of 
rhetoric ensured that, at time of any crisis, people willingly referred to previous 
crises providing analogies of resistance to the same sort of threats 55 In early 
eighteenth-century England, these analogies were mostly found in the politico-
religious conflicts of the preceding century. It was typical, even of writers 
inclined to innovation, to legitimise their arguments by references to continuity 
with the national, collective and mythical past.56 
Contemporaries were aware that changes were taking place, both in everyday 
realities and public discourse, but their attitudes towards change varied 
according to the field of change. In science, the results of the new experimental 
method sometimes provoked overly optimistic expectations. Urbanisation, 
gradual industrial and colonial growth and developments in agriculture 
appeared differently depending on the observer. As far as the political system 
was concerned, however, any innovation and change continued to be viewed as 
destructive. In accordance with traditional thought patterns, changes were 
52 Pocock 1975, 423, 425; Langford 1989, 677; Jones 1992a, 8-9; Jones 1992b, 51. 
53 See, for instance, The Glorious Life and Actions of St. Whigg, 1708, 15, and Benjamin 
Griffin, Whig and Tory. A Comedy, 1720, 10, in which a Whiggish character declared that 
'the greatest blessing we enjoy is change' and was consequently interpreted to be a libertine; 
For paranoid fear of change, see also Clark 1994, 221. 
54 Condren 1994, 158; If some distinction is to be drawn between the two parties in attitudes 
toward change, it is obvious that the Tories tended to be suspicious, whereas the Whigs were 
more inclined to think positively about change, even though this must be understood as only 
a slight difference, the Whigs being far from a party which advocated modernity. Gascoigne 
1989, 147. 
55 Clark 1994, 222. 
56 Wilson 1995, 21. 
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considered signs of decline.57 Throughout the seventeenth century, most 
thinkers had remained dedicated to the pessimistic belief that novelty in thought 
was always degenerate, as, according to a widely shared early modern 
presumption, change both in the universe and in human affairs was necessarily 
change for the worse.58 
Suspicious attitudes toward political change were of ancient inheritance, and 
were not significantly transformed in the course of the early eighteenth 
century.59 Because of a shared appreciation for political traditions and suspicion 
of novelties, positive political change could be difficult to imagine. It was 
inconceivable to most Englishmen how the world's best political system could 
have been somehow improved, let alone the introduction of innovations. 
However, arguments about change frequently occurred in political discourse. It 
remained probably the most efficient rhetorical strategy to present one's own 
group as defenders of ancient conventions and the rivals as innovators violating 
inherited laws and customs. 
Accusations of innovation and suspicions of conspiracy were most likely to 
rise when religion was somehow thought at stake. In religion, the rhetoric of 
tradition was usual in defending the writer's points, whereas a rhetoric of 
innovation was used against opponents. The same pattern of argument was 
easily applied to political discourse. When the opposition claimed that 
government was neglecting the inherited liberties of the subjects and violating 
the ancient constitution, government would answer by accusing the opposition 
of attempting to introduce innovations. In politics, however, arguments of 
tradition were not merely used for opposing change; arguments of tradition 
could also facilitate adaption to change or even forward change. Rhetoric of 
change was thus also tradition-centred.60 This is a noteworthy point, as religious 
terminology was apparently used both to criticise change and to argue in favour 
of it. 
The senses of the vocabulary of modern and change in the early eighteenth 
century offer little support for arguments that the transition to modernity had 
taken place by the end of the seventeenth century. The meaning of the term 
modern remained stable, only an occasional new derivation emerging, and 
these neologisms supported inherited suspicious interpretations of the term 
rather than added new positive and future-oriented senses to it. Most dictionary 
definitions of the term were neutral, whereas in public discourse its senses were 
overwhelmingly pejorative. 
In dictionaries, modern was something like 'new, of late time'.61 Johnson 
(1755) also recalled the intellectual tensions between ancients and moderns. 
`Moderns' was the term for `those who have lived lately, as opposed to the 
57 Jones 1992a, 2-3; Skerpan 1992, 1-2. 
58 Harrison 1990, 103. 
59 See, for instance, Bolingbroke's statement in Bolingbroke, Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 
24, that most things in politics had changed for the worse, whereas the disappearance of the 
old party distinction was the only change for the better. 
60 
	
	 London Journal, no. 735, 28 July 1733, in Gentleman's Magazine (GM), Vol. III, July 1733. 
Reel 134; Langford 1989, 677, 679-80; Clark 1994, 221: Condren 1994, 153. 158-9. 
61 Gordon-Bailey 1730; Bailey 1733; Dyche-Pardon 1740/1750; Penning 1741. 
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ancients'. More particularly, it stood for seventeenth-century authorities as 
opposed to those of antiquity. Though politically marginal, the controversy 
between ancients and moderns may have led to an increasing tolerance of 
innovation and even to suspicion of tradition.62 An obvious neologism 
mentioned by Johnson in connection with modern vocabulary is interesting: 
modernism was a pejorative term referring to `deviation from the ancient and 
classical manner' and thus conveying a touch of scepticism as to the 
justification of substituting ancient traditions with modern innovations. Such 
reservedness of modern vocabulary is important to recognise. Contemporaries 
did not merely welcome modernity; rather they opposed or remained indifferent 
to it. 
Suspicions towards things modern are visible in political texts. In pamphlet 
literature, the attribute modern, when added in the front of a name of a party, 
regularly stood for a development towards something worse. Pamphleteers 
provided the reading audience of their own party with derogatory texts 
describing the character of 'a modern Tory', 'a modern Whig', `modern 
pleaders for an absolute, unrestrained toleration', 'the modern way of 
freethinking' and `modern politicians',63 all suggesting a negative turn. 
Whereas the Craftsman lamented the `few instances of modern patriots' as 
compared to the number of ancient ones, thus contrasting ancient Rome in a 
glorifying manner with eighteenth-century England, a governmental 
pamphleteer replied by writing an abusive history of 'the modern patriots' 64, as 
the opposition to Walpole wished to term themselves, thus giving the attribute 
modern its typically pejorative sense in a political context. 
In the mind of a late-twentieth-century reader, the expression innovation 
invokes positive associations with progress as opposed to stagnation. At the 
threshold of the twenty-first century, things at their best are considered 
innovative. In early eighteenth-century England, in contrast, describing some 
development as an innovation was one of the surest ways of making the 
audience suspicious towards it. Innovation was an inherently pejorative term; 
no-one would have spoken in favour of innovation in that society. This contrast 
underscores the necessity of carefully interpreting each concept before 
declaring the early eighteenth century as a take-off period for modernisation. 
Innovation was 'a bringing in of new customs or opinions, change, 
alteration' ,65 or, `change by the introduction of novelties'. The ambiguous 
connotative content of the term is visible in the quotations of Johnson's 
Dictionary. In the quotations with a negative undertone, traditionalists referred 
to the value of Christian and ancient authorities as opposed to innovation, either 
religious or political. Particularly interesting from the point of view of political 
62 Condren 1994, 160. 
63 	 The True Picture of a Modern Tory, 1702; Henry Stebbing, An Essay Concerning Civil 
Government, 1724; Thomas Dawson, Good Advice: In a Letter to a Friend, Concerning the 
Modern Way of Free-Thinking, 1731; The Craftsman, no. 312 (C312), 24 June 1732; C366, 
7 July 1733; C368, 21 June 1733. 
64 	 C213, 1 August 1730; The History of the Modern Patriots, 1732. 
65 See, for instance, Gordon-Bailey 1730; Parallel definitions appear in Martin 1749, A Pocket 
Dictionary 1753 and Wesley 1764. 
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change is a quotation from Swift in which he appears to accept shifts in political 
structures provided that they were slow and did not violate the constitution. 
Such readiness to accept gradual innovation was rarely expressed in published 
texts, and even more surprising it is to find it in a text of a traditionalist such as 
Swift. There are no reasons to draw conclusions about the rise of a positive 
sense of the term innovation, however, when more occurrences are analysed. In 
the eyes of many, nothing was more despicable than attempts to `innovate in 
matters of religion'.66 The texts of traditionalist preachers offer examples of 
defining innovation in utterly scathing terms. Atterbury contrasted 'the bold 
innovators in the faith' with the respectable orthodox and warned for `heresies 
and innovations'.67 Sacheverell extended the term innovation to concern the 
affairs of the state as well, insisting in his sermon of 5 November 1709 that 'no 
innovation whatsoever should be allowed in the fundamental constitution of 
any state, without a very pressing, nay unavoidable necessity for it'.68 Not 
unlike traditionalists, the organ of the opposition to Walpole considered 
innovations as something that 'must prove dangerous' 69 Many a republican 
writer was also careful to demonstrate that `ancient precedents' showed his 
proposal to be 'no innovation'?° An unanimous dissociation from innovation, 
both religious and political, is further illustrated by Langhorn Warren's sermon 
preached in connection with the rebellion of 1745. Warren urged his 
parishioners to 'have no communication with men of fluctuating notions, and 
unsettled principles, with respect to religion and government' as these were 
`factious tempers, who love innovation'.7' 
People were equally afraid of being suspected for favouring novelty, for 
having an `affection of novelty', or 'a fond desire after new, uncommon and 
odd things'.72 Novelty was a pejorative term arousing suspicions analogous to 
those caused by the term innovation. A novelty in politics was necessarily 
something breaking ancient customs which were generally regarded as the 
model for a mixed constitution. The Craftsman, for instance, presented 
robinarchy and robinocracy — both derived from the first name of the Prime 
Minister— as `political novelties' that, they claimed, Walpole's government had 
introduced.73  
Innovation and novelty meant change, and change was what an over-
whelming majority of early eighteenth-century writers feared. James Drake 
(1705) — an extreme case — maintained that Dissenters attempted to `bring about 
... great change in the constitution of Church or state'.74 Such Tory fears of 
66 	 See e.g. A Modest Defence of the Goverment, 1702, 28; Stebbing, An Essay Concerning 
Civil Government, 1724, 164. 
67 	 Francis Atterbury, A Letter to a Convocation-Man, 1697, 13, 26. 
68 	 Henry Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren, both in Church and State, 1709, 11. 
69 C745, 11 October 1740. 
70 	 Roger Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 19. 
71 	 Langhorn Warren, Religion and Loyalty inseparable, 1745, 5. 
72 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, 3.11.12; Dawson, Good 
Advice, 1731, 4, 33; Old Whig, No. 63, 20 May 1736, in GM, Vol. VI, May 1736, Reel 136. 
73 C172, 18 October 1729. 
74 	 [James Drake], The Memorial of the Church of England, 1705, 4: This originally anonymous 
pamphlet contributed to an intense debate that continued for over a year. The author, printer 
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change are also visible in the way Tory propaganda described Whigs as 
proponents of both religious and political change. Changing what was utterly 
unacceptable to change, such as Anglican Protestantism and the mixed form of 
government, could be presented as the main aim of the rival party.75 
Mandeville's Fable of the Bees (1714) was one of the very few crosscurrent 
texts that dared to suggest that `alternate changes in the civil society' were 
natural phenomena. For Mandeville, a physician himself, changes were so 
natural that he depicted them as parallel to some functions of the human body.76 
Similar views sympathetic towards change appeared sometimes among radical 
circles. John Trenchard, for instance, though not proceeding far in discussing 
the implications, pointed to the inevitability of both natural and political bodies 
experiencing `variations and injuries of time'.77 This was an indirect way of 
referring to the natural character of political change. 
Such modernist views remained few. The Craftsman, for instance, though 
representing the views of the opposition, did not openly advocate political 
change. Quite the contrary, the paper wrote about how a majority of 
Englishmen had been so `uneasy under the various alterations' during the Civil 
War that they had, after the crisis was settled, restored the `ancient foundation' 
of their constitution.78 Among the opposition to Walpole, belief in 
constitutional progress was almost nonexistent. These advocates of classical 
republicanism held negative views toward any change which they understood 
as a movement away from the preferred norms of stability, rationality and virtue 
towards degeneration, corruption and destruction of liberty and civic virtue.79 
In 1731, the Craftsman participated in a medico-political controversy which 
concerned, in passing, also the character of political change. A pamphlet had 
suggested that `political, as well as natural bodies, are subject to changes' and 
that the British political system was in a `declining state'. In his answer, the 
essayist of the Craftsman did not dispute the existence of political changes 
analogous to medical changes but took a more positive stand as to the 
possibilities of healing of what he saw as a corruptive illness in the political 
system. In a Craftsman published in 1733, the British constitution was depicted 
as 'a fleeting thing' that had changed in a manner analogous to changes in the 
human body caused by aging and illnesses. Such an organic analogical 
approach to the issue of political change survived in an essay published in 1740. 
Applying a multitude of medical terminology to the question of reforming the 
nation, the writer saw 'a total change' as inevitable in the British body politic. 
After pointing this out, however, he turned the essay into a humourous one so 
that the graveness of the statement remains questionable. As another essay 
published later the same year suggests, constant changes in the political system 
and publisher were eagerly looked for, and the publication itself was burnt by the common 
hangman. Tyacke 1991, 45. 
75 The True Genuine Tory-Address, And the True Genuine Whig-Address, 1710, 3, 11. 
76 	 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 1714, 258. 
77 [John Trenchard], Cato's Letters, The Third Edition, Reissued at New York 1969, no. 69 
(CL69), 10 March 1722. 
78 C103, 22 June 1728. 
79 Foord 1964, 158; Pocock 1975, 402; Greene 1994, 31. 
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were observed with caution among the editors of the Craftsman.80 
In other texts discussing political change, similar cautiousness is evident. In 
1732, an anonymous author came to the conclusion that a free form of 
government, by allowing a widespread interest in political issues, made people 
`dissatisfied with their present circumstance, and whimsically desirous of a 
change'. A nation such as the English was `naturally fond of change' 81 
Governmental writers replying to views presented in the Craftsman rather saw 
desire for political change among the advocates of the opposition. They 
suggested that the opponents of Walpole, being out of power and therefore 
discontented, wished to make use of people in order to carry out a political 
change favourable to their aims. In a parallel manner, a poem attacking the 
opposition and defending the stability of the Whig government lamented: 'Love 
of change the British race betray, And heaven's best gifts delight but for a day; 
With their own choice never can they long agree, Too wise for slaves, nor yet 
content when free'.82 
To this opposition to change which was based on the interests of the 
establishment should be added the opposition to change characteristic of 
religious communities, and not least the Church of England. Particularly in a 
time of crisis, Anglican pulpits offered sermons supporting the established 
order and presenting change of all types as impossible to accept. Warren, for 
instance, concerned about the consequences of the Jacobite rising of 1745, told 
his parishioners not to `meddle ... with them that are given to change', as a 
change was necessarily an unhappy event.83 Changes were taking place in most 
sections of life, including politics, but the nation was taught to beware of them. 
The language of political pluralism is an exemplary case of such resistance to 
change. 
Contemporary theories on language 
In methodological writings on the history of concepts, prevalent conceptions of 
the nature of language have been seen as a valuable context when conceptuali-
sations of politics are traced. Also in the early eighteenth century, the nature and 
proper use of language was debated, often in texts discussing pluralism. It has 
been suggested that seventeenth-century thinkers had been unable to trust 
ordinary language and had blamed it for confusing issues. The seventeenth 
century has been seen as having experienced a break between human and divine 
languages, so that language was no more considered God-given but created by 
ordinary people.84  A radical Lockean minority of the political nation may have 
80 C245, 13 March 1731; C375, 8 September 1733; C704, 5 January 1740; C745, 11 October 
1740. 
81 	 The Danger of Faction to a Free People, 1732, 6, 12. 
82 A Political Lecture, Occasioned by a late Political Catechism Address'd to the Freeholders, 
1733, 10-11; An Essay on Faction, 1733, 4. 
83 Warren, Religion and Loyalty inseparable, 1745, 5, 18. 
84 de Grazia 1980, 319. 
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held such a view, but many Englishmen hardly yet believed in completely 
secular language. Interesting is that a new approach to religious diversity 
emerged when some English thinkers started to explain it by linguistic 
diversity, paying particular attention to the way in which commonly used words 
could carry misleading meanings.85 A similar linguistic approach was 
sometimes also applied to the question of political diversity. 
In this subchapter, early eighteenth-century theories on language are 
discussed on the basis of statements that appear in the consulted source 
material. Genuine theorists on the nature of language other than Locke have not 
been consulted. Though seldom offering abstract interpretations on the nature 
of language of the type of Locke, a number of political authors referred to how 
they perceived language affecting political discourse. Their comments, though 
habitually directed towards the abuse of `political jargon' by opponents,86 
disclose the central role of certain religious concepts in political discourse. It 
was usually the critics of traditionalists who wrote about the deficiencies of 
language, often claimed to have been caused by vague use of religious 
terminology in politics. 
Locke's writings on language, though by no means universally read nor 
approved,87 may still have had an effect on conceptions of political language. At 
least they offer the most articulate formulation of a contemporary theory. In his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke dedicated considerable space 
to the philosophy of language. Highly conscious of linguistic change, he 
pointed out how new terms were constantly coming into use and old ones 
rejected. As customs and opinions changed, creating new combinations of ideas 
that were frequently thought and discussed, new terms were introduced to avoid 
unnecessarily lengthy descriptions. A great variety of ideas were absorbed in a 
single `short sound'; yet there was 'a close connection between ideas and 
words, and our abstract ideas and general words have ... [a] constant .. . 
relation one to another'. Words were `immediately the signs of men's ideas, and 
by that means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, 
and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within 
their own breasts'.88 This was how terms came into being and words and ideas 
were seen as inseparably interconnected. 
Though not taking a stand on contemporary political discourse, Locke 
referred to a tendency to misleadingly connect independent ideas and thus give 
rise to religious and philosophical contradictions.89 The close relationship 
between religion and politics taken into consideration, it may well have been of 
importance to the relationship between religious and political discourses that, 
according to Locke, one of the most dangerous errors arose when 'two different 
ideas, which a customary connection of them in ... minds has ... made in effect 
85 Harrison 1990, 155-6. 
86 The Daily Courant, 13 November 1734, in GM, November 1734, Reel 134. 
87 Locke's Essay Concerning Hunan Understanding was more often ridiculed than praised in 
the 1690s. Spellman 1993, 84. 
88 Locke, An Essay Concerning Hunan: Understanding, 1690, 2.22.7, 2.33.19, 3.2.6. 
89 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, 2.33.18. 
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but one, fills ... heads with false views, and ... reasonings with false 
consequences'.90 One of the most controversial elements of Locke's thought 
was his readiness to distinguish between the spiritual and the temporal. When 
another anticlerical Whig read Locke's statement, it may well have occurred to 
him to use it with reference to traditionalist churchmen who applied religious 
approaches to political issues. Those willing to draw distinctions between 
religion and politics may have read Locke's statement as an illustration of the 
consequences of mixing those areas of discourse. An example of shared 
conceptions can be found in Toland who argued that false aspects may have 
been connected with a concept, and such aspects could easily mislead naive 
persons using words uncritically.91  
Locke also pointed to the misunderstandings that arose when people 
supposed a word to mean exactly the same to themselves and to other users of 
the word, where that was not necessarily the case. Using a word according to an 
imagined `common acceptation of that language' did not secure that the idea the 
user connected with the word was identical with ideas connected to the word by 
other users. Writers failed to examine the exact significations of words and to 
define words they used. Furthermore, argued Locke, the very nature of words 
made many of them, particularly terms expressing complex ideas, unavoidably 
wavering in their meanings. Whereas common use regulated to some extent the 
meaning of everyday words, abstract terms were understood very differently by 
the speakers of the same language. These abstract words with undetermined 
significations included terms such as faith, religion and Church. It was difficult 
if not impossible for people to agree as to the meanings of these terms. 
Furthermore, argued Locke, there appeared intentional obscurity in terms for 
three reasons: (i) old terms were applied in unconventional senses; (ii) new 
ambiguous terms were introduced without bothering to define them; and (iii) 
terms were combined in ways that confused customary meanings. This 
linguistic ambiguity, or 'ill use of words', gave rise to numerous disputes. 
Locke was ready to go as far as to argue that 'the most I can find that the 
contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with 
another, is, that they speak different languages'.9- All this was very real in early 
eighteenth-century use of politico-religious terminology. 
Similar interpretations of political disputes as 'a meer war of words' were 
also put forward by less well-known writers.93 Ryder was convinced, after 
reading Locke, that people would seldom differ in their opinions if only they 
consistently used the same words in the same significations: `It is words that 
perplex us, and the difficulty is to get clear, distinct notions affixed to them'.94 
Lockean views on the inherent obscurity of language were also echoed in the 
90 Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, 2.33.18. 
91 	 For Toland, see Harrison 1990, 157. 
92 Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 1690, 3.2.4, 3.2.7, 3.2.8, 3.9.8-9, 
3.10.4. 3.10.6. 3.10.22: Differences in `language and terms' between parties were also 
pointed to in A Memorial of the Present State of the British Nation, 1722, 3. 
93 	 See [Daniel Defoe], The Ballance: Or, A New Test of the High-Fliers of all Sides, 1705, 43. 
94 	 The Diary of Dudley Ryder, ed. William Matthews, 1939, 24 December 1715. 155-6. 
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Independent Whig.95 It may have represented more widely held conceptions of 
the role of language when an author started his pamphlet in 1713: 'The 
misunderstanding, and from thence, the misapplication of some popular or 
hateful terms, have many times been one of the principal occasions of those 
national distractions wherein this kingdom has been often involved'. The words 
this author listed as frequently used yet incorrectly understood include politico-
religious terms such as Church, heresy, schism, faction, Tory, High Church, 
Whig and Low Church.96 In 1731, Thomas Dawson suggested that sects among 
divines might have been caused by differences in appearance of matters arising 
from terms being differently understood rather than from genuine 
disagreements.97 An awareness thus seems to have existed of the centrality and 
disputability of religious (and political) terms. 
In many a preface, attention was paid to the universal problem of ambiguities 
in language 98 A noteworthy instance of this sensitivity towards language is 
offered by the Bishop of Bangor Benjamin Hoadly's sermon The Nature of the 
Kingdom, or Church, of Christ (1717), which was preached in the royal 
presence and published by royal command, and which, with its views 
concerning the relationship between Church and state, occasioned the so-called 
Bangorian Controversy. When interpreting a Bible passage with constitutional 
implications, Hoadly expressed his views about the nature of language as well. 
Being aware of linguistic change through time, he stated: 'One of those great 
effects, which length of time is seen to bring along with it, is the alteration of the 
meaning annexed to certain sounds'. He then described how the signification of 
a word was 'very insensibly varied' when used by a variety of speakers so that 
a term finally came to stand for 'a complication of notions'. Further, argued 
Hoadly, words had affected the ways people perceived religious and other 
matters as they carried with them `multitudes of new inconsistent ideas'.99 
The anticlericals of the early 1720s expressed parallel views of varying 
meanings of religious language, suggesting that priests abused 'scripture 
language' by leaving terms for complex ideas undefined or by defining them in 
opposition to the original sense in Scripture. Whereas there was abuse of words 
in `civil life', abuse had been even greater in religion.100 Gordon wrote a special 
essay on the abuse of words in 1720, pointing out that words tended to become 
equivocal so that they signified different things to different people. This 
ambiguity was particularly true of the words of religion which, according to 
Gordon, had been `tortured into infinite variations, and puzzled and explained 
out of ... original importance and signification'.'°' 
95 	 [John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon], The Independent Whig, no. 35 (IW35), 14 September 
1720. 
96 [Daniel Defoe], Whigs turn'd Tories, 1713, 1; The opposition to Walpole readily added the 
term constitution on the list. C405, 6 April 1734. 
97 	 Dawson, Good Advice, 1731, 33. 
98 	 See e.g. C405, 6 April 1734, for a conventional start to an essay consisting of a complaint 
about the abuse of words. 
99 	 Benjamin Hoadly, The Nature of the Kingdom, or Church, of Christ, 1717, 3-5; Rupp has 
also paid attention to this aspect of Hoadly's sermon in Rupp 1986, 91. 
100 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW22, 15 June 1720; IW36, 21 September 1720. 
101 Thomas Gordon, The Humourist: Being Essays upon Several Subjects, 1720, 195-6. 
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The same theme of the abuse of words reappeared in periodicals published in 
the 1730s. A number of Universal Spectator (1735) began with the statement:12 
Words are themselves nothing, till they receive a reputation from the 
meaning they convey. It was therefore the idea that first created the 
word, till words by not being rightly understood began to convey false 
ideas, and so gave the first rise to the abuse of them. In divinity, there is 
not a word of any importance which has not been tortured a thousand 
ways, and defined, and explained till the original meaning was quite lost. 
It is noteworthy that the writer spoke separately about the civil (i.e. political) 
sense of words such as `king' and `lord' but still chose to call attention to 
religious terms as the primary objects of the abuse of words. He referred to the 
importance of the connotations that various terms had gathered and to the 
possibilities that these connotations created for the conscious application of the 
terms for particular purposes. Without a doubt, religious terminology was, in 
the 1730s, still applicable for expressing political views as well. 
The above statements reflect an awareness of the inherent ambiguity of 
vocabulary derived from the dominant religious discourse. Contemporaries 
were conscious of the plurality of meanings carried by each concept of religious 
origin and did not fail to make use of the existing ambiguities. They applied 
religious terms in new contexts to describe political change. They ventured to 
introduce a few neologisms for discussing political developments, though they 
seldom at first clearly defined what they meant with these novel terms. 103 In 
addition to religion, political neologisms could be borrowed from warfare and 
trade. Contemporaries also frequently created word combinations in which 
terms were used to describe analogous phenomena, though not necessarily in 
their original literal senses. In 1729, James Bramston described change in 
political language:10.4 
In state affairs use not the vulgar phrase, 
Talk words scarce known in good Queen Bess's days. 
New terms let war or traffic introduce, 
And try to bring persuading ships in use. 
Coin words: in coining never mind common sense, 
Provided the original be French. 
To things themselves if time such change affords, 
Can there be any trusting to our words. 
Sometimes fresh names in politics produce, 
And factions yet unheard of introduce. 
102 Universal Spectator, No. 526, in GM, January 1735, Vol. V, Reel 135; Other essays on the 
abuse of words include The Old Whig, No. 20, 24 July 1735, in GM, July 1735, Vol. V, Reel 
135. 
103 Locke wrote that people seldom dared to coin new words because of a prevailing fear of 
being considered 'guilty of affection of novelty'. Locke, An Essay Concerning Hunan 
Understanding, 1690, 3.11.12. 
104 James Bramston, Art of Politicks, 1729, 7-8. 
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This popular poem contains allusions to a tendency among politicians to favour 
French expressions at the cost of English ones, which was an understandable 
concern in a world where Francophone culture dominated. It also refers to 
political neologisms that had entered the English language after the golden age 
of Elizabeth, to the role of war and trade as sources of new terms — obviously as 
opposed to the traditional politico-religious vocabulary — and to the tendency of 
inventing new political expressions by abusing the inherited senses of old 
terms. The next two lines of the poem probably refer to a slight recognition of 
change and to the unreliability of words in expressing political realities. The 
final lines refer, with a negative undertone, to the number of names of political 
groupings that had emerged since the mid-seventeenth century. 
The language of politics, though dedicated to traditions, was also undergoing 
change together with change in political structures. Above all, it was becoming 
increasingly secular. But secular political language had not yet made an 
overwhelming breakthrough. Concepts borrowed from religious discourse and 
applied to political discourse continued to dominate debates such as the one 
concerning political pluralism. 
Later eighteenth-century disagreements about the language of politics have 
seldom been discussed by historians. Miller has argued that the small amount of 
theoretical debate about political concepts in Britain in the 1750s is explained 
by the shared attitudes of the opposition and government as to the common 
good.105 This calming down of disagreements suggests that a consensus about 
political terminology had been achieved by the mid-century. Any such 
conclusion, however, requires further demonstration. The rise of vocabularies 
of commerce, empire and other secular discourses at the cost of politico-
religious terminology may, of course, explain an emergence of a shared 
political vocabulary. Before its emergence, however, a conception of a separate 
character of the spheres of politics and religion must have become widely 
accepted. 
105 Miller 1994, 266. 
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Defining the Political: 
Alternative Senses of `Pont' 
Vocabulary 
Polity and politics 
For a number of historians, the early eighteenth century has appeared as a 
transformatory period in the relationship between the spheres of religion and 
politics. It has been maintained that the role of religion in public debate declined 
and the secular character of political discourse strengthened. Instead of being 
content with mere estimates about a growing separation between the two 
spheres, however, it might be helpful to trace genuine contemporary 
understandings of the political and the religious and their mutual relationship. 
One way to analyse these understandings is to focus on vocabularies of the 
political and the religious and the connections and distinctions that 
contemporaries drew between the two. 
This chapter has the limited goal of summarising alternative senses of early 
eighteenth-century `polit' vocabulary. In the following chapter, contemporary 
conceptions of the extensions of the sphere of religion are contrasted with those 
of politics. Such an endeavour facilitates an analysis of the application of 
religious terminology in the discourse on political pluralism in the ensuing 
chapters. Previous studies on the conceptual boundaries of the eighteenth-
century sphere of the political are few, which means that many of the alternative 
senses of the 'polit' vocabulary presented here were reconstructed on the basis 
of primary sources and studies concerning earlier periods. 
The early modern concept of politics was shaped by diverse lines of 
development. According to the traditional Aristotelian and Christian 
conceptions, politics in its highest form was the art of good government for 
realising the virtuous life of citizens. Ethics was taken as a branch of political 
philosophy that aimed at depicting true virtue. Since the early sixteenth century, 
however, these conceptions had been confronted by ideas of politics as the 
reason of state, the art of acquisition and maintanance of power with little 
attachment to morality. Politics was no more universally taken as the noblest of 
human sciences but could appear as a dishonourable and corrupt activity. The 
simultaneous existence of these competing conceptions of politics was reflected 
in early modern political vocabulary.' The terminology of the political was far 
from unproblematic also to early eighteenth-century English thinkers.' 
1 	 Sellin 1978, 790. 794, 808-9; Viroli 1992, 1-2. 
2 	 Compare with Koselleck 1988, 42, who has suggested that eighteenth-century Europeans 
used the concept politics 'in a seemingly neutral, objective sense'. Koselleck also argued that 
the eighteenth century experienced a `widespread devaluation of politics'. The first point 
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The roots of the word politicus stretch back to the translation of Aristotle's 
Politics in the thirteenth century. The term, its derivatives and its Latin 
equivalent civilis were thereafter used with reference to the city or state, to a 
statesman actively engaged in public affairs, to the constitution of the state, or to 
that form of constitution where rulers were many and the common interest the 
goal of government. Politicus was customarily used to denote the features of 
republican government, while other derivatives from polis or civilis were 
employed in a wider sense with reference to the state in general. In England, 
John Fortescue applied the term, instead of to republican regimes, to 
descriptions of monarchical government. This extension of the meaning was 
followed by Niccolö Machiavelli, whose reputation as a secular innovator in 
political thought contributed incomparably to the uncertainty in the meanings 
of `polit' vocabulary. Policy and politic, for instance, became used with 
reference to craftiness, deceitfulness and unethical conduct, not for constructive 
action. 
The development of modern political theories since Machiavelli has been 
interpreted as increasing secularisation within an autonomous area of politics. 
Such an interpretation may be an oversimplification, however, as the reception 
of secular political theories remained conflicting. Noteworthy is also the 
transformation brought about by the expansion of vernacular languages. The 
impact of an expansion in 'polit' vocabulary could still be felt in seventeenth-
century political discourse in the form of a continuous fear of the growth and 
instability of vocabulary.' A further pejorative connotation of `polit' 
vocabulary had emerged from the French religious wars, politique having been 
used to describe those who were prepared to make compromises in religious 
issues in order to reconcile political disputes. Englishmen consciously looked 
for French precedents when endeavouring to explain problems in their own 
political system, and the habit of referring to late sixteenth-century French 
history remained vital all through the first half of the eighteenth century. 
Contemporary political events, including discrimination against religious 
Dissenters, were compared with the French Wars of Religion. The French 
religion-related conflict had led to transformations in political theory and 
political concepts, and these transformations had an effect on English political 
thought as well.4 As a result of the mentioned developments, seventeenth-
century `polit' vocabulary was ambivalent, associated with religious and ethical 
indifference, yet carrying some constitutionalist meaning.' 
does not appear to fit early eighteenth-century England because of the multiplicity of 
meanings associated with politics and because of their frequently derogatory senses. 
Devaluation of politics was necessarily diminished by the already low status of political 
activity in public discourse. 
3 	 Rubinstein 1987, 41-2, 45-6, 48-9, 52-6; Condren 1994, 27-30. 
4 Salmon 1959, 3-5, 158-9, 165; For references to the French religious wars, see Fog's 
Journal, No. 237, 19 May 1733, and No. 261, 3 November 1733, in GM, Vol. III, May 1733, 
and November 1733, Reel 134. 
5 	 Compare with Sharpe and Zwicker who suggested that the conception of politics changed by 
the end of the seventeenth century: whereas early seventeenth-century Englishmen had 
seldom defined politics as a struggle for power between competing groups of politicians and 
their alternative political programmes, politics had become a respectable part of life by the 
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Late seventeenth-century `polit' vocabulary was neither unambiguous nor 
entirely secular. The occurrence of `polit' vocabulary alone does not prove that 
an unambiguous conception of the political existed. Neither does a failure to 
write in `polit' vocabulary need to be considered a sign of a lack of political 
awareness. The general sense of public activity implied that writers on political 
theory could employ both legal and religious terminology, religion being 
associated with rules that held society together. The terms politic, politician and 
policy carried opposing connotations and did not refer to a particular sphere of 
human experience known as `politics'. The word politic, for instance, was used 
pejoratively in areas of discourse which had nothing to do with political 
activity. The connotations of the `polit' terms were primarily negative 
references to immorality, cunning and machiavellianism. However, references 
to good or true policy also occurred, and politic could occasionally stand even 
for prudence.6 
The early modern clash between classical and modern political theories and 
the connected ambiguity of `polit' vocabulary continued well into the 
eighteenth century. 'Polit' terminology did not refer to a specific area of 
`politics', its connotations remained conflicting, and it was not infrequently 
religious in undertone. A continuous division between ancient and `modern' 
politics is illustrated by quotations from traditionalist writers who eagerly 
directed their points against their political opponents, the Whigs. One of them 
summarised the development:7 
... there has appeared a class of men, since the sixteenth century, (at 
whose head we may place Nicholas Machiavel) who have endeavoured 
to introduce a very different notion of policy. They have had no manner 
of regard to the natural and inviolable end of all reasonable societies; but 
only examined by what methods the heads of the societies may render 
themselves absolute masters of the laws, .. . 
William Whiston contrasted the traditionalist values `truth, honesty, religion, 
and Christianity' with `deceit, fraud, worldly politics, and knavery' represented 
by the Machiavellian alternative.' A letter of Thomas Hearne, written during the 
Succession Crisis of the mid-1710s, gives another illustration of the continuous 
conflict between classical and modern understandings of politics, Hearne 
regretting how, at the University of Oxford,' 
end of the century. Sharpe and Zwicker 1987, 5. Such a claim is, however, an exaggeration 
that needs to be re-examined in the light of early eighteenth-century conceptual 
developments. Sharpe and Zwicker based their interpretation on a letter of Swift reporting 
his having been involved in politics. It is highly questionable, however, whether a single 
letter can demonstrate a general change in linguistic usage. 
6 	 Condren 1994, 17, 32, 43-4, 46-7. 
7 	 Le Parterre de Fleurs, 1710, 163. 
8 	 [William Whiston], Scripture Politicks: Or, an Impartial Account of the Origin and 
Measures of Government Ecclesiastical and Civil, 1717, 146. 
9 	 Thomas Hearne to Dr Woodward, 6 September 1714, Remarks and Collections of Thomas 
Hearne, ed. C.E. Doble, Oxford 1885, Vol. IV, 402. 
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the study of modern politics is in vogue here, as well as at London, to no 
small disservice of learning. I wish the ancients were read upon this 
subject, which would be to the increase of virtue and learning. 
A hint to the division between classical and modern learning can also be found 
in Benjamin Griffin's play Whig and Tory which criticised `modern' politicians 
for changing their principles whenever the ministry changes.10 The expression 
`modern politicians' also appeared in the Craftsman with a distinctly pejorative 
connotation." 
The exact meanings of the ambiguous `polit' words are not always easy to 
distinguish. Arnold Heidenheimer has suggested that, since the early modern 
period, policy carried a more noninstitutional, intentional kind of meaning 
related to administration and public affairs. As the term was increasingly 
applied not only to the political elite but also to the actions of common people, 
its positive connotations strengthened. When issues such as power, authority, 
conflict and participation were concerned, however, politics was regarded as 
the more proper concept.12 
Early eighteenth-century dictionaries give illustrative insight into the 
meanings of `polit' vocabulary. Polity and its synonym policy were generally 
defined as `government of Church and state', or, as in Martin (1749), as 
`Church or state', thus leaving the question of the separate status of the two 
institutions open. Secularisation of the `polit' vocabulary is visible as some 
dictionaries started to reject reference to the Church and concentrate merely on 
the government of state. Chambers (1728) already pointed out that some - but 
not everyone - considered ecclesiastical government as a part of policy. 
Whereas in the beginning of the century, polity was still customarily linked with 
ecclesiastical affairs, many dictionaries from the 1730s onwards omitted this 
connection and defined polity as 'the governance or rule of a town, 
commonwealth, (state) etc'. Policy and polity could also be defined as 'the 
laws, orders, and regulations, prescribed for the conduct and government of 
states and communities'. Sometimes a distinction was also drawn between the 
two: For Fenning (1741), polity was 'a form of government, a civil institution' 
whereas policy stood for 'the art of government'. Most compilers of 
dictionaries continued to emphasise the crafty, subtle and prudent 
characteristics of policy. Johnson's authoritative definition for polity was based 
on both Richard Hooker and Locke, thus taking both extremes of seventeenth-
century political theory into account. Johnson's definition itself, polity as 'a 
form of government; civil constitution', appears as a purely secular one.13 An 
10 Griffin, Whig and Tory, 1720, 17. 
11 	 C311, 17 June 1732. 
12 	 Heidenheimer 1986, 4, 6-7, 14; Heidenheimer's thesis may well be valid but is weakened by 
being based merely on the OED, whereas a consultation of primary sources is clearly needed 
for such an analysis. 
13 Coles 1701; Coles-Johnson 1732; Cocker-Hawkins 1704; Phillips-Kersey 1706; 
Glossographia 1707; Kersey 1715; Chambers 1728; Gordon-Bailey 1730; Kersey 1731; 
Bailey 1733; Dyche-Pardon 1740; Fenning 1741; Martin 1749; A Pocket Dictionary 1753; 
Johnson 1755; Wesley 1764. 
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undeniable secularisation at the level of dictionary definitions for polity is thus 
traceable, and, in the case of polity, the development was leading to more 
strictly `political' senses of the term being established. 
At the same time, the term politics retained much of its inherited ambiguity. It 
was given two major senses, one referring to writings on government, the other 
to the actual art of governing. The emphasis between these two senses varied 
from dictionary to dictionary. Coles's seventeenth-century English Dictionary 
continued to define politics merely as treatises of government of either Church 
or state. The editors of Cocker's dictionary were not more conscious of 
conceptual change, as the definition for the term changed between 1704 and 
1724 but its content remained essentially the same, politics being, in 1704, 
`books or discourses about states' and, in 1724, `treatises or common discourses 
of government in Church and state'. It is certainly difficult to fit the fact that the 
role of religion in political discourse was more distinctly stated in the latter 
edition to a pattern of linear secularisation of politics. Furthermore, politics 
remained simply a discipline in a very limited sense. The 1719 edition of 
Bullokar's early seventeenth-century English Expositor was also content with a 
secular but ancient definition of politics as `books written touching the 
government of a city'. 
Politics as written polemic is exemplified by Locke's letter in which he 
maintained (in opposition to general knowledge) that he was `little acquainted 
with books, especially on these subjects relating to politics'." Swift often 
regretted his `treating' the addressee of a letter `with politics' and his having to 
'talk politics', yet offered long descriptions of political events of the day. Other 
examples of politics as text discussing political issues are also numerous.15 For 
the writers of the 1700s and 1710s, politics continued to be essentially texts. 
Interestingly, however, the consulted material does not contain instances of 
politics having been used to refer to political polemic dating after 1720. The 
traditional sense of politics as text is unlikely to have disappeared overnight, but 
its uses were becoming less frequent, whereas the sense of politics as a more 
practical art of governing was becoming increasingly dominant. 
The sense of politics as the art of governing became more frequently stated. 
Phillips-Kersey (1706) and Glossographia Anglicana Nova (1707) already 
maintained that politics was 'the art of governing a state' though had a 
secondary sense of 'a book, or treatise of political affairs'. References to 
political literature were omitted by some dictionaries16 but restated by others". 
14 	 Locke to [Richard King], 25 August 1703, The Correspondence of Jolm Locke, ed. E.S. de 
Beer, Oxford 1982, Vol. VIII, 59. 
15 For example, Swift to the Reverend William Tisdall, London, 16 December 1703, The 
Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, ed. Harold Williams, Oxford 1965, Vol. 1, 38; Jonathan 
Swift, Journal to Stella, ed. Harold Williams, Oxford 1963, 25 August 1711, Vol. I, No. 39, 
346, 18 December 1712, Vol. II, No. 57, 593, 25 January 1713, Vol. II, No. 59, 608; A 
Presbyterian Getting On Horse-Back, 1717, 33, 41; [Charles Davenant], The Old and 
Modern Whig Truly Represented, 1702, 2; The Way to Bring the World to Rights, 1711, 4-5; 
[John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon], A Collection of all the Humorous Letters, No. 3, 14 
May 1720, 16. 
16 Kersey 1715 and 1731; Fenning 1741; Wesley 1764. 
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The dual meaning of the concept remained so evident that Defoe's New English 
Dictionary (1737), which promised particularly to omit words of no real use, 
presented politics as either 'the art of government, or books which treat upon 
those subjects'. Johnson (1755) expressed the same by defining politics as 
either 'the science of government' or 'the art and practice of administrating 
public affairs'. 
Politics as something more than mere writing appeared in varied but 
predominantly pejorative contexts, referring to politics as scheming or as a sort 
of national entertainment. In a dialogue, plot-shamming might be called 'one of 
the greatest turns in politics'.1 8 Adherents of classical republicanism, who were 
eager to undescore the role of virtue in politics, might argue that `generosity, 
self denial, and private and personal virtues are in politics, but mere names, or 
rather cant-words, that go for nothing with wise men, though they may cheat the 
vulgar'.19 In a diary, the writer might report his relatives, who were supporters 
of the opposing party and eager to 'talk of politics', justifying the policy of the 
previous ministry by claiming that 'all their treachery, knavery, and cheating 
the nation and destroying its trade is to be accounted nothing else but politics', 
as opposed to morality.'-° In a comedy ridiculing public discourse on political 
issues in coffee houses, a coffee house politician declared: `I say that politics 
are everything; it is the most noble of all sciences, the most useful of all arts, and 
the most delectable of all enjoyments'. While this fool of the play was 
enchanted by politics that `governs kingdoms, upholds states, balances 
empires', his more civilised friend concentrated on poetry, the opposite of 
politics?' Politics thus appeared as speculation and plotting on public affairs in 
at least a slightly sinister sense. 
Evidence against a rapid separation of politics from ethics is offered by 
Chambers's (1728) and Gordon-Bailey's (1730) definitions which saw politics 
as 'the first part of ethics, or the art of governing a state or commonwealth, for 
the maintainance of the public safety, order, tranquillity, and good morals' and 
by Dyche-Pardon's (1740) definition of politics as 'that part of ethics or moral 
philosophy, that relates to the well-governing a state or kingdom'. Importantly, 
however, these editors did not refer to religious issues when defining politics." 
Politics and the Church were no more associated in mid-eighteenth-century 
definitions. The 1720s would seem to have been a turning point in the adoption 
of a narrower concept of politics concerning mere `state matters'.23 
17 Gordon-Bailey 1730; Bailey 1733; Martin 1749. 
18 	 The True Picture of an Ancient Tory, 1702, 43. 
19 [Gordon], CL11, 7 January 1720. 
20 	 The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 24 June 1715, 42. 
21 [James Miller], The Coffee-House, 1737, 5. 
22 Potential continental influence on English thought is represented by Pierre Bayle's 
Dictionary (1697) which defined politics as 'the art both of governing and deceiving men' 
which was 'no new invention' but rather 'the same play acted over again; the same comedy, 
and farce'. The masters of the art of politics needed both qualifications to achieve public 
good. The Dictionary ... of Mr Peter Boyle, 1734-38, Vol. 5, 752. 
23 Compare with Phiddian 1989, 66, who suggests that the early eighteenth-century concept of 
`politics' was essentially a narrow one. 
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One way of forming expressions for political discourse was to connect the 
word politics to another term by using the preposition in. This method was used 
creatively against political opponents; none of the found instances carried an 
unambiguously positive connotation of politics. John Evelyn, for instance, 
regarded Dr King, the Archbishop of Dublin, as 'a sharp ready man in politics', 
which was not necessarily a merit for a clergyman in post-revolutionary 
England. Early eighteenth-century texts also contained references to `students 
in politics', `striplings in politics', `sages in politics', `experts in politics', 
`conjurers in politics', `jobbers in politics', `squabblers in politics', and 'Don 
Quixotes in politics', all used in a highly ironical sense. To these combinations 
should be added phrases such as `saints in politics',24 in which religious 
enthusiasm of the sort of the Civil War period was combined with politics in 
order to achieve a polemical effect directed against opponents. As late as 1742, 
cooperation among the opposition was rejected as `Methodism in politics'.25 All 
in all, politics appeared as an activity with which few writers wished to be 
openly associated. At the same time, political rivals were frequently accused of 
involvement in politics. Sometimes their activities were compared with what 
was seen as analogous religious phenomena. 
Politic and political 
The adjectives of the `polit' vocabulary were experiencing at least two 
transformations during the early eighteenth century. The attribute politic was in 
the process of losing its inherited pejorative connotations and becoming 
synonymous with political, an attribute that became more frequently used and 
lacked unavoidably pejorative connotations. Both transformations decreased 
the relevance of religious associations in political discourse, including the 
discourse on political pluralism. 
The term politic had originally referred to the politiques of late sixteenth-
century France, an opportunist and moderate party that had regarded peace and 
political reform as more urgent than trying to solve religious quarrels by the use 
of arms.26 It had initially been a proper party name in a confessional conflict, 
both major sides of which had condemned this sort of `Machiavellian' thought 
seen as ready to tolerate several forms of religion and hence threaten the unity 
of the nation. The leading religious parties, which had both considered 
themselves as defenders of the Christian concept of politics, had depicted 
politiques as nzachiavellistes, heretics and atheists and inserted tyrannical and 
irreligious qualities into their image. 
The same confrontation of traditional and modern concepts of politics 
24 	 The Diary of John Evelyn, 4 June 1705, Vol. V, Kalendarium, 1690-1706, Oxford 1955, 597; 
The True Picture of an Ancient Tory, 1702, 34; [Edward Ward], A Fair Shell, but a Rotten 
Kernel, 1705, 17; [Gordon], CL38, 22 July 1721; [Trenchard], CL82, 23 June 1722; C14, 20 
January 1727; C170, 30 August 1729; C311, 17 June 1732; C380, 13 October 1733. 
25 Colley 1982, 97. 
26 OED: politic. 
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continued in most European countries throughout the seventeenth century'-' and 
provides background to early eighteenth-century use of 'polit' vocabulary 
against opponents who were willingly represented as supporters of heresies, 
irreligion and tyranny. The senses of the word politic in early modern English, 
when referring to persons, included 'apt at pursuing a policy, sagacious, 
prudent, shrewd' and `scheming, crafty, cunning'. Among several sinister 
quotations offered by the OED, Satan was termed 'a politic hunter' and 'a 
politic or cunning man' was said to know how to compass his end. Politic had 
also stood for an indifferentist in matters of religion, Machiavelli being 
described as 'a politic not much affected to any religion' and a politic man being 
called 'a carnal fellow' and one 'who cares not what religion be'.28 This sense of 
politic as a religious indifferentist, though suggested to have become obsolete, 
may well have survived in some early eighteenth-century texts. The writers 
knew that their audience was familiar with such a connotation and hardly failed 
to make use of it when a suitable chance appeared. In the translation of Moreri's 
Great Historical... Dictionary (1701), the only sense given to politics was that 
of the faction or party of politiques who did not concern themselves with 
religion during the French Wars of Religion.29 
Distinct instances of an exploitation of connotations derived from the French 
Wars of Religion are not easy to identify, as the term politic was often used in a 
parallel way with the term political before political was adopted in common use. 
Such exploitation may have been involved when a defender of the Occasional 
Conformity bill called the proponents of the rights of the Dissenters `Modern 
Whigs, and Politic Dissenters',30 thus implying that the Whigs had abandoned 
their original principles and Dissenters had moved from a religious to a political 
movement. Religious associations were also in use when Sacheverell claimed in 
1713 that `politic mutineers' abused religion by attempting to provoke fear 
among `credulous and ignorant people' 31 The same rhetorical technique may 
have been employed when Addison wrote about the `politic predecessors' of 
parish clerks, who on every Sunday at the time of Cromwell had been 'for 
binding kings in chains, and nobles in links of iron'.32 As late as 1718, Eubulus 
(pseudonym) accused 'some very politic heads' of dividing the English into 
High and Low Church,33 which certainly carried an inherently pejorative sense. 
By contrast, Steele's way of using the word politic in the Taller was secular 
and comes very close to the term political when he stated that `politic persons' 
were so `public-spirited' that they neglected their own affairs while perusing 
27 Sellin 1978, 812-13; Weinacht 1989, 1049-50. 
28 OED: politic. 
29 Other dictionaries seldom brought up this sense, and it should be noticed that this dictionary 
expressed a French understanding of the term which was not necessarily shared by all 
Englishmen; Politiques as politicks were also discussed in Peter Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, 
609-10. 
30 [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, 4. 
31 	 Henry Sacheverell, False Notions of Liberty in Religion and Government, 1713, 15. 
32 Joseph Addison, The Freeholder, ed. James Leheny, Oxford 1979, No. 53 (F53), 22 June 
1716. 
33 A Letter to the Free-Thinker; with some Remarks upon his Conduct, 1718, 8. 
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`transactions of state'.34 It is also important to notice that politic could 
occasionally appear in a context that made it sound positive in its connotations, 
as in Charles Gildon's essay from 1694:35 
... like a politic and faithful statesman, he was continually studying the 
government, and the most proper methods for settling peace and 
tranquility throughout the whole kingdom, and in order hereunto, he 
resolved upon correcting the vices of the age, encouraging virtue, 
establishing good orders, and reforming corruptions .. . 
Particularly with reference to appreciated monarchs, politic could carry a 
distinctly positive sense. Whereas Defoe called the adored Queen Elizabeth 'a 
politic princess', he presented other leaders as 'impolitic' .36 Ryder reported how 
an acquaintance of his had speculated on what George I should have done in 
relation to the Tory party in order to be `prudent and politic'.37 
The connotations of the term politic thus remained highly contradictory. 
Only the context revealed the evaluative content of the term. The word still 
carried a burden of pejorative connotations derived from an assumed hostility 
of politic persons to Christianity and thus provided a powerful expression for 
political polemic. In dictionaries, politic was universally seen as crafty, subtle, 
cunning, artful and prudent, but, importantly, restricted to references to civil 
government, rather than religious issues. In a dialogue mocking the Tory party 
as potentially treasonous, one of the characters asserted that 'it was not 
impoliticly done in our friends, thus to espouse the cause of the Church, ... [to] 
strengthen our party'.38 A pamphlet writer started his protestations of 
impartiality by stating that 'it is no very politic thing to side with no party, when 
all people seem mad to be in one party or other'.39 Finally, in a polemical title, 
impertinent appeared as an opposite of politic.40 
The term politic could also be employed in secular and less derogatory 
contexts in which its meaning was hardly distinguishable from its later 
synonym political. Dictionaries published after 1730 made no distinction 
between the term politic and its synonym. According to Gordon-Bailey (1730), 
politic and political both referred to something `belonging to policy or politics'. 
Whereas Bailey (1733) omitted the term politic, Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) 
interpreted politic and political as synonyms for `cunning, well-contrived, 
belonging to politics'. According to both Fenning (1741) and Johnson (1755), 
politic stood almost always for political or civil41, body politic and the general 
34 Richard Steele, The Tatler, ed. Donald F. Bond, Oxford 1987, No. 1 (T1), 12 April 1709. 
35 The Century of Prose Corpus (COPC), ed. Louis T. Milis, Cleveland State University: 
Charles Gildon, Miscellaneous Letters and Essays, 1694. 
36 	 [Daniel Defoe], A New Test, 1702, 5; [Daniel Defoe], An Essay on the History of Parties, 
1711, 26; Elizabeth was seen as politic also in A Memorial of the Present State of the British 
Nation, 1722, 5. 
37 	 The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 22 July 1715, 59. 
38 	 The True Picture of a Modern Tory, 1702, 5. 
39 [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, preface. 
40 The Political Quack's Advice, 1705. 
41 	 Civil was a near synonym of political lacking pejorative associations and being distinguished 
from religion as 'not ecclesiastical' by Johnson (1755). According to Gordon-Bailey (1730), 
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non-political sense of artful being the only exceptions °'- Out of numerous 
instances of the use of politic as a synonym for political can be mentioned 
Toland's Christianity not Mysterious (1696), in which he wrote about `politic 
and secular affairs' as opposed to religion. Toland also employed the old 
derogatory sense of the word when suggesting that a man following nature 
might explain religion simply as 'a politic trick invented by statesmen to awe 
the credulous vulgar'. He mixed the two senses when hinting that, during a state 
of forced uniformity, religion was often `purely embraced out of politic 
considerations'.43 Likewise, a later defender of religious toleration offered 
`politic reasons for toleration' in his pamphlet.44 An unambiguous example of 
the synonymity of politic and political is offered by Defoe's suggestion, 
referring to the tendency to mix political and religious issues, that the Low-
Church Whigs were not ready genuinely to support Dissenters as a `religious 
party' but did accept them as members of their own `politic party'.45 In addition 
to demonstrating the synonymity of the mentioned attributes, this quotation is 
one of the few early eighteenth-century instances in which an unambiguous 
distinction between religious and political parties is drawn. 
Political, if separately defined at all, was, in entries inherited from the 
seventeenth century, seen as `belonging to government of Church or state', or, 
from the late 1720s onwards, simply to civil government. Chambers (1728) 
already defined it as `something that relates to policy or civil government' and 
provided instances of expressions such as `political interest', `political views' 
and `political discourses'. According to both Fenning and Johnson, political 
was related to 'the administration of public affairs' only, with an alternative 
sense of cunning and skillfulness.46 An increase in the use of this attribute as an 
alternative to the term politic contributed to the disappearance of associations 
between political activities and religious indifference and thus facilitated 
secularisation of political discourse. In the beginning of the century, political 
was yet rather seldom used, Bishop Nicolson, for instance, recalling the `bitter 
political controversy, in Church as well as state matters, in the years 1702-4' in 
connection with the bill for Occasional Conformity47 and Swift reporting how 
he had received information from persons 'who are fonder of political 
refinements than I am' 48 
At the dawn of the century, politic was still the word generally applied by 
writers. The rise of the attribute political can be particularly well seen in the 
Craftsman which already wrote very positively about themes such as `political 
affairs', 'the political art', 'a political seminary', `political morality', `political 
virtues', `political regeneration', `political duties ... equally obligatory with the 
in its general sense, it was `something that respects the policy, public good or repose of the 
citizens, city or state'. Dyche and Pardon (1740/1750) told that, in its political sense, civil 
referred to `belonging to the management, regulation, and government of a city, state or 
kingdom'. Interestingly, some dictionarists such as Fenning still followed ancient traditions 
so that they restricted the term civil to concern 'that which belongs to a city, or the 
government thereof', with no reference to state. 
42 Glossographia 1707; Kersey 1715; Bullokar-Browne 1719; Gordon-Bailey 1730; Kersey 
1731; Bailey 1733; Dyche-Pardon 1740/1750; Fenning 1741; Martin 1749; Johnson 1755. 
43 	 [John Toland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, v, 58, 162. 
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moral or Christian', and `political jealousy'. In addition, the Craftsman 
mentioned, with a more critical tone, `offences, of a political nature' as equally 
unavoidable with moral offences and sins, and accused the ministry of 
introducing `political novelties' and `political schemes and measures'. 
Bolingbroke's Dissertation upon Parties, originally published in the same 
periodical, contains dozens of instances of the attribute political being used in 
both positive and negative senses. In contrast, the previously dominant attribute 
politic does not occur at all 69 
Even if a minority usage in the beginning, a small linguistic shift could 
change much in the connotations of the concept of politics, particularly when 
applied by an influential moulder of political discourse such as the Craftsman. 
Though far from conclusive evidence of the suggested linguistic change, it is 
interesting to see how John Wesley, the leader of the Methodist awakening and 
one of the least radical of thinkers, who lamented the secularisation of politics, 
distinguished between `political reasons' and `providential reasons',50 using the 
more neutral attribute for politics and separating simultaneously between the 
temporal and spiritual. The term politic had carried plenty of pejorative 
connotations derived from confessional conflicts, whereas the term political 
was a neutral if not even a positive expression. 
Politicians, statesmen and machiavils 
Like the entire `polit' vocabulary, the term politician possessed conflicting 
meanings after its first occurrence in English in the late sixteenth century. The 
Latin politicus had been used for a political thinker and debater, for a political 
writer, or for a person using political learning in practice,51 and all these senses 
were assimilated in early modern English usage. The sinister sense of politician 
as 'a shrewd schemer, a crafty plotter or intriguer' was employed frequently: 
the devil might appear as the chief politician; a politician could be claimed to 
break oaths by profession; and it was suggested that a politician studied only his 
own ends.52 Such a cynical attitude towards politicians appeared frequently in 
44 	 [John Dennis], The Danger of Priestcraft to Religion and Government, 1702. 
45 	 [Daniel Defoe], The Weakest go to the Wall, 1714, 40. 
46 Coles 1701; Kersey 1715; Chambers 1728; Kersey 1731; [Defoe] 1737; Fenning 1741; A 
Pocket Dictionary 1753; Johnson 1755. 
47 	 The London Diaries of William Nicolson, Bishop of Carlisle 1702-1718, ed. Clyve Jones and 
Geoffrey Holmes, Oxford 1985, spring 1711, 570; In some early eighteenth-century 
experiences, `political controversy' thus appears to have expanded into both religious and 
political institutions. 
48 	 Swift to Archbishop King, London, 1 January 1708, The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, 
Vol. I, 62. 
49 C31, 24 March 1727; C32, 27 March 1727; C78, 30 December 1727; C170, 30 August 1729; 
C172, 18 October 1729; C238, 23 January 1731; C304, 29 August 1732; C372, 18 August 
1733; Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, passim. 
50 	 The Journal of John Wesley: A Selection, ed. Elisabeth Jay, Oxford and New York 1987, 12 
September 1743, 76; Hole 1989, 23. 
51 Sellin 1978, 815. 
52 OED: politician. 
96 n DEFINING THE POLITICAL: ALTERNATIVE SENSES OF 'POLIT... 
the eighteenth century as well. Most dictionaries repeated the alternative senses 
of the term referring to `crafty tricks, cunning shifts, artifices and intrigues'.53 It 
has been suggested that 'the final devaluation of the term, to signify merely one 
who engaged in political activity rather than one who had an expertise in the art 
and craft of politics, belongs with the eighteenth century'.54 
Abhorrence towards what was seen as secular `Machiavellian' politicians 
was expressed in texts such as Nathanael Carpenter's True Picture of a Wicked 
Politician, originally published in 1627 but still reprinted in 1703. Carpenter 
emphasised the contrast between Aristotelian-Christian and `worldly policy', 
the first of which made politicians regret their sins whereas the latter 
encouraged modern politicians to contrive plots, that is, to `strengthen the 
faction' S5 Building on the prevalent threat of innovation, Sacheverell attacked 
in his sermon of 5 November 1709 'new preachers, and new politicians' (the 
Protestant Dissenters and Whigs) who, according to him, knew neither 
Christian religion. Such politicians, argued Sacheverell, were `cunning, 
temporising politicians' .56 
In spite of repeated damnations of politicians, more positive definitions such 
as 'one that understands the art of governing, or judges of it according to the 
parts he has acquired' were also printed in dictionaries 57 Politician was 
considered synonymous to statesman, 'a person skilled in the art of governing', 
particularly in foreign policy.58 Some older dictionaries such as Cocker-
Hawkins (1704), which followed a restricted definition of politics, termed 
authors of books concerning state affairs as politicians. This double meaning is 
also visible in Dyche-Pardon's (1740/1750) definition of politician as 'a 
practiser or studier of policy, or the well regulating and governing a state or 
kingdom; a wise or cunning man'. 
Associations of the concept politician continued to be frequently derived 
from religion. It was a commonplace to suspect that politicians were interested 
in religion only as a means of advancing their goals, adherents of the opposing 
party being called `impious politicians who in heart make no account of 
religion, yet will make show of giving reverence to it, because it is always seen 
to have a mighty influence upon all ranks and degrees'.59 Suspiciousness 
towards the religious integrity of politicians occurred throughout the early 
eighteenth century, but the separateness of politics and religion was 
increasingly underlined:6° 
53 Phillips-Kersey 1706; Kersey 1715; Kersey 1731; Dyche-Pardon 1740/1750; Fenning 1741; 
Johnson 1755. 
54 Langford 1989, 719. 
55 	 [Nathanael Carpenter], Achitophel: Or, the True Picture of a Wicked Politician, 1703 [ 1627], 
26, 32-3, 36, 44, 48. 
56 	 Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren, 1709, 12, 21. 
57 OED: politician. 
58 Coles 1701 and 1732; Cocker-Hawkins 1704; Phillips-Kersey 1706; Glossographia 1707; 
Kersey 1715; Bullokar-Browne 1719; Gordon-Bailey 1730; Kersey 1731; Bailey 1733; 
[Defoe] 1737; Martin 1749; A Pocket Dictionary 1753; Johnson 1755. 
59 	 Three Questions of Present Importance, 1702, 16. 
60 	 A Dissuasive from Party and Religious Animosities, 1736, 4, also 10. 
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Politicians full of craftiness and design, ... would do well to consider, 
first, what religion is, and, secondly, what is it they do, when they lug it 
in, to assist them to carry on their schemes of state! 
A contrast between the terms politician and Christian remained common, as 
visible in the statement that `I always looked upon religion as a very good thing, 
and am now about to consider it, not as a politician, but as a Christian'." The 
potential of unfavourable religious associations of politicians was used in 
debates such as the one on occasional conformity in 1705.62 Defoe, in his turn, 
suggested that a `wicked politician' acted atheistically 'in direct opposition to 
his inward light and knowledge; that he may cunningly bring about his own 
private ends'.63 Religious associations were likewise abused in a common 
metaphor of a hellish `college of politicians' organised in the lines of Louis 
XIV's proposed `academy of politicians'.64 Also interesting is the denial of 
connections between Presbyterians and `politicians and sectaries',65 referring to 
the memory of the Interregnum when radical sects had had more than a fair 
share of political power. Especially noteworthy is the suspected alliance 
between politicians and religious sectaries. 
An occasional occurrence of the term `state politician'66 raises the question 
whether there were, in early eighteenth-century conscience, other groups of 
politicians such as `Church politicians'. Indeed, one of the most common 
associations between politicians and some professional groups was that 
between politicians and priests. Such an association was unavoidably 
anticlerical, criticising the churchmen's involvement in politics. Defoe the 
dissenter was particularly eager to warn about the disastrous consequences of 
cooperation between politicians and priests.67 Also in the highly anticlerical 
Independent Whig, clergymen were considered to be 'but heavy intriguers, and 
sad[ly] want both the temper and talents of politicians', hence making poor 
`doggerel politicians'. 68 Similar suspicions towards the engagement of divines 
in politics can be found in the Craftsman's description of a man who 
`despairing to rise as a worthy churchman ... determined to try his fortune as a 
politician, and has since wholly neglected spiritual, for the sake of temporal 
affairs'.69 Anticlerical authors were always ready to curb these priestly 
`excursions into politics'.70 
Together with indifference in religious questions among politicians went low 
morals in the more secular sense. Disregard of honesty, loose morals and the 
61 	 Schemes from Ireland, for the Benefit of the Body Natural, Ecclesiastical, and Politick, 
Dublin 1732, 4. 
62 A Political Quack's Advice, 1705, 12. 
63 [Daniel Defoe], The Remedy Worse than the Disease, 1714, 28-9. 
64 [Joseph Addison], The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond, Oxford 1965, No. 305 (S305), 19 
February 1712; Advice front Shades Below, No. 2, 1710, 7; C170, 30 August 1729. 
65 	 Three Questions of Present Importance, 1702, 57. 
66 	 A New Voyage to the Island of Fools, 1713, 36. 
67 [Defoe], The Remedy Worse t/orn the Disease, 1714, 21. 
68 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW, 1721, xvii-xix. 
69 C28, 16 March 1727. 
70 	 [John Middleton], A Vindication of Liberty of Conscience, 1734, 24. 
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primacy of one's own interest were seen as typical of all politicians?' Ironical 
statements against the `great politicians' of a rival political group were 
commonplace. It was suggested that `good' or 'very great politician' was 
necessarily 'a very cunning fellow' ;72 it was hinted that a `great politician' was 
ready to extend the power of the crown or the Parliament as best suited to him;73  
and it was implied that an ability to form a party was not a qualification for 
becoming a politician.74 References to `disaffected, subtle politicians' 75 
appeared in abundance, but there were also occasional references to respectable 
`sound politicians',76 `staunch politician[s]', 'able politicians and patriots', and 
'the wisest politicians',77 mainly in the writings of the opposition to Walpole. 
The use of the term politician was characterised by a deep conflict of senses, 
many of which remained pejorative and derived from associations with 
religious indifference. 
The conflict of senses was not as obvious in the senses of its near synonym 
statesman. This more appreciative term78 had three senses. In the first sense, a 
statesman, as 'one who takes a leading part in the affairs of a state or body 
politic, especially one who is skilled in the management of public affairs', 
lacked inherently pejorative connotations.79 All early eighteenth-century 
thinkers would have agreed on mentioning Cicero, for instance, as 'the great 
statesman'.80 The basic sense of the term statesman was positive, and extra 
attributes were needed to refer to corrupt forms of statesmanship such as 
cunning and irreligion.81 The second sense of statesman referred to a political 
polemist and the third to a commoner interested in reading and speculating on 
political news.82 This last belittling sense of a statesman belonging to the lower 
71 The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 24 June 1715, 42, 27 September 1716, 337-8; The Female 
Politician: Or the Statesman Unmask'd, 1733, 87; Reflexions upon the Politeness of 
Manners, 1707, 212; Stebbing, An Essay Concerning Civil Government, 1724, 214. 
72 [Concanen], The Speculatist, 30 April 1726, 128. 
73 The Daily Courant, 1 September 1733, in GM, Vol. III, September 1733, Reel 134. 
74 C372, 18 August 1733. 
75 	 For example, The Dangerous Consequences of Parliamentary Divisions, 1742, 30. 
76 Rectius Declinandum, Edinburgh? 1709, repeated four times on pages 5, 12, 14 and 24. 
77 	 C23, 20 February 1727 (compare with C29, 13 March 1727); C392, 2 February 1734, in GM, 
Vol. IV, February 1734, Reel 134; Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 120; 
Compare with The Daily Courant, 6 February 1734, in GM, Vol. IV, February 1734, Reel 
134. 
78 This difference in connotation can be seen in William Bond's 'The character of a Wicked 
Politician' and 'The Portrait of a Good Statesman' in The Manual of Epictetu.s, 1734. 
79 OED: statesman; Gordon-Bailey 1730; Kersey 1731; Bailey 1733; [Defoe] 1737; Dyche-
Pardon 1740/1750; Fenning 1741; Martin 1749; A Pocket Dictionary 1753; Johnson 1755. 
80 	 [Sackville Tufton], The History of Faction, Alias Hypocrisy, Alias Moderation, 1705, 167; 
For other positive references to statesmen, see A Memorial of the Present State of the British 
Nation, 1722, 45; Bernard Mandeville, An Essay on Charity, and Charity Schools, [ 1723], in 
The Fable of the Bees, ed. Phillip Harth, 1989, 320; C29, 13 March 1727; C160, 26 July 
1729; C201, 9 May 1730; Bolingbroke, A Letter on the Spirit of Patriotism, 1736, 367; 
Common Sense, No. 27, 6 August 1737, in GM, Vol. VII, August 1737, Reel 136. 
81 [Defoe], The Weakest go to the Wall, 1714, 8, I1; Griffin, Whig and Tory, 1720, 10, 21; 
[Trenchard], CL12, 14 January 1720; CL37, 15 July 1721; [Gordon], CL66, 17 February 
1722; C116, 21 September 1728. 
82 	 The States-Men of Abingdon, 1702, 9; The Political Quack's Advice, 1705, preface; Steele, 
T67, 13 September 1709, T69, 17 September 1709; Addison, T18, 21 May 1709, T155, 6 
April 1710, T160, 18 April 1710, The Whig Examiner, in The Works of Joseph Addison, eds. 
Henry G. Bohn and Richard Hurd, 1877-78, No. 5, 12 October 1710, S403, 12 June 1712, 
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orders was a temporary early eighteenth-century innovation, and it was 
commonly recognised as ironical, emphasising what a commoner involved in 
political debates was not. 
Finally, no discussion of early modern `polit' vocabulary can overlook the 
term machiavel or machiavilian, an anglicised and generalised form of the most 
famous of modern political theorists, which denoted 'a politic statesman and 
subtle politician', one who `studies or practices the doctrine of Nicholas 
Machiavel', 'an intriguer, an unscrupulous schemer' and one who practises 
`duplicity in statecraft or in general conduct'.83 At the dawn of the eighteenth 
century, Machiavelli was still considered responsible for politics that 'have 
poisoned almost all Europe', and his political thought was declared as 'very 
dangerous' even in dictionary definitions.84 Most English political thinkers 
remained wedded to the idea of the English as a Christian nation and 
ostentatiously declined to accept `secular' Machiavellian thought. Machia-
vellian thought was considered such a challenge to commonly shared political 
values that any secular attitude toward politics was customarily linked with both 
Machiavelli and atheism. Accusations of Machiavellism, or the use of religion 
for political purposes, were commonplace, until they started to wane with the 
decline of the role of religious assumptions in political discourse.83 At least 
three dictionaries published in the 1730s and 1740s no longer printed a 
definition for the general term machiavilian,86 and most other dictionaries 
ceased to underscore tensions between machiavelianism and the Christian 
religion. In publications advocating classical republicanism, the general term 
machiavel being omitted, more positive references to Machiavelli reappeared 
from 1720s onwards.87 
The `polit' vocabulary and its close associates employed in political 
discourse remained equivocal due to a simultaneous existence of traditional and 
modern conceptions of politics. At least at the level of published rhetoric, the 
Christian conception still had considerable significance. Ethics and religion 
S452, 8 August 1712, F53, 22 June 1716; [Trenchard and Gordon], A Collection of all the 
Humorous Letters, No. 3, 14 May 1720; Universal Spectator, No. 334, I March 1735, in 
GM, Vol. V, March 1735, Reel 135. 
83 OED: Machiavel, Machiavellian, Machiavellist; Cocker-Hawkins 1704 and 1724; Phillips-
Kersey 1706; Glossographia 1707; Kersey 1715; Bullokar-Browne 1719; Gordon-Bailey 
1730; Bailey 1733; Dyche-Pardon 1740/1750; A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
84 Coles 1701; Moreri-Collier 1701. 
85 Hunter 1985, 155; Sommerville 1992, 144, 151-2; For criticism of machiavelianism on 
religious grounds, see Henry Sacheverell, The Political Union. A Discourse Spewing the 
Dependence of Government on Religion In General: And of The English Monarchy on The 
Church of England In Particular, Oxford 1702, 34; [Carpenter], Achitophel: Or, the True 
Picture of a Wicked Politician, 1703 [1627], 24; A View of the Present Divisions in Great 
Britain, 1708, 13; See also OED: body politic. 
86 Kersey 1731; [Defoe] 1737; Martin 1749. 
87 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW, dedication in the 1721 edition, v; CL15, 11 February 1721; 
C19, 10 February 1727; C23, 20 February 1727; The Craftsman also contained at least one 
pejorative reference to a `darling son of Machiavel and Tacitus' in C29, 13 March 1727; In 
the 1730s, The Free Briton forcefully defended Machiavelli against those abusing his name. 
The Free Briton, No. 258, 10 October 1734, in GM, Vol. IV, October 1734, Reel 134; See 
also Fog's Journal, No. 319, 14 December 1734, in GM, Vol. IV, December 1734, Reel 134; 
Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 107, 155; Bolingbroke, The Idea of a 
Patriot King, 1738, 389-90, 393, 395. 
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continued to be seen as inseparable, and in texts of traditionalists and other 
writers, Machiavellian notions were criticised as un-Christian and even 
atheistic. The conflict of these conceptions had caused deep-rooted pejorative 
connotations to emerge for most of the words used by early eighteenth-century 
authors in debates, as in that on political pluralism. 
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Defining the Sphere of 
Religion: Conceptions of 
Clerical Political Activism 
The clergy's status and use of biblical language in political 
sermons 
The relationship between the spiritual and political spheres, to the existence of 
which sixteenth-century reformers had referred, remained a central concern for 
politico-religious discourse for centuries to come. In England, religious 
diversities caused conflict for nearly two centuries after the Reformation. In the 
1640s, religious and constitutional disagreements had led to an armed conflict, 
to the execution of the monarch, to the declaration of the Commonwealth of 
England, and to an expansion of religious separatism at the cost of the Church 
of England. During the Restoration, the victorious hard-line Anglicans had 
defended the reintroduction of the established Church in a form which had 
allowed no toleration for religious alternatives. Moderate Anglicans and 
Presbyterians had unsuccessfully defended reforms that would have made 
comprehension of Protestant Dissenters possible within the Church. 
This victory of traditionalist Anglicanism initiated a conflict between the 
Church and religious dissent also in the state, as the traditionalists believed that 
a subject could not be loyal to the political system without being a loyal member 
of the Church.' The questions of freedom for religious minorities and the health 
of religion remained sensitive issues among the entire political nation. Many 
Tories believed that the Toleration Act (1689) and the freedom of the press had 
fostered the growth of dissent, heresies and even irreligion. They preferred 
ideological conformity, attempted to restrict the religious freedoms and, after a 
long campaign in the reign of Queen Anne, succeeded in passing the Act of 
Occasional Conformity (1711) and Schism Act (1714).3 Once the Whigs 
achieved power in 1714, the government rejected some of discriminatory 
legislation but was unwilling to extend religious toleration much further, which 
ensured the political relevance of religious dissent all through the early 
eighteenth century. 
I 	 Jean Calvin had written: `Il y a double regime en l'homme. L'un est spirituel ... L'autre est 
politic ou civil, par lequel l'homme est apprins des offices d'humanite et civilite.' Institution 
de la religion chrestienne, 1536. Cited in Rubinstein 1987, 55. 
2 	 The traditionalist point of view is illustrated by the statement that `all religious dissention 
from the established Church' was `naturally and necessarily attended with some disaffection 
to our civil constitution'. Conyers Place, The Arbitration: Or, the Tory and Whig Reconcil'd, 
[1710?], 27. 
3 	 Speck 1970, 25; Holmes 1975, 8-9, 13-5, 19, 21; Speck 1978, 83-4; De Krey 1985, 74-5, 
112, 116; Holmes 1987, xx; Clark 1985, 287; Reay 1989, 18; Rogers 1989, 393; Burtt 1992, 
20-1, 40; Harris 1993, 6-7, 42, 152-3; Clark 1994, 4, 142. 
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But how did early eighteenth-century Englishmen more exactly understand 
religion? Did a sole right religion exist? Dictionary entries illustrate different 
degrees of readiness to compromise as to the latter question. Some emphasised 
the unique status of the Christian religion while others approached religion 
more objectively as a universal phenomenon. What is noteworthy in Gordon-
Bailey's (1730) definition, for instance, is its implication that there was not 
merely one established way of serving God. Likewise, Chambers (1728) 
referred to the Siamese who held the diversity of religions to be pleasing to God 
and commented that this Siamese belief was more just than a belief in the 
rightness of merely one religion. Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) described religion 
as 'that awful reverence and pure worship that is due to the supreme author of 
all beings, called God' but added a cynical remark that religion was 'very often 
abused'. Also important is his introduction to several religions, avoiding 
partiality in favour of Christianity. For Fenning (1741) as well, 'any system of 
faith and worship' would suffice as religion, whereas the traditionalist Johnson 
did not admit such equality among religions. None of the dictionaries dared to 
vindicate the Anglican cause, however. Neither did the dictionaries draw clear 
lines of demarcation between religion and politics in such a way that 
intermixing politics and religion was not possible. 
The relationship between religion and politics was most often discussed in 
connection with the issue of political activity among the clergy. The clergy was 
divided along party lines and was engaged in party conflicts at all levels: while 
the lower clergy usually voted for Tories, many of the bishops were inclined 
towards Whiggism. A major question in which religion affected politics and 
made clergymen take a stand was the question of religious dissent. The Tories 
defended the religious monopoly of the Church of England, the Whigs being 
more inclined towards toleration. In the eyes of the Tories, dissent appeared as 
such a religious rival to the Church that it might undermine the positions of the 
clergy, and the Whigs were suspected of being the political manifestation of 
dissent.4 Fear of Puritan fanaticism was used to persuade the audience to vote 
for Tories, who were ready to save the country from the threat of dissent. 
Parsons did not merely preach Christian doctrine to their congregations; they 
also stated the principles of the political order, and did so more effectively than 
any alternative media, as religious rituals played a central part in the lives of 
early eighteenth-century Englishmen.' Especially in the countryside, priests 
remained major deputies of the state who taught obedience to the crown and 
condemned all radical political altematives.6 To an average subject, sermons 
were the commonest mode of discourse in prose; a great majority of the nation 
was exposed to sermons every Sunday; and a number of sermons were also 
printed.' Sermons frequently restated the idea of the unity of the Anglican 
4 	 Rupp 1986, 74; Black and Gregory 1991, 8; Phillipson 1993, 213. 
5 Champion 1992, 6-7. 
6 	 Bennett 1975, 5; Spellman 1993, 138. 
7 	 Rogers 1978, 30, 63; John Middleton pointed out that few read printed sermons but great 
numbers heard them preached. A Vindication of Liberty of Conscience, 1734, 24. Printed 
sermons are, however, the only available way of searching eighteenth-century preaching, as 
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Church and state,8 and governments willingly gave orders on what to preach 
and which official announcements to read from the pulpit, particularly on 
national days of commemoration.' Political sermons were common on these 
anniversaries. In addition to preaching political sermons, bishops were engaged 
in pamphleteering and sometimes persuaded lesser clergy to support a 
particular side in elections. Neither did lesser clergy fail to grasp opportunities 
to propagate High-Tory views in election times.1) They often achieved popular 
support for advocating commonly shared traditionalist views and open 
resistance to Whig governments." A Tory parson's status was strongest in 
communities in which he worked in cooperation with Tory squires.12 
Among the clergy, it was common practice to draw parallels between 
contemporary society and the Bible. A Protestant world-view provided a 
prevalent conception of politics and justified the application of Bible passages, 
sometimes intentionally modified, to acute questions.13 The starting point of 
many sermons was that conformity to the established Church was a 
precondition for the survival of the political order.14 Though principally 
directed against religious schisms, many sermons could also be applied to 
party-political strife. Terms of conflict employed in sermons and in political 
literature could be almost identical. For instance, a sermon of John Needham 
against religious Dissenters emphasised the need of suppressing animosities, 
faction and division in a manner that, in the minds of listeners, was easily 
intermixed with timely political matters.15 
The tendency among the clergy to interpret politics through biblical language 
was no new development, but the practice became widely debated at the turn of 
the eighteenth century, right after the extension of press freedom in the mid-
1690s. In his Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), Locke demanded that 
those who wished to understand the Bible should focus on what had been 
originally meant by the writers. It was misleading to collect `scattered sentences 
in Scripture-language' and then combine them as `accommodated to our 
notions and prejudices'. Locke specifically stated that St Paul's epistles to the 
Corinthians — often cited in texts advocating unity in Church and state — had 
been written for particular occasions and did not constitute a universal law.16 
the use of manuscript sources would require extensive work and would still not guarantee a 
more authentic picture of what was really preached. 
8 	 The London' Diaries of William Nicolson, 556; The Diary of Dudley Ryder 1715-1716, 30 
January 1716, 173; Joseph Trapp, Most Faults on One Side, 1710, 47; Whiston, Scripture 
Politicks, 1717, ii; Speck 1970, 24, 88-90; Richards 1972, 16, 20-2, 24-5, 54, 74. 
9 Claydon 1996, 83-4. 
10 Speck 1970, 24, 88-90; Richards 1972, 16, 20-2, 24-5, 54, 74. 
I I 	 Wilson 1995, 106. 
12 	 Addison, 5106, 2 July 1711, provides a simplified stereotype of a country parson written by 
a political opponent of the Tory party; For the influence of party conflict in localities, see 
Addison, 5112, 9 July 1711. 
13 Colley 1992; Speck 1970, 88-9. 
14 Schochet 1992, 126. 
15 	 John Needham, Considerations concerning the Origine and Cure of our Church-Divisions, 
1710, 3-5. 
16 	 John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures, ed. George 
W. Ewing, Washington 1989 (1965), 186-9; A favourite Bible passage used by the Tory 
clergy to attack Protestant dissenters seems to have been 1 Corinthians 3:3,4: `For ye are yet 
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Toland adopted a more provocative way of expression in his Christianity not 
Mysterious (1696), suggesting that people tended to overemphasise `certain 
sounds' as if they constituted the most essential and unquestionable content of 
all religion, although, in reality, they signified nothing or had been purposely 
invented. Toland lamented how Scripture had been put 'to the torture to 
countenance this scholastic jargon' and denounced the use of the words of 
Scripture separately from their context." 
In numerous other publications as well, a typical High-Church preacher was 
accused of exploiting 'an abominable jargon of hard words, with which he 
amazes and deludes the ignorant, and confounds the understanding of the 
wise'. '8 Critics claimed that19 
• appellations, and the names of complex ideas, are often left untranslated, 
that they may pass for real beings, and signify whatever the priests have 
occasion for; and sometimes, where they have been translated, false and 
unfair meanings have been assigned to them, and they have been made 
to convey a quite different sense from what they import in Scripture. 
As a result of this type of preaching, words such as heresy, schism and faction 
were suggested to be `terms often used by the vulgar, though not one in ten of 
either side, understand the true and proper meaning of any of these words' 20 
One critic gave a long catalogue of `synonymous appellations' said to reflect 
High-Church vocabulary but actually illustrated Whiggish contempt for Tory 
hints to their alleged antimonarchical, sectarian, freethinking and irreligious 
origins. The list contained, among others, the terms Whigs, Roundheads, king-
killers, Republicans, Presbyterians, innovators, false brethren, fanatics, 
sectarians, self-opiniators, sceptics, lovers of anarchy, freethinkers, half- 
conformists, Nonconformists, infidels, heretics, schismatics, enthusiasts, deists 
and atheists.21 Many a Whig writer, however, was ready to boast that `neither 
the names of heterodox, schismatic, heretic, sceptic, nor even infidel, or atheist 
itself, will in the least scandalise me, whilst the sentence comes only from your 
mouths' .22  
Francis Atterbury's influential Letter to a Convocation-Man (1697), a 
demonstration of High-Church disquiet for what they depicted as the rise of 
diversity of opinions throughout society, was also the most influential reply to 
criticisms of High-Church preaching. Deistical and even moderate Anglican 
texts were regarded by traditionalist divines as conspiratorial attacks against 
carnal: for whereas there is among you envying, and strife, and division, are ye not carnal, 
and walk as men? For while one faith, I am of Paul, and another I am of Apollos, are ye not 
carnal?'; See Thomas Rennell, The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Divisions for the 
sake of Greater Edification, s.l., [1705?], and Needham, Considerations concerning the 
Origine and Cure of our Church-Divisions, 1710. 
17 	 [Toland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, xi—xii, xxv; Toland was twice prosecuted by the 
shocked clergy for this book but with no success. Bennett 1975, 18-19; Hill 1995, 65. 
18 	 The Character of a Modern Tory, 1713, 20. 
19 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW22, 15 June 1720. 
20 [Defoe], Whigs turn'd Tories, 1713, 1. 
21 	 A Free-Thinker at Oxford, 1719, 61-2. 
22 [Shaftesbury], Miscellaneous Reflections, 1714, in Characteristicks, Vol. III, 334. 
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religion in general and priesthood in particular. Atterbury welcomed a royal 
order to bishops `forbidding the use of any new terms in the explaining of our 
faith'.-3 This statement and the entire pamphlet was directed against Whiggish 
bishops and politicians with whom the lower clergy and much of Oxford 
University were dissatisfied. 
The clergy's interventions in party politics contributed to the terminology of 
religion being widely employed in political discourse. Such interventions are 
exemplified by the engagement of Benjamin Hoadly, the Bishop of Bangor and 
a dedicated Whig, and Atterbury, the Dean of Carlisle and a Jacobite Tory, in 
propaganda during election campaigns.24 Furthermore, the number of religious 
titles was high throughout the eighteenth century, and there was a considerable 
overlap between these and political titles. Over half of the output of the press 
was concerned with spiritual affairs, and many of these titles were equally 
concerned with both national and individual salvation.25 
The most famous instance of the clerical mixture of political and religious 
issues was the case of Henry Sacheverell. Sacheverell first gained fame in 1702 
by publicising in Oxford a sermon full of fear of 'a party' of religious dissent.2 6 
After this sermon, the question of dissent remained a topic of political discourse 
for the decade to come. In 1709, Sacheverell preached an even more 
provocative political sermon to an audience consisting of Whiggish London 
businessmen at the double anniversary of William III's landing (1688) and the 
Gunpowder Plot (1605). Rejecting claims that 'the pulpit is not a place for 
politics', warning the audience of `conspiracy' and `malicious, and factious 
designs', and drawing once again a parallel between the divisions of the Church 
of Corinth and those of the Church of England,27 this High-Church cleric 
questioned the Revolution of 1688, defended traditionalist royalist doctrines, 
attacked toleration to what he saw as the descendants of the rebels of the 1640s, 
and hinted that the Whig ministry formed a danger to the Church. Ideas 
expressed in the sermon were neither original nor carefully considered. Even 
Oxford High-Church Anglicans might adopt a critical attitude towards 
Sacheverell's language and manner of intermixing religious and political 
issues:'-8 
23 	 Francis Atterbury, A Letter to a Convocation-Man, 1697, 2, 6, 8; At least the terms priestcraft 
and freethinker had been very recently introduced to the English language; Bennett 1975, 
48-50; Gascoigne 1989, 79. 
24 	 Addison to Thomas Wharton, Earl of Wharton staying in Winchendon, [London, 25 August 
1710], Joseph Addison, The Letters of Joseph Addison, ed. W. Graham, Oxford 1941, 234; 
Hoadly became a major figure in several politico-religious controversies, and his pamphlets 
were popular among Whig politicians. Rupp 1986, 88-9; COPC: Atterbury, English Advice 
to the Freeholders of England, 1714. 
25 Wilson 1995, 36. 
26 Holmes 1975, 11. 
27 	 Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren, both in Church, and State, 1709, 3, 5-7. 
28 D. Evans to Thomas Hearne, 10 November 1709, Remarks and Collections of Thomas 
Hearne, Vol. II, 304-5; On 11 November, Hearne repeated the same in his diary; J. Bennett 
to Thomas Hearne, ibid., Vol. II, 1 December 1709, 317; Sacheverell's person and his 
language were unpopular in Oxford, but his views found sympathy at the University. Bennett 
1975, 110, and Bennett 1986a, 63, 82-3. 
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... all congregation were shaken ... at the terror of his inveterate 
expressions. The Whigs, says he, are conformists in faction, half-
conformists in practice, and non-conformists in judgement. Formerly 
they laboured to bring the Church into the conventicle, but now they 
bring the conventicle into the Church, which will prove its inevitable 
ruin. 
I could not have imagined if I had not actually heard it myself, that so 
much heat, passion, violence, and scurrilous language, to say no worse 
of it, could have come from a Protestant pulpit, much less from one that 
pretends to be a member of the Church of England ... I am sure such 
discourses will never convert anyone, but I am afraid will rather give the 
enemies of our Church great advantage over her; since the best that her 
true sons can say of it, is that the man is mad; and indeed most people 
here think him so. 
What became decisive was the reaction of the Whig government toward this 
popular preacher. The Whig ministry saw an opportunity for putting an end to 
the High-Church campaign by prosecuting Sacheverell for attacking the 
Revolution which every loyal subject was supposed to venerate. Although the 
Whig government won the prosecution case in Parliament, it finally lost the 
contest as the trial was broadened into a national affair by fierce pamphleteering 
and riots which revealed deep-rooted animosities between High-Church 
Anglicans and Dissenters. The antipathy towards dissent was turned into a 
political issue in a debate where a distinction between spiritual and secular 
spheres was hardly made. Ultimately, the Sacheverell affair, its catchwords `the 
Church in danger' being exploited by the Tories, contributed to the downfall of 
the Whig ministry, the dissolution of Parliament and a landslide victory for 
Tories in the ensuing general election. For many voters who had been 
suspicious of the alliance of Whiggism and dissent against the Church, the 
Sacheverell affair proved that their suspicions had been justified.29 Thomas 
Hearne, for instance, expressed his horror of what he saw as Whig requirements 
that the doctrine of the Church was to be subordinated to laymen and wondered 
why books written by those he regarded as atheists were not censored while a 
sermon of a defender of the Church of England was. A friend of his insisted that 
`the Church and the monarchy will not be run down so easily, as [the Whigs] 
presume and imagine'.30 
Sacheverell's sermon was burned by the sentence of Parliament, and the man 
himself was condemned to a three-year preaching ban. In 1713, however, 
Sacheverell was already preaching on the anniversary of the Restoration in 
front of the now Tory-dominated House of Commons. This honour was a 
demonstration of the Tory government in favour of Sacheverell. In his sermon, 
29 Speck 1970, 42, 90; Richards 1972, 105-6, 123; Holmes 1975, 11, 26, 28; Downie 1979, 
116; De Krey 1985, 223, 228; Rupp 1986, 64, 69; Burke 1989, 46-7; Harris 1989, 48; Harris 
1993, 153-4, 180-1. 
30 
	
	
Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 15 December 1709, Vol. 11, 327; Hearne to Dr. 
T. Smith, ibid., 17 December 1709 and 25 January 1710, Vol. II, 329-30, 338; Ibid., 2 March 
1710, Vol. II, 350; Dr Smith to Hearne, ibid., 4 March 1710, Vol. II, 352. 
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Sacheverell preached what the majority of the MPs wished to hear, emphasising 
the Christian duty of subjection to civil power.31 The Sacheverell affair 
strengthened rather than weakened the political position of the Anglican 
Church. At least some Dissenters felt this way. Dudley Ryder claimed that the 
advantage that the prosecution brought to Sacheverell had encouraged the 
Anglican clergy to take political stands during the Succession Crisis of 1714-
16, as the clergymen believed that no-one would dare to prosecute a divine 
again, knowing what the consequences could be.32 
In spite of calming down in religious discourse after 1720, application of 
biblical language to political issues continued. Roger Acherley's Reasons for 
Uniformity in the State, published in 1741, still lamented the clergy's far from 
welcome role as an interpreter of the constitution. Acherley stated that 
clergymen, when discussing public matters, `couched their meaning in words of 
a double entendre'. It was the divines who reasoned on the British constitution 
cleverly but falsely, advocating ideas not in line with the `human constitution' 
and basing their interpretations on Scripture, and thus causing diversities in 
opinions concerning the constitution.33 Clerical political commentary on the 
constitution continued, though it became increasingly supportive of the 
Hanoverian and Whig order. 
Debate on the relationship between religion and politics 
Numerous early eighteenth-century texts discussed the relationship between 
religion and politics and changes in the balance between the two. This 
subchapter focuses on a few statements about the connection between religion 
and politics. Many of the available statements are so tendentious that an 
articulated point is hardly traceable, but at least they reveal the intensity of 
debate on the limits of religion and politics. 
For the traditionalist Tories, religion and government remained inseparable. 
They called for unity but gradually abandoned attempts to enforce it by 
violence. Even if many started to recognise toleration as a fact, they continued 
to resist its consequences, still regarding schism as an evil. The Whigs, in 
contrast, accepted in principle a distinction between religion and politics but not 
one between Church and state. Even they were unwilling to distinguish between 
religion and politics in cases where religious arguments could be used to their 
political advantage. Some High-Church traditionalists such as Atterbury, 
however, demanded a complete distinction between the spiritual and temporal 
powers, which would have meant that civil authorities would have been unable 
to interfere in ecclesiastical issues. A separation of Church and state was in the 
interest of the traditionalists provided that the Church was allowed a wide 
31 	 Sacheverell, False Notions of Liberty in Religion and Government Destructive of Both, 1713, 
1, 12; 29 May, when the sermon was preached, was the anniversary of the Restoration of 
1660. 
32 	 The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 19 December 1715, 152. 
33 	 Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 7-8. 
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autonomy, including a right to regulate public discourse. Atterbury's demand 
started an intensive phase in the High-Church campaign which aimed at 
restoring the lost harmony of Church and state through uncompromising 
conformity.3a 
Certain separation of religion and politics could thus be advocated by both 
the moderates and traditionalists. A writer criticising Whig pamphleteers 
claimed in 1711, with reference to the Sacheverell controversy, that matters 
previously regarded as state-affairs had been presented as religious concerns 
and matters of conscience,35 evidently to achieve some political goals. Such 
accusations of `religionisation' of politics had been routinely posed by 
Whiggish writers against traditionalists. This writer made a basic distinction 
between the political and religious spheres now having been disturbed by a 
reintroduction of religious elements to politics. In 1712, a writer on `scripture 
politics' opposed parties and `worldly politics' and argued that once these evils 
were removed, 'the Church and state will be no longer confounded together; 
courtiers will not influence ecclesiastical affairs, ... [and] the clergy will no 
longer intermeddle with worldly affairs'.36 The ideal worth aiming at was the 
separation of religious and political questions and the creation of personnel 
specialising in either, not both. Mixing religious and political affairs appeared 
as the cause of the emergence of parties; once the two spheres were separated, 
the problem would disappear. 
In sermons, such separation between the two spheres was rarely heard. 
Hoadly, the major figure of the Bangorian Controversy (1717), was one of the 
few divines openly vindicating it. The Controversy was initiated by a sermon of 
Hoadly which advocated the nature of the Church as a voluntary society in a 
Lockean sense in opposition to the Church as a universal society as understood 
by the High Churchmen. Hoadly saw Christianity as being based on reason and 
Scripture, which meant that no Church was needed for defining doctrine, and 
hence the Church appeared to him as an administrative institution controlled by 
the state.37 
In a sermon preached at the time of the ensuing controversy, John Laurence 
defended the status of religion as the major supporter of political government. 
Laurence saw secular authorities as 'the pillars, that keep the world from falling 
into anarchy and confusion' whereas clergymen were 'the lights, that God has 
set up to preserve it from ignorance, atheism, and superstition'. Laurence made 
a distinction between the two spheres but allowed no independent status to the 
sphere of politics, declaring in a manner characteristic of an Anglican 
clergyman and self-evident to a great majority of the audience that, though the 
way of governing and the governors had been chosen by humans, power was 
essentially of a divine origin. The unsurprising deduction from this was that 
both the Church and state were meant to enforce obedience. Like thousands of 
34 Stromberg 1954, 127-8, 131, 133, 137; Spurr 1991, 380-1; Claydon 1996, 189. 
35 	 The Way to Bring the World to Rights, 1711, 28. 
36 [Whiston], Scripture Politicks, 1717, 146. 
37 Gascoigne 1989, 123; Walsh and Taylor 1993, 46. 
38 John Laurence, Christian Religion the best Friend to Civil Government, 1717, 6-8. 
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other sermons, that of Laurence declared that 'the best Christians are always the 
best subjects'?$ Such a statement was a vindication of the favoured status of the 
members of the established Church as opposed to adherents of all religious 
alternatives. 
The opposite view ready to reject the divine origin of political power was 
stated in republican texts. Many Englishmen would probably not have accepted 
Trenchard's statement that governments can only possess power given by those 
they govern. Highly controversial must also have been his Lockean statement 
about the independence of each person's religion and the consequent lack of 
necessity for political power to intervene in religious issues.39 A contrasting 
argument appeared in the writing of Henry Stebbing, who advocated the right 
of the civil authorities to encourage 'true religion' by legal measures. Stebbing, 
who observed a calming down in the intensity of controversy, considered the 
year 1724 suitable for an extended contemplation on the relationship between 
religion and politics. He maintained that religious issues were the responsibility 
of magistrates as the guardians of the public good. Religion and political 
interests could `never in fact be separated the one from the other', as religion 
necessarily `affect[ed] the happiness of civil society'. As to political instability, 
Stebbing maintained that 'no civil disorders are occasioned by differences 
about religion'. Whenever such disorders emerged, the authorities possessed a 
power to repress them.40 Stebbing also wished to restrict the extent of religious 
discourse by removing theological controversies from daily papers and by 
turning them into topics of more academic discourse. The educated participants 
of this discourse would abstain from appealing to the audience, which would 
contribute to a further calming down of the debate. By this restriction of 
religious discourse, the authorities would be able to turn religion into a tranquil 
affair which would cause little trouble to politics. This analysis may well have 
corresponded with real transformations in the character of religious discourse 
starting in the 1720s. 
After the 1720s, a distinction between the spheres of religion and politics was 
drawn by a number of writers. An ideological basis for this separation was 
provided by a distinction that was drawn between two sources of religious truth, 
revelation and nature.41 Bolingbroke, for instance, denied the right of the civil 
authorities to intervene in religious questions: 
Question Has not the magistrate a power to compel thee to be of what 
religion he thinks fit? 
Answer No. Because neither in the state of nature, nor in the state of civil 
society, has any man an absolute power over another man's mind or 
conscience; . . . compulsion without conviction making a man an 
hypocrite, that is a criminal, but can never secure the public peace. 
39 [Trenchant], CL60, 6 January 1722. 
40 Stebbing, An Essay Concerning Civil Government, 1724, iii-iv, 61-2, 165, 168. 
41 Harrison 1990, 19. 
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This catechistic dialogue repeated natural law arguments denying the right of 
secular authorities to enforce religion by violence. The result of such 
enforcement would only have been hypocrisy which was worse than variety in 
religious opinions. The basic assumption in the background was that the 
religious and political spheres were fundamentally distinct. 
Bolingbroke also drew distinctions between politics and religion in his 
Dissertation upon Parties when he wrote in the same context about 'the 
political' and 'the religious system' as if the two were separate yet 
interconnected. The separate character of the two did not prevent him from 
drawing analogies between them.42 His understanding of politics was secular, 
yet he reinforced traditionalist views of the comparability of religion and 
politics. He also restated the necessary interconnection between religious and 
political strife:43  
It is a certain truth, that our religious and civil contests have mutually, 
and almost alternately, raised and fomented each other. Churchmen and 
Dissenters have sometimes differed, and sometimes thought, or been 
made to think, that they differed, at least, as much about civil as religious 
matters. 
Bolingbroke saw the Restoration as an exemplary case of religious differences 
alone having maintained divisions within the nation.44 It was easy for most 
readers to accept such an interpretation of the interdependence of religious and 
political divisions in English history. People may only have disagreed as to the 
degree of the seriousness of the divisions. 
The conception of a separate yet interconnected character of politics and 
religion was gaining ground. The leading article of the Gentleman's Magazine 
for March 1735, for instance, advocated a purely secular understanding of 
political power when stating that the end of political government was not 'to 
maintain religion, erect it into an establishment'. Anyone who saw the political 
authorities responsible for religious issues, `jumbles together what is in the very 
nature of things separate, and thereby deprives good civil subjects on account of 
their difference in religious matters ... what might otherwise justly belong to 
them as such'.45 Other papers cited in the Gentleman's Magazine in the 1730s 
also distinguished between religious and political matters.46 Such distinctions 
had not usually been drawn during the first two decades of the eighteenth 
century; by the 1730s, however, they already appeared as much more evident, 
which illustrates a growing secularisation of the sphere of politics. 
42 Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 7; The expression `systems of policy and 
religion' appeared also in ibid., 167; In The Idea of a Patriot King, 1749, 377, Bolingbroke 
referred anticlerically to 'an old alliance between ecclesiastical and civil policy' which had 
contributed to the rise of absolutism. 
43 Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 25-6. 
44 Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 32, 37. 
45 
	
	
`Remarks on The Weekly Miscellany of Feb. 1', by [A true Friend to Liberty], in GM, Vol. V, 
March 1735, Reel 135. 
46 Old Whig, 20 May 1736, No. 63, in GM, Vol. VI, May 1736, Reel 136. 
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A final phase in the early eighteenth-century discourse on the relationship 
between politics and religion was William Warburton's Alliance between 
Church and State (1736), a vindication of the status of the established Church 
published at a time of dissenting campaigns for extended toleration. Though 
wishing to draw a distinction between the political and religious spheres, 
Warburton rejected claims for the independent authority of the Church and 
insisted on the responsibility of the state to protect the Church. In principle, 
Warburton saw religious opinions as individual concerns with which the civil 
authorities had little connection. However, in case of religious diversity, the 
authorities possessed a right to restrict the political activities of advocates of 
alternative Christianity in order to protect the established Church and public 
peace. Warburton's recognition of the inescapable civil utility of religion in a 
state explains the popularity of the work in later replies to the demands of the 
Dissenters.47 
Anticlerical critique of the clergy's involvement in politics 
Sermons and clerical writings being a principal channel of both religious and 
political communication, Whiggish, dissenting and freethinking authors 
became anxious about the effects of the intolerant message of clerical texts 48 
The Whigs as a party represented Low-Church views, which meant that they 
were critical of High-Church intolerance and some of them defended liberty of 
conscience and religious toleration for all Protestants.49 Like constitutionalism, 
anticlericalism had been a characteristic feature of Whiggish thought ever since 
the Exclusion Crisis, Locke, for instance, having opposed the political role of 
the clergy.50 Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington provided other models for 
criticising clerical intrusions in politics. Importantly, Whiggish anticlericalism 
hardly ever implied a will to abolish all religion. The anticlericals rather wished 
to remove independent political power from divines whom they considered 
corrupt. Following classical models, some wished to unite state and religion to 
create a civil religion for a more harmonious society. Public religion had to be 
reconciled with politics and the clergy made to propagate the state ideology 51 
A special anticlerical term derived from the anti-Catholic language of the 
Reformation was taken up by the Whiggish anticlericals. The term priestcraft 
referred to corruptions in religion, but also to the clergy's maintenance of 
traditional beliefs that disturbed what the anticlericals saw as a pure religious 
instinct among people. Also in their willingness to persecute `heretics', the 
English clergy represented a case of a universal phenomenon of priestly 
impostors. The term, introduced by Harrington in the 1650s and often used in 
the broad sense of 'all that the clergy do to advance their temporal greatness', 
47 Sykes 1934, 319, 321; Langford 1989, 43-4; Miller 1994, 299-300, 302. 
48 Harrison 1990, 77. 
49 Harris 1993, 154-5. 
50 Goldie 1993a, 212, 214, 216, 219-220; Phillipson 1993, 214; Ashcraft 1995, 73-4, 82. 
51 Champion 1992, 17, 24, 173-4, 178, 195. 
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became widely used in the 1690s. 52 Toland, for instance, set out to demonstrate 
how priests had turned their false constructions of mystery into a theology that 
suited their own interests. He used the neologism to create associations with 
continuous Protestant Reformation against priestcraft. He took upon himself a 
role equivalent to that of the reformers in exposing the mysteries of priestcraft 
as they appeared in late seventeenth-century England 53 
Sacheverell's discourse on The Political Union (1702) provided anticlericals 
with an illustration of the reality of priestcraft. In The Danger of Priestcraft to 
Religion and Government, a republican answer to Sacheverell, priestcraft 
appeared as a counter-concept of religion. Whereas religion was a uniting social 
force and a `support of government', priestcraft was depicted as `destructive to 
government', as priests with mischievous designs exploited religion and 
fomented divisions to advance their own secular interests. Both national 
divisions and irreligion had emerged as the clergy had `interfered with 
government'.54 Another piece of Whiggish propaganda suggested that, among 
the Tories, any religion would do as far as it advanced the Tory interest. 
Religion was kept as a topic of public discourse only to achieve the favour of 
the clergy, the most useful of tools for winning the support of the common 
people. The writer also set the integrity of the Tories as Protestants and 
supporters of the English constitution in question.ss 
As churchmen were eager to use their influence at elections in favour of Tory 
candidates, Whig election propaganda answered with highly anticlerical 
attacks. The Whigs urged readers to disregard political opinions expressed by 
the clergymen,56 who, as `state divines',57 were practising a new type of 
`political divinity'.58 Political use of religion was condemned in 1708 by asking 
'must religion be the stalking-horse to faction'?59 The fact that Whigs did their 
best to counter any charges against Whig ideology as a threat to the established 
religion, and their suggestions that Tories were harming the Protestant cause, 
demonstrate the importance of the established religion to that party as well. 
Tories were unhappy with the Whiggish use of the concept priestcraft, as the 
Tories claimed, to denounce all defences of the Church. One pamphleteer 
suggested that the Whigs wished to see the Church as an institution that had 
achieved its authority from the state and ultimately from the people. Instead of 
vindicating a traditional union between the Church and state, however, the 
writer was content with underlining how the Church concentrated on religion 
52 Harrison 1990, 77-8, 82-3; Champion 1992, 173; Goldie 1993c, 33, 35, 38-9, 41; Klein 
1994, 160-1. 
53 [loland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, 176; Champion 1992, 166. 
54 	 [Dennis], The Danger of Priestcraft to Religion and Government, 1702, 4-6, 9, 12; The 
pamphlet contains references to the pagan religion of the ancient Romans and to the lack of 
virtue as a cause of factiousness, elements typical of the republican tradition of discourse. 
55 	 The True Picture of an Ancient Tory, 1702, 38-9. 
56 Harris 1993, 104. 
57 	 Chuse which you Please: Or, Dr. Sacheverell and Mr. Hoadley, Drawn to the Life, 1710, 3. 
58 An Antidote against Rebellion, 1704, 26, 29. 
59 	 A View of the Present Divisions in Great Britain, 1708, 45; The Tories did endeavour to 
exploit the question of the security of the Church in the election campaign 1708, hoping that 
the public would set secular issues aside and vote for Tories as the only defenders of the 
Church. Richards 1972, 93-4. 
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whereas the state took care of civil concerns.60 Another Tory pamphlet, when 
discussing accusations of the clergy's excessive involvement in political affairs, 
denounced theocratic government but vindicated the clerical responsibility to 
preach Christian political values and thus educate the audience to loyal 
citizenship:61  
... if by that expression (meddling in politics) be meant presuming to 
settle the constitution, or to dictate in matters of state; most certainly the 
clergy would be justly censurable for pretending to it ... But if by that 
form of speech be meant preaching upon those duties of Christianity, 
which are of a political nature; we must insist upon it, that this is really 
their province, ... For are there not virtues and vices of a political nature 
... These things are not points of politics, but of divinity. 
This view represented moderate Anglican views of the clergy's status in the 
political system. Though everyday political practice and even the foundations 
of the political system were increasingly considered independent of the sphere 
of religion, political values could not be allowed such an independence in a 
Christian society. 
A new wave of Whiggish anticlericalism was experienced after the 
Sacheverell affair. John Dennis, for instance, wished to see religion and politics 
as two separate spheres and suggested that the clerics omitted their 
responsibilities, interfered in politics and politicised parishioners, causing 
`convulsions in the state'. The clergy were making religious life political, not so 
much bringing more religion into politics.62 Simon Clement's treatise contains 
one of the clearest articulations in favour of separation between political and 
ecclesiastical matters. According to Clement, politics was a sphere with which 
the clergy should have had nothing to do, and their interference was likely to 
cause harm to all parties.63 In other anticlerical writings, High-Church clergy 
were accused of having `warmed the people with their politic lectures' 64 and 
contributing to party struggles.65 The entire `Church in danger' -campaign was 
seen as an intentional trick by politicians conspiring to demolish the English 
political system, aimed at bringing popular support to the Tory party 66 
Writing to persuade his readers to support the reintroduction of less frequent 
parliamentary elections, Addison complained of the consequences of 
ecclesiastical and political affairs having been intermixed by Tory clergymen. 
He pointed out how piety had declined, so that a former `nation of saints' had 
turned into a country where religion had less weight than in any nearby realm. 
This decline was manifest in the clerical enthusiasm in making disciples to 
60 	 [Charles Leslie], The Wolf Stript of his Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 17, 26, 30. 
61 	 [Trapp], Most Faults on One Side, 1710, 47. 
62 	 John Dennis, An Essay upon Publick Spirit, 1711, v, 11. 
63 [Simon Clement], Faults on both Sides: Or, An Essay Upon The Original Cause, Progress, 
and Mischievous Consequences of the Factions in this Nation, 1710, 11, 34, 37, 47. 
64 	 Now, or Never: Or, Seasonable Thoughts for the Present Times, 1714, 11. 
65 	 Reflections on the Management Of some late Party-Disputes, 1715, preface and 3. 
66 	 Samuel Bradford, Christian Religion the Occasion: not the Cause of Division, 1716, 22. 
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Toryism and High-Church ideas. The High-Church defenders of the Church 
were acting for political motives, regarding themselves67 
rather as a political, than a religious communion; and are held together 
rather by state-notions than by articles of faith. This fills the minds of 
weak men, who fall into the snare, with groundless fears and 
apprehensions, unspeakable rage towards their fellow subjects, wrong 
ideas of persons whom they are not acquainted with, and uncharitable 
interpretations of those actions of which they are not competent judges. 
Addison, who supported separation between religion and politics at least as far 
as the application of ultra-traditionalist doctrines to politics was concerned, was 
arguing that the Tories and High Church considered politics more important 
than religion. Turning the Church political had been particularly perilous to 
plain people and to the unity of the Church 68 
Among all the critics of political activities of the High-Church clergy, the 
Dissenter Defoe was the most prominent. In 1714, pointing to the latest legal 
measures of the Tory government against the Dissenters, he lamented the 
ruthlessness of cooperation between politicians and priests 69 In 1715, he hinted 
that the ultra-Tory propaganda machinery was to be blamed for the 
politicisation of parishioners in previous years.70 
Some of the clergy ... seem more fond to be thought state-politicians 
than pious clergymen; as if the politics of government were to be 
practised by their auditors with more vehemence and ardour than the 
doctrines of the gospel ... Politics in the pulpit is like fire amongst flax, 
it soon blazes, and sets whole kingdoms on a flame ... a little more 
divinity and less politics in their sermons, [and they] would better 
become the ministers of both parties. 
An apparent argument in favour of a separation of political and ecclesiastical 
affairs was also put forward by Defoe. Defoe argued that any Protestant could 
be a loyal subject. In Defoe's definitions of various spheres, politics and 
religion on the one hand and morality and religion on the other appeared as 
independent:71  
... politics (strictly considered) have nothing to do with religion; an 
atheist may be as good, nay a better politician than the greatest devotee. 
Politics only respect this world and the government thereof. Religion 
leads us to another, and the enjoyment of eternal life, and a man may 
manage the affairs of the former, though he has no regard to the latter. A 
man, though an atheist, may have such a regard for his own interest, for 
the good of his country, the prosperity of his friends and relations, the 
future felicity of his posterity, or for the service of his sovereign out of a 
67 Addison, F37, 27 April 1716. 
68 Addison, F37, 27 April 1716. 
69 [Defoe], The Remedy Worse than the Disease, 1714, 21. 
70 	 [Daniel Defoe], An Attempt Towards a Coalition of English Protestants, 1715, 14-16, 18. 
71 	 [Defoe], An Attempt Towards a Coalition of English Protestants, 1715, 7-9. 
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principle of morality, as honour, justice, or the like, though at the same 
time he has no regard to the growth and being of religion. 
Politics and religion are two different things, and may subsist distinctly 
of themselves. 
In 1718, Defoe again dedicated a pamphlet to 'the consequencies of the clergy's 
intermeddling with affairs of state'. These `gown-politicians' appeared as 
responsible for the rise of factions and parties, as 'the preaching of the gospel 
was superseded by politics, and the cure of souls was forced to give place to 
intrigues of state'.72 
The early 1720s experienced a further anticlerical blow against priestcraft 
carried out by Trenchard and Gordon, two suspected deists and advocates of 
toleration.73 Gordon's Creed of an Independent Whig (1720) summarised much 
of the criticism, exploiting the form of a confession of faith:74 
I believe that the word Church, an innocent word in its nature, has done 
more mischief, than ever I fear it will do good; for when artfully 
mouthed by a priest, it stirs up the people to rebellion, and is made a 
cloak for murder and treason. 
I believe that no ecclesiastic has power to force or bind men's 
consciences. 
I believe that Tory and traitor, begin with a letter, so do priestcraft and 
perjury. I believe I need not pause long to determine, whether they are 
synonymous terms. 
Such an open attack against the spiritual monopoly of the established Church, 
the clergy and the Tory party would hardly have gone unpunished some ten 
years earlier. The anticlerical arguments calling for a civil religion that were put 
forward by these republican authors can be categorised as follows: Firstly, 
clergymen were poor politicians who confused 'all national, public, and 
political morality'.75 Secondly, lack of secular control on religious institutions 
led to a situation where the civil government was dominated by clergymen 76 
Thirdly, most religious institutions were based on secular motives such as 
`usurpation, faction, and oppression'.77 Fourthly, clergymen should not have 
been allowed to get involved in party politics. It only caused contempt towards 
the clergy,78 as seen in the preceding two decades when the most 'visible 
ideologists of both parties had been clergymen. Fifthly, the introduction to 
72 	 [Daniel Defoe], Miserere Cleri: Or, the Factions of the Church, 1718, 3-5, 17, 19-21, 24-5. 
73 Klein 1994, 137. 
74 	 Thomas Gordon, The Creed of an Independent Whig, 1720, 17, 21, 23-4. 
75 Dedication for [Trenchard and Gordon], IW, 1721, xvii; IW44, 16 November 1720. 
76 	 Preface to [Trenchard and Gordon], CL, The Third Edition, Iii. The writer or the exact date of 
this preface is not known. 
77 	 [Gordon], CL66, 17 February 1722; This view lends some support to the secularisation thesis 
advocated by Sommerville (1992), an objective explanation being offered to what was really 
behind religion. Religious institutions, if not religion itself, were interpreted as secular and 
even as political phenomena. 
78 [Trenchard and Gordon], 1W3, 3 February 1720. 
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public discourse of undefined religious concepts and their manipulation for 
political purposes should have been hindered.79 Finally, a tendency among the 
clergy to mislead the credulous uneducated common people8° was lamented. 
This concern reveals both the feared status of clergymen as communicators on a 
local level and also the mistrust of the political integrity of the nation at large. 
Later in the 1720s, the Craftsman continued on similar anticlerical lines, the 
formulations being slightly more moderate. When 'a parson in politics' was 
presented as an unmannerly actor in secular politics, acting cruelly and using 
grossly abusive language,81 the distinction drawn between the spiritual and 
temporal was a sharp one. The Craftsman maintained that `state-matters' were 
unsuitable topics for preaching. The political periodical itself, however, 
contained essays in which expressions and modes borrowed from religious 
discourse were employed for communicating political messages. `Political 
duties' might be presented as equally obligatory as the moral or Christian ones. 
'Offences of a political nature' were compared with sinning, the observance of 
political `articles' called for, and 'a public confession of our guilt' sometimes 
appealed for.82 `Infidelity in the Church' among clergy was compared with 
`infidelity in the state' caused by the conduct of political ministers. 
Furthermore, the paper underlined the importance of keeping up the people's 
`faith in' political rulers who continue to give `their blessings' to the people.83 
It is possible that such language was parody of abuse of religious discourse 
for political purposes in other circles, calling for a secular political discourse. 
Alternatives for a secular political discourse, however, remained few. The 
opposition to Walpole found one in the tradition of classical republicanism, but 
they could hardly abandon the religious discourse altogether as that had not lost 
its vitality. Indeed, a considerable proportion of the readers saw no parody in 
such politico-religious formulations but rather regarded it as one of the most 
convincing ways in political argumentation to draw analogies between religious 
and political life. Even the Craftsman expressed some sympathy for the clergy 
as an entity. It was only priestcraft that caused distortions.86 
Illustrations of a calming down of the politico-religious debate in which the 
clergy had been involved can be found in literature. Bramston's poem Art of 
Politicks (1729), states how 'not long since parish clerks, with saucy airs, 
applied King David's Psalms to state-affairs', implying that applications of 
scriptural texts in politics were in decline.85 As both political preaching and 
concern about clerical political activism declined, texts discussing the clergy's 
political activities became scarcer. However, a few texts from the 1730s and 
79 IW1, 20 January 1720; This condemnation of the use of religious concepts in political 
discourse did not prevent radical Whigs themselves from making use of them. In fact, the 
title Creed of an Independent Whig is an example of such manipulation. 
80 	 1W36, 21 September 1720; See also A Memorial of the Present State of the British Nation, 
1722, 27. 
81 C28, 16 March 1727. 
82 C78, 30 December 1727. 
83 C169, 27 September 1729. 
84 C116, 21 September 1728; C119, 12 October 1728. 
85 	 Bramston, The Art of Politicks, 1729, 9. 
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early 1740s still echo anticlerical arguments, demanding that `unjustifiable 
excursions into politics' in sermons should have been effectively restrained. 86 
Early eighteenth-century English political discourse was far from 
secularised, as religious questions formed one of the deepest dividing lines 
between contending political groupings. Many clergymen were involved in 
politics and preached traditionalist doctrines of the oneness of politics and 
religion. Criticism against this involvement is as a sign of a growing willingness 
among some Whigs and a few Tories to draw a clearer distinction between 
politics and the established religion. Even when such a distinction was drawn, 
religious language remained in wide political use. Since the language of 
religious origin was universally understood, even anticlerical writers employed 
it in their political pamphlets. The introduction of religious vocabulary to 
politics could be done for rhetorical purposes but more often it was to express 
genuine associations due to the lack of an entirely secular terminology of 
politics. Drawing analogies between religion and politics was a natural and 
quick way to make oneself understood. Religious terminology was easy to 
exploit, as religious terms offered usefully compact expressions for broader 
political concepts. The authors must have assumed that their rhetoric was 
capable of convincing their audience. After all, the use of religious terminology 
would not have been effective if the audience had not regarded politics and 
religion as interrelated. 
86 Middleton, A Vindication of Liberty of Conscience, 1734, 24; Acherley, Reasons for 
Uniformity in the State, 1741, 4. 
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Necessity of Uniformity 
and Possibilities for 
Diversity 
Uniformity and diversity 
A transition from uniformity based on the orthodoxy of the established Church 
to officially recognised heterodoxy has been a long and painful process in most 
societies. In early modern England as well, the political limits of discourse were 
such that diversity of values easily led to attempts to solve disputes over basic 
beliefs and attitudes by arms.' Religious diversity was seen to give rise to 
serious political instability, as conceptions of the common good were based on 
an idea of community, and the community, in turn, was conceived to be 
founded on shared religious beliefs. Eighteenth-century governments were still 
dedicated to the assumption that religious uniformity contributed to political 
stability and that civil support to the established Church was hence essential.'
Because of the intimate connection and frequent fusion between the religious 
and political discourses in the early years of the eighteenth century, the 
transition from orthodox uniformity to recognised heterodoxy is also of utmost 
importance to the simultaneous and connected transition in attitudes towards 
political parties. Terms of disbelief were used to defend Anglican orthodoxy 
against varieties of heterodox behaviour,3 but they were also applied to 
`heterodoxies' in politics that were understood in parallel terms. An analysis of 
conceptualisations of political pluralism thus calls for an understanding of 
conceptualisations of religious pluralism, another and dominant aspect of the 
phenomenon of pluralism. 
If the plurality of political values (a fact increasingly difficult to dispute) was 
to be recognised and accepted, the existence of a positive general concept for 
diversity — the nearest eighteenth-century counterpart of pluralism' — was 
essential. Occurrences of positive connotations for religious diversity and 
diversity in other areas of discourse may contribute to an attempt to understand 
transformations towards an acceptance of diversity in politics as well. In order 
to reconstruct the alternative meanings of diversity in thought available for an 
1 	 Schochet 1993, 3-4; Schochet 1995, 128. 
2 	 Miller 1994, 8, 19. 
3 	 Lund 1995, 8. 
4 	 Dictionary definitions of plurality were heavily inclined towards the ecclesiastical sense of 
the term. The general sense of 'a discrete quantity consisting of two, or a &eater number' or 
'many things of one sort or kind' is mentioned, but the term also had a specific ecclesiastical 
reference to the multiplicity of spiritual livings possessed by a clergyman. Fenning differed 
in this respect, leaving out the ecclesiastical sense and giving instead `majority' as a 
synonym. Gordon-Bailey 1730; Dyche-Pardon 1740/1750; Fenning 1741; The term 
pluralism in a modern political sense was not in use. 
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early eighteenth-century mind, it is important also to consider the connotations 
of its much more authoritative counter-concept, uniformity. In the Anglican 
view, uniformity was a basic value and starting point for discussions on the 
organisation of religious life. This shared religious ideal was unavoidably 
reflected in contemporary attitudes towards political diversity. 
The ideal of uniformity had achieved an established status during the 
Restoration. Together with its close synonyms concord and unity, it had 
become a central concept in English politico-religious discourse from at least 
the passage of Charles II's Act of Uniformity (1662) onwards. The Act, which 
insisted on 'a universal agreement in the public worship of Almighty God' in 
order to guarantee internal peace of the realm, formed a starting point for the 
reintroduced Book of Common Prayer, according to which the Anglican clergy 
were obliged to organise parish life. The Act was re-enforced by William III's 
declaration, enclosed in the Book of Common Prayer, which required `all our 
loving subjects to continue in the uniform profession' and prohibited `the least 
difference from the said articles'. The orders and the spirit of the Act of 
Uniformity became, through Anglican worship, familiar to every Englishman 
as a matter of course.' Calls for unity as an essential doctrine of Christianity, 
supporting the political system as well, became a normal feature of Anglican 
sermons and pamphlets.6 
Some High-Church clergymen were willing to seek a compromise with those 
who did not fully comply with such ecclesiastical regulations that could be 
considered as having minimal doctrinal significance. Drake, for instance, stated 
in his consequential Memorial of the Church of England (1705) that the Church 
of England did not require an absolute uniformity from her members in 
questions of `doubt and speculation, which are not essential to the true faith, nor 
necessary to the maintenance of order and good discipline'.' Of course, it still 
remained for the Church and Anglican-dominated Parliament together with 
Convocation to decide what type of diversity could be allowed among her 
members. As a pamphleteer wishing for a settlement of religious disputes 
pointed out in 1718, the legislature continuously possessed the power of `fixing 
the terms of uniformity, and enlarging or straitening them'.8 
Protestant Dissenters were constant critics of excessive uniformity; yet they 
usually attempted to express their criticism in moderate terms without 
5 	 The Book of Common Prayer, 1681, 1693, 1709; The 1693 edition contained the following 
prayer, emphasising unity and stability to be pronounced on the anniversary of the 
Gunpowder Plot: 'Let truth and justice, brotherly kindness and charity, devotion and piety, 
concord and unity, with all other virtues so flourish among us, that they may be the stability 
of our times, and make this Church a praise in the earth'. 
6 For calls for unity, see Randolph Ford, Unity the Greatest Security and Preservation of 
Religion and Government, 1715, 6, 8, 15; The Church of England's Apology, 1718, 3; [Lover 
of Truth], A Sure Way to Orthodoxy, 1718, 19; John Plaxton, An Exhortation to Unanimity 
and Concord, 1745, 1, 8-9, 11, 13; Matthias Mawson, The Mischiefs of Division with respect 
both to Religion and Civil Government, 1746, 24; Wesley, the founder of Methodism, also 
wrote in his diary, with reference to Count Zinzendorf's religious community in Germany: 
'0 how pleasant a thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity!' The Journal of John 
Wesley, 37. 
7 	 [Drake], The Memorial of the Church of England, 1705, 19. 
8 	 The Church of England's Apology, 1718, 28. 
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provoking the supporters of the established Church. At the same time, a thinker 
such as Shaftesbury might state ironically that `uniformity in opinion' was 'a 
hopeful project' .9 Four instances opposing or vindicating uniformity at the turn 
of the 1740s can illustrate the state of debate on uniformity towards the mid-
eighteenth century. 
The first of these instances comes from Thomas Story, a dissenting preacher, 
who, in a conventicle in 1737, ventured to demonstrate that the unity of 
Christians had never and would never be dependent on `uniformity of thought 
or opinion' but rather on what Story defined as `Christian love'. According to 
Story, 'the Son of God has not made uniformity of opinions any condition to 
this duty of social love'.10 
The second instance is an essay published in the Universal Spectator which 
discussed the humorous issue of calls for 'a uniformity of dress in the nation' 
and pointed out that, the `natural inconstancy' of the English being taken into 
consideration, it was as unrealistic to wish for `uniformity in religion, or 
politics' to be achieved as to aim at an establishment of a national uniform." 
Though a playful formulation, the passage reflects a mental submission to the 
fact of irreconcilable plurality of values among the English, both on questions 
of religion and those of politics. The two spheres were treated here as separate 
yet interconnected. The message of the passage was that both religious and 
political diversity were there to stay. 
The third instance comes from an anonymous author propagating radical 
views against uniformity in 1740, insisting in his title that social harmony could 
be achieved without uniformity being essential. According to this writer, 
`uniformity in name' did not always entail `uniformity in the thing', and, as 
there was disagreement among those asserting uniformity, there might well 
have been harmony without uniformity. The author offered illustrations from 
six fields of life to verify his point, including human anatomy, professional 
medicine, handicraft, everyday religious life, social structure and what he called 
'the laws of virtue'. He built his argument, firstly, on familiar facts of human 
bodies such as the absence of uniformity from human faces and senses. 
Secondly, he pointed out that the authorities did not attempt to regulate medical 
doctors either, so that all patients would be treated in uniformity of practice. 
Thirdly, the writer turned to products of artisans to illustrate the impossibility of 
uniformity in human judgments, pointing out that none of the clocks could go 
exactly alike nor all the pipes of an organ resound the same tune. Fourthly, he 
argued that the state of the Church of England herself remained far from 
complete uniformity. Fifthly, he exploited the universally held belief in the 
necessity of the stability of the divinely established social order to demonstrate 
the absurdity of the idea of uniformity. According to this reasoning, there was 
'no uniformity in the distributions of providence in the moral world, whose 
9 	 [Shaftesbury], A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm, 1708, in Characteristicks of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times, Vol. I, 18-19. 
10 Thomas Story, Thomas Story's Discourse, [1737], subtitle, 25. 
11 	 The Universal Spectator, No. 257, 9 July 1737, in GM, Vol. VII, July 1737, Reel 136. 
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inhabitants are a compound of rich and poor, high and low', as `uniformity here 
would be levelling'. Carrying the analogy between social order and religious 
uniformity to a favourable conclusion, the writer insisted that uniformity in the 
Church was `levelling human capacities'. Following anticlerical trends, he 
declared that uniformity introduced by force was 'a new invention of a corrupt 
priesthood hatched in the Roman conventicle'. Finally, he presented religious 
uniformity as inconsistent with 'the laws of virtue' with which he meant that 'no 
being but a free agent is capable of virtue, which is a principle that consists in 
choosing and acting what is right and good'.'2 The effects of classical 
republican emphasis on virtue are distinctly visible here. 
The fourth instance of the use of the term uniformity at the turn of the 174Os 
represents a statement in favour of a continuous uniformity, and, in this case, 
not so much in a religious but above all in a political sense. When calling for 
`uniformity in the state' to guarantee political stability, Acherley was 
undoubtedly using for political purposes an analogy derived from the concept 
of uniformity in religious discourse. What is more, he was applying a model 
borrowed from the Church to the organisation of state affairs. He started his 
essay by underlining the strength of the constitution of the Church of England 
which was built on uniformity and the people's knowledge of it. He then 
proceeded to the constitution of the state in which he saw — in rather medical 
terms — `infirmity' caused by the lack of corresponding uniformity in the 
people's minds as well as in their knowledge of the constitution. According to 
Acherley, `uniformity in the state' analogous to that of uniformity in religion 
would have solved the constant problem of 'the fluctuating opinions' 
concerning the relative powers of the monarch and Parliament that had given 
rise to so many internal conflicts and provoked so many attempted invasions in 
English history. He insisted that the authorities should — following ancient 
examples no matter how anachronistically applied — have taken care that 
opinions concerning the constitution remained uniform and in accordance with 
Magna Charta. They should also have started to legislate with the specific 
purpose of bringing the parts of the constitution to uniformity, following the 
example of uniformity created in religious questions. Acherley drew only one 
distinction between religious and political uniformity: whereas in religion, 
Protestant Dissenters had been given a special right to abstain from complete 
uniformity, such exceptions would have remained unacceptable as far as 
`uniformity in the state' was concerned.13 From political history it is known that 
no reform of the constitution proposed by Acherley was ever realised. 
However, the model status which Acherley gave to the religious settlement in 
search for solutions to political problems illustrates the continuous potential of 
12 Harmony without Uniformity, 1740, title and v-vi, 6, 8, 13, 17, 22, 25, 29, 32, 34-5, 39, 41-
2, 51-2. 
13 
	
	 Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, preface, 2-4, 9, 19, 22-3; A politico- 
religious analogy was also in question when Tile Craftsman used language of unity in an 
ironical political context in 1733. With the expression `political unity', the periodical 
suggested that Prime Minister Walpole was using methods borrowed from orthodox religion 
when governing the country. C359, 19 May 1733. 
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religious analogies in political discourse. 
In dictionaries which included an entry for uniformity, the term was usually 
defined very generally, with few explicit references to the consequences of 
uniformity in religion or politics. Chambers (1728) was the only dictionary to 
refer directly to the term being `particularly used for one and the same form of 
public prayers, and administration of the sacraments, and other rites, etc. of the 
Church of England'. Disagreements about the meaning of the term do not seem 
to have arisen among the lexicographers. To introduce a few instances, Gordon-
Bailey (1730) defined uniform as being 'of one form or fashion' and uniformity 
as `regularity, a similitude or resemblance'. Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) associated 
uniformity with `evenness, regularity, orderliness, similitude, agreement'. For 
Fenning (1741), uniformity was a synonym of `conformity; agreeing in all 
parts'. Finally, also for Johnson (1755), uniformity meant `conformity to one 
pattern' without diversity. 
Diversity, the counter-concept of uniformity, was customarily defined as 
`variety, a being diverse or different, unlikeness' but sometimes also `variety, 
difference, alteration, change'. '4 A development in the senses of the term 
becomes visible when later eighteenth-century dictionaries are consulted. In the 
quotations of Johnson (1755), the connotations of diversity are already 
interestingly varied. While diversity in religion might lead to unwanted 
consequences, diversity in social stations appeared as an essentially positive 
phenomenon. Attempting to define diversity as opposed to variety in 1766, 
John Trusler wrote about both in highly positive terms with no reservations 
whatsoever in relation to diversity in religion or politics. According to Trusler, 
diversity `supposes a change, which taste is always in search of; in order to 
discover some novelty that may enliven and delight it'. `Without some 
diversity', Trusler continued, 'life would be, altogether, insipid.' At the same 
time, variety `supposes a plurality of things, differing from each other in 
likeness, which cheers imagination, apt to be cloyed with too great a 
uniformity'. Such comfortable `infinite variety' could be found, above all, in 
nature, as `there is no species in nature, in which, we may not observe great 
variety'. In this context, Trusler even stated that `there is no government, but, is 
subject to variation',15 thus implicitly suggesting a noteworthy analogy between 
nature and society. This statement reproving excessive uniformity and 
replacing the previously dominant concept of religious diversity with natural 
diversity, dates from the late 1760s and, though not representative of early 
eighteenth-century attitudes, demonstrates an increasing acceptance of 
diversity and variety in different areas of life. 
If dictionaries are set aside, a discourse on diversity can be reconstructed 
through previous research and a few contemporary remarks on the issue. 
Unsurprisingly, ideological diversity was most intensively opposed by the 
14 Gordon-Bailey 1730; Bailey 1733; Dyche-Pardon 1740/1750; Fenning 1741; Martin 1749; A 
Pocket Dictionary 1753; Johnson 1755; Wesley 1764. 
15 John Trusler, The Difference, Between Words, esteemed Synonymous, in the English 
Language, Vol. I, 1766, 115. 
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advocates of monarchy and the Church, whereas religious dissidents and 
thinkers referring to the impossibility of resolving conflicts of conscience 
defended pluralism. Modest defences of pluralism gradually turned into claims 
that people had a right to follow doctrines that differed from established 
orthodoxies. Such arguments about diversity became part of that diversity 
itself.16 Moderate Anglicans and Dissenters might recognise the contribution of 
religious uniformity to political stability, but refused to accept claims that they 
formed a threat to the security of the state. Later in the eighteenth century, some 
of them found, in theories of natural rights, a justification for individual liberty 
to make choices on questions of religion.'7 
The history of discourse on religious pluralism has thus far been most 
exhaustively discussed by Peter Harrison who has pointed out that, throughout 
Church history, theorists had been looking for explanations for human diversity 
in biblical history and sometimes applied their findings to the case of religious 
pluralism. The existence of different religions thus became linked to the more 
general problem of human diversity. Still in the seventeenth century, it was 
usually taken as self-evident that both the God-created universe and human 
species had been characterised by uniformity. It was the Fall that had started an 
unfortunate process of change that caused both the universe and human society 
continuously to degenerate. Human inconstancy and variability, results of the 
Fall, had led to a deplorable diversity in the world. Change and diversity 
appeared as an unavoidable human destiny, and both were traditionally equated 
with sin. Religious diversity had thus appeared as merely one of the results of 
universal degeneration. A number of thinkers had advocated a broad theory of 
degeneration which was supported by the classics, the Bible, Reformation 
literature, advances of astronomy, and the discovery of new civilisations.18 In 
these circumstances, political diversity was also likely to appear merely as 
another result of universal degeneration. 
In the seventeenth century, however, conceptions of diversity started to 
change. In the controversy between the ancients and the moderns, the moderns 
maintained that the new sciences had achieved knowledge unknown to the 
ancients. Such an optimistic belief in the new scientific method was difficult to 
fit together with a pessimistic theory of universal degeneration. Cambridge 
Platonists started to make attempts to recognise and deal with the problem of 
global religious pluralism. Some of them saw the limits of human knowledge as 
a necessary cause of pluralism in beliefs. Furthermore, they saw pluralism as a 
necessary condition of natural knowledge, which enhanced optimistic views of 
religious diversity. To some degree at least, Cambridge Platonists saw religious 
pluralism as an acceptable and even inescapable fact.19 
Though not discussing diversity in any considerable length, John Locke had 
already referred to diversity in contexts that made the concept appear as 
positively charged. In his Two Treatises of Government, for instance, he 
16 Schochet 1993, 4. 
17 Miller 1994, 19. 
18 Harrison 1990, 41-2, 47, 59, 104. 
19 Harrison 1990, 101-2, 104. 
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referred to 'the variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests' that would 
`unavoidably happen in all collections of men'.20 In his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding he had made a statement that would rarely command the 
agreement of the traditionalist commentators of the early eighteenth century but 
which was certainly welcomed by adherents of more radical directions of 
contemporary thought. Locke's point of departure was the recognition that 
diversity of opinions was unavoidable. On the basis of this fundamental 
assumption, he had recommended that21  
it would, methinks, become all men to maintain peace, and the common 
offices of humanity, and friendship, in the diversity of opinions; since 
we cannot reasonably expect that any one should readily and 
obsequiously quit his opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind 
resignation to an authority which the understanding of man 
acknowledges not. 
Locke accepted diversity and conflict of opinions as an unavoidable structural 
feature of his theory of practical action. Problems emerged when those with 
different opinions were not tolerated, and hence it was hopeless to reach for 
religious uniformity through political measures. An acceptance of diversity and 
conflict was realism and made toleration and freedom of individuals to make 
rational choices possible.22 Locke was ready to accept denominational diversity 
on the basis of an inevitable weakness and difference of human understandings. 
Locke argued for the right of sects to exist even though he did not consider 
sectarian diversity (the `guilt of schism') as a value in itself.23 
As seen in other aspects of early eighteenth-century thought, the reception of 
Locke's thought was characterised by disagreement rather than universal 
approval. Some popularisers of his thought started to emerge, however, 
particularly in the early Hanoverian period. In 1718, an anonymous writer 
characterised Locke as a thinker with the finest reasoning and argued, in the 
same treatise, that differing opinions in any sort of controversy were not all 
false nor unreasonable. He also argued that it was a mistake to pretend 
superiority of judgement only because of differing in opinion.'-' 
Statements in favour of recognition of diversity are not often met in the 
printed literature of the 1700s and 1710s. One is much more likely to come 
across lamentations for the English being `wretchedly divided in opinions' and 
`industriously creating in themselves variety of conceits, in religion and 
politics'. Randolph Ford, for instance, preached in 1714 that difference in 
opinion was a reproach to God.25 Other writers on religion, however, might own 
that differences in opinion were unavoidable because of the inherent 
imperfection of human nature and thus consider it unreasonable that people 
20 	 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, Cambridge 1988 (1690), 11, §98. 
21 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, 4.16.4. 
22 Ashcraft 1995, 76-7. 
23 Goldie 1993b, 160-1. 
24 A Sure Way to Orthodoxy, 1718, 3, 10, 16. 
25 	 Ford, Unity the Greatest Security and Preservation of Religion and Government, 1715, 5, 8. 
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hated and criticised one another because of differences in opinion 26 
The instances of statements more sympathetic to diversity occurred in the 
texts of more or less radical or at least dissenting writers. Defoe set out in 1714 
to prove that neither diversity of religions nor diversity within one religion was 
harmful, arguing that men unavoidably had different notions of things because 
they naturally had different abilities, understandings and opportunities. He 
maintained that animosity between various sects was not caused by difference 
of opinions as such but by treating the supporters of other sects badly because of 
the difference in views. Defending the rights of Protestant Dissenters for free 
worship, he went so far as to state that `diversity of religions ... ought ... to be 
counted beneficial, as it creates a noble emulation in manners, learning, 
industry, and loyalty'. In brief, Defoe argued that 'a variety of opinions is a 
certain sign of a free government.'27 This recognition of diversity did not, of 
course, mean an acceptance of political parties, but merely the allowance of 
several religious groupings in society; yet the idea of diversity brought a 
positive contribution to development towards political diversity as well. 
Gordon's Creed of an Independent Whig (1720) already contained a 
declaration in favour of `diversity of faith', stating that opinions among humans 
were as various as their complexions. He urged people not to condemn others 
because they could not be of the same opinion in all matters, as the condemner 
could as well be condemned for his opinions. Expressing his message in brief, 
Gordon argued that there were 'more ways to the wood than one' .28 In the 
Independent Whig and Cato's Letters, he followed the same course of 
argument, referring to the inherently various and contradictory opinions of 
men,29 stating provocatively that any violent attempt to impose uniformity of 
thoughts was 'a thing tyrannical and impossible' and claiming that, in a well-
governed free state, `diversity of speculation' promoted rather than disturbed 
the public good.3° 
Towards the end of the 1720s and early 1730s, religious writings contained 
compromising statements about the potential positive effects of diversity in 
opinion. William Stevenson, for instance, emphasised the view that `others 
have the same right to differ from us, that we have to differ from them'. 
Defending the right of every person to judge on one's own, Stevenson was 
ready to declare that31  
... to inquire freely into the truth of every thing that is proposed to us, for 
our belief, or our practice, is the natural and unalienable right of every 
man. It is the indispensable duty of every Christian. It is the 
characteristic of a true Protestant. It is the joy and triumph of every true 
26 	 John Shuttleworth, A Perswasive to Union; Being An Essay Towards Reconciling all Parties, 
1716, preface. 
27 	 [Defoe], The Remedy Worse than the Disease, 1714, 31, 43. 
28 	 Gordon, The Creed of an Independent Whig, 1720, i, v. 
29 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW49, 21 December 1720. 
30 CL39, 29 July 1721. 
31 	 William Stevenson, Zeal and Moderation reconcil'd, 1728, 20-1. 
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Briton ... liberty of inquiry, and of private judgement ... is the 
fundamental principle of our Reformation. 
Stevenson concluded that while independent judgements unavoidably led to 
differing opinions, people should respect each other's opinions.32 Not unlike 
Stevenson, Thomas Dawson, when commenting on freethinking, recognised a 
variety of opinions among humans caused by their inherently different 
constitutions that create different inclinations.33 Thomas Story, when lecturing 
on diversity of opinions in religion `still subsisting and prevailing' to a 
dissenting congregation in 1737, could recommend no other solution to the 
consequent hatred towards supporters of competing religious groups than social 
friendship between Christians across sectarian boundaries. Variety in thinking, 
which he saw as nothing like a novelty, he explained via different interests, 
educational backgrounds and degrees of understanding, people being not 
always capable of choosing freely how to think 34 In a parallel manner, in 
periodical journalism of the 1730s, writings recognising differences in opinion 
as unavoidable appeared. In 1733, for instance, an essay published in London 
Journal contained the statement that `there ever will be different sentiments 
about religion and politics'.35 
In spite of these and other statements sympathetic to diversity,36 authoritative 
texts warning about the consequences of diversity, particularly in religion, also 
continued to be published throughout the early eighteenth century. The most 
influential of all was probably Warburton's Alliance between Church and State, 
reissued several times and regarded by many as an ample representation of 
establishment attitudes towards the relationship between religion and politics. 
Warburton, who accepted religious toleration yet defended the established 
religion and the continued necessity of the Test Act, stated, for instance, that 
`diversities of religions in a state' necessarily led to each sect considering itself 
the representative of the only true religion, thus advancing its interests at the 
cost of other religious groups, making use of the state machinery for religious 
purposes whenever possible.37 
Acherley's Reasons for Uniformity in the State, published in 1741 as a 
supplement to a volume describing the basics of the British constitution, is also 
worthy of note. With this supplement, Acherley wanted to submit to 
consideration those `diversities of opinions' concerning the constitution that 
weakened the political system, and he wished to argue in favour of uniformity 
in conceptions concerning the constitution. Indeed, most of these diversities 
were of a religious nature, related to disagreements about the proper extent of 
toleration and the organisation of the Church. Religiously motivated 
controversies provoked by the High Church had increased `diversities of 
32 Stevenson, Zeal and Moderation reconcil'd, 1728, 21. 
33 	 Dawson, Good Advice, 1731, 32. 
34 Story, Thomas Story's Discourse, [1737], 3-4. 
35 London Journal, No. 750, 10 November 1733, in GM, Vol. III, November 1733, Reel 134. 
36 	 Other statements include The Present Necessity of distinguishing Publick Spirit from Party, 
Edinburgh (London) 1736, 22. 
37 	 William Warburton, The Alliance between Church and State, 1736, 112, 116. 
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opinions' in the state, as clerical interpretations of the constitution had departed 
from the human constitution. Speaking in favour of a secularised constitution, 
Acherley wanted to prevent religious controversy from causing diversity in 
interpretations of the constitution. The constitution should rather have been 
based on the ancient constitution as expressed in Magna Charta.38 It should be 
noted, of course, that Acherley's requirement of uniformity in constitutional 
issues did not necessarily exclude diversity in less fundamental political 
questions. 
By the 1740s, however, in spite of the rebellion of 1745 that provoked 
traditionalist reactions, diversity seems to have become an increasingly 
accepted phenomenon in contemporary writing. For instance, when William 
Gilpin chose in 1747 to write about 'the bad consequences of dissention', or 
`party-rage', he yet pointed out, on the basis of human nature, that a complete 
unanimity of opinion could not have been the original meaning of God and 
could not be imposed by man either, human minds appearing in as many shapes 
as human bodies. He condemned it as 'a mishapen way of thinking' to treat 
fellow subjects badly only because `sentiments happen to differ'. According to 
Gilpin, the thoughts of every person were 'his own property' .39 
One of the most interesting early eighteenth-century texts discussing 
diversity is the anonymous Harmony Without Uniformity which set out in 1740 
to vindicate 'the right of private judgement'. Following Lockean lines of 
thought, the writer considered it both absurd and impious to attempt to impose 
one's views on others by violence, as God had given the ability of free 
judgement to every human being. Above all, he advocated the view that religion 
was based on free reasoning and not on coercion. The writer's arguments in 
favour of diversity were, importantly, based on precedents derived from the 
new Newtonian physics and Lockean psychology rather than on religious or 
other traditional justifications:40 
In the works of nature, there is the greatest variety and greatest harmony. 
And till the whole world is animated with one soul, there must be a 
variety of thoughts. But God has given many souls, men therefore 
should allow of many judgements .. . 
Diversity is the glory of the universe. Nature abounds with variety, its 
glories are displayed in a variegation without variance. This variety 
presents us with beauties that inspire human minds with transports: 
Beauties which could never flow from one object, or one species of 
beings, though exactly the same in their proportions and powers .. . 
The sun is one, but useful by variety of influences on the planetic and 
cometic worlds. The firmament, that vast expanse, is one beautiful arch, 
but its beauties shine by an infinite variety of stars. 
38 	 Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 1, 4-5, 7, 9, 19. 
39 	 William Gilpin, The bad Consequences of Dissention and Party-rage Considered, 1747, 8-
9, 21. 
40 Harmony Without Uniformity, 1740, iii-vi, 1-5, 35, 39. 
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Let us take a short survey of the terraqueous globe, and we shall soon 
find how its glories shine in an admirable scheme of varieties; .. . 
But no such variance observable as in mankind, whose individuals vary 
as remarkably as if they were beings of a different species .. . 
... he that takes a survey of the world, will find that the harmony of the 
universe is founded on the basis of differing sentiments, diversity of 
constitutions and customs, different laws, different modes of worship in 
different kingdoms, even where the same religion is professed; .. . 
If diversities in nature have such a beautiful aspect, how came they to be 
disfigurements in the religious world? 
How is it that diversity in religious sentiments, and modes of adoration, 
is accounted to be reputable, when nature in all its forms triumphs in 
. variety? 
In addition to this primary justification derived from nature, the writer pointed 
to variety in traditionally authoritative areas of discourse, including religion and 
medicine. According to this unconventional interpretation of diversity, divinity 
was full of `variety of communications' and `multiformity of acts', yet it 
formed 'an agreeable union between many different things'. Likewise, the 
writer suggested, the human body consisted of many parts which differed in 
their senses, and the same sense created different ideas in different cases and in 
different persons. Variety in human faces, and even more in human minds, was 
overwhelming, and even in each human mind, the variety of conceptions was 
high.41 Clearly despising those who remained servile to values propagated by 
their teachers, parents and the clergy, the author offered a description of an ideal 
character of people who possessed an42 
inquisitive genius, and do not content themselves with hearsay notions 
received from dealers in ignorance and partiality, but make an impartial 
scrutiny into the truth of things, and are not afraid of professing their 
dissent from common opinions, under which falsehood is commonly 
hatched and entertained instead of truth. 
This inquisitive genius concerned religion in the first place, and the treatise 
contained no explicit reference to political diversity, but it is arguable that the 
idea could be easily extended by the mid-eighteenth-century mind to include 
political questions as well. If `diversity of sects and opinions' was pleasing to 
God and diversity in all universe natura1,43 what would prevent the acceptability 
of diversity in political opinion or potentially even association in the form of 
political parties? The author was already defending religious pluralism by the 
means of newly interpreted Christianity and medicine. It remained for late 
eighteenth-century authors to advance the same with respect to political 
matters. 
41 Harmony Without Uniformity, 1740, 2, 5-6, 22. 
42 Harmony Without Uniformity, 1740, 30-1. 
43 Harmony Without Uniformity, 1740, 48. The text put forward points analogous to 
freethinking texts discussed in chapter 12. 
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Conformity, nonconformity and dissent 
Conformity and nonconformity were counter-concepts that frequently 
appeared in early eighteenth-century discourse on religious diversity. If 
compared with the explicit manner in which many other terms of religious 
origin were applied in political contexts, these appeared relatively seldom in 
political texts. Nevertheless, these religious concepts reflecting conceptions of 
pluralism in religion deserve to be discussed. In some early eighteenth-century 
texts, the word conformity, which carried fundamentally religious 
connotations, was also applied to issues of political constitution, the originally 
religious term being `secularised' for political purposes. Yet its political sense 
remained wedded to the original religious notion. 
The restored Church of England had aimed at a complete conformity within 
the nation. The explicit intention of the Act of Uniformity, as passed in the 
beginning of the reign of Charles II and reprinted in the copies of the Book of 
Common Prayer, had been to bring into the knowledge of every subject 'the 
rule to which he is to conform in public worship' 44 The term Nonconformist 
had thereafter referred to all those priests and congregations, whatever their 
sect, who did not accept the Book of Common Prayer and were thus excluded 
from the national Church.45 This uncompromising line of religious conformity 
led to serious political consequences: 'All those, who declined an exact and 
strict conformity to the whole establishment of the Church ... were deprived of 
the protection, nay, exposed to the prosecution of the state'.46 
Before long, such discrimination of religious alternatives led to opposing 
reactions. On the other side of late seventeenth-century discourse on conformity 
we find, among others, Locke, who had stated in his Reasonableness of 
Christianity (1695) that all standards of conformity should have been based on 
reason or revelation,47 and, by implication, not on human laws such as the Act of 
Uniformity. A typical eighteenth-century Nonconformist supported the idea of 
separating Church from state and yearned for the same political rights for every 
subject (except Catholics). Many nonconformists asserted that uniformity was 
impossible to achieve, that persecution led to no uniformity, hence freedom of 
religion was essential. It was not religious diversity as such that caused 
problems but the denial of religious liberty. They also insisted that the 
established Church should have no civil power, and that no church was entitled 
to act independently of the state.48 
In the very beginning of the eighteenth century, the concept conformity was 
most frequently discussed in connection with the practice of occasional 
conformity, that is, attendance in the Anglican communion by Dissenters 
merely in order to qualify for office. This was a practice which Tories and High-
Church Anglicans eagerly endeavoured to put to an end. Propositions for 
44 	 The Book of Conunon Prayer, 1681. 
45 Bradley 1990, 49. 
46 Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 36-7. 
47 	 Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, 1695, 174. 
48 Robbins 1959, 228, 239, 241. 
130 ® NECESSITY OF UNIFORMITY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR DIVERSITY 
banning occasional conformity came up in Parliament thrice in the beginning of 
the century (1702-3, 170349, 1704), but the bill was finally passed only in 1711. 
The political aspects of this intended legislation against religious pluralism are 
visible in Swift's letter when he described 'the highest and warmest reign of 
party and faction I ever knew or read of, upon the bill against occasional 
conformity' .50 Traditionalist clergymen willingly interpreted toleration towards 
alternative forms of Protestantism, which the. Revolution of 1688 had 
established, as a temporary solution to a problem that could be finally solved 
only through the return of all Protestants to conformity to the established 
Church, to the ideal state of religious life.5 ' By contrast, the anticlerical radicals 
of the Independent Whig, for instance, criticised such constant demands for 
more complete religious conformity in an ironical tone: `Conformity is the 
word! It is the mother of all virtues, and the sanctifier of all crimes'.52 Criticism 
of demands for conformity could be later developed into statements such as 
`every man ... has a natural inherent and unalienable right to conform or not 
conform to religious establishments, just as his own judgement and conscience 
direct him'.53  
Dictionary definitions of the 1730s, 1740s and 1750s for conformity offer 
little that could be interpreted as a shift in the meaning of the concept. Gordon-
Bailey (1730), for instance, defined conformist in a very conventional way as 
'one who conforms, especially to the discipline of the established Church of 
England'.54 Bailey (1733), Martin (1749) and A Pocket Dictionary (1753) 
added the expression 'to any establishment', thus presenting the term as more 
universal, including potential political uses. For each of these, conformity 
meant `compliance'. For Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) as well, a conformist was 
'one who complies with, or assents to the public establishment of any 
discipline' and, in England, usually `denotes a professor and practiser of the 
faith and discipline of the Church of England'. Hence conformity stood for 'the 
agreement or relation that is between different things or persons; compliance, 
yielding, or submitting'. The counter-concept Nonconformist (and noncon-
formity) referred to 'one who does not conform to the Church of England, with 
respect to its discipline and ceremonies'. Dyche was more precise in this 
respect, giving a general sense of 'one that does not consent to, or comply with, 
his company' and specifying still that Nonconformist was `particularly one that 
does not comply with the present established Church of England in her 
49 	 Narcissus Luttrell reported on the readings of this bill in the two Houses of Parliament on 27 
November 1703, 363, 30 November 1703, 364, 9 December 1703, 367, and 14 December 
1703, 369, all in A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs, Farnborough 1969, Vol. V; 
Observations on the Conduct of the Tories, the Whigs, and the Dissenters, 1739, 17-18, 
discussed the Tory campaign against occasional conformity. 
50 Swift to the Rev. William Tisdall, London, 16 December 1703, The Correspondence of 
Jonathan Swift, Vol. I, 38. 
51 	 See e.g. George Sewell, Schism, Destructive of the Government, both in Church and State, 
1714, 17, 21. 
52 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW26, 13 July 1720. 
53 A nonconformist son's lines in a dialogue with his conformist father in Conscientious 
Nonconformity, 1737, 30. 
54 The same definition was echoed by Wesley 1764. 
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discipline and ceremonies'. Furthermore, according to Dyche, the term 
Nonconformist was applied to `Protestant Dissenters only, who agree in the 
general articles of faith', thus excluding Catholics and some radical sects. The 
same restriction was made by Chambers (1728) who also added some 
etymology, reminding that the term originated from the religious divisions of 
the reign of Charles I. Fenning (1741) defined conformity as `likeness; 
resemblance; the act of regulating one's actions to some law; consistency; 
compliance with the worship of the established Church'. Nonconformity yet 
carried the pejorative undertone of 'the act of refusing compliance; refusal to 
join in or conform to, the forms used in the established worship'. Finally, in 
Johnson (1755), conformity meant `similitude; resemblance; the state of having 
the same character of manners or form', its applicability thus extending beyond 
a religious context. Conformist referred more exclusively to 'one that complies 
with the worship of the Church of England' as opposed to religious Dissenters. 
The respective counter-concepts nonconformity and Nonconformist Johnson 
defined in a highly pejorative manner by referring to their refusal to join in the 
established worship. 
Even though dictionaries do not refer to the rise of an explicitly political 
sense of conformity, signs pointing to that direction can be found in texts from 
the 1730s. Bolingbroke, an author particularly willing to make use of religious 
associations for political purposes, wrote how good government was always run 
'with a strict conformity to the principles and objects of the constitution', 
whereas bad government lacked such appropriate constitutional conformity. In 
order to make his allusion against Walpole's administration perfectly clear, 
Bolingbroke pointed out that the submission of the people to their governor was 
wholly dependent on the governor's `conformity or nonconformity' to the 
constitution. He further argued that the positive or negative consequences of 
some phenomenon to British liberty should have been deduced merely from the 
conformity of the phenomenon to the constitution." 
Not unlike Bolingbroke, Acherley used the concept conformity for an 
unambiguously political purpose. According to Acherley, those who acted 
against the constitution and against what he called 'the state uniformity', should 
have been regarded as `state Dissenters, and Nonconformists'. Acherley, 
though building his argument on an analogy between religious and political 
conformity, distinguished between the two: whereas dissent in religion could be 
allowed as far as the Bible was observed, no-one could be allowed to dissent as 
to conformity to the constitutional principles of human origin.56 These few 
instances illustrate the applicability of the term conformity in two areas of 
discourse that were increasingly moving apart from each other. Noteworthy is 
that the term was used in political contexts by authors who welcomed the 
separation of the spheres of religion and politics. 
Another widely used term of religious pluralism which was occasionally 
applied with an unambiguously political sense was that of dissent. Religious 
55 Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 88-9, 112. 
56 	 Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 22-3. 
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dissent was a major factor affecting political identities and giving rise to 
political strife in early eighteenth-century England. Therefore, it is important to 
consider the political implications that the widely applied term could have. The 
applications of the term being so numerous and diverse in contemporary 
discourse, this survey will concentrate specifically only on those occurrences of 
the term in which its political implications were made explicit. 
The main lines of discourse on dissent can be summarised as follows: 
Whereas radical and dissenting writers referred to the often unreasonable 
inconveniences caused to those dissenting from established religious 
conceptions,57 those advocating Orthodox Anglican views frequently expressed 
their suspicions towards Dissenters. John Evelyn, for instance, heard a High-
Church sermon in which dissent had been depicted as an unnecessary novelty 
that had emerged in the heat of the seventeenth century and only aimed at 
advancing the interest of a party. In other and probably more Low-Church 
sermons which Evelyn reviewed, it had been recommended that `Dissenters 
from our opinion' should have been treated kindly while their conversion to the 
established form of religion was to be prayed for. Thomas Naish, a priest 
himself, saw Dissenters as capable of causing needless divisions everywhere, 
even within their own congregations.58 
In traditionalist texts, and particularly in those published before 1720, dissent 
was often turned into a plot that concerned not simply the status of the 
established Church but also the future of the prevailing political system. 
Conyers Place stated: 'All religious dissention from the established Church .. . 
[is] naturally and necessarily attended with some disaffection to our civil 
constitution'. To justify this point, a writer of the 1710s readily turned to 
metaphors derived from traditional medicine and presented dissent as a disease 
disturbing the health of the body politic.59 
Much of this suspicion towards Dissenters survived after 1720 even though it 
was usually expressed in less exaggerated terms. In particular, the attempts to 
repeal the Test Act in the mid-1730s gave rise to anti-dissent publications.° 
57 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, 1.2.25; [Toland], Christianity 
not Mysterious, 1696, xxix. 
58 	 The Diary of John Evelyn, 17 October 1703, Vol. V, 546-7, 17 June 1705, Vol. V, 599, 11 
November 1705, Vol. V, 615-16; The Diary of Thomas Naish, ed. Doreen Slatter, Devizes 
1965, 30 May 1701, 44. 
59 	 Place, The Arbitration; Or, the Tory and Whig Reconcil'd [1710?), 27. 
60 	 The connection between religious schism and `civil dissentions' was stated in Robert against 
Ferguson, 1704, 4, and [Leslie], The Wolf Stript of his Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 5; In 
Drake's Memorial of the Church of England, 1705, 9, 15, 36, Dissenters were viewed as 
aiming to destroy both Church and state; In Matthew Tindal's New Catechism, 1710, 24, one 
of the questions concerned the loyalty of the Dissenters and the respective answer referred to 
their factious caballing to subvert both the established Church and state. Tindal himself, of 
course, did not hold such High-Church views. He was only re-editing a High-Church 
catechism; Hysterical propaganda against Dissenters appeared still in the late 1710s, as can 
be seen in John Dunton's Conventicle; or, a Narrative of the Dissenters New Plot Against 
The Present Constitution in Church and State, 1715, in the pamphlet A Presbyterian Getting 
On Horse-Back: Or, The Dissenters Run Mad in Politicks, 1717, and in The Church of 
England Man's Memorial, 1719, `Introduction'; Anti-dissenting writing was continued after 
1720 by authors such as Stebbing, An Essay Concerning Civil Government, 1724, 214, and 
Warburton, The Alliance between Church and State, 1736, 3. 
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Throughout the early eighteenth century, dissent was considered dangerous not 
only for its religious implications but also for its political consequences. The 
Dissenters' separated ecclesiastical polity and egalitarian social views formed a 
radical pluralistic challenge to the socio-political stability. Furthermore, the 
Dissenters increasingly saw themselves as not only a religious but also a 
political alternative.61 For instance, a pamphlet published during attempts to 
pass a law against occasional conformity in 1703 implied, by using expressions 
such as `political Dissenter' and `state-Dissenter' as opposed to `religious 
Dissenter', that much of dissent was political rather than purely religious in 
character. The Tory assumption about the interconnection between dissent and 
politics is particularly visible in the universal manner in which their texts used 
the terms Dissenter and Whig, portraying them as closely united if not 
synonymous.62 
Dissenting writers customarily, though not always very convincingly, denied 
such connections between religious issues and 'the several factions in the state'. 
The rejection of political discrimination against Dissenters was what they called 
for. Such a reform in the political status of Dissenters was defended more 
openly after the Hanoverian Succession. By the early 1720s, some anticlerical 
publications did not hesitate to use such highly positive expressions as 'most 
godly Dissenters'. By 1740, a pamphleteer already extolled the courage of those 
who were 'not afraid of professing their dissent from common opinions'.63 
In some early eighteenth-century dictionaries, the term dissent was given 
senses that suggest that it was not considered merely a religious term. For 
instance, Gordon-Bailey (1730), Bailey (1733) and Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) 
gave the word a very general definition, stating that dissent was simply 
`contrariety of opinions', that to dissent was 'to disagree or differ in opinion', 
and that the term Dissenter stood for 'one of an opinion different or contrary to 
another; commonly applied to those Nonconformists who dissent from the 
Church of England'. The concept would seem to have been so wide that anyone 
holding opposing views could in principle have been called a Dissenter. In 
practice, of course, the term was reserved for Protestant Dissenters. Fenning 
(1741) repeated that dissent was `disagreement, difference of opinion; avowal 
or declaration of difference of opinion' and Dissenter 'one who disagrees, or 
61 Bradley 1990, 418. 
62 A View of the present Controversy about Occasional Conformity, As far as Religion's 
Engag'd in it, 1703, 9; Robert against Ferguson, 1704, 2; Drake, The Memorial of the 
Church of England, 1705, 4; The expression 'politic Dissenters' was also used in [Defoe], 
The Ballance, 1705, 4; [Leslie], The Wolf Stript of his Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 5; 
Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 22 December 1709, Vol. II, 330; Dr. T. Smith 
to Hearne, 18 February 1710, ibid., 346; The expression state-Dissenter was also applied by 
Acherley in 1741 as an analogy referring to the necessary rejection of those who did not 
comply to the basic rules of the constitution, whether ecclesiastical or political. Acherley, 
Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 22. 
63 
	
	
[Defoe], The Weakest go to the Wall, 1714, 37; The Church of England's Apology, 1718, 28; 
A collected volume of the anticlerical Independent Whig, 1721, was dedicated to the Lower 
House of Convocation, a stronghold of High-Church clergy, and provocatively spoke about 
'godly Dissenters' (p. xli); For later defences of religious dissent, see Observations on the 
Conduct of the Tories, the Whigs, and the Dissenters, 1739, passim., and Harmony without 
Uniformity, 1740, 30-1. 
134 ® NECESSITY OF UNIFORMITY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR DIVERSITY 
declares his disagreement with respect to an opinion' and, more particularly, 
'one who separates from the communion of the Church of England'. Johnson 
chose a quotation from the honoured royal martyr Charles I to refer to `morose 
and perverse dissentings', a passage from a book titled Decay of Piety to 
illustrate 'the inhumanity of dissenting Christians' and a statement from a 
sermon questioning the consistency of dissenting doctrines. Quotations from 
writers that had been more sympathetic to Dissenters such as Addison and 
Locke were chosen, with a distinct intention, from such contexts that did not 
disturb Johnson's negative interpretation of the term. The only dictionary 
limiting the term Dissenters only to religious issues was Chambers (1728) who 
referred with it to `certain [tolerated] sects, or parties' who disagreed with the 
established Church 64 
Dissent remained a disputed word. But the consulted texts suggest that 
attacks against dissent were becoming less fierce and defences of dissent more 
open. The term dissent was occasionally applied to non-religious issues, 
including politics, but it remained an essentially religious term. 
Orthodoxy and heterodoxy 
In 1720, one of the characters of Benjamin Griffin's comedy Whig and Tory 
pointed out, with reference to the forty-year-old politico-religious party 
rivalry:65 
The old dispute of parties is still kept alive, nor is it long since our very 
newspapers were so crowded with orthodox and heterodox principles, 
that religion, at length, was entirely lost in the dispute. 
The statement indicates that Griffin considered party division an initially 
religious phenomenon that had been prosecuted by the use of religious 
terminology. Orthodoxy and heterodoxy, a pair of counter-concepts, had also 
been used in the debate in which demands for religious and political orthodoxy 
became closely linked.66 
Orthodoxy, or holding `correct' opinions as to religious — as well as political 
— principles was an ideal for the majority of Englishmen, so that even a defender 
of the rights of the Protestant Dissenters could write positively about an 
`orthodox union' against 'the gangrene of sects and schisms'.67 In England, the 
term orthodox was not traditionally associated with any specific party within 
the Church. It had obviously come into use in the 1620s as a denomination for 
64 Definitions containing the same elements as the dictionaries mentioned in the text include 
Martin 1749, A Pocket Dictionary 1753 and Wesley 1764. 
65 Griffin, Whig and Tory, 1720, 10. 
66 See, for example, Cocker-Hawkins 1704 and Bullokar-Browne 1719; A search with http:// 
www.jubilee.org/bible/search.html shows that the terms orthodox and heterodox do not 
appear in King James Bible (1611), the standard English Bible. 
67 	 Three Questions of Present Importance, Modestly Resolved, 1702, 28. 
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all those divines who were not called Puritans.68 In the early eighteenth century, 
defenders of traditionalist Anglicanism eagerly pronounced their conception of 
the necessary constancy of the established politico-religious order by repeated 
phrases vindicating 'the most orthodox and best of churches, and the most 
admirable constitution of all governments in the universe',69 in which the two 
appeared as hardly separable. It was insisted that the Church of England was the 
Church by law established,70 and, in relation to all of its religious alternatives, 
the Church of England was presented as a 'much more orthodox 
establishment'.7' This orthodoxy was not so much connected with theological 
positions but with cultural practices and ideological assumptions. It was defined 
in various ways. Writers debated on the relative weight of revealed truth and 
reason, and of private conscience and the authority of the Church. Some of them 
wished to increase the range of acceptable beliefs whereas many demanded a 
narrower definition of orthodox behaviour.72 
The discriminating use of the term orthodox had for some time been 
criticised by authors such as Locke, who had pointed out that everyone 'is 
orthodox to himself' and further that being `orthodox' gave no right to crush 
those who held different opinions.73 Locke was followed by several anticlerical 
writers who criticised the clergy for abusing the term orthodox to strengthen 
their own positions. Toland, for instance, stated that it was impossible to please 
all `parties' of clergymen, as 'if you be orthodox to those, you are a heretic to 
these'. He suggested that many of those called orthodox were as unwise, brutal 
and factious as men who did not carry such a name. Himself he declared to 
acknowledge no orthodoxy other than what he considered the truth.74 
Efforts to define orthodoxy continued throughout the century. Francis Hare 
suggested in 1714 that orthodoxy could not be defined merely on the basis of 
Scripture but was rather an artificial construct created by the Church which 
called itself orthodox.75 The republicans of the early 1720s also complained: `If 
we grow wilful, and break loose our orthodox ignorance, we are pursued with 
hard names and curses.' They vilified the term by applying it to a text that 
certainly did not come up to the Anglican interpretation of orthodoxy 76 
Likewise, a periodical essay discussing the misapplication of religious 
vocabulary in the mid-1730s argued with reference to the term orthodoxy that 
'all [were] claiming it, and, if they have power on their side, condemning all 
that differ from them, as atheists, or unbelievers' .77 The term orthodox remained 
a term with considerable suggestive power. 
68 Nockles 1993, 338. 
69 [Ward], A Fair Shell, but A Rotten Kernel, 1705, preface; For reference to the Church of 
England as 'the most orthodox part', see John Giffard, Family Religion, 1713, 42. 
70 Pocock 1995, 37, 41. 
71 	 [Baron], An Historical Account of Comprehension, and Toleration, 1705, title. 
72 Lund 1995, 2-3. 
73 Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 1689. 
74 [Toland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, 1-3, 175. 
75 Lund 1995, 3. 
76 	 Gordon, The Creed of an Independent Whig, 1720, title; [Trenchard and Gordon], 1W18, 18 
May 1720. 
77 	 The Old Whig, No. 20, 24 July 1735, in GM, Vol. V, July 1735, Reel 135; About a year later, 
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The discriminatingly Anglican sense of the term orthodox, with an 
underlying implication of political orthodoxy as well, survived though 
weakened in the course of the early eighteenth century. Gordon-Bailey (1730) 
and Chambers (1738) defined orthodoxy as 'a soundness of doctrine or opinion, 
with regard to all the points and articles of faith' and orthodox, with no sign of 
attempts to objectivity, as something done `according to the true belief, 
expecting that all those who consulted the dictionary were aware of what true 
belief was. In Bailey's own dictionary (1733), too, orthodoxy was simply 
`soundness of judgment, true belief and orthodox something 'that is of a true or 
right opinion or belief'. Likewise, Martin (1749) remained loyal to the old 
definition of orthodoxy as 'the true belief . Fenning (1741) was more restrictive 
in his definition, circumscribing the term orthodoxy to the religious sphere 
only; orthodoxy for him was `soundness of doctrine or opinion in matters of 
religion'. Once again in Johnson's (1755) traditionalist interpretation, 
orthodoxy was an opposite to heretical and meant `soundness in [religious] 
opinion and doctrine'. Unorthodox was someone 'not holding pure doctrine'. 
Wesley (1764), as another man of religion, was not ready to compromise but 
stated simply that orthodox was one `holding right opinions'. In contrast, A 
Pocket Dictionary (1753) already dared to adopt a more cynical approach to the 
term orthodoxy, seeing it as 'the true belief, or what is thought so by those who 
are fond of applying the term to their own opinions'. 
In everyday arguments, orthodoxy retained its general applicability into the 
1730s. The Craftsman, for instance, wrote a few times, rather ironically, about 
politicians supporting Walpole's government who had turned `perfectly 
orthodox' in politics.78 Bolingbroke in particular willingly applied the attribute 
orthodox in his political propaganda, insisting in his political catechism that 
certain orthodoxy in relation to the fundamentals of the English constitution 
was essential and suggesting in his essays on parties that 'the civil faith of the 
Old Whigs' could well be made 'a test of political orthodoxy' for the Country 
Party.79 His adversaries replied to such insinuations by suggesting that 
Bolingbroke's political `faith' was accepted by all Whigs even though it was 
'not exactly orthodox, according to our constitution'.80 An essay of the Daily 
Gazetteer (1740) offers a similar instance of references to political orthodoxy 8' 
Statements concerning political orthodoxy were not always supported with 
detailed production of evidence. References to orthodoxy were easy to apply 
and probably retained much of their effectiveness without yet turning into 
entirely ironical expressions. Instances of questioning the justification of the 
the same periodical wrote ironically about medical quacks by applying the expression 
`physical orthodoxy'. The point, though remaining rather obscure, may have been that it was 
as unrealistic to struggle for orthodoxy in medicine as it was in religion or politics, i.e. for 
`believing and subscribing, whatever our superiors require, without reluctance or 
exceptions'. The Old Whig, No. 78, 2 September 1736, in GM, Vol. VI, September 1736, 
Reel 136. 
78 C272, 18 September 1731; C380, 13 October 1733. 
79 Bolingbroke, The Freeholder's Political Catechism, 1733, 5; Bolingbroke, A Dissertation 
upon Parties, 1735, 27. 
80 London Journal, No. 735, 28 July 1733, in GM, Vol. III, July 1733, Reel 134. 
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terms orthodox and heterodox also occurred in this period.82 
Late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century English men and women 
experienced constant fears of rising disbelief. It was widely feared, for instance, 
that heterodoxy was gaining ground among the lower orders. The perceived 
threat, when compared to the actual numbers of the heterodox, turns out to have 
been a myth. But for those confused by contemporary intellectual upheavals 
and those fearing the consequences of emerging secularism in religious and 
rising republicanism in political thought, heterodoxy became an evil affecting 
all areas of life.83 
In dictionaries, definitions offered for heterodoxy might be very general, 
enabling ambiguous applications in different areas of discourse, including 
politics. For example, Coles (1701), Kersey (1715, 1731), Cocker-Hawkins 
(1724) and even A Pocket Dictionary of 1753 all defined heterodoxy simply as 
'a being of another judgment or opinion than what is generally received'. 
Phillips-Kersey (1706) made use of the same definition but emphasised the 
primarily religious sense of the term. Glossographia Anglicana Nova (1707), 
Bailey (1733), Defoe (1737) and Fenning (1741) all defined heterodox in 
essentially analogous terms as `differing in sentiments or opinion from the 
generality of mankind', thus making a wide usage possible. Gordon-Bailey 
(1730) saw heterodoxy as 'the being different in opinion, from the generality of 
people, or the established principles', with no explicit reference to religion, yet 
interpreted heterodox to mean `contrary to the faith or doctrine established in 
the true Church', which carried a whole deal of prejudice in favour of the 
Anglican Church as the representative of the only true faith. The same prejudice 
is reflected in Martin's (1749) definition of heterodox as being 'of different 
opinion from the Church'. Dyche-Pardon's (1740/1750) definitions were more 
detailed, revealing a lot of the contentious nature of the term. Heterodoxy was 
defined as 'the contradictiousness of a person's or nation's opinions from 
known, established truths, especially in matters of religion'. Heterodox was 
termed conventionally 'some opinions contrary to the established and true faith 
generally received in the Church', but the dictionary also stated the common 
wisdom among contemporaries that 'this word is very often applied by different 
parties to different things, each accusing the other of heterodoxy, when perhaps 
they are both so'. This more objective type of definition had also appeared in 
Chambers's (1728) remark that the term was mainly applied in polemical 
theology. However, the common definition was still followed by the 
authoritative Johnson (1755), who saw heterodox as `deviating from the 
established opinion' or, even, as any `opinion peculiar' and most distinctly by 
Wesley (1764), whose Methodist background hardly increased his toleration, as 
can be seen in his definition of heterodox as simply `holding wrong opinions'. 
The general character of the definitions refers to the fact that the field of 
81 The Daily Gazetteer, No. 1507, 18 April 1740, Burney 351. 
82 Harmony without Uniformity, 1740, 10-11, 18-19. 
83 Lund 1995, 11. 
138 n NECESSITY OF UNIFORMITY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR DIVERSITY 
application for the term could still be extended outside of the sphere of religion 
— to that of politics. 
The most vocal critics of the application of the term heterodoxy against those 
who questioned what they saw as misleading then prevalent doctrines include 
Toland. According to this anticlerical thinker, accusations of heterodoxy had 
become general for such trifling reasons that, instead of being a reproach, being 
called heterodox could be 'the greatest honour imaginable'.84 Such accusations 
of heterodoxy appear to have taken place on both the ultra-traditionalist and 
radical sides as, for instance, in connection with the trial of Sacheverell. Tindal 
reported Sacheverell having stated that `heterodoxy in the Church naturally 
produces, and almost necessarily infers rebellion and high treason in the state'; 
whereas Tindal himself gave to understand that the High-Church was itself 
guilty of fostering heterodoxy." 
In 1710, Swift still attacked rival Whigs for favouring `every heterodox 
professor either in religion or government',86 that is, for letting Protestant 
Dissenters or Anglicans sympathetic towards them gain positions in the Church 
and even state. In the minds of most contemporaries, his expression may have 
created an association between both heterodoxy in a religious and political 
sense. On the whole, however, the term heterodox was relatively seldom used in 
a political context. The instances given here all date from the very beginning of 
the century, which suggests that the word was losing its applicability in political 
contexts when religion and politics were becoming increasingly seen as two 
separate areas of life. 
84 [Toland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, xii, 175. 
85 	 Tindal, A New Catechism with Dr. Hickes's Thirty Nine Articles, 1710, 7. 
86 [Jonathan Swift], The Examiner (E), E33, 22 March 1711. 
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Heresies, Schisms and 
Sects in Religion and 
Politics 
Parties in state, heresies in Church 
Late seventeenth-century editions of the Book of Common Prayer contained the 
following litany to be pronounced by the congregation in Anglican services 
three times a week after the morning prayer: 'From all sedition, privy 
conspiracy and rebellion; from all false doctrine, heresy and schism ... Good 
Lord, deliver us'.' This was how the conforming English prayed, and this was 
how they had been taught to perceive religious pluralism: as something from 
which, together with the parallel and connected political rebellion, God was 
beseeched to protect the nation. 
In the reign of Queen Anne, on every anniversary of the Queen's ascent to the 
throne, the nation was directed to repeat the prayer: 'Let not heresies, and false 
doctrines disturb the peace of the Church, nor schisms and causeless divisions 
weaken it; but grant us to be of one heart and one mind in serving thee our God, 
and obeying her according to thy will'.2 In this prayer as well, the vital role of 
unity in both religion and politics was made crystal clear: on a national 
anniversary, loyal subjects asked God for uniformity in obeying the teachings 
of the established Church and, by implication, the political system with which 
the Church lived in a symbiotic relationship, embodied by the reigning Queen. 
Heresy and schism were the strongest expressions within the wide register of 
derogatory terminology the Christian tradition could offer to eighteenth-
century political polemicists searching for authoritative language to convince 
their readers. Augustine, for instance, had taught that schism tended to produce 
new schisms and led to heresy, which made it important to extinguish schism as 
soon as possible.3 In medieval thought, the particular danger of heresy had been 
seen in the possibility of schism, i.e. the threat which heresy posed to social and 
ecclesiastical order.' Restoration writers had been particularly conscious of the 
problem of heresy and schism. Samuel Parker, for instance, had maintained that 
religious dissent, schism or heresy was equivalent to rebellion. When talking 
about schism and heresy, he had referred to the need for political order and not 
to some particular theological doctrines of their sinfulness: religious uniformity 
1 	 'The Litany' in The Book of Common Prayer, 1687 and 1693. A special reference to schism 
was added between the editions of 1642 and 1687 with the obvious intention of referring to 
Protestants dissenting from the established Church. 
2 	 'A Form of Prayer for the 8th of March', in The Book of Common Prayer, [1702-1714]. 
3 	 Goldie 1991, 342. 
4 	 Harrison 1990, 13. 
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was needed to secure political stability.5 Many other Restoration pamphlets and 
parliamentary speeches had also expressed fears that the `heresy' and `schism' 
of nonconformity encouraged political disobedience, as seen in the 
Interregnum .6 By the early eighteenth century, both terms were frequently used 
in fierce theological disputes between the Church of England and dissenting 
churches and also found their way into debates that later generations would 
interprete as political rather than religious. Given the religious motivation of 
much of party dispute, such borrowing must have been self-evident at least to 
the traditionalist majority of the audience. In contrast, for opponents of 
uniformity, the terms heresy and schism were constant objects of criticism 
which could be exploited in texts propagating innovative views. 
Heresy was initially a biblical word, the pejorative sense of which is aptly 
condensed by the epistle passage 'a man that is an heretic ... reject'.' Writers 
held different views on the nature of heresy. Some saw it as an error of teaching 
while others considered heresy an error of will. Some wished to admonish 
heretics, others to teach them. Some took heresy to be the original form of party, 
not necessarily in a pejorative sense, while others saw it as a 'work of flesh' to 
be denounced. The proper definition for heresy was an important question to 
debate as it had direct effects on the justification of discriminatory legislation 
against deviant Christians and infidels.' An early eighteenth-century dictionary 
states that heresy had originally signified `choice' and had been used to denote 
a sect so that even St Paul himself had once stated that he had been of the heresy. 
As a result of a long history of disputes between competing Christian 
denominations, however, early eighteenth-century English thinkers took the 
word 'in an ill sense' as 'a fundamental error against religion'. A dictionary 
editor saw it as reasonable to warn against too general a use of the term, 
pointing out that 'no man is called heretic unless he is obstinate in his opinion' .9 
This type of purely religious definition of the concept includes Defoe's `heresy 
I take to consist, either in the denying of what is essentially necessary for 
salvation, to be believed, or in the believing of somewhat which is essentially 
inconsistent with the revealed terms of salvation' .i° A primarily religious 
approach also represented the definition of heresy as 'any doctrine that 
overthrows the faith, and destroys the foundation of religion, and the hope of 
salvation by Jesus Christ; especially if it is openly espoused, industriously 
5 	 Schochet 1995, 133, 135. 
6 	 Schochet 1992, 131, 135; See also Goldie 1991, 332. 
7 	 Titus 3:10; King James Bible contains four other references to heresy (Acts 24:14, 1 
Corinthians 11:19, Galatians 5:20, 2 Peter 2:1), stating that `there must be also heresies 
among you' and 'there shall be false teachers among you, who privily shall bring in 
damnable heresies'. The list 'strife, sedition, heresies' was also employed by the early 18th-
century English. See http://www.jubilee.org/bible/search.html. According to the OED, the 
terms heresy, sect, party and faction had been used interchangeably in various English 
versions of the Bible. 
8 Redwood 1976, 23-4. 
9 	 Moreri-Collier 1701; St Paul's statements about heresy could be used both to attack heresy 
and to present it as an originally neutral term. 
10 	 [Defoe], Whigs tuned Tories (1713), 10. 
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propagated, and obstinately persisted in'." In practice, however, such a purely 
religious way of understanding heresy was accompanied by a much more 
generalised use. 
The possibilities for a general use of the term heresy are reflected in several 
eighteenth-century dictionaries. Cocker-Hawkins (1704, 1724), Phillips-Kersey 
(1706), Kersey (1715) and Defoe (1737) all gave a general definition for heresy, 
presenting it as 'an opinion contrary to the fundamental points of religion'. In 
Cocker's 1704 edition, a heretic was anyone that maintained 'an opinion of his 
own, contrary to the Scriptures and doctrines of the Church'; the Church of 
England being by implication the one and only Church. Furthermore, this 
definition suggests that opposing Anglican doctrines of potential political 
relevance could be interpreted as heresy. According to the renewed edition of 
1724, a heretic had opinions contrary to 'that which is called orthodox' - still a 
very vague definition. Particularly applicable for generalisations was the 
definition in the ancient Bullokar-Browne (1719), which was ready to label 
heretical any one or doctrine `differing in chief points of religion from the 
common received opinion'. In 1764 Wesley still maintained that heresy was 'a 
sect or party; a dangerous opinion'. In principle, a party could still have been 
called a heresy. As Chambers (1728) pointed out, heresy was `sometimes also 
used, by extension, for a proposition that is notoriously false in some other 
science besides theology'. 
Later dictionary editors did not change much of their definition when 
compared to those of the earlier part of the century. Chambers (1728), Gordon-
Bailey (1730) and A Pocket Dictionary (1753), for instance, repeated the 
definition of heresy as 'an error in some fundamental point of Christian faith; 
and an obstinacy in defending it'. According to Chambers, heresy might also 
rise out of 'a spirit of ... faction'. Bailey's analogous definition for heresy from 
1733 illustrates the continuous synonymity of `Christian faith' and `religion', 
the two being interchangable. Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) offered readers the 
most detailed account of the `proper' application of the term, pointing out that 
heresy `properly signifies only choice or liberty, and was formerly used to 
denote a particular sect; but now, and for many ages past, it has been, and still is 
taken in a bad sense, and means some fundamental error against religion, 
followed with obstinacy, and a resolute refusal of conviction'.'2 The definition 
for heretical reveals an assumed uniformity of belief in society, heretical being 
'any thing that is false or contradictory to common or known truths'. A heretic 
was 'one who holds, maintains, invents, or propagates known falsities or 
heretical opinions in the Christian religion pertinaciously, obstinately, and 
wilfully, against all possible methods of conviction'.13 Fenning's definitions 
from the early 1740s were much the same, heresy, if 'used in a good sense, it 
implies a sect or collection of persons holding the same opinion' whereas 'in a 
bad sense, it implies a sect or number of persons separating from, and opposing 
1 1 	 A Brief Discourse of Schism, 1714, 16. 
12 A parallel definition appeared in Martin 1749. 
13 Repeated also in A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
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the opinion of the Catholic Church, and as such culpable'. A heretic was anyone 
'who propagates his private opinion, in opposition to that of the Church'. Such 
a definition left the word continuously usable in political discourse, as any 
disagreement with the Anglican Church could be interpreted as heretical 
thought and as such potentially dangerous to the English political constitution. 
Another line of thought wished to restrict the use of the term heresy to 
religious discourse only. The definitions of the Glossographia Anglicana Nova 
(1707), for instance, followed the ones used by Locke in his Letter Concerning 
Toleration, stating that heresy was 'a separation made in ecclesiastical 
communion between men of the same religion for some opinions, which those 
that make the separation know are no way contained in the rule of their 
religion'. Consequently, a heretic was either 'a person knowingly maintaining 
false opinions against the Scriptures and the doctrines of the Church', or, 
according to Locke, one 'who divides the Church into parts, introduces names 
and marks of distinction, and voluntarily makes a separation because of such 
opinions'." Most of the writers of this line of thought did not regard the 
persecution of those known as heretics as necessary. On the basis of the history 
of the early Christian Church, they could claim that 'all the heresies that arose 
from Christ to Constantine, found no persecution of one Christian by another, 
any further than words'.15 Another author could 'by no means, approve the 
exaggeration of those men, who call all kinds or error, by the name of heresies'. 
He pointed out that his contemporaries, particularly the High-Church clergy, 
made use of religious words 'to hide the craft'.16 According to Francis Hare 
(1714), the term heretic contained 'a strange magic' though it had 'no 
determinate meaning' when used by the public. Originally, it carried no 'ill 
meaning' but was generally supposed to include everything that was bad. After 
being condemned for heretical opinions — whether being called a heretic, 
sceptic or an atheist — there was little one could do to restore one's reputation, as 
those who had given the label intensively looked for evidence for their claims." 
Criticism of the traditionalist way of using the term heresy can be particularly 
frequently found in anticlerical and republican texts of the period. Republican 
Whigs did not hesitate in attacking the use of the term in creating associations 
between the increasing plurality of values in religion and those in politics. 
Toland, one of the most radical of Presbyterian Whigs, started an unrelenting 
attack against what he regarded as false accusations of heresy with his 
Christianity not Mysterious (1696). According to Toland, violating in any way 
the interests of the established clerical hierarchy led to imputations of heresy. 
Likewise, argued Toland, party distinctions of all kinds were presented as 'so 
many sorts of heretics, or schismatics, or worse' by those favouring calling 
names in religious disputes. When doing so, Toland insisted, they were 
14 The very same definitions had been used by Locke in his Letter Concerning Toleration, 
1689. See http://english-server.hss.cmu.edu/18th/toleration.txt. 
15 [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, 47. 
16 Le Parterre de Fleurs, 1710, 116-17. 
17 Lund 1995, 5. 
HERESIES, SCHISMS AND SECTS IN RELIGION AND POLITICS o 143 
breaking against the principles of Christianity. Furthermore, attempts to live in 
an orthodox way as perceived by some divines only led to one being declared 
heretics by others. Referring to the apostle on whose teachings most 
condemnations of heresy were based, Toland stated provocatively: 'God 
knows, I no more value this cheap and ridiculous nickname of a heretic than 
Paul did before me.' '8 To refute imputations of heresy, Toland chose a Bible 
passage in which heretic appeared as a neutral term, whereas most users of the 
term based their arguments on those parts of Scripture in which heresy appeared 
as an unambiguously derogatory one. 
Toland's book, together with other publications provoking concern among 
traditionalist Anglicans, was replied to by Atterbury with a long list of new 
accusations of heresy. Atterbury, uneasy at the consequences of the Act of 
Toleration (1689) and the uncontrolled press (1695), saw `heresies of all kinds' 
and `heresies and innovations' rising in the country, and he called for strict 
measures to halt their progress.19 The constant heresy scare also remained a 
central feature of traditionalist thought in the early eighteenth century, Hearne 
and Sacheverell providing the best examples. For them, the heresies that had 
come into the open as a result of the Civil War provided a warning of what 
could happen if the established order in religion and politics collapsed 20 
Politico-religious charges making use of the term heresy also appeared, one of 
the most illustrative being Swift's suggestions that Whigs favoured `heresies in 
the Church', and not only that, as 'all the heresies in politics' had also been 
encouraged by the Whig administration of the late 17OOs.21 With `heresies in the 
Church', Swift referred to the toleration of various forms of religious dissent. 
With `heresies in politics', he probably meant the political line of the Whigs, but 
more particularly their measures against the High-Church campaign for cutting 
the extent of religious toleration. The association created by these expressions 
in contemporary minds was that religious and political heresy went hand in 
hand. 
The mixing of heresy and politics flourished on the radical side as well. In 
1717, Toland drew a controversial analogy between plurality in political and 
religious values, recognising both as potentially positive phenomena in 
Machiavellian terms:22 
Every division however, is not simply pernicious: since parties in the 
state, are just of the like nature with heresies in the Church: sometimes 
18 [Toland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, vi, xxviii-ix, 2, 175. 
19 Atterbury, A Letter to a Convocation-Man, 1697, 2, 26. 
20 	 See e.g. Heame's remarks on a sermon `against heresies and new opinions' and his declaring 
Mr Whiston a heretic. Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 22 April 1707, Vol. II, 7, 
and 10 September 1709, Vol. II, 266. Sacheverell preached against the danger which heresies 
of freethinking caused to the nation as a whole in 1713 in Sacheverell, False Notions of 
Liberty in Religion and Government Destructive of Both, 1713, 7. In his Family Religion, 
1713, 42, Giffard lamented the number of heresies in England. See also Mawson, The 
Mischiefs of Division with respect both to Religion and Civil Government, 1746, 3, which is 
a sermon preached to the House of Lords on the anniversary of the execution of Charles I. 
21 	 Swift, E33, 22 March 1711, E40, 10 May 1711. 
22 	 [John Toland], State-Anatomy of Great-Britain, [1717], preface. 
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they make it better, and sometimes they make it worse; but held within 
due bounds, they always keep it from stagnation. 
Even though Toland's statement should not be interpreted as particularly 
revolutionary — parallel statements had appeared before, and many may also 
have considered it an ephemeral opinion — it provides one of the best 
illustrations of development towards the recognition of pluralism both in 
religion and in politics. The comparison between politico-religious party and 
religious heresy was nothing really innovative in contemporary discourse.'-3 
Religious minorities had intensively defended their right to existence though 
they had rarely dared to underscore the potential positive effects of religious 
pluralism. However, even the Bible, if it was so wished, could have been used 
for arguments about the inevitability of religious diversity.24 In Toland's 
statement, this limited toleration of religious sectarianism was extended to 
concern politico-religious parties as well. Among the leading politicians, the 
reality of political parties remained something impossible to approve openly, 
particularly after the establishment of a near one-party rule after the Hanoverian 
Succession. Among the opposition Whigs, however, the defence of the 
continuous existence of several political voices was seen as essential. After a 
centuries-old religious strife seemed to have been brought into a conclusion by 
an increasingly widespread agreement of not silencing harmless heresies, it was 
the time, thought Toland, to find an analogous solution to political conflicts by 
allowing harmless party divisions. Toland's reference to the avoidance of 
political and religious stagnation through the tolerance of parties and heresies 
should not, however, be interpreted as a belief in progress aided by a modern 
party system that should have been introduced. Toland's work as a whole would 
rather suggest that his way of viewing society was more past than future 
oriented. Toland found his models in ancient Rome rather than was 
campaigning for the development of society through reforms. Considering the 
reference to the negative effects of stagnation in state and Church a sign of a 
breakthrough to modernity runs the risk of anachronism. 
Other radical Whiggish writers criticised the way the term heresy was applied 
in reproaching religious and political rivals 25  In the early 1720s, the writers of 
the Independent Whig censured the supporters of the High Church for 'an 
unintelligible jargon of undefined words', which contained the term heresy. 
They themselves applied the term to politics and ironically called independency 
at court 'a heresy in politics, never pardoned, much less countenanced there' 
and declared that their ideal Whig, as opposed to a Court Whig, `scorns all 
23 	 For example, in his Civil Polity, 1703, 614-15, Paxton had written about the essential link in 
world history, and also on the basis of reason, between 'state factions' and `church schisms, 
or abominable heresies'. 
24 	 The inevitability of heresies comes up in 1 Corinthians 11:19: `There must be also heresies 
among you, that they which are approved, may be made manifest among you'. Quoted and 
explained in Bradford, Christian Religion the Occasion, 1716, 16. 
25 	 These include [Defoe], Whigs tunz'd Tories, 1713, 1, and The Character of a Modern Tory, 
1713, 20. See also Harmony without Uniformity, 1740, 15, and The Daily Gazetteer, No. 
1501, 18 April 1740. 
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implicit faith in the state, as well as the Church'. The ironical phrase `heresy in 
politics' was repeated in another periodical written by the same writers 26 In 
both cases, the phrase was intended to indicate that the writers did not hesitate to 
propagate ideas that might be termed `heresies in politics' by those in power. 
Indeed, they were defending the right of being a political heretic. In other 
words, they were defending the right to plurality of political values. This 
politico-religious analogy shows that these anticlerical writers spoke for secular 
politics and attacked traditionalists who, according to them, drew no proper 
distinction between political loyalty and religious conformity. Simultaneously, 
they were using a metaphor borrowed from religious language to attack the 
establishment Whigs who were unwilling to share power with opposition 
Whigs. 
In Bolingbroke's political polemic in the 173Os, the vocabulary of heresy 
was useful in another way, not as clearly in connection with political pluralism 
but rather concerning the origins of government. In his political catechism, 
Bolingbroke viewed divine right theories of kingship as `heretical doctrines' to 
be avoided by proper Englishmen. He built this argument about `false 
doctrines' on a daring interpretation of Scripture that supported his own 
republican position. According to Bolingbroke, divine right theories were not 
based on the Bible but were actually in conflict with it: the Bible gave no 
description of the formation of the first political societies, the first government 
of Israel had been republican rather than monarchical, and Scripture provided 
several instances of bad absolute monarchs whereas many of its passages were 
in favour of the sovereignty of the people. As a result of such an unconventional 
interpretation, constitutional theories questioning republicanism appeared as 
`heretical'.27 Bolingbroke's manner of verifying his point illustrates how 
thinkers putting forward innovative political arguments considered it essential 
to legitimate their points through the use of religious language. 
The rather few references to heresy that can be found in political texts 
published after 1720 indicate, with other parallel decreases in frequencies, that 
the role of religious terminology in political discourse was declining. Like other 
terms of religious origin, the language of heresy experienced a brief revival in 
the 173Os when the rights of the Dissenters were again eagerly debated. The 
Gentleman's Magazine, for instance, participated in a politico-religious debate 
in which the proper definition of the concept heresy was at stake. Whereas one 
writer had complained that the concept heresy had been used in a way that made 
no distinction between a heretic and a true Christian, the writer in the 
Gentleman's Magazine called for an exact definition of the concept before it 
was applied as an object of fear even to people who were sincere in their 
beliefs.28 In 1736, the Gentleman's Magazine quoted an essay in which it was 
ironically suggested that the only solution to heresy would be 'that the exercise 
26 	 Gordon, The Character of an Independent Whig, 1719, 3; 1W18, 18 May 1720; CL37, 15 
July 1721. 
27 Bolingbroke, The Freeholder's Political Catechism, 1733, 6-8. 
28 GM, Vol. V, March 1735, Reel 135. 
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of thinking and reasoning be entirely demolished'.29 By the late 1730s, such a 
remedy to variety in opinions must have appeared as unacceptable to a 
considerable proportion of the governing elite. The term heresy had lost much 
of its previous applicability as far as political contexts were concerned. 
Schisms in politics 
Many early eighteenth-century Englishmen had learned that schism was a 
sinful state that deserved to be put to scorn. In particular, the authorised version 
of the Bible stated that `there should be no schism in the body; but that the 
members should have the same care one for another'.30 In their Book of 
Common Prayer, Anglican ministers could read about the severe consequences 
of schisms to the established Church during the Interregnum. Clarendon's 
history of the Civil War affirmed this tradition and added descriptions of the 
actions of the `schismatical party' against the Church and state during those 
traumatic times. Neither did propaganda fail to remind readers about the deeds 
of `schismatical and rebellious saints' during the Interregnum. Having inherited 
such attitudes towards schism, it is no wonder that the parishioners asked in 
their weekly prayers and especially in connection with national anniversaries — 
in accordance with the Book of Common Prayer but with conviction — for God 
to forgive them their schisms and deliver them from future ones.31  
Few dictionary editors cared to discuss the etymology of the term schism. 
Those who cared might simply suggest that the word originated from divisions 
within the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages.32 As to the definition of schism 
itself, the editors were agreed. They defined schism uniformly as 'a separation/ 
rent or division (in/from the Church)', sometimes leaving out the specification 
'in the matters of religion' or adding the explanation that the strife was `caused 
by diversity of opinions'. Likewise, a schismatic(al) was defined as one `guilty 
of' or `inclining to' separation from `the true Church, and setting up new 
doctrines or discipline'. In other words, he/she was a separatist and one 'that is 
erroneous and gone astray'.33 Importantly, however, not every separation from 
29 The Old Whig, No. 63, 20 May 1736, in GM, Vol. VI, May 1736, Reel 136. 
30 1 Corinthians 12:25 at http://www.jubilee.org/bible/search.html; Schisms in the Church of 
Corinth were deplored by Plaxton in An Exhortation to Unanimity and Concord, 1745, 1-2, 
for instance. 
31 
	
	
'The Litany', The Book of Common Prayer, 1681; 'A Form of Prayer for the 8th of March', 
The Book of Common Prayer, [1702-14]; Plaxton preached on the necessity of deserving 
God's forgiveness from schism in An Exhortation to Unanimity and Concord, 1745, 11; 
Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England 
Begun in the Year 1641, ed. W. Dunn Macray, Oxford 1969, 1702, Vol. II, 70, 417; The 
Modern Champions, 1710, no pagination. 
32 Moreri-Collier 1701 mentioned two major schisms, the one between the Greek and Roman 
Church and the Great Schism of the Late Middle Ages. 
33 Coles 1701; Cocker-Hawkins 1704; Phillips-Kersey 1706; Kersey 1715; Bullokar-Browne 
1719; The Secretary's Guide, 1721, 152; Gordon-Bailey 1730; Kersey 1731; Martin 1749; A 
Pocket Dictionary 1753; Wesley 1764; Separatist appears to have been the most common 
synonym for schismatic. Rectius Declinandum, 1709, 10-11; The general definition for 
schism was followed in Conscientious Nonconformity, 1737, 5. 
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the established Church was necessarily defined as a schism, if Defoe (1737) and 
Bailey (1733) are to be believed: a division from the Christian Church was a 
schism only if it took place `without just cause'. Noteworthy is also the way 
Chambers (1728) and Gordon-Bailey (1730) referred to the potential wider 
applicability of the term for referring to diversity of views when defining 
schism as a term that 'is chiefly used of a separation, happening through 
diversity of opinions, among people of the same religion and faith'. Their 
dictionary also gave the forms schismatic as 'a separatist, or one who separates 
from the Christian Church' and the related verb to schismatize. Dyche and 
Pardon, whose dictionary first came out in the 1730s, were careful in defining 
terms such as schism in their own words without repeating definitions already 
printed elsewhere. According to them, schism was, in its general sense, 'a wilful 
and resolute breaking off or going from any person or persuasion' but more 
particularly it meant `persons of the same general religion or faith' who 
separated 'upon account of some particulars of lesser moment'. Schismatical, 
argued Dyche-Pardon, was `inclining, yielding, encouraging, or being guilty of 
schism' and a schismatic 'a separatist, a leaver or forsaker of the public worship 
for the sake of some particular humour, fancy, or unjustifiable opinion'. The 
continuously uncompromising line among the editors of dictionaries is 
illustrated in Fenning's definition of schism as late as 1741 as 'a criminal 
separation or division in religion'. 
According to some Dissenters and their defenders, schism and heresy stood 
for two different forms of religious diversity. By contrast, in traditionalist texts, 
the terms often appeared in the same contexts with no difference in meaning 
being made. According to John Sage, who was a traditionalist writer himself, 
those sympathetic towards dissent might argue that schism should be contrasted 
and distinguished from heresy as 'a breach ... among Christians consenting 
together in the same faith'. Such a breach could take place either within the 
Church or from it, and it might be from worship or purely from Church 
government. In contrast, Sage himself, following traditionalist organic 
analogies, defended the unity of the Church and condemned 'the dreadful 
leprosy of schism' as 'an infection' within the Church which he considered the 
one body of Christ. For Sage, schism and heresy were self-evidently 
synonymous:34 
It is certain the word heretic, naturally signifies the same thing which we 
mean by the word schismatic. It is certain that in the apostolic age, and 
many after ages, heresy and schism were words indiscriminately used to 
signify any communion opposite to the one catholic communion .. . 
Heretic ... signifies schismatic or separatist ... He is to be rejected .. . 
He is turned out of the true way .. . 
Such an uncompromising understanding of schism can be contrasted with that 
of Defoe who, as a defender of Protestant `schismatics', drew a clear distinction 
34 	 Sage, The Reasonableness of a Toleration, 1705, 46, 68-9, 75-6, 81. 
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between heresy and schism, defining schismatic as 'one who though true in his 
credendas, believing all things necessary to be believed, yet for some 
unjustifiable cause, refuses to communicate with the Church, whom he believes 
to hold all things necessary to salvation, and to believe nothing inconsistent 
with it'.35 
Schism was a favourite term for traditionalist polemicists among whom it 
was used with a conviction of the necessity to end what traditionalists saw as a 
state in which 'each schismatic tribe a church became, much differing, yet all 
Protestant by name',36 i.e. the constant existence of Protestant dissent side by 
side with the Protestant Church of England. `Conforming to the Church of 
England occasionally, and yet keeping up a schism against her',37 that is, 
occasional conformity among the Dissenters for securing a position, was 
presented as a particularly disturbing phenomenon. The concept of schism was 
central to public debate in 1713-14 in the days of the passage of the Schism Act 
with which the Tory traditionalists intended to destroy religious dissent by 
interdicting dissenting teaching.38 
What were, then, according to this traditionalist line of thought, the religious, 
social and political consequences of schism? The potential societal implications 
of schism are visible in the Jacobite Mathias Earbery's restrictive definitions of 
Church as 'a society of men united for the preservation of the Christian faith, 
and to promote the eternal happiness of mankind', and the counter-concept 
schism as `an internal obstruction of those methods, by which this society 
works to obtain its ends'.39 Another way to express doubts as to the social 
consequences of schism was to lament how 'some ... out of pride and self-
conceit, or interest, and enthusiasm, will set themselves up against the rest, and 
create schisms and divisions in the community, to the disturbance of all about 
them' .4° 
Among traditionalist documents filled with the scare of schism, Hearne's 
diary is one of the most illustrative. The diary contains statements by an Oxford 
librarian, his fellow academics and leading adherents of the High Church in 
favour of measures for `healing the schism'. Hearne attended High-Church 
sermons, supported their proposals for prohibiting occasional conformity, and 
inveighed in his diary against `those schisms and confusions which now disturb 
the whole kingdom'. 'the prevailing of faction and schism in the nation' and 
`Presbyterians, and other schismatics, who had already once ruined the Church 
and government'.41 The High-Church divines, whom Hearne listened to with 
approval, preached against Protestant Dissenters by using expressions such as 
35 [Defoe], Whigs turtyd Tories, 1713, 10. 
36 	 Ward, A Fair Shell, but a rotten Kernel, 1705, 52; For other instances of a fear of expanding 
schisms, see Evelyn's comments on Mr Wye's and an anonymous doctor's sermons in The 
Diary of John Evelyn, 4 February 1700, Vol. V, 378, and 8 November 1702, Vol. V, 520. 
37 	 [Leslie], The Wolf Stript of his Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 71. 
38 Hill 1976, 144. 
39 	 M[athias] E[arbery], Elements of Policy Civil and Ecclesiastical, In a Mathematical Method, 
1716. 
40 A Free-Thinker at Oxford, 1719. 
41 	 Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, Vol. I, 17 November 1705, 79, 16 December 
1705, 130, 28 April 1706, 237, 6 September 1706, 287, 9 October 1706, 293. 
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'a formal schism', 'the dangerous infection of a then growing schism' and 
`factious and schismatical impostors'. In Sacheverell's famous sermon of 1709, 
in particular, schism was presented in both religious and medical terms as one 
of the worst possible phenomena.42 
Swift, a more moderate Tory, claimed that these traditionalist Anglicans used 
the term schismatic in a parallel way with those Whigs who frequently talked 
about the High Church as a faction; both sides did this in order to condemn the 
majority of people. No matter how plausible this observation about the use of 
the term schism was, Swift himself drew analogies between religious schisms 
and political parties by referring to Whigs and Tories as `civil schisms' 43 and as 
a `schism in politics'.44 These two formulations referring to political party 
rivalry by using terminology borrowed from the discourse on religious diversity 
demonstrate the ease with which the two interconnected discourses were 
conflated. Such conceptualisations of political pluralism were completely 
plausible to most contemporaries and did not necessarily appear as 
metaphorical or even ironical. 
Indeed, the two phenomena were seen as universally interconnected by 
many, as Paxton's Civil Polity (1703) shows when referring to the inevitable 
links between `civil factions' and `church schisms' in history.45 Presbyterian 
preachers had also connected these two types of schisms in their sermons during 
the Civil War; this was at least the point of those traditionalists who reprinted 
old Presbyterian sermons attacking schism in order to use their arguments 
against Whigs and Dissenters in 1710. Matthew Newcomen's statement in front 
of Parliament in 1644, for instance, fully fitted the interests of opponents of 
Dissenters in 1710. Newcomen had stated that 'a schism in the state' without 
delay gave rise to 'a schism in the Church' and, conversely, 'a schism in the 
Church' necessarily caused 'a schism in the state'. What was more, a schism in 
the state stood not for some harmless disagreement in opinions but for civil 
war.46 J. A. W. Gunn has referred to an early Hanoverian author who discussed 
the misuse of sectarian terms of abuse and the assumption that people should 
have held orthodox views in politics as well as in religion. According to that 
writer, schism meant in religious affairs the same as faction in politics, and both 
conveyed the assumption of being somehow detrimental to the public good.47 
42 Rennell, The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Divisions, 1705, 7; Sacheverell, The 
Perils of False Brethren, both in Church and State, 1709, 7, 23. Sacheverell repeated his 
criticism against schisms in False Notions of Liberty in Religion and Government 
Destructive of Both, 1713, 7, 19; Needham, Considerations concerning the Origine and 
Cure of our Church-Divisions, 1710, 4. 
43 Swift, E31, 3 March 1711, E33, 22 March 1711. 
44 
	
	
Swift to the Earl of Peterborough, [19] February 1711, The Correspondence of Jonathan 
Swift, Vol. I, 211; Swift congratulated Peterborough who stayed abroad for having 'left off 
breathing party-air' and claimed that he was 'apt to think this schism in politics has cloven 
our understandings, and left us but just half the good sense that blazed in our actions'. 
45 Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, 614-15; For the connection between `schisms in the Church' and 
`parties in the state' in English history, see also A Dissuasive from Party and Religious 
Animosities, 1736, 5. 
46 Bodkins and Thimbles: or, 1645 against 1710, 1710, 27, quoting Mr Matthew Newcomen's 
sermon before the Parliament, 12 September 1644. 
47 Gunn 1972, 17. 
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Without a doubt, when Swift introduced the phrases `civil schism' and 
`schism in politics', it was in the Tory interest to induce his readers to perceive 
political pluralism in the same terms as they perceived religious diversity. 
Tories wished to present party conflict as primarily religious, and what better 
way of doing so than writing, instead of parties, directly about schisms. As far 
as schisms were concerned, Tories, as defenders of the established Church, 
always felt themselves representing the most powerful and the only acceptable 
grouping of all. Indeed, every Tory reader believed that the Church of England 
could not be justifiably called a schism and her defenders the Tories 
schismatics. `Civil schisms' and `schisms in politics' were as evil as schisms in 
religion, and Whigs and Dissenters together were guilty of both. 
Whig responses to Tory polemic making use of the term schism were highly 
conscious of the polemical power of religious terms in political discourse. 
Republican Whigs shared Locke's view that 'he that denies not anything that 
the Holy Scriptures teach in express words ... cannot be either a heretic or 
schismatic' 48 Accordingly, they could argue that49 
... the term schism, which is of the offensive kind, and very furiously 
dealt about amongst all such as do not exactly come up to the political 
model of the national Church; ... By the loose and random use of this 
term, it is manifest, that very few affix any determinate meaning 
thereunto; and those who are most eager in the charge, seem quite 
unacquainted with the controversies from whence it arises; and therefore 
they throw it about amongst all they do not like, for no other reason, but 
as it appears to carry in it something of reproach; so that wheresoever we 
find it, it seldom goes for any other than a mark of ill nature and malice, 
and is entirely destitute of any other signification, but a dislike of the 
person upon which it is charged. Those who at all concern themselves in 
meanings, understand by it, a groundless rent, a separation from some 
religious society, of which the separatists were once members. 
A parallel attitude towards the use of the term schism can be found in a fictitious 
dialogue between an Anglican divine and his son who had converted to 
nonconformism, published in 1737. According to the son, 'real schism' was 
indeed 'a great sin', but the term schism was commonly used merely as 'a term 
of reproach, and a religious scarecrow to make some appear odious, and to 
[frighten] others from them'. Denying the schismatical character of the 
Nonconformists on the basis that their separation from the Church was 
unavoidable, the son argued that real schism would have been the same in the 
Church as rebellion in the state.50 At its most scornful towards the application of 
the term schism as a reproach, radical polemic sympathetic to dissent might take 
the form of describing how, in the human body, various senses could act 
separately from each other without the least danger of schism.51 In an analogous 
48 Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 1689. 
49 
	
	
Reflections on the Management Of some late Party-Disputes, 1715, 17-18; Earlier references 
to the same include [Toland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, xxviii. 
50 Conscientious Nonconformity, 1737, 6, 25. 
51 Harmony without Uniformity, 1740, 7-9, 27. 
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manner, it was argued, separation in religious (and consequently political) 
opinions did not lead to schisms and so did not deserve that derogatory name. In 
the Independent Whig, the radicals summed up what they saw as an essential 
connection between the religious and political plurality of values: `Civil and 
religious liberty are certain signs of each other, and live and die together; but, I 
believe I may lay down for a maxim, that in any country where there is never a 
separatist from the Church, there is never a freeman in the state'.52 
Whereas, in the early years of the century, the term schism could 
occasionally be applied to conceptualisations of political parties, such 
conceptualisations were disappearing in the course of time, as an increasing 
proportion of the political elite became willing to distinguish between religious 
and political organisations at the conceptual level. However, all sections of the 
political elite conceived pluralism in religion and in politics as interconnected. 
Sect in religion and other areas of discourse 
The term sect had belonged to English public discourse since the Middle Ages, 
denoting a body of persons united in holding views that differed from those of 
others who were of the same religion. Accordingly, in many early eighteenth-
century sources, sect was listed together with such authoritative terms as 
Church and religion, though not as an equal but as a derogatory alternative for 
the two positive expressions. Eighteenth-century Englishmen willingly applied 
positive expressions such as `right religion' for describing themselves and 
`sect' to describe others. The history of the 1640s and 1650s, in particular, was 
customarily discussed in terms of sectarianism. These decades of Civil War and 
Republic gave continuous ballast to the terminology of sectarianism, as the 
Dissenters and their opponents held contradictory historical memories of the 
republican period. Whereas some Dissenters continued to use political 
language inherited from the Commonwealth, their opponents reminded the 
public of the role of sectaries in the regicide of 1649. In addition to religious 
disputes, the meanings of sect were broadened outside a purely religious sense 
so that the word sometimes signified also a school of opinion in philosophy or 
politics 53 
Abundant published and private sources demonstrate that, in early 
eighteenth-century discourse, the terms sect and party frequently occurred in 
52 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW36, 21 September 1720. 
53 OED: sect; In King James Bible, the term appears five times in the Acts, each time in a 
pejorative sense. See http://www.jubilee.org/bible/search.html; Evelyn had heard a sermon 
recommending charity to everyone independently of one's 'sect or religion'. The Diary of 
John Evelyn, Vol. V, 17 June 1705, 599; In the preface to his treatise on political systems, 
Paxton promised not to spare any `church, sect, or party' from criticism concerning their 
appearing, without exceptions, vicious when in power. Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, preface; 
For sect as something inferior to church, see [Charles Leslie], The Second Part of the Wolf 
Stript of His Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 3, and The Church of England the Sole Encourager 
of Free-Thinking, Nottingham 1717, title; The author of Harmony without Uniformity, 1740, 
47, wrote about `different religions and sects' in Japan which all were allowed a religious 
freedom; For a discussion of the sects of the 1640s and 1650s, see Bolingbroke, A 
Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 33; Webb 1992, 159; Albers 1993, 318. 
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close connection. Indeed, the terms sect, party and faction were employed in 
such synonymous ways, particularly in religious issues,54 that it remains 
doubtful whether the three were generally distinguished from each other at all. 
The synonymity of the terms sect, faction and party is particularly noticeable in 
the definition of sectary as `separating, or setting apart from others, one that 
adheres to any sect, i.e. faction or party' S5 This synonymity was also expressed 
in French in a description of English parties: ` ... it n'y a que deux partis parmi 
nous, ... qui sont les Whigs et les Torys, sous lesquels sont comprises toutes les 
autres sectes et factions'.S6 Sect, party, and even faction, signified essentially 
the same in religious issues, and even though no one used an expression such as 
`political sect', the associations between religious sects and political parties 
remained unavoidable for as long as in common conscience politics did not 
form a sphere clearly independent of religion. These associations were 
exploited by early eighteenth-century party writers, both those advocating the 
union between religion and politics and those fighting against it. 
In spite of these associations between religious sect and political party, some 
dictionaries presented sect as an essentially religious term. Sect was defined as 
`a party (divided from the Church)',57 `party, or singular opinion, one that cuts 
himself off from the public faith, or Church'S8 or 'a party professing the same 
opinion in divinity or philosophy'.59 In the mid-eighteenth century, the specific 
character of sect as opposed to political parties, for instance, became visible in 
definitions such as 'a religious party' and 'a particular party in religion'.60 
54 The synonymity of sect and party (sometimes faction) is visible, for instance, in Locke, An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2.33.18; Matthew Hole, The Danger of Division, 
1702, 24; Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, 77; Anthony Collins to John Locke, 27 May 1704, The 
Correspondence of John Locke, Vol. VIII, 305. In order to be precise, Collins used the 
expression `religious sect'; Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren, both in Church and 
State, 1709, 9; The Humble Confession and Petition of a Whig with his Eyes Open, 1712, 9; 
[Steele and Isaac Watts], S461, 19 August 1712; The Diary of Dudley Ryder, I1 August 
1715, 74; The Country Hobb upon the Town Mobb: Or, the Party Scuffle, 1715, 1, 6, 8; A 
Tory Pill, to Purge Whig Melancholy: Or, a Collection of above One Hundred New Loyal 
Ballads, Poems, etc. Written In Defence of Church and State, 1715, 42; The Church of 
England the Sole Encourager of Free-Thinking, 1717, 5; A Sure Way to Orthodoxy, 1718, 
19, 29. In this source, the expressions `sects of religion' and `parties of men' obviously both 
refer to religious divisions; [Trenchard and Gordon], IW12, 6 April 1720; IW19, 25 May 
1720; [Trenchard], CL124, 13 April 1723; Edward Synge, The Case of Toleration 
consider'd with Respect both to Religious and Civil Government, Dublin 1726, 25; 
[Benjamin Grosvenor], An Essay on the Christian Name. Its Origin, Import, Obligation, and 
Preference to all Party-Denominations, 1728, 51, 53; A Guide Into the Knowledge of 
Publick Affairs, both Foreign and Domestick, 1728; Fog's Journal, No. 237, 19 May 1733, 
in GM, Vol. 111, May 1733, Reel 134; London Journal, No. 750, 10 November 1733, in GM, 
Vol. III, November 1733, Reel 134; Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 26; 
Bayle, The Dictionary, Vol. IV, 711; [Zachary Grey], A Caveat Against the Dissenters, 1736, 
1; Story, Thomas Story's Discourse, 1737?, 26; Conscientious Nonconformity, 1737, 26, 85. 
55 Glossographia 1707; According to Kersey 1715 and Defoe 1737, faction was 'a party, or 
sect' and sectary 'a follower of a particular sect or party'; This kind of usage is illustrated by 
[Robert Ferguson], Who Plot Best; The Whigs or the Tories, 1712, 2. 
56 	 Le Chevalier de St. George, Rehabilite dans sa Qualite de Jacques III, Whitehall? 1713, 60. 
57 Coles 1701; Cocker-Hawkins 1724. 
58 Cocker-Hawkins 1704. 
59 Phillips-Kersey 1706; Kersey 1715 and 1731 and Defoe 1737 gave the same definition but 
left 'in divinity or philosophy' out; For sects in philosophy, see e.g. Locke, An Essay 
Concerning Hunan Understanding, 1690, 2.3.8, and sects of philosophy and religion. 
2.33.18. 
60 Martin 1749; A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
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Likewise, some of the editors defined sectary restrictively as 'one that follows 
private opinions in religion'61 or 'one that follows a particular sect, separated 
from the established Church'.62 In contrast with such religiously oriented 
definitions, however, the most imprecise explanation offered for sect was 
simply 'a particular opinion of some few', 'a number of people, professing the 
same principles', or 'such as follow the doctrines or opinions of some famous 
divine or philosopher, etc' 63 This general sense of the term appeared also in 
everyday use as seen, for instance, in Locke's reference to 'the sect of the 
literati, or learned' in ancient China and by Cheyne's way of writing about 
`sects of physic'.64 
No major alterations in dictionary definitions for sect can be discovered as far 
as the early eighteenth century is concerned. The dictionaries of the 1730s and 
1740s are rather unsurprising in their definitions of sect as 'a party professing 
the same opinion' and in the derived terms sectarian and sectary65 Dyche-
Pardon (1740), instead of merely repeating the conventional definition of sect 
as 'a number of persons professing the same opinions', excluded potential use 
in political discourse by adding that a sect 'is commonly supposed to be in 
opposition to the received opinions either of religion or philosophy'. Sectarians, 
sectaries and sectarists were those who follow 'the opinion of a sect or party', 
and, in the English context, the terms usually referred to 'a Dissenter from the 
established religion'.66 Fenning (1741) gave a very general definition for sect, 
implying no attempt to restrict its applicability only to the sphere of religion. 
For him, sect was 'a body of men following some particular master, or adopting 
some peculiar tenet' and sectary 'one who refuses to comply with the public 
establishment, and joins with others of an opinion contrary to it'.67 On the basis 
of Fenning's dictionary, any group of dissidents might be defined as a sect. 
Unlike some previous dictionary editors, however, Fenning refrained from 
criticising sects on religious grounds. 
When participations in public discourse are analysed, it becomes clear that 
the term sect carried essentially pejorative connotations and that it was 
commonly applied, and not only in strictly religious contexts. Sects were very 
much a `political' concern as well. High-Church writers in particular did not 
hesitate to employ the word in a variety of contexts, expressing their certainty 
that the Church (and consequently the connected political constitution) was in 
danger of 'the invasion of sectaries' who had grown so numerous and who had 
already in `forty-one' (1641) and in the subsequent Civil War `violently 
overturned the Church and state'. In connection with their campaign for 
forbidding occasional conformity, they regretted the way 'so many sects are 
61 Bullokar-Browne 1719. 
62 Kersey 1731. 
63 Bullokar-Browne 1719; John Sage, The Reasonableness of a Toleration, 1705, 51; 
Chambers 1728. 
64 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, 1.3.8; George Cheyne, The 
English Malady: Or, a Treatise of Nervous Diseases of all Kinds, 1733, 152. 
65 Gordon-Bailey 1730; Bailey 1733; Wesley 1764. 
66 Dyche-Pardon 1740/1750. 
67 Fenning 1741. 
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countenanced' and `sectaries of all sorts are openly tolerated'. It was also feared 
that 'the admission of sectaries into the state', that is, extending their political 
rights, would speedily lead into a downfall of the established Church.68 
After a calmer phase in politico-religious discourse in the 1720s, sects 
became once again criticised for causing political instability from the mid- 
1730s onwards. Warburton wrote in his influential Alliance between Church 
and State (1736), which opposed the proposed abolition of the Test Act, that the 
allowance of 'many and discordant sects' into political power would have led to 
violent political disturbances to 'the original union' between the Church and 
state.69 An even more straightforward statement against sectarianism as a cause 
of political pluralism of an undesired type was contained in an attack against 
Methodism which was published in the Common Sense in 1739. Writing about 
the effects of sectarianism — Methodism in particular — on civil society, the 
author stated:70 
I think it must be owned by all, that a multitude of sects in religion must 
be very disadvantageous to any community. Differences of opinion in 
religious matters not only breed dissensions and animosities among the 
people, but generally carry along with them a diversity of sentiments 
with regard to government. 
This statement was far from original. Rather the reappearance of such a 
traditionalist statement as a reaction to the rise of the new sect of Methodism 
demonstrates the continuity of the widely shared inherited idea of a unitary 
society. Reflecting the unchanged attitudes of the Anglican majority, the writer 
presented religious pluralism as necessarily harmful and connected it, without 
the least reservation, with political pluralism. 
Numerous ways were available for expressing the writer's negative attitude 
towards sectarianism. Evelyn, for instance, seems to have agreed with a 
preacher who saw the seventeenth-century Church of England having been 
threatened by 'so many dangerous sects'. Furthermore, when lamenting the 
degeneration of his age, he listed sectaries together with atheists and deists, all 
being in need of reformation.71 These `sectarists against the Church', as viewed 
by traditionalist writers, might include 'the whole sect of Socinian Whigs, and 
Republican Deists' as well as Presbyterians, former Puritans, and from the 
1730s onwards, also 'the new sect of Methodists'.72 The answer of the 
68 	 [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, 30; [Drake], The Memorial of the Church of England, 1705, 3, 
5; Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, Vol. I, 3 November 1705, 65; Rectius 
Declinandum, 1709, 15; For the dangers of spreading sectarianism, see also Giffard, Family 
Religion, 1713, 42; For the bitter memories of sectarianism during the Civil Wars, see 
Sacheverell, False Notions of Liberty in Religion and Government Destructive of Both, 
1713, 19; The Church of England Man's Memorial, 1718, title. 
69 	 Warburton, The Alliance between Church and State, 1736, 3. 
70 The Compton Sense, 19 April 1739, in GM, Vol. IX, May 1739, Reel 137. 
71 	 The Diary of John Evelyn, May 1700, Vol. V, 408, and 17 October 1703, Vol. V, 546. 
72 The Old and Modern Whig Truly Represented, 1702, 2; [Leslie], The Second Part of The 
Wolf Stript of His Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, title; Socinians were followers of Faustus 
Socinus (1539-1604), who had denied the divinity of Christ and represented Him instead as 
a moral exemplar. Clark 1985, 281; Place, The Arbitration: Or, the Tory and Whig 
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Presbyterians to attacks against them as a sect often took the form of criticism of 
the High Church and counter-arguments that 'the people that were called 
Puritans, and now Presbyterians, have no fellowship with politicians and 
sectaries'. The `sectarian party', with which no-one wished to be associated, 
was charged with 'wild extravagances',73 and the sectarian character of the 
Presbyterians strictly negated. 
Neutral, not to say positive, statements on sects in early eighteenth-century 
sources are much more difficult to find. Harmony without Uniformity (1740) is 
one of the very few pamphlets which dared to suggest that the existence of a 
great number of various sects was indeed pleasing to God 74 
In political periodicals, sectarianism was often used as a means of political 
allusion. During the heated election campaign of the autumn of 1710, 
stimulated by the politico-religious mixture of the Sacheverell affair, the organ 
of the Tory party compared Whigs with young Rosicrucians who 'must be 
exercised in a certain jargon of unintelligible words, before they can be received 
among the adepts'.75 Somewhat later, Swift, the new editor of the Examiner, 
being well aware of the realities of political strife, polemically insinuated that 
the Whig party, then in opposition, was a sect which had once been ready to 
`raise a rebellion, murder their king, destroy monarchy and the Church'.76 Such 
accusations were aimed at making the readers associate Whiggism with the 
radical sectarians of the Interregnum who had then overturned both the Church 
and state. Indeed, neither did Whiggish writers miss an opportunity for parallel 
allusions concerning Tory assumptions of the character of political groupings. 
Addison, a Whiggish moderate Anglican, once called Whigs and Tories 'two 
religious orders'77 with the obvious purpose of ridiculing the traditionalist 
Anglican Tories for mixing religious and political issues. This insinuation was, 
of course, intended to be ironic and understood as such with a great deal of 
certainty; yet its humorous character was based on widely shared assumptions 
about similarities between religious sects and political parties. Such analogies 
were not merely metaphorical: religious sects and political parties had several 
common features and were interpreted in similar terms. Analogies between 
religious sects and political parties were favourites for writers with republican 
inclinations. These analogies may have been so self-evident to many other 
contemporaries, who called religious sects `parties' and did not consider it 
necessary to distinguish between `political' and other sects, that they had no 
Reconcil'd, 1711, 23; Peter Annet, Judging for Ourselves, 1739, title; On 3 May 1749 
(Strawberry Hill), Horace Walpole wrote to Sir Horace Mann, with reference to Methodism: 
`If you ever think of returning to England, ... you must prepare yourself with Methodism.. 
. this sect increases as fast as almost ever any religious nonsense did'. Horace Walpole, 
Selected Letters, ed. William Hadley, 1967, 506. 
73 	 Three Questions of Present Importance, 1702, iv, 21, 57. 
74 Harmony without Uniformity, 1740, 48. 
75 [William King, ed.], E8, 21 September 1710; The Rosicrucians were devoted to the study of 
metaphysical and mystical lore. This magical and cabalistic group probably never existed as 
an organisation, but the term was applied to a number of societies that appeared as somehow 
secret and thus suspicious. Jacob 1976, 217-18. 
76 Swift, E36, 12 April 1711. 
77 [Addison], T129, 4 February 1710. 
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need to write them down. Radical authors, who dared to question the 
conventional intermixing of political and religious issues, recorded these 
analogies with ironical undertones. They opposed sectarian enthusiasm but they 
opposed party politics as well. These two negative phenomena could be easily 
lumped together and both rejected. Gordon, for instance, compared political 
parties to sects when writing about their unwillingness to allow restrictions on 
their power, parties being 'like sects in religion, who all abhor persecution, and 
disclaim its spirit while it is over them, but fall almost all into it when they are 
uppermost' .78 
Even though the few cases in which a conceptual distinction between party 
and sect is drawn may not be sufficient for concluding that such a distinction 
had emerged and had also been universally adopted, they reflect a gradual 
development towards separate terminologies for discussing pluralism in 
religion and politics. Sects in religion and parties in politics were not 
infrequently presented as simultaneous historical phenomena,79 and in such 
texts they were usually seen as two separate organisations that had been 
deliberately brought into interconnection. Paxton, for instance, took the 
anarchical circumstances of the Interregnum as an explanation why 'the people 
[had] spawned into differing religious sects, and of course into different 
political factions'. He then distinguished between sects (Presbyterians, 
Independents and Anabaptists) and parties (the Commonwealth Party, the 
Levellers and the Fifth-Monarchy-Men), which all, in spite the conceptual 
difference, functioned very much in parallel ways, all persecuting others when 
in power.80 The connection between religious sects and political parties 
appeared as unavoidable also to an obviously dissenting writer who would have 
allowed the co-existence of several religious sects but would have abolished 
political parties as disturbers of peace:81  
... state factions will naturally unite with religious sects, where a people 
are divided into different ones; And it is certain, that different sects of 
religion, may peaceably and quietly subsist under the same civil 
government, and will be promiscuously admitted into the magistracy 
where state factions do not interpose for them. 
More instances of slight conceptual distinctions being drawn between parties 
and `sects and persuasions in religion' can be found in texts dating from the late 
1730s and 1740s. In an anonymous pamphlet, for instance, both parties in 
politics and sects in religion were lamented and discussed as separate 
phenomena, yet as phenomena that became frequently intermixed.82 
Warburton, who was defending the existence of an established religion in 1736, 
argued that, in the case of allowing several sects or Churches within a state, each 
78 [Gordon], CL96, 29 September 1722. 
79 	 An instance of this can be found in [A True Britain], A View of the Present Divisions in Great 
Britain, 1708, 4. 
80 Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, 573. 
81 	 Occasional Thoughts Concerning Our Present Divisions, And Their Remedies, 1704, 18. 
82 	 A Dissuasive from Party and Religious Animosities, 1736, 3, 12, 15. 
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of them would have considered itself the only true, or at least the most perfect, 
and advance its interests at the cost of others. For the purpose of securing a 
monopoly in religious life, each sect naturally tended to turn to political power 
for assistance 'by introducing a party into the public administration' and by 
endeavouring to convince the state that its interests were very much concerned 
in religious disagreements. This abuse of political power for religious purposes 
was, according to Warburton, the way in which politico-religious strife was 
augmented.83 Warburton's text leaves the impression that party was seen as a 
secular extension for a religious sect. Warburton saw the two as interconnected; 
yet he made a slight conceptual distinction between them. Such a conceptual 
distinction between political parties and religious sects is obvious also in 
Mawson's text, published a decade later, in which he described how, in the 
seventeenth century, 'all the several sects of religion' had united with 'the 
discontended parties in the state' with serious consequences to both the 
ecclesiastical and political constitutions. Mawson pointed out, like Warburton, 
that each sect had then attempted to establish its own forms of worship and 
doctrine as the only true ones. Having been previously persecuted, they, once in 
power, began to persecute others.84 
Even though dictionaries continued to define sect in general terms, political 
writers were becoming increasingly conscious of a distinction between 
religious sect and political party, which was a significant step in the 
transformation of attitudes toward political pluralism. The continuously 
pejorative associations of sectarianism no longer hindered an adoption of more 
sympathetic attitudes towards political parties, which was increasingly done 
towards the end of the eighteenth century. 
83 Warburton, The Alliance between Church and State, 1736, 63, 116. 
84 	 Mawson, The Mischiefs of Division, 1746, 7-8. 
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Party, or Rather Faction': 
Parties and Factions in 
Religion and Politics 
Attitudes towards parties: state of research 
`Party' was one of the most frequently used expressions in early eighteenth-
century public discourse. Contemporary parties, Whigs and Tories, were 
organisations seeking to gain political power, and the extent of organisational 
and ideological coherence that existed within them should not be 
underestimated even when compared with many coalition parties in present-
day western societies.' Twentieth-century preconceptions of political parties as 
inescapable and highly organised secular institutions in any democratic 
government, however, cannot be transferred to the eighteenth century without 
risk of undue anachronism.' At the dawn of the eighteenth century, attitudes 
towards parties were still based on considerations that cannot be interpreted as 
purely `political'. 
The history of early eighteenth-century political parties as political 
institutions is well established in studies on political history. It has been 
demonstrated, for instance, that the structure and content of politics under 
Queen Anne differed from the rather more connection-based politics of the 
mid-eighteenth century, that party ideologies mattered throughout the century, 
that party conflict divided society at all levels, and that the contemporary 
electorate often had a crucial role in elections.` For historians of ideas as well, 
parties have been a rather conventional topic of study. Yet historians studying 
conceptions of political parties have customarily concentrated on searching for 
progressive views that demonstrate how some later party system came into 
being. Their work has built on famous thinkers such as the Marquess of Halifax, 
Viscount Bolingbroke, David Hume and Edmund Burke whose texts appear to 
have brought essentially new elements to party theories. In recent years, even 
this type of study has received relatively little attention, probably because it is 
felt that the field has already been adequately explored. This chapter suggests, 
however, that our present understanding of early eighteenth-century 
conceptions of political parties is far from complete and might benefit from a 
conceptual approach to the issue. 
1 	 An expression used e.g. in [Swift], E31, 8 March 1711, and C306, 13 May 1732. 
2 	 For defining the concept of political party, see Harris 1993, viii, 5. 
3 	 See Jones 1961, 2. 
4 	 Speck 1970, 22; Holmes 1987, xiii, xv—xvi; Reviews of these and other studies can be found 
in Dickinson 1976, in Thomas 1987, and in Black 1989. 
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In the history of ideas, a major transformation in attitudes toward parties has 
been traced in the late eighteenth century. Caroline Robbins, for instance, dated 
an increasing recognition of political parties as an inevitable, necessary and 
even respectable part of popular government in the reign of George III (1760-
1820). Already for two centuries before that, she argued, some Englishmen had 
realised the existence of political parties, accepted their role in a free state, and 
developed party theories. Robbins admitted that the overwhelming majority of 
Englishmen continued to condemn parties and factions, promoted uniformity of 
opinion, and preferred nonpartisan public service, believing that good men 
should find it easy to agree on measures to ensure the well-being of their 
country. Heresies in religion were felt to be leading to anarchy, factions among 
politicians facilitating the rise of tyranny, management by ministers resulting in 
a decline in public spirit, and associations among citizens promoting conspiracy 
and strife. Everyone denied their own status as party men and accused 
opponents of being guilty of partisanship. Robbins, however, doubted the 
significance and frankness of these condemnations of party, pointing out that 
the English were well aware of variety in both religious and political ideas and 
of the importance of political organisation. The experiences of the Civil War, 
the Exclusion Crisis and the non-party Revolution of 1688 may have caused 
criticism of the concept of party, but this criticism was increasingly 
accompanied by arguments for the value of dissidence in politics, the 
criminality of being neutral in significant disputes, the importance of securing 
the balance of the constitution, and the fact that party was the effect and, 
possibly also, the support of liberty.' Though basically trustworthy, Robbins's 
account, aimed at providing background for more advanced party theories, 
suffers from a one-sided concentration on positive views on parties, and has not 
produced a balanced account of early eighteenth-century conceptualisations.' 
Other searches for the roots of a positive Anglo-American understanding of 
party include those by Harvey C. Mansfield and Richard Hofstadter. Mansfield 
found in the traditional negative understanding of parties an element that 
contributed to a more positive understanding of party government, namely the 
assumption of the acceptability of an occasional use of party by good men to 
suppress bad parties endangering the public good.' Hofstadter's interpretation 
did more justice to contemporary conceptions, arguing that many in early 
eighteenth-century England were looking for an answer to the question of 
whether parties were to be accepted as indispensable evils in a free polity or 
whether it was possible to suppress them in the interests of political harmony. 
5 	 Robbins 1958, 505-7, 513-521. 
6 	 Robbins's article has been criticised by Schonhorn 1986, 187-9, 191-4, who has 
demonstrated that Defoe, for instance, held much more conventional views of political 
parties than Robbins has maintained. Defoe's texts contain no reference to the virtue of 
opposition or to the vitality of diversity. Defoe was not a citizen of the modern world nor 
antithetical to his more traditionalist contemporaries. 
7 	 Mansfield 1965, 13-15; This type of reasoning can be found in C69, 28 October 1727. If 
some found divisions advantageous and adopted 'a spirit of faction', The Craftsman was 
ready to declare: 'I hope we shall never want another party, able to balance their power and 
defeat their designs, which, at present, I have the satisfaction to observe, does not seem to be 
an expiring party'. 
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The ideal of anti-party writers was the elimination of conflicts and the 
achievement of national unity through non-partisan government. Party was 
associated with seventeenth-century conflicts, religious intolerance and 
animosities, with treason and a threat of foreign invasion, with political 
instability and dangers to freedom. Any political party was believed to be 
capable of becoming a tool with which some group could advance its — possibly 
tyrannical — interests at the cost of the whole. Political parties were also 
regarded as a threat to the much emphasised civic virtue, as they tended to cause 
hostilities and make adherents loyal to restricted interest only and not to public 
welfare as a whole.8 
Positive conceptions of party expressed by canonical figures have achieved a 
dominant status also in anthologies edited by Alan Beattie and J.A.W. Gunn. 
Beattie has placed party strife in a constitutional context of disagreements on 
the role of the Parliament, paying some attention to alternative senses of party 
terminology.' Gunn has looked for secular political explanations for the 
inability of contemporaries to accept parties and has emphasised any signs of an 
emerging acceptance. He has pointed out that, in traditional literature, the 
primary importance of national unity had been underlined and party presented 
as one of the techniques employed by absolutist regimes and party-men with 
questionable motives. Furthermore, the idea of party was difficult to fit together 
with what Gunn has called prevailing conceptions of individualism: the 
adherents of a party were believed to reject their own reason for the benefit of 
party leaders who were imposing their self-interest on others. Eighteenth-
century Englishmen also tended to view political parties through ancient ideals 
of a balanced constitution which excluded such organisations. Though 
mentioning religious issues as a factor involved in the strife between the Whigs 
and Tories,10 Gunn has not considered religion a phenomenon with particular 
importance in conceptualisations of parties. 
A notable conceptual approach to the history of party is that of Klaus von 
Beyme who has paid particular attention to the strong status of the ancient 
doctrine of concordia in early modern Europe. Models of order and balance, 
theories of mixed government, and an inherited imagery of an organic state all 
served to restrict possibilities for an acceptance of political pluralism. Nuances 
of party words experienced little change, party being seen, almost without 
exception, as a highly mischievous phenomenon. Noteworthy is that the Latin 
term partes had often been used for religious schismatics and that the Italian 
Guelfs and Ghibellines", for instance, had been both political and religious 
parties. The first instances of more positive attitudes towards parties can be 
discovered in Renaissance Italy, Machiavelli having drawn a distinction 
between harmful parties (aimed at gaining benefits by abusing patronage, 
economic dependency and the perversion of justice) and parties that simply 
8 	 Hofstadter 1969, 10, 12-13, 18. 
9 	 Beattie 1970, 1-9. 
10 Gunn 1972, 7, 9-10, 12-13, 16-17. 
11 	 Guelfs had originally been supporters of the Pope while Ghibellines had defended the status 
of the emperor. 
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competed for public positions. Nevertheless, the concept of party and its 
synonym, faction, retained their religious associations, being widely employed 
in a pejorative sense for schismatics in religious strifes such as nonconformist 
sects in seventeenth-century England. In the course of time, however, a 
differentiation in the nuances conveyed by the highly discriminatory words 
faction and party became manifest. In England, the term party became common 
as a result of the rise of the Whigs and Tories. Isolated instances of the word 
party being used to describe one's own group started to appear. In polemical 
texts, the use of the words party and faction tended to vary according to the 
position of the writer, it being a standard rhetorical device to attack the rival 
party by calling it a faction.'2 
Another conceptual analysis of the history of party has been provided by 
Terence Ball who has argued that political parties emerged from a long pre-
history in which political vocabulary was gradually transformed enabling shifts 
in perceptions. According to Ball, no vocabulary or images for a modern notion 
of party existed before the late seventeenth century. Ball's hypothesis has been 
that this transformation was facilitated by a shift from organic imagery to 
contractual notions of the polity. Other major shifts in perceptions were the 
emergence of the idea of an irreducible plurality of political interests and that of 
a legitimate and loyal standing opposition. In classical political theory, polis 
had been understood as a unified political body greater than the sum of its 
several parts, and any faction aiming at its own good had been conceived 
detrimental to the public interest. Most early modern theorists had repeated 
these warnings of the evils of faction. Only Machiavelli had suggested that a 
controlled conflict might prevent corruption and promote freedom. 
What was important in the thought of Hobbes, continues Ball's argument, 
was his idea of the body politic as an artificial body based on a contract between 
parties rather than as a natural body. Ball may have overestimated the 
profoundness of this Hobbesian idea and the effects of the Revolution of 1688 
when he connected the rise of English parties with a novel contractarian view of 
the monarchs as parties in a constitutional agreement. Still, it is evident that the 
English political nation experienced a gradual change in political self-
understanding in relation to party, which included an emerging linguistic 
distinction between the terms faction and party. Ball has suggested that the early 
eighteenth century already saw the emergence of the idea that some political 
divisions were based on principles, that such division might be unavoidable in a 
free constitution, and that honest and honourable men could disagree about the 
common interest and the best way to serve it. Partisan contention even came to 
be considered by some as an identifying feature of the English national 
character. Parties might be viewed as novel, acceptable and even valuable 
English political institutions, while opponents to parties attempted to show that 
parties were but an old phenomenon of factions under a new name» 
12 von Beyme 1978, 677, 680, 682, 684-5, 687-8, 732; von Beyme 1989, 134-5. 
13 Ball 1989, 155-74; See also Ball 1988, 19, 22-46. 
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Unfortunately, Ball has not proceeded to demonstrate these points by an 
analysis of a sufficiently large sample of contemporary sources. 
Most historians have been cautious not to exaggerate the speed and ease of 
the acceptance of political parties in England. Some have suggested, however, 
that the shift happened rather suddenly in the late seventeenth century. Kevin 
Sharpe and Steven N. Zwicker, for instance, have described the early 
seventeenth century as a period when a unified world of values had still been an 
ideal, fragmentation in politics had been widely denied, and parties had been 
disclaimed as factional interests. `Party' had been considered a synonym for 
`part' and hence inconceivable outside the whole. According to Sharpe and 
Zwicker, however, the Civil War had already made many realise that the 
acknowledgement of diversity and acceptance of differences was essential to a 
stable political system. `Party' became associated with taking sides in political 
contests and, by the end of the seventeenth century, Sharpe and Zwicker have 
argued, it became the starting point for any discussion of politics so that 
`dispute and fragmentation, once anathematized as the roots of dislocation, 
have now become the norms of political and social life'." Such an 
interpretation, when compared with early eighteenth-century discourse on 
political parties, appears to be a crude generalisation. Dispute and fragmen-
tation can hardly be called `norms' in early eighteenth-century politics. Mental 
obstacles for such a rapid transformation were considerable, and historical 
evidence provides a much more varied picture of conceptualisations of political 
parties in early eighteenth-century England. 
Party in preceding centuries 
The definition for party in the OED contains no detailed conceptual analysis but 
gives a summary of alternative senses of the term in early modern English 
language. The OED suggests that the word party could refer either to (i) part, 
portion or side; (ii) a company or body of persons; or (iii) a single person 
considered in relationship to another. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
texts, the word appeared in senses such as 'a division of a whole', 'a part or 
member of the body', and 'a conspiracy, plot',15 all of which may have been 
familiar to early eighteenth-century writers through their acquaintance with 
past texts. Seventeenth-century examples demonstrate that the term was 
increasingly used in a political sense to denote persons united in maintaining a 
cause, policy or opinion in opposition to others who maintained a different 
attitude. Naturally, such growing use alone cannot be taken as evidence of a 
general acceptance of political parties. One of the quotations, originating from 
Alexander Pope in 1714, illustrates how party remained for long a cursed 
expression: 'A curse on the word party, which I have been forced to use so often 
in this period!'16 
14 Sharpe and Zwicker 1987, 6-7. 
15 OED: party. 
16 OED: party. 
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Historians disagree slightly as to when it is legitimate to speak about political 
parties in English history. Some have discovered the first signs of party strife 
from the time of the Civil War; most take the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-1681 as 
an evident starting point; and others regard the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as 
the event after which parties began to dominate English politics.17 These parties 
spread fast to the constituency level. Their organisations remained weak, but 
the ideologies formulated during the Exclusion Crisis were to provide the basis 
for party identities long thereafter. '$ Whereas the members of the parliaments of 
the 1660s still mostly acted as individuals and only used the expressions sides 
and parties in connection with religious issues, by the early 1680s, the 
Commons already appeared as distinctly divided according to party lines.19 
Despite the growing use of the term in political contexts, its religious 
associations were unlikely to disappear overnight. Evelyn, for instance, wrote 
on the days of the Revolution of 1688 about `several parties' such as 'a Tory 
part', `Republicans', 'the Romanists', the `popish party', 'the Protestants' and 
`K[ing] James party' without making the least separation between parties 
religious and political.20 Official propaganda of the 1690s was strict in its 
rejection of all parties — often on religious grounds. William III's propaganda 
machine denounced parties by associating political division with the vice of 
sensuality, both being consequences of a sin calling for an immediate cure. 
Williamite Churchmen authoritatively took up party division as a question of 
morality and insisted that the political elite should abandon their sin of 
division.''-' 
Without proceeding more deeply into late seventeenth-century discourse on 
political parties, contemplations on the subject of party by two eminent writers 
with potential influence on early eighteenth-century attitudes, namely Locke 
and Halifax, can be briefly introduced. Reading Locke — as far as that was done 
by his rather suspicious contemporaries — did not provide members of the early 
eighteenth-century political elite with decisive models for the use of the term 
party. In Locke's Two Treatises of Government, praised in much of twentieth-
century historiography as an embodiment of late seventeenth-century liberal 
political thought, parties and partisans appear rarely and even then mostly in 
connection with the state of war.2'- In his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, Locke took up the issue of party only in very general senses 
with little direct political implication. He wrote about how people generally 
wished to see their party persuasion universally adopted and all alternative 
views rejected. As seen in connection with contemporary theories of language, 
17 	 Harris 1993, 3; see also Jones 1991, 198, and Hill 1976, 15. 
18 Holmes 1993, 133, 136, 141. 
19 Miller 1983, 7. 
20 	 The Helsinki Corpus of English Texts (HCET), 2nd edition, ed. Merja Kytö, University of 
Helsinki, 1993: John Evelyn, The Diary of John Evelyn, 1689-1690. 
21 Claydon 1996, 153-5. 
22 	 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1690, I, § 131, II, §235; A word listing created by the 
Oxford Concordance Programme shows that Locke's Second Essay on Civil Government 
contains five occurrences of the term party. In Essay concerning Human Understanding, 
party appears only three and in Letter Concerning Toleration four times. 
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Locke also pointed out that constant repetition of separate ideas by a `party' (or 
sect in philosophy or religion) led to their distorted association into one idea and 
above all antipathy towards other groups in the minds of party adherents. This 
misleading association of ideas by party adherents, wrote Locke, `gives sense to 
jargon, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, and is the 
foundation of the greatest, and I had almost said of all the errors in the world' .23 
This was not a very promising start for defences of party! Locke did not proceed 
so far as to refer to constant associations created between secular and spiritual 
issues in contemporary public discourse, but that may well have been a point of 
criticism in his mind. All in all, Locke's role in early eighteenth-century 
discourse on parties seems to have been marginal. 
The state of the concept of party in the end of the seventeenth century can 
also be illustrated by the study of Halifax, a thinker who has been said to have 
outlined a party theory for the first time since the Italian Renaissance. Von 
Beyme, for instance, has argued that, in his writings of the 1680s, Halifax did 
not deny the utility of parties but urged his contemporaries not to join them. 
With a close reading of Halifax's writings, statements such as `there must in 
every body be a leaning to that sort of men who profess some principles, more 
than to others who go upon a different foundation'26 can be found. Rather than 
being taken as an advanced theorist on party who introduced ideas to be 
adopted by those who came after him, however, Halifax should perhaps be seen 
as a political opportunist typical of his age. Though some of his writings were 
published in the early eighteenth century, his influence on later thought remains 
unexplored. Whatever his actual reception, Halifax probably sounded 
agreeable to his contemporaries when he declared, pointing to the Civil War, 
that 'a party, even in times of peace ... sets up and continues the exercise of 
martial law', and, 'the best party is but a kind of a conspiracy against the rest of 
the nation'.25 His characterisation of party as `little less than an inquisition, 
where men are under such a discipline in carrying on the common cause as 
leaves no liberty of private opinion'26 must also have been agreeable. In fact, 
Halifax's texts exemplify the conflicting situations which many a member of 
the political elite experienced: on the one hand an awareness of the insuperable 
difficulty of ignoring parties altogether, on the other, an awareness of the grave 
problems involved in attempts to reconcile party adherence with classical 
political theory, not to say early modern belief in the necessity of unity:27 
23 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, 1.2.20, 1.2.25, 1.33.18. 
24 	 Halifax, ,'The Character of a Trimmer', 1685, cited by von Beyme 1978, 689. 
25 Halifax, `Cautions for Choice of Parliament Men' and `Political Thoughts and Reflections', 
cited by von Beyme 1978, 689; Halifax did not make any noticeable distinction between the 
terms party and faction. In the early 1690s, he wrote in his Maxims: `Faction is the mother of 
eloquence, which shows that a hard favoured mother may have a very handsome daughter. A 
prevailing party has always ingenious excuses for doing the same things, they had a little 
before complained of'. Halifax, `Maxims: Miscellanys', c. 1692, in The Works of George 
Savile Marquis of Halifax, ed. Mark N. Brown, New York 1989, Vol. III, 403. 
26 Quoted in Hill 1996, 11. 
27 Halifax, `Political Thoughts and Reflections', cited by von Beyme 1978, 689. 
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If there are two parties, a man ought to adhere to that which he dislikes 
least, though in the whole he does not approve it: For whilst he does not 
list himself in one or the other party, he is looked upon as such a 
straggler that he is fallen upon by both ... Ignorance makes most men go 
into a party, and shame keeps them from getting out of it. 
The statement demonstrates what many of Halifax's contemporaries were 
thinking: they denounced parties as something to be avoided as far as principles 
were concerned but had to admit that party adherence could be useful in 
everyday political life. 
Even though party in a nationwide sense was undoubtedly a new 
development in early eighteenth-century England, contemporaries willingly 
looked to the past to find parallel instance of parties, and they were able to find 
many. Party was frequently, and often in an anachronistic manner, used with 
reference to confrontations preceding the Civil War by centuries. Twelfth-
century history, for instance, could be viewed through the terms `English and 
Norman part[ies]'. Thirteenth-century Englishmen were seen as having been 
divided into parties over the Magna Charta in a way that they could 'be ranked 
under the modern denominations Whigs and Tories'. Later medieval court 
intrigues were described via the terminology of party and faction, and the sides 
in the Wars of Roses were likewise called parties. In connection with the 
Reformation, Roman Catholics were seen to have constituted a party. Catholics 
and Huguenots in the French Wars of Religion were too discussed as parties. 
Queen Elizabeth was praised for her ability not to favour any of the Protestant 
religious parties, and James I criticised for his failure to do the same and for his 
attempt to form 'a third or neutral party in religion' between Catholicism and 
Protestantism. James I's desire of `governing by parties' was seen as the starting 
point of continuous party strife and all its negative consequences, including the 
rise of `anti-parties to the establishment'. Cavaliers and Roundheads, or 'the 
Royal party' and 'the Republican party' were discussed as parties, and so was 
the `Independent party', a faction within the Parliamentarians. After the Civil 
War emerged the `popular or dissenting party' and the `Church-party', and 
these developed later into the Whig and Tory parties. Some were prepared to 
call the Royalist side 'the Church-party' referring to the pre-Civil War period, 
thus underlining the questionable history of the Tory party in defending the 
rights of monarchs aiming at what was seen as absolute power.28 All in all, 
parties were presented as an ancient phenomenon that was as much if not more 
connected with religion than with politics. 
In Clarendon's History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England Begun in 
the Year 1641, published at the very beginning of the eighteenth century, party 
28 	 Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, 395, 552-3, 558, 580, 588; A Vindication of the Constitution of 
the English Monarchy, 1703, 3; [William Baron], An Historical Account of Comprehension, 
and Toleration, 1705, preface; C17, 30 January 1727; Bevil Higgons, A Short View of the 
English History, 1727, 65, 67, 101, 138, 179, 202, 234-5, 275, 282, 319, 325-6; The Fog's 
Journal, No. 237, 19 May 1733, in GM, Vol. III, May 1733, Reel 134; A Dissuasive fronz 
Party and Religious Animosities, 1736, 5; Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 
1741, 19. 
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is a term that constantly appears in descriptions of the traumatic events of the 
1640s. The publication of this thorough and, without a doubt, widely perused 
narration may have strengthened the already fearful feelings of a possible return 
of civil strife. The work may also have contributed to the continuity and even 
revival of political language generally used during the Civil War period. In his 
monumental history, Clarendon told how the monarch and Parliament had both 
referred to each other with the term `malignant party' during the rise of their 
disputes in the early 1640s. 'The king's party' and 'the loyal party' had been 
opposed by 'the parliament party'. Religious questions had been unavoidably 
mixed in this confrontation, 'the factious and schismatical party' or 'the Puritan 
party' having opposed not only the monarch, but also called for a more far-
reaching reformation. In Clarendon's history of the Civil War, both parties 
were, first and foremost, parties in a war. At a later stage, and particularly 
during the Interregnum, the term party had also signified groupings for and 
against Cromwell within the troops of Parliament: 'the Independent party' 
opposing 'the Presbyterian party' and the division being mainly about religious 
matters.29 
Developments in senses of party vocabulary 
Party terminology became only gradually incorporated into English 
dictionaries. Several dictionaries printed in the early eighteenth century could, 
despite the universal use of the term party in several areas of discourse ever 
since the sixteenth century, completely omit the word. Even though party was 
one of the dominant concerns for members of the elite and many commoners as 
well, some dictionaries on sale were capable of excluding the entire entry for a 
surprisingly long period. Glossaries ignoring the rise of parties to the status of a 
political institution and the connected rise of party vocabulary in political 
discourse include Coles's English Dictionary of 1701, originally published in 
1676 and thus predating the Exclusion Crisis, but also its `revised' edition of 
1732. Likewise, the posthumous edition of the seventeenth-century Cocker-
Hawkins (1704) and a reprint of Bullokar's English Expositor (1719) made no 
additions as to party vocabulary. Furthermore, those dictionaries that included 
an entry for party might refer merely to its legal or military senses and omit 
political and religious ones, as was the case with Glossographia Anglicana 
Nova (1707) and Cocker's new edition for 1724. 
This habitual negligence of the term party from dictionaries calls for an 
explanation. These omissions could, of course, follow from the policy of 
printing houses to reprint seventeenth-century wordbooks in a world that was 
experienced as stable. They could also follow from the belief that parties were a 
temporary phenomenon of minor relevance, from an assumption that everyone 
knew what party was even without a definition, from a conscious refutation of 
29 	 Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, 1702, Vol. II, 45, 53, 57, 70, 245, 310, 314, 415, 
461; Vol. III, 453, 506; Vol. V, 129, 274. 
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the existence of such a phenomenon, or from a combination of all these factors. 
Undoubtedly, inertia in dictionary publishing was considerable. Printers saw no 
reason for extensive (and expensive) re-editing of their publications which 
anyway sold as they were. The obvious severity of party strife ever since the 
early 1680s being documented from diverse sources, considering party an 
ephemeral phenomenon had become increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, that 
was the view to which many contemporaries remained attached. Furthermore, 
at the very dawn of the eighteenth century, party conflict had not yet reached the 
levels of the early 1710s. By 1719 and 1732, in turn, party strife probably 
seemed to have decisively weakened, justifying a continuous negligence of a 
term that was thought useless. As to the notion that everyone knew what party 
was without definition, it is unlikely to have led to such omissions, as 
dictionaries routinely clarified everyday expressions. In fact, party would 
rather, because of its differing senses in many areas of life, have demanded 
exceptional attention in any dictionary aiming to be helpful to its users. 
The major explanation for the absence of definitions for party vocabulary in 
early eighteenth-century dictionaries is actually found in a continuous denial 
among contemporaries of the reality of parties and their unwillingness to accept 
the phenomenon. In the long run, omissions are difficult to explain with reasons 
other than negative perceptions of parties, and the fore-mentioned technical 
delay in updating dictionaries. In addition to an unwillingness to revise, failure 
to include a definition may have been caused by a conscious demonstration of 
the printer's or editor's negative attitude towards all parties and his 
determination not to create partisan associations in the minds of readers. Party 
was, in a sense, an inconvenient `four-letter word' to be excluded as an 
annoying expression that might upset some readers. Defining party vocabulary 
also entailed the risk of provoking supporters of some party by the use of 
excessively partisan language. This contemporary denial of party words is 
particularly visible in a text from 1739 which demanded: 'Let us banish [party-
names] our language, and expunge them from our dictionaries, and for ever 
forget all the injurious thoughts of one another, that have accompanied them' 3° 
This is an outspoken illustration of the reasons for party terminology being 
omitted from dictionaries. It was believed by some printers and editors that a 
refusal to recognise the existing party vocabulary would contribute to 
extinguishing the phenomenon of party. 
Not every dictionary steadfastly denied the reality of parties, however. The 
non-political senses of the term were first to see daylight in dictionaries, but 
political senses also started to appear. The English having experienced the 
heated party strife of Queen Anne's reign, Phillips-Kersey (1706) and Kersey 
(1715) included not only the legal but also the political and military senses, 
party being 'a person (one that is at law with another); also association, faction 
or side; in the art of war, a small body of men (of horse or foot) sent out to 
discover, or upon any military execution'. Kersey's dictionary of 1731 
30 	 Observations on the Conduct of the Tories, the Whigs, and the Dissenters, 1739, 39. 
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mentioned the senses of 'a person, a faction, or side; a body of soldiers sent out 
upon some service', omitting for some unknown reason the legal sense. Bailey 
(1733) already distinguished clearly between the socio-political and military 
senses of party, giving each a separate entry. Party was thus either (i) a person; 
also association, side, or faction, or (ii) in military affairs 'a body of men sent 
out upon some expedition'. Likewise, Gordon-Bailey (1730) published a 
separate entry for the various senses of party, thus emphasising the distinctive 
character of the socio-political, military and legal senses of the term. According 
to Gordon-Bailey, party was (i) 'a person; also a faction or side', (ii) 'a body of 
soldiery horse or foot sent out upon some expedition', and (iii) `those persons 
who are named in a deed or fine as parties to it'. 
Dyche-Pardon's definition for party from 1740 introduced the same three 
senses and seems to have already been realistic in its recognition of the 
existence of parties. For Dyche-Pardon, party as a legal and also increasingly 
commercial term was 'one concerned in a business, or that has interest therein'. 
Its political sense and its analogous character with religious groupings were 
also made explicit, probably for the first time in the history of English 
lexicography, when Dyche-Pardon stated that `sometimes it signifies a great 
collection or number of people siding with, or espousing particular opinions in 
religion, government, etc.'. Neither did Dyche-Pardon omit the military sense 
of party as 'a small body of horse or foot'. Fenning's definition of party from 
1741, however, came closest to the emerging new understanding of party, 
mentioning first the sense of party as 'a number of persons united in one 
common design'. Of course, party could still stand for 'one of two adversaries' 
or 'an accomplice or one concerned in an affair' or 'a particular person' or 'a 
detachment of soldiers'. Later in the eighteenth century, the political sense of 
party was to develop into something more substantial, into party in a Burkean 
sense as an honest association for advancing common goals. 
At the time of Johnson's project for a new English dictionary in the mid-
century, the meanings of the word party remained highly diverse, but Johnson 
did not hesitate to list the political sense first. For him, like most dictionary 
editors, party was still essentially a faction and thus a self-evidently negative 
phenomenon, but the definition itself came surprisingly close to the emerging 
conception of political party as 'a number of persons confederated by similarity 
of designs or opinions in opposition to others'. Choosing the second sense for 
party as someone engaged in a lawsuit must also been a self-evident choice. The 
following four senses were generalised from this legal sense, party referring to 
someone concerned in any affair, some particular person, persons opposed to 
each other, or cause or side in general. A social sense was also there as a 
selected group of people gathered for some social occasion. Likewise, the 
military sense was included though only at the end of the list of the eight senses 
which Johnson was able to distinguish. 
A distinct entrance of political party vocabulary to dictionaries is thus 
traceable. At the same time, however, the traditional religious senses of party 
remained vital. When the word occurred in dictionary entries for terms regarded 
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as synonymous, the context was conventionally religious. When defining the 
term schism, for instance, Moreri-Collier (1701) referred to Pope `Urban's 
party' and Pope 'Clement's party', the strife between which had led to a break 
within the Catholic Church in the late Middle Ages. For Phillips-Kersey (1706) 
and Glossographia (1707), a zealot was a `party-man, chiefly in matters of 
religion', for Kersey (1715) simply a `party-man'. Whereas Kersey (1715) 
regarded cabal and sect as synonyms of party, Cocker-Hawkins (1724) 
considered sect a party. 
The very ambiguity of the concept party in the English language facilitated 
its political use in a way that allowed senses from other areas of discourse to be 
attached to the word. As definitions in dictionaries reveal, the term continued to 
have several non-political senses, an analysis of which may be helpful when 
shifts in its political meanings are traced. Party had military, legal, social and 
religious senses, and changes in the relative importance of each may be 
revealing as to changes in prevailing attitudes towards political parties. Some 
early eighteenth-century trends of conceptual change are indeed discernible, 
including the continuous existence, though decreasing centrality, of the military 
sense, widespread but essentially juridical use of legal senses, and the 
emergence of a distinctly social sense. Above all, religious associations of the 
concept were very slowly withering away though retaining their status in some 
texts throughout the period 1700-1750. Particularly interesting is, of course, 
the gradual rise of an increasingly secular political sense of the concept. 
In early eighteenth-century English, party was, among other things, a 
military term which referred to a body of troops selected for a particular service 
or duty, 'a small party of foot or horse sent out to discover, or upon any military 
execution'.3' Throughout the period, it might also refer to one of the sides in a 
military conflict.32 Chambers (1728) did not separate between party, faction, 
interest or power in one of his several entries for parties but wrote in practically 
analogous terms about France and Spain as parties in a military conflict, and the 
two parties in the English domestic political division. As late as in 1749, Martin 
defined party, among other things, as 'a side in faction or war', warfare and 
political parties thus appearing as nearly parallel. It has been suggested that the 
military associations of party disappeared by the end of the seventeenth century 
and parties as political labels thus lost their associations with military violence. 
Undoubtedly, political behaviour was becoming more `civilised' after the 
conflicts of the mid-seventeenth century so that physical violence was 
substituted by verbal strife,33 but the extent and completeness of this change in 
meaning should not be overestimated. Even if English thinkers increasingly 
disowned military force as a way of solving internal political problems, fear of 
the military remained part of parliamentary rhetoric as well as national 
consciousness.34 The consciousness of a threat of a repeated martial conflict 
31 	 OED: party; Cocker 1704 and 1724; Chambers 1728; A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
32 See e.g. The Daily Courant, 9 October 1734, in GM, Vol. IV, October 1734, Reel 134. 
33 Sharpe and Zwicker 1987, 7. 
34 Hill 1996, 2-3. 
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may also explain some of the continuous relevance of militaristic party 
vocabulary in the early eighteenth century. 
The entrance of some new military party terms into English and their quick 
application to political rhetoric suggests that the military associations of party 
terminology retained a strong status. For instance, the word party-man was 
borrowed from French as a novel military term in the late seventeenth century. 
By the early eighteenth century, it was already used for someone devoted to a 
religious or political party. Party-men were, in contrast with patriots, `those 
who advance doctrines any way destructive of the public good ... , drive on a 
private interest, and only assume a zeal for the Church, or the laws, which they 
have not, to strengthen their party, by imposing on the honest and well-meaning 
of both sides'. Furthermore, party-men were seen as blindly deferential to their 
leaders," inclined to turn dangerous for both religion and political liberties," 
certainly of `designing and perverted minds',37 and `absolute[ly] determined at 
all events against the Court and ministry'.38 Fenning (1741) was probably the 
first editor to include an entry for party-man in his dictionary as 'a factious 
person, or one joined in a faction'. For Johnson (1755), party-man was self-
evidently 'a factious person' and 'an abettor of party' with no explicit military 
senses mentioned. Notably, however, not all uses of the term were derogatory. 
One commentator believed that most party-men were simply misled: `Party-
men will always be (for the greatest part) insignificant, and often honestly 
intentioned, while the party they support, will always be dangerous'. Another 
did not hesitate to declare that ' ... when the honour, interest and security of the 
government are in question, I desire to be esteemed in such cases a man of 
warmth and a party-man'. A third commentator, a preacher, applied similar 
conditions, stating that 'to be a party-man on the side of truth, and justice, and 
honesty, is a glorious distinction. In the cause of virtue and religion, of liberty 
and public good, every honest man ought to endeavour with all his might to 
form a party against a world of knaves'.39 
Partisan, a devoted follower of a party, was an even more sinister word of 
military origin used in connection with party conflict. It had the sense of blind, 
prejudiced, unreasoning or fanatical adherence. According to Coles (1701), 
partisan had two major meanings, either referring more generally to 'a partaker' 
or, more specifically, to 'a (lieutenant's) leading staff'. Cocker-Hawkins (1704) 
defined partisan in predominantly military terms, referring to 'a leading staff in 
war' and 'a party man that goes with a select party upon adventurers, a 
partaker'. Partisan was 'a soldier well skilled in commanding a party who 
knows that country, and how to surprize the enemy and avoid ambushes'. The 
35 [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, 26. 
36 	 [Whiston], The Supposal, or A New Scheme of Government, 1712, 143. 
37 	 Bernard Mandeville, 'A Vindication of the Book', 1724, in The Fable of the Bees, ed. Phillip 
Harth, 1989, 396. 
38 The London Journal, No. 760, 19 January 1734, in GM, Vol. IV, January 1734, Reel 134. 
39 	 [John Oldmixon], The False Steps of the Ministry after the Revolution, 1714, 18; The Present 
Necessity of distinguishing Publick Spirit, 1736, 8; Gilpin, The bad Consequences of 
Dissention and Party-rage considered, 1747, 11. 
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same definition was repeated as an alternative sense by Phillips-Kersey (1706) 
and by Cocker-Hawkins as the sole sense as late as 1724. Though Phillips-
Kersey (1706) and Glossographia Anglicana Nova (1707) gave first a more 
general sense to partisan as 'a favourer or abetter of a party, a stickler', the 
military undertone of the word was further strengthened by the identical 
outward appearance of partisan, 'a weapon like a halbard' and reference to 'one 
that commands a party' in war. The same two military senses were yet echoed in 
Bullokar-Browne (1719) which omitted the expression party for good. In 
Kersey (1731), partisan was still associated within the same dictionary entry 
with favouring a party, for military command and weaponry. 
Bailey (1733), Martin (1749) and A Pocket Dictionary (1753) already drew a 
clearer distinction between the various senses of partisan by writing separate 
entries for religious or political activism, for organisation and for weaponry. 
First was mentioned partisan as 'a favourer or abetter of a party', then partisan 
as 'a commander of a party' and finally partisan as 'a halberd'. Dyche-Pardon 
(1740/1750) drew a further distinction by separating the weapon from the other 
senses with a new way of writing `partuisan'. He also distinguished between the 
politico-religious and military senses of partisan which could refer to 'one that 
espouses the interest, party, or concern of another with great vigour and 
application' or 'an old expert soldier'. Chambers's new edition of 1753 
developed the distinction further by speaking, with reference to the military art, 
about `partisan-party' led by a partisan. In Defoe (1737) and Wesley (1764), the 
military senses of the word could be rejected while the general sense of the 
word remained. Yet the relationship between the two senses was close and 
associations between military leadership and political or religious manoeuvring 
remained unavoidable. Fenning (1741) still suggested that `halberd' and 'one 
who adheres or belongs to a faction' were just two senses of the same 
expression partisan. In his diary, lieutenant-general Adam Williamson, for 
instance, consistently used partisan as a name of a weapon.40 All the military 
senses of party and partisan were also repeated by Johnson (1755). Following 
early eighteenth-century authors, he gave partisan the distinctly political 
definition of 'an adherent to a faction'. 
In contemporary usages of the term party, some noteworthy instances 
demonstrating the continuous presence of its military associations can be found. 
Luttrell, who observantly reported what he had read and heard about the events 
of the day in the early years of the century, frequently used the term party with 
reference not only to parliamentary politics of London but also to manoeuvres 
in the Great Northern War and the Spanish War of Succession.41 When early 
40 	 The Official Diary of Lieutenant-General Adam Williamson, Deputy-Lieutenant of the Tower 
of London 1722-1747, ed. John Charles Fox, 1912, 28 March 1731, 71, 15 April 1741, 112, 
24 July 1746, 124; The editor of the Diary has been confused on this usage, as authorities 
such as the OED suggested to him that partisan should have been an obsolete expression for 
a weapon ever since 1700, whereas it clearly was not. 
41 	 See e.g. Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs, 17 July 1701, Vol. V, 72; 16 
August 1701, Vol. V, 81; 23 September 1701, Vol. V, 92-3; 2 October 1701, Vol. V, 96; 30 
October 1701, Vol. V, 105; 4 November 1703, Vol. V, 355; 2 March 1704, Vol. V, 397; 6 
May 1704, Vol. V, 421; 23 May 1704, Vol. V, 427; 18 July 1704, Vol. V, 446. 
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eighteenth-century authors wrote about the period of the Civil War and the 
Interregnum, they described the Republicans as a `veteran party' in which 'the 
army and party combined'. Clarendon's account of the Civil War, very 
naturally, made little distinction between military and political parties.42 The 
distinction between military and political parties remained blurred for long. 
Ryder the Whig and Presbyterian, for instance, described party activities 
opposing Tories in terms of almost a military conflict in 1716, considering 
singing party-songs in which the opposing party was humiliated `something 
like the drums and trumpets in an army, to raise the courage and spirits of the 
soldiers' 43 The military associations of political parties in connection with the 
Succession Crisis are also visible in Defoe's fear that 'the present cessation of 
party arms will not hold long'.44 
Later in the century, partisan appeared every now and then in political 
contexts particularly in the Craftsman in the form of 'a zealous partisan in the 
Whig cause'. Instead of being clearly martial, however, its connotations were 
increasingly linked to ridicule, 'old doting partisans' being associated with 
`state-bigots' and `superannuated lovers'.45 Still in the 1730s, however, a 
pamphlet vindicating public spirit as opposed to party described parties through 
highly militaristic naval metaphors. According to this author, party adherents 
`still range themselves as in battle, and each aim chiefly at sinking the other, 
when these differences must end in their common destruction' 46 These 
instances of party vocabulary connected to warfare suggest that, throughout the 
early eighteenth century, the word party inevitably still conveyed some 
associations with a military conflict, particularly if military affairs and political 
groupings were discussed in the same text. Such associations could at any time 
be revived for rhetorical purposes. It was only gradually that a distinction 
between a military and political party emerged. 
The second group of alternative senses of party that may have had an effect 
on its political senses is constituted by party as a legal term. In previous research 
on the concept of party, it has been argued that the old usage of the word in legal 
contexts affected its senses in political contexts. Already in ancient Roman 
judicature, party had stood for persons that constituted the two sides in a legal 
proceeding such as entering into a contract. The expression partes had thus 
originally invoked legal associations unlike the rather more pejorative 
expression factiones, and this basic difference of valuative nuances had passed 
into the major European languages.47 In early modern England, party might 
refer either to one side in a dispute or to a particular body of men who might or 
might not have common opinions as the basis of association. The first meaning 
42 	 Three Questions of Present Importance, 1702, 2; Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, 
1702, Vol. II, 286, 323, 464. 
43 The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 20 July 1716, 279-80; Anti-Presbyterian feelings were 
expressed widely after the accession of George I. Albers 1993, 328. 
44 	 OED: party; COPC: Daniel Defoe, An Apeal to Honour and Justice, 1715. 
45 See e.g. C17, 30 January 1727; C40, 24 April 1727; C327, 7 October 1732. 
46 	 The Present Necessity of distinguishing Publick Spirit from Party, 1736, 4. 
47 	 OED: party; The wide judicial usage of the word party is well illustrated by statutes dating 
from the late 1690s and contained in the HCET; von Beyme 1978, 678. 
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is related to that of the legal sense of a party to a dispute, while the second could 
refer to various kinds of groupings.4$ Ball has suggested that, in the course of 
the eighteenth century, a breakthrough of contractual notions of polity furthered 
an acceptance of political parties as a natural phenomenon in society.49 This 
hypothesis is difficult to either prove or invalidate. The early eighteenth-
century material consulted for this study provides hardly any evidence of 
political parties being presented as participants in a contract. The continuous 
strength of traditionalist thought, above all the widespread use of organic 
analogies, suggests that contractual notions of society were not universally 
accepted. Of course, this lack of evidence from the early part of the century does 
not rule out a possibility of Ball's suggested change in the later eighteenth 
century. 
In any case, the term party had a considerable legal range in the period under 
study. The only sense of the expression parties which Glossographia Anglicana 
Nova (1707; originally by Blount 1656) offered originated from law, parties 
being `those which are named in a deed, or fine as parties to it' .5° More up-to-
date dictionaries also introduced this legal sense of the term. Chambers (1728) 
and Martin (1749) both placed it second in their lists of senses. Throughout the 
early eighteenth century, some dictionaries also called party a side or 
association, which comes close to its legal senses. In everyday judicial matters, 
the term was very generally applied. The diaries of Bishop William Nicolson 
and of Dudley Ryder, a law student, provide several instances of the use of party 
as a participant in some court cases.S1 Given the long English tradition of 
discussing politics in legal terms and the central role which lawyers played in 
the political system, it is plausible that the legal sense of party had some, even if 
unspecific, influence on the homonymous political term. 
The third alternative sense of the term party was a social one, referring to a 
group of people gathered together for social pleasure 52 It has been suggested 
that this sense entered the English language at the end of the seventeenth 
century, evoked the sociability of the term, and thus facilitated an acceptance of 
political groupings 53 Previous scholarship has shown that local party activities 
could resemble social party. For instance, the London organisation of the Tory 
party initially consisted of drinking and dining clubs which started to meet 
weekly at a settled time and place, usually at a coffee house.54 However, there 
are few examples of the use of the term party in a social sense in early 
eighteenth-century texts. Before Martin (1749) and Johnson (1755), 
dictionaries did not include such a distinct sense. Among the few instances of 
`social parties' in consulted source material can be mentioned a letter from 
48 Beattie 1970, 6. 
49 Ball 1989, 156. 
50 Glossographia 1707. 
51 The London Diaries of William Nicolson Bishop of Carlisle 1702-1718, e.g. 22 January 
1703, 185, 27 November 1704, 236-7, 8 February 1706, 373, and 22 March 1709, 488; The 
Diary of Dudley Ryder, 26 September 1715, 107. 
52 OED: party. 
53 Sharpe and Zwicker 1987, 7. 
54 Colley 1977, 80, 82, 86, 88. 
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Martha Lockhart to John Locke offering herself to be 'of the party' and thus 
referring to a group of people attending some event together 55 Swift once gave 
a critical description of how faction was involved in `balls, assemblies, and 
other parties of pleasure'.56 Ryder, though frequenting various events of 
London high society, did not use the word party with such a social meaning in 
his diary.57 In descriptions of English history in the Craftsman, former kings 
and statesmen were sometimes said to have attended 'a party of pleasure',58 and, 
by 1750, a wealthy citizen could also relate how he had had 'a party of pleasure' 
expressing his attendance at an event,59 which demonstrate the existence of such 
an expression yet leaves the question of a conceptual linkage between a social 
gathering and political party open. For lack of further conceptual evidence of 
political parties being considered respectable social associations, it cannot be 
demonstrated that political parties gained acceptance due to the rise of the social 
sense of the word. However, the social character of many local party 
associations most probably contributed to a positive understanding of party. 
Party as a religious term forms the fourth group of senses out of which 
illustrative quotations are easily found and connections with political senses of 
the term easy to draw. Eighteenth-century religious debates were often opened 
with continuous criticism of books published in the 1690s, that is to say in the 
aftermath of the lapse of pre-publication censorship. Toland's Christianity not 
Mysterious, which summarised much of previous critical study of the Bible, 
was one of the books which provoked critical comment, and though nothing 
like revolutionary in its use of the term party, exemplifies what party could 
mean to a manifestly radical thinker. In Toland's book, party was clearly a 
polemical religious concept, the writer lamenting the great number of `partisans 
of error' and `partisans of mystery' (i.e. High Church supporters)60 and 
limitations on free theological debate set by various parties in religion. 
According to Toland, siding with a party in religious matters meant that one was 
severely condemned by the rest, and denouncing all parties caused the most 
violent of attacks. Yet each party was willing to put Scripture to the service of 
its own interest.61 In contrast, the traditionalist side of the debate as represented 
by Atterbury might despise Toland's writings as statements of 'a levelling 
party' who wished to see religious and political issues as separate and to remove 
the union between the Anglican Church and English political system.62 
In the early years of the eighteenth century, party was generally used as a 
55 	 Martha Lockhart to John Locke, 16 December 1701, The Correspondence of John Locke, 
Vol. VII, 316. 
56 [Swift], E31, 8 March 1711. 
57 	 The Diary of Dudley Ryder, passim. 
58 	 C8, 30 December 1726; Higgons, A Short View of the English History, 1727, 139; C238, 23 
January 1731. 
59 Horace Walpole to George Montagu, 23 June 1750, Selected Letters, 80. 
60 	 By contrast, another radical thinker Anthony Collins pointed out in his letter to Locke on 16 
February 1704 that there were indeed 'too few partisans of truth', that is, too few radical 
republicans, in early eighteenth-century England. The Correspondence of John Locke, Vol. 
VIII, 197. 
61 [Toland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, iv, 2, 150, 173. 
62 Atterbury, A Letter to a Convocation-Man, 1697, 23. 
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religiously charged term, Convocation then forming a center of public debate 
and the hotly debated issue being whether occasional conformity could be 
allowed. Locke's correspondence provides several instances of such religious 
usage, his correspondents greeting those who were able to be `Christians 
without being of a party', reporting how Convocation was divided into 
`Atterbury's party' and 'the other party', requesting Locke to convince London 
society that `partiality to parties' was madness, and wishing that Scripture was 
interpreted by those `least bigotted to a party', the interpretations of 'all parties' 
being presented by someone appreciated by `every party' (i.e. Locke) so that 
people could better decide which one was true.63 Locke himself seems to have 
been highly sceptical as to the benefits of the religiously motivated parties of the 
early eighteenth century. In a letter to Anthony Collins, one of the most radical 
correspondents one could find, Locke wrote: `I think it is so that the parties are 
more for doing one another harm than for doing any body good'.64 Party as a 
religious grouping was used in a parallel manner by churchmen such as 
Jonathan Swift and Thomas Naish. In his letter dated December 1703, during 
the second attempt to pass a bill banning occasional conformity, Swift 
described the universal debate on the issue as 'the highest and warmest reign of 
party and faction that I ever knew or read of'. 65 The diary of Naish shows in turn 
how the Archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Tenison regarded High-Church 
clergymen party-men and how ecclesiastical nominations depended on the 
parson's stand in the religious party divide.66 
Many writers considered the fundamental issue dividing people into parties 
to consist simply of disagreements between the Church of England and 
Protestant Dissenters.67 In pamphlets published at the dawn of the century, the 
expressions `Presbyterian Party' and `Episcopal Party' were used as the `grand 
parties' of Protestants.68 An alternative partisan way to express this religious 
division was to call them 'the moderate party' and 'that violent party, which 
calls itself the Church of England'.69 Even some traditionalists did not hesitate 
to use the expression `Church-Party', the opponent of which was, of course, the 
Whig party,70 or the `Commonwealth Party', or customarily merely 'the party', 
which was not infrequently portraited as a heir of 'the Puritan party'. Most of 
63 	 Richard King to Locke, 13 January [1701], The Correspondence of John Locke, Vol. VII, 
222; Awnsham Churchill to Locke, 1 March 1701, ibid., Vol. VII, 259; Mrs Elizabeth Burnet 
to Locke, 6 July [1701], ibid., Vol. VII, 360; Richard King to Locke, 9 October [1703], ibid., 
Vol. VIII, 76-7. 
64 	 Locke to Anthony Collins, 29 May 1704, The Correspondence of Locke, Vol. VIII, 306. 
65 Swift to the Rev. William Tisdall, London, 16 December 1703, The Correspondence of 
Jonathan Swift, Vol. I, 38. 
66 	 The Diary of Thomas Naish, 24 November 1707, 59, and 10 December 1707, 62. 
67 	 [Defoe], A New Test of the Church of England's Loyalty, Dublin, 1702, 3. 
68 	 Three Questions Of Present Importance, 1702, 5-6, 53. 
69 	 [Dennis], The Danger of Priestcraft, 1702, 7. 
70 	 [Charles Leslie], The New Association, 1702, 19; [Tufton], The History of Faction, 94, 118, 
144; The True Genuine Tory-Address, 1710, 6; [Jonathan Swift], The Conduct of the Allies, 
1711, in Swift, Political Tracts, 1711-1713, ed. Herbert Davis, Oxford 1951, 11; [Swift], 
Some Advice Humbly Offer'd to the Members of the October Club, 1712, ibid., 73. 
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them, however, eagerly disputed the party character of the Churchmen and 
condemned all religious alternatives as parties:7' 
... the Church of England Party, as by law now established, ... though 
they call a party, is no party, and no part, but the whole of our legal 
established constitution, .. . 
The rest are parties I grant ... , and the law distinguishes them as parties: 
It makes them a dissenting party, a recusant party, a criminal party. 
Can they mistake the body of the nation [i.e. the Churchmen], and call 
that a party? There is, indeed, a party of Dissenters ... ; but these all 
together do not make a tenth of the nation .. . 
The underlying assumption among Tories was that the established Church was 
or at least should have been naturally identical with the nation and thus could 
not possibly be merely a part or party of it. In the early 1710s, Tory propaganda 
appealed to the monarch when defending the position of the Church party as the 
only acceptable:72 
Your majesty recommends, with the utmost earnestness, a union of 
affections among your subjects ... We ... are continually doing what we 
can to persuade all our fellow subjects into one well-compacted body, 
that is the Church of England, which is nevertheless a Church for being 
called a party. 
During the Tory domination of Parliament in the early 1710s, Swift insisted that 
'the majority of the two Houses, and the present ministry (if those be a party) 
seem to me, in all their proceedings, to pursue the real interest of Church and 
state'73 The period of Tory power was a brief one, but also in the early 
Hanoverian period, sectarian divisions among English Protestants were 
generally interpreted as party distinctions advanced by the use of party-names, 
Dissenters being not infrequently considered 'a party against the Church'." 
The diary of the Oxford librarian Thomas Hearne provides helpful 
illustrations of the use of party as a primarily religious term of division by a a 
traditionalist. Whereas Hearne mentioned 'that party called Tories' only when 
feeling disappoinment towards the policy of the party, he did not have anything 
against the use of the expressions `High-Church Party', `Church-party' or 
`honest party' for the party towards which he himself felt sympathy. The 
71 [King], E4, 24 August 1710; [Davenant], The Old and Modern Whig Truly Represented, 
1702, 4. 
72 The True Genuine Tory-Address, 1710, 5-6. 
73 [Swift], E39, 3 May 1711. 
74 See e.g. Shuttleworth, A Perswasive to Union, 1716, preface; Laurence, Christian Religion 
the Best Friend to Civil Government, 1717, 31; The Church of England the Sole Encourager 
of Free-Thinking, 1717, 5, 13; A Sure Way to Orthodoxy, 1718, 29; [Trenchard and Gordon], 
IW 12, 6 April 1720; IW 19, 25 May 1720; Gordon, The Humourist, 1720, 196; Stebbing, An 
Essay Concerning Civil Government, 1724, 214; Synge, The Case of Toleration, 1726, 25; A 
Cursory View of the History of Lilliput, 1727, 12; The Present Necessity of distinguishing 
Publick Spirit from Party, 1736, 8; Warburton, The Alliance between Church and State, 
1736, 2; Grey, A Caveat Against the Dissenters, 1736, title; Story, Thomas Story's 
Discourse, [1737], 26; Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 4. 
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opponents of this positive party he called 'the Whig party' or rather 'the 
Whiggish party', 'the fanatic party', 'the Low-Church party', or, increasingly in 
the course of time, simply 'the party'. Party seems to have been a wider concept 
for Hearne than the parliamentary Whigs or Tories, including on the one hand 
Dissenters of all kinds, and on the other all defenders of the Church of England. 
One of his correspondents also used the expression `wicked party' in the same 
purpose. Summing up his conception of the opponent as an essentially religious 
threat analogous to that of the 1640s, Hearne wrote about 'this time of danger, 
when these crop-eared whelps [Roundheads] make it their business to 
undermine the Church, and once more ruin it'. 
In the 1700s, national politico-religious anniversaries and professional 
appointments at the university were typical occasions for party commentary in 
Hearne's diary. On the day of thanksgiving for English victories in the Spanish 
War of Succession, Hearne complained about a sermon he had heard which 
contained politico-religious viewpoints favourable to 'the Whiggish party'. He 
wrote how the rival parties disagreed on what would have been proper to preach 
on January 30th, the anniversary of the execution of Charles I - attitudes 
towards King Charles's beheading reflecting, in Hearne's view, the attitudes of 
each party towards the institutions of the monarchy and the Church of England. 
On November 5th, when the Gunpowder Plot and William III's landing were 
commemorated, he was pleasantly surprised for a known Whig not to be 
preaching in favour of his own party. In appointments to university chairs and 
commentaries on colleagues, party sympathies of the candidates also seem to 
have frequently played a role, at least when viewed by the party-conscious 
Hearne. In a letter to a colleague, he went as far as to state that `amongst [the 
Whig party] there are not many competent judges of true learning',75 thus 
connecting politico-religious views and academic competence. 
Neither was the application of party in a religious sense unfamiliar to the 
Whigs of the 1700s and 1710s. Steele's description, which dates from the days 
of the Sacheverell affair, illustrates a semantic relationship between the terms 
party-dispute and religion, the former appearing as an obvious antonym to the 
latter. A right type of religion - missing from traditionalist Tories as Steele was 
implicitly suggesting - appeared as the most positive of things, whereas party-
dispute was the most negative of all:76 
75 	 Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 4 July 1705, Vol. I, 1; 11 August 1705, Vol. I, 
28; 13 August 1705, Vol. I, 28; 23 August 1705, Vol. I, 33; 23 September 1705, Vol. I, 48; 
29 September 1705, Vol. I, 50; 1 October 1705, Vol. I, 51; 5 October 1705, Vol. I, 52; 7 
October 1705, Vol. I, 53; 3 November 1705, Vol. I, 64; 5 November 1705, Vol. I, 66; 12 
November 1705, Vol. I, 70; 20 December 1705, Vol. I, 134; 20 January 1706, Vol. I, 166; 26 
January 1706, Vol. I, 169; 3 April 1706, Vol. 1, 216; 3 April 1706, Vol. I, 217; 4 April 1706, 
Vol. I, 219; 20 April 1706, Vol. I, 229; 8 May 1706, Vol. I, 242; 27 February 1707, Vol. I, 
336; 10 January 1708, Vol. II, 88; Dodwell to Heame, 23 November 1708, Vol. II, 152; 13 
August 1709, Vol. II, 234; 10 September 1709, Vol. II, 254; 10 December 1709, Vol. II, 324; 
17 December 1709, Vol. II, 329; 2 March 1710, Vol. II, 350; On 6 March 1710, Vol. II, 355, 
Hearne wrote about 'the Whigs and all the party', suggesting that 'the party' was more than 
merely the Whigs; 16 March 1710, Vol. II, 360; 25 September 1714, Vol. IV, 408. 
76 Steele, T114, 31 December 1709. 
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... as he abounds with that sort of virtue and knowledge which makes 
religion beautiful, and never leads the conversation into the violence and 
rage of party-disputes, I listened to him with great pleasure. 
In the mid-1710s, Ryder reported having heard how the rival Tory party, in its 
stronghold at Oxford University, was 'busy about Church and politics' and 
believing that `religion and good sense is to be found nowhere but among their 
own party or sect'." Ryder saw no reason to distinguish between the Tories as a 
party and Tories as a sect. For the Tories at least, party seemed to concern 
religion. 
The use of the term party in a religious sense was very much a phenomenon 
of the 1700s and early 1710s. After 1720, references to religious parties become 
much rarer and less explicit. Of course, even political periodicals of the late 
1720s and 1730s, though making less use of religious terminology in discussing 
political matters than their predecessors of the 1710s, occasionally applied 
terms that were designed to provoke religious associations in the reader. But the 
aim of this usage was often clearly to ridicule the governing Whig party and its 
adherents. The anti-party Craftsman, in particular, readily wrote about 'a new 
convert' and `proselite' from a party who remained 'a little heretical ... in his 
Church tenets' yet had become `perfectly orthodox in state matters'.'$ During 
the heated debate over the Excise Crisis, the editors offered a description of 'the 
credenda of [the Whig party]' which was said to have received `several new 
articles',79 in other words, a reversal of policy. A further instance of the use of 
the term party in a religious sense can be found in discussions on freethinkers 
who might be depicted as a party as well as a sect or a `sceptical society'8° The 
religious sense of party was in obvious decline from around 1720, but the 
possibility of exploiting it in political rhetoric remained, as the contemporaries 
were well aware of the sense and seldom drew clear distinctions between parties 
in a religious and those in a political sense. 
While religious associations of party were increasingly set aside, instances of 
the use of party as a distinctly political term started to appear. A considerable 
proportion of sources, particularly those dating from the first two decades of the 
eighteenth century, associate party with religious issues. Of course, party was 
also used in political contexts, the two spheres being intermingled, but 
unambiguously political senses of party as opposed to its religious sense are 
few. In the course of time, differences between religious and political parties 
started to be more outspokenly recognised. Defoe drew such a distinction in a 
pamphlet expressing disappointment among Protestant Dissenters at the limited 
extent to which the Whigs were willing to vindicate their rights. In his 
pamphlet, Defoe contrasted the Dissenters as 'a religious party' and as a 
`political party', thus clearly distinguishing between the two and providing one 
of the very few early eighteenth-century instances of the use of the expression 
77 	 The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 11 August 1715, 74. 
78 C272, 18 September 1731. 
79 C366, 7 July 1733. 
80 The Weekly Miscellany, No. 36, 18 August 1733, in GM, Vol. III, August 1733, Reel 134. 
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`political party'.81 Also in a translation of Jean Le Clerc's text from French 
(1715), a `distinction of a party in the state' was contrasted with 'a sect in the 
Church'.82 In 1722, Trenchard claimed in Cato's Letters, that 'the two parties in 
England do not differ so much as they think in principles of politics',83 thus 
suggesting that it was pretended differences in political principles that really 
mattered. As to religious distinctions, he first referred to how well the Church of 
England was adapted to the political system of the country and then argued that 
those were 'kept up more by party animosities than any essential difference of 
opinion'.84 The impression one gets is that party was essentially political and 
not so much religious, and, in both respects, parties were artificial rather than 
unavoidable. Discussing the restricted possibilities for toleration in 1726, Edward 
Synge expressed the commonly held linkage between religious and political 
parties yet implicitly suggested that there were differences between the two:85 
Parties in religion, they say, soon become parties in the state. They then 
enter into contests for power, thwart and oppose one another, clog the 
wheels of government, divide the force of the community, and suffer it 
not to exert itself with full vigour for the public good. 
In 1733, the Craftsman, though using religiously coloured language, already 
drew what seems to be an implicit distinction between religious and political 
reasons for diversity of groupings. The authors of the periodical insisted that all 
Englishmen should unite to defend liberty and property — secular values —
'without distinction of party, or religion'. In this context, party, contrasted with 
religion, would seem to have been an overwhelmingly secular political concept. 
The separation between religious and political parties was made clearer than 
ever in another essay referring incidentally to `parties both religious and 
political'.86 This statement reveals that the opposition to Walpole would have 
been prepared to use the expression `political party', though probably not as its 
own denomination. The government side of political polemic quickly seized the 
Craftsman's idea of the existence of different types of `parties, ecclesiastical 
and civil'. The point of various parties was not denied as such. On the contrary, 
the author of the London Journal himself before long wrote about `political' 
and `religious parties' that continued to advocate their old principles. The 
author of the London Journal also disputed the Craftsman's suggestion that the 
two parties Whigs and Tories 'rose politically', i.e. that the parties had been 
formed because they `hated one another from views of interest and power'. The 
alternative explanation for the rise of parties which the London Journal put 
forward may have been gaining ground among the public at large. According to 
this view, which increasingly considered variety in religious and political 
81 	 [Defoe], The Weakest go to the Wall, 1714, 40. 
82 	 Le Clerc, Mr Addison's Travels Through Italy, Epitorniz'd, 1715, 51. 
83 [Trenchard], CL80, 9 June 1722. 
84 [Trenchard], CL81, 16 June 1722. 
85 	 Synge, The Case of Toleration, 1726, 25. 
86 C366, 7 July 1733; C379, 6 October 1733. 
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thought as unavoidable, parties were the result of diversity in things such as 
nature and education.87 
The status of party as a more general concept and religious division 
increasingly as a subconcept to this general concept is visible in a pamphlet 
from 1736 in which a pseudonymous author stated: 'A greater misfortune can 
hardly attend any nation, than a division of its members into parties, but 
especially into many different and opposite sects and persuasions in religion'. 
In another connection, the author stated that the arbitrary actions of James II had 
created among the English sharing the memories of the Civil War 'a glorious 
coalition not only of all parties, but of all religions too'. In the end of the text, he 
yet distinguished between party, faction and religious animosities, though 
presenting all as related.88 These may at first appear as merely trivial details, yet 
it is arguable that they reveal how religion was no more the undeniably 
dominating discourse as far as party was concerned; religious parties were 
simply one type of party and there could be other types, including political 
parties. Furthermore, parties and religions were increasingly being seen as two 
distinctly separate matters. According to this author, religion could rather be 
mixed with parties that already existed, bringing with itself extra stimulus and 
symbolism to party politics and making party confrontations permanent.89 In 
the late 1730s, party was no more automatically synonymous with religious 
inclination. A further instance of the increasingly diverging meanings of 
religious sect and political party comes from 1746, when a pamphlet, though 
applying religious criteria for political divisions as well, yet distinguished 
between 'all the several sects of religion' which had united with 'the 
discontended parties in the state' during the seventeenth century.90 In his Idea of 
a Patriot King, Bolingbroke drew a parallel distinction between matters 
political and religious yet treated them as analogous when he stated that, in the 
case of governing unconstitutionally by party, 'the interest of the state is 
supposed to be that of the party, as the interest of religion is supposed to be that 
of a church', the interest of the state becoming, like the interest of religion, a 
matter of less importance.91 In this approach, party belonged to matters of state, 
whereas the corresponding religious term for undesired division was church 
rather than party. Of course, Bolingbroke continued the established tradition of 
presenting the two as analogous. At the dictionary level, the same transition 
from the traditional religion-dominated concept of party to a more general 
concept can be seen in mid-eighteenth-century definitions of sect as a `religious 
party' .92 
87 The London Journal, No. 750, 10 November 1733, in GM, Vol. III, November 1733, Reel 
134; The London Journal, No. 762, 2 February 1734, in GM, Vol. IV, February 1734, Reel 
134. 
88 	 A Dissuasive from Party and Religious Animosities, 1736, 3, 15, 35. 
89 	 A Dissuasive from Party and Religious Animosities, 1736, 3, 15, 35. 
90 	 Mawson, The Mischiefs of Division, 1746, 7. 
91 	 Bolingbroke, The Idea of a Patriot King, 1738, 402. 
92 Martin 1749; A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
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Party in word combinations 
Party was a concept carrying a multitude of alternative meanings. Party was a 
term with which new expressions, needed to describe pluralism in religion and 
politics, could be easily formed. One way to trace early eighteenth-century 
understanding of the concept of party and ways in which the meanings of the 
concept were changing is to focus on word combinations containing the term. 
Particularly interesting are, of course, new combinations based on the use of the 
term party. 
Such an analysis was in this study realised through a systematic collection of 
instances occurring in various sources. Contexts were used to deduce the sense 
of the expression and its evaluative connotation; yet because of the high number 
of instances, the entire quotations cannot be listed. In Appendix B, 109 word 
combinations are listed with instances of their users and time of use. Here will 
follow a suggestion on how the combinations could be categorised into 
semantic subfields and what these subfields tell us about the direction of the 
development in senses of the concept party. Many more word combinations 
could be found by extending the source material. As far as the variety of genres 
and number of consulted sources are concerned, however, the sample can be 
considered fairly representative. 
Appendix B prompts some suggestions on the direction of development in 
the meanings of the concept political party in the period 1700-1750. One 
unavoidable conclusion is that all the combinations, including obvious 
linguistic innovations, remained pejorative in their connotations throughout. 
This conclusion also concerns the expression party-man, which originated from 
military language and occasionally appeared as a positive term — only because 
of its restricted definition in some particular texts. When analysed in more 
numerous instances, party-man also appears to have been a pejorative 
expression widely used by a variety of writers. The connotations of all word 
combinations containing the term party being so pejorative, the concept 
political party itself was likely to convey overwhelmingly negative associations 
during the first half of the eighteenth century. 
The occasional conformity controversies of the very beginning of the century 
do not seem to have caused considerable innovation in party word 
combinations, whereas the years of the Sacheverell affair (1709-10), the anti-
dissenting policies of the ensuing Tory administration, and the Succession 
Crisis (1714-16) gave rise both to much political polemic and to several new 
word combinations. Appearances of party combinations are more numerous in 
the first two decades of the century than in the 1720s, 1730s and 1740s. This 
weight on the early part of the century reflects the gradual calming down of 
party political debates from the 1720s onwards. It is, however, partly explained 
also by the fact that sources discussing pluralism are more abundant from the 
first two decades of the century, and thus form a relatively high proportion of 
the consulted material. Opposition to Walpole did not very intensively discuss 
questions related to political pluralism, whereas the government exaggerated 
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the consequences of party to blacken the Tories and to discourage the 
opposition Whigs from supporting them. In contrast, the late eighteenth-
century opposition underscored the positive aspects of party as opposed to 
`corruption' within the government. A more extensive study of later eighteenth-
century material would undoubtedly create a more detailed picture on 
developments in party vocabulary after the pacification of the party strife of the 
early part of the century. 
For a closer analysis of party vocabulary, the listed word combinations can 
be categorised into loose semantic groups that reflect various aspects of the 
phenomenon of party. These groups can be named: (i) terms of a concrete party 
conflict referring to a possibility of open violence; (ii) terms of a more abstract 
party conflict with minimal risk of open violence; (iii) terms of political writing, 
a major form of party activity; (iv) terms connected with preliminary forms of 
party organisation; (v) expressions referring to an emergence of party-related 
terminology in political discourse; (vi) ideological terms that refer to the role of 
party principles; (vii) party-political terms that indicate that the party was, in 
one way or another, engaged in an acute political issue; (viii) terms of party 
adherence with obvious spiritual connotation; (ix) terms of party adherence 
with potential links to prevalent medical beliefs; and (x) other party expressions 
— including metaphorical expressions — describing a party adherent's state of 
mind and his/her behaviour. 
(i) Terms of concrete party conflict 
Party-quarrel, 1705, 1720 
Party-struggle, 1709 
Party-feud, 1709 
Party-arms, 1715 
Party-strife, 1715, 1727 
Party-hostility, 1720 
Party-scuffle, 1723 
Terms of concrete party conflict occurred in crisis years such as 1709 and 1715 
as well as in texts that later recalled those years of intensive party conflict which 
had been feared would lead to another civil war. Polemicists such as Defoe, 
Gordon, Trenchard and Mandeville willingly used these martial metaphors, but 
others applied them as well. In these expressions of mostly military origin, the 
relationship between parties was associated with quarrels, struggles, feuds, 
strife, hostilities and scuffles, parties being seen to make use of party-arms, for 
instance. Party was used in a sense of a party of war. The metaphors were those 
of direct warfare, making use of the bitter memories of the Civil War and the 
on-going foreign battles in which the nation was engaged. Importantly, these 
expressions of concrete party conflict seem to have been dying out after the 
1720s, only the somewhat weaker expression `quarrel' being occasionally used 
in later decades. When the coexistence of the two parties was gradually moving 
towards forms in which outbreaks of open violence between the parties was 
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becoming less likely to occur, metaphors describing the system also began to 
reflect this shift, terms of war being replaced by terms of more abstract party 
rivalry. 
(ii) Terms of abstract party conflict 
Party-distinction, 1696, c. 1710, 1715, 1716, 1727, 1733, 1736, 
1736, 1741, 1744, 1747 
Party-dispute, 1709, 1718, 1727 
Party-animosity, 1711, 1722, 1736 
Party-difference, 1714, 1714, 1745 
Party-division, 1715, 1718, 1735 
Party-dislike, 1737 
Party-debate, 1740 
Terms of more abstract party conflict containing no explicit hint of a possibility 
of open violence were available and increasingly applied in descriptions of 
reality of party conflict. A rough estimate of the relative frequency of these two 
types of terms for party conflict can also be made: whereas the consulted 
sources contained ten instances that can be listed under the category of a 
concrete party conflict, twenty-five occurrences of a more abstract party 
conflict building on less derogatory terms such as distinction, animosity, 
dispute, difference and division were traced. Expressions of an abstract party 
conflict occurred throughout the early eighteenth century, even though 
occurrences from later years rather than the very beginning of the century tend 
to be more numerous. Towards the end of the period, combinations based on the 
words dislike and debate also appeared, the latter in particular, though 
continuously pejorative, referring to a rather `civilised' form of party system. 
No particular group of political writers seems to have specialised in the use of 
these more peaceful expressions of party conflict; the shift towards their use 
may have been rather universal and demonstrates a decline in the fierceness of 
the politico-religious discourse on parties. An abstract party conflict was more 
secular and less violent. Violence between parties was giving way to debate. 
(iii) Terms for political writing 
Party-pamphleteer, 1703 
Party-author, 1707, 1712 
Party pocketbook, c. 1710 
Party-writer, 1710, 1714 
Party-story, 1712 
Party-relation, 1712 
Party-scribbler, 1714 
Party-agitation, 1715 
Party-account, 1716, 1735 
Party-writing, 1720 
Party-song, 1729 
Party-play, 1729 
Party-guide, 1736 
Party-paper, 1739 
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No equally apparent conclusion can be drawn for terms referring to those 
elementary forms of party organisation that existed. Unsurprisingly, in printed 
source material, the dominance of writing as party activity is evident. A clear 
majority of terms referring to party activities were words related to publishing, 
which is to some extent an illusion caused by sources through which conceptual 
developments can be studied: all are written sources and as such are often 
themselves manifestations of party activism. Many of the terms of literary party 
strife were used by leading party polemicists such as Addison and Swift. 
Authors, writers, pamphleteers and scribblers had a central role in verbalizing 
the line of each of the parties by producing writings such as papers, accounts, 
relations, stories, pocketbooks, guides, plays and songs, particularly in the early 
part of the century. If this was not called propaganda, it could yet be called 
agitation. Evidently, no dramatic changes in the frequency of the terms for party 
writing occurred, the 1710s being the time of most intense party journalism and 
party strife in general. Even after that, the number of terms related to party 
propaganda was steadily increasing as political journalism consolidated its 
position in the political system. 
(iv) Terms of party organisation 
Party-broker, 1701 
Party-making, 1702, 1709 
Party-man, 1702, 1705, 1707, 1707, c. 1710, 1712, 1714, 
1715, 1715, 1724, 1734, 1736, 1740, 1747 
Party-agent, 1710, c. 1710 
Party-woman, 1711 
Party-offender, 1712 
Party-leader, 1712, 1715, 1718, 1721 
Party-deserter, 1718 
Party-taking, 1719 
Party-champion, 1720 
Party-badge, 1728 
Ever since the Exclusion Crisis, the party organisations of both Whigs and 
Tories had been in the process of formation. The organisations never reached 
the level of twentieth-century mass parties, but still there were activists 
particularly dedicated to their party known as party-men. Even if party officials 
were not chosen in this period, the writings of the political opponents easily 
found leaders, brokers, agents and champions within the rival party. Many of 
these activists certainly carried party-badges. Much of this organisational 
vocabulary of party dates from the early 1710s, a period when the intensity of 
the party struggle necessitated the existence of a party organisation. The 
existence of parties, or party-making, entailed party-taking within some of the 
politically active public but also gave naturally rise to the emergence of party- 
offenders and party-deserters. One more observation on `organisational' 
terminology can be added. Even though male dominance in parties was self- 
evident, an occasional occurrence of the term party-woman illustrates that 
PARTY, OR RATHER FACTION: PARTIES AND FACTIONS... s 185 
women might also be seen to have a role in the day's party politics. In a society 
where the areas of life proper for each gender were strictly defined, this term 
necessarily carried a belittling connotation: a party-woman had rejected her 
natural responsibilities and interfered in politico-religious disagreements that 
belonged to the male sphere. 
(v) Terms for party terminology in political discourse 
Party-name, 1710, c. 1710, 1713, 1717, 1728, 1729, 1733, 1739 
Party-nickname, c. 1710 
Party-term, 1713 
Party-word, 1713, 1717 
Party-combination, 1721 
Party-watchword, 1722 
Party-denomination, 1728 
The rise of the first political parties was such a change in the structure of politics 
that it unavoidably remoulded some of the language of politics as well. This 
refashioning did not go unnoticed. For instance, the expression party-name 
seems to have come into common use from the crisis year 1710 at the latest, and 
it was supplemented in some discussions of parties with terms such as 
nickname, term, word, combination, watchword and denomination. The 
adoption of these terms reflects contemporary awareness of the emergence of 
specific forms of language for discussing parties. The very existence of party-
names was commonly cursed, their use even being declared a sin,93 or at least 
their being considered `meaningless' 94 and adherence to them `ridiculous', as 
the disputes of the mid-1730s, for instance, were claimed to have little in 
common with the original party divisions.95 
(vi) Terms of party ideology 
Party-notion, 1711, 1727 
Party-principle, 1716, 1739 
Party-disposition, 1718 
Party-kindness, 1719 
Party-puncto, 1722 
Party-regard, 1722 
Party-consideration, 1733 
Party-dream, 1733 
Party-view, 1735, 1736 
Party-opinion, 1747 
Historians might easily interpret early eighteenth-century party conflict as mere 
struggle for power. However, ideology, often religiously motivated, evidently 
93 [Grosvenor], An Essay on the Christian Name, 1728, 50. 
94 C172, 18 October 1729. 
95 C348, 3 March 1733. 
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played a major role in party adherence. The importance of ideology is 
illustrated by Swift's reference to `ideas fastened to parties' which did not 
describe the parties simply as groups of interest but saw that diverging values 
directed the way people took sides, the way the parties acted and the way the 
adherents of a party were distinguished from others. As Swift pointed out, 
`principles . . . served to denote a man of one or the other party'.96 An 
anonymous pamphleteer also agreed that `there is a real and visible distinction 
in men's principles and practices' independently of the party-names used.97 
An ideological vocabulary of party — once again used by opponents of the 
party and not by its adherents themselves — seems to have developed 
increasingly from the 1710s onwards, alternative terms emerging first for party-
principles and party-notions and later also for party-views and party-opinions. 
Major party propagandists such as Addison and Bolingbroke distinguished 
themselves as some of the first users of expressions such as party-notions and 
party-views98. This rise of ideological vocabulary does not need to mean that 
ideological questions had not been important before; quite the contrary, the 
1700s, for instance, had experienced debates in which ideologies derived from 
religious sources had played a considerable role; whereas the ideologies of the 
parties became rather more mixed later in the century. Did the writers then use 
the vocabulary of ideology to hide the fact that party politics concerned 
practical issues of power rather than some distinctly defined ideology? This is 
unlikely, as the terms of ideology, not unlike other party terms, were pejorative 
in their connotations and used against opponents. It may simply be that political 
writers gradually became accustomed to writing in ideological terms rather than 
in terms of concrete conflict. In the mid-eighteenth century, many members of 
the political elite still manifested party-kindness, expressed their party-
dispositions and dreamed party-dreams. The basic principles of one's own party 
were taken into party-consideration and party-regard. 
(vii) Party-political terms 
Party-cause, 1705, 1708, 1735 
Party-question, 1708 
Party-project, 1709 
Party-design, 1710 
Party-end, 1711 
Party-measure, 1712, 1730 
Party-concern, 1713 
Party-matter, 1713, 1722 
Party-business, 1714, 1715 
Party-interest, 1717, 1721 
Party-administration, 1735 
Party-king, 1735 
Party-system, 1735 
Party-reign, 1740 
96 [Swift], E43, 31 May 1711. 
97 [Trapp], Most Faults on One Side, 1710, 21. 
98 	 Party-view also appeared in The Dictionary ... of Mr Peter Bayle, 1734-38, Vol. IV, 711. 
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Despite the importance of ideology in motivating party conflict, less idealistic 
interests also moulded much of the strife. Terms of more practical party politics 
usually originate from contexts where some acute political issue was claimed to 
have been made a party-matter or party-question, in other words, the advocates 
of some party had adopted a common stand in the matter and acted as a group 
rather than as individuals, a feature despised by many contemporaries who 
admired, at least at the level of rhetoric, an impartial formation of one's own 
views. It was a commonplace to complain that some policy was being 
advocated as a party-cause, party-project or party-business with party-designs, 
party-ends, party-concerns and party-interests in the background and put into 
effect with party-measures. Alternatively, it was happily noted that some other 
issue had escaped from becoming a concern of party. Defoe used several of 
these expressions of practical party politics in his polemic. Worth a separate 
mention are Bolingbroke's terms party-system, party-administration and party-
king, as well as the term party-reign, which do not appear in the texts of other 
writers. These terms should not be interpreted as excessively modern, however, 
the first standing for nothing like a twentieth-century party system, the second 
and third accusing some particular administration or monarch of favouring one 
of the two parties, and the last referring to 'an anarchy, when the government 
was modelled to the prevalent faction in every session' 99 Party-interest appears 
to have been a term favoured by Bolingbroke and Gordon, advocates of 
classical republicanism, but rarely used by other writers. 
(viii) Spiritual terms of party adherence 
Party-spirit, 1711, 1727, 1728, 1735, 1736, 1747 
Party-zeal, 1711, 1722, 1736, 1739 
Party-bigot, 1712 
Party-bigotry, 1715 
Party-zealot, 1718, 1722 
Several of the above-mentioned party combinations were used in contexts 
where no strict separation between political and religious parties was in force. 
An average party-man or party-woman was much more likely to be motivated 
in his or her actions by Sacheverell's or Hoadly's politico-religious arguments 
than by some secular party ideology. Given this religious background of much 
of party adherence, it is not surprising that some of the terminology applied by 
political rivals to each other was a direct loan from the sphere of religion. For as 
long as society was conceived to be based on a religious and organic 
foundation, terms could easily be derived from the traditionally authoritative 
discourses of Christian religion and ancient medicine. Independently of their 
own conviction as Christians, the introducers of these terms could rely on 
commonly shared associations of terms such as spirit, zeal and bigot and the 
99 C7I3, 1 March 1740, BL Burney Vol. 349B. 
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traditional discourse of Protestant religion, which was familiar to all readers. 
For instance, in the aftermath of the Sacheverell affair, which had reinforced the 
habit of viewing religious and political issues as intermixable, the Whig 
Addison introduced the terms party-spirit100 and party-zeal in his essays, 
making use of conventional associations between enthusiasm for religious and 
political reasons. For an overwhelming majority of Englishmen, yet 
unrecovered from the trauma of the 1640s, all enthusiasm in the form of party-
spirit or party-zeal was necessarily something to be utterly rejected. This 
underlying mentality may explain why party combinations building on 
religiously charged words became rather frequently used in early eighteenth-
century texts discussing parties. 
Party-spirit, in particular, was a term in which political, religious and even 
medical discourses united. As late as in 1727, John Balguy, a Low Churchman, 
dedicated a sermon to the `ill effects of a party-spirit', urging the audience to 
`carefully guard our minds against that spirit of party which usually prevails so 
much among us, and to which we seem so unaccountably addicted'. 
Fortunately, commented Balguy, party-spirit had become less intense — an 
assertion shared by most contemporaries — and the English now had a rare 
opportunity for `expelling it quite from among us, since our distemper has 
remitted, it may now be more easily dealt with, we should therefore use our 
utmost endeavours to perfect a cure, and prevent a relapse' .1°' Balguy's sermon 
was obviously aimed at traditionalist Anglican circles and attempted to 
accommodate them to the Whiggish and Low-Church rule. Whereas Balguy's 
status as an Anglican divine made the raging spirit of party appear as a spiritual 
affair requiring improvement, his conscious metaphorical language could also 
be interpreted from the point of view of traditional medicine. As to spirituality, 
Balguy wrote that party-spirit `roots up our kind affections, and good 
dispositions, and instead of them fills our hearts with rage and rancour'. As to 
medical metaphors, he pictured how `party-spirit eats into our breasts like a 
cancer, corrupts and poisons our best humours'.102 Religious and medical 
teachings became inseparably intermixed, and, in the minds of both the 
preacher and most of his listeners, all this discussion of party-spirit concerned 
political party strife as well. Associations between religious, medical and 
political disagreements were only strengthened by Balguy's statements such as 
`intestine strife . . . preys upon our vitals, and cuts the very sinews of 
government'. 103 
100 Bayle had written in his Dictionary, in a religious sense, that 'the spirit of party is a strange 
fury: some readers are so warm that they tear to pieces, or take out all the pages where they 
find certain ignominious things charged upon their sect'. The Dictionary .. of Mr Peter 
Bayle, 1734-38, Vol. IV, 711. 
101 John Balguy, The Duty of Benevolence and Brotherly Love, and the Effects of a Party Spirit, 
1727, 16-17; C213, 1 August 1730, offered the same view about the decline of 'this 
mischievous spirit of division'. In C218, 5 September 1730, 'the spirit of party' was 
described as `blind and furious' as opposed to the spirit advanced by The Craftsman which 
was presented as originating from `information and conviction'. 
102 Balguy, The Duty of Benevolence, 1727, 18. 
103 Balguy, The Duty of Benevolence, 1727, 19. 
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The unambiguously negative connotations of party-spirit can be seen in 
several contemporary sermons and other writings. Another version of the 
expression was `partisan spirit', which Saint Paul had attempted to heal among 
the quarrelsome Corinthians, so often presented as a warning example of party 
conflict. One author maintained that it was necessary for the godly 'to separate 
themselves from such party-spirits, unless they will deny Christ',104 for Christ 
and Church were one, not many. Another claimed that 'a spirit of party' could 
'sum up all the wickedness and weakness, which human nature can contrive or 
connive at, in one word'. In his view, party-spirit was 'a spirit of interest and 
dependency, a spirit of ambition and revenge', and, furthermore, it raged 
nowhere else in the way it raged in England.i°5 In yet another pamphlet, party-
spirit was said to be suppressed only by `charity, justice, and moderation'.106 
Neither did discussion on party-spirit die out with a gradual calming down of 
religious disputes. The Craftsman of the 1730s and early 1740s still saw 'the 
spirit of party' as something that 'has so often destroyed our inward peace',107 
and a preacher from the late-1740s complained how 'the spirit of party' 
appeared in abundance in England, `working up the passions of thousands into 
violence and rage'. According to this view, party-spirit, which could never be 
brought to conformity with the Christian religion, led to mismanagement of 
various kinds of public affairs and to disturbances in social life. 1°8 To put it 
briefly, Englishmen remained suspicious towards party-spirit all through the 
early eighteenth century. 
A nearly synonymous and hardly less derogatory expression was that of 
party-zeal. In the mid-1730s, for instance, party-zeal was employed as a 
politico-religious concept in a pamphlet which saw religion as a force 
introduced into party politics with the purpose of strengthening hatred among 
the parties. The pamphleteer openly pronounced his conception of the 
connection between politics and religion in this respect: `Party-zeal, which ever 
forgets the public good, to mind only its own imaginary phantom, grows 
formidable and terrible indeed, to the true national interest, because zeal for 
religion is, in this case, mixed with it'.109 Religious and political zeal were 
frequently intermixed, party-zeal often containing both, and contemporaries 
were highly conscious of this fact when using concepts such as party-zeal. The 
author saw the Civil War having been carried out with party-zeal, and the party-
zeal of the mid-1730s having led to conditions as dangerous to the constitution 
of the country as the situation before the Civil War had been)'0 In another 
pamphlet from the late 1730s, party-zeal was presented as one of the negative 
forces that made people disregard other men's rights, led to distrust and 
sometimes to `convulsions and revolutions of state'."' Likewise, William Keith 
104 Grosvenor, An Essay on the Christian Name, 1728, 30, 50-1. 
105 The Present Necessity of distinguishing Publick Spirit from Party, 1736, 4. 
106 A Dissuasive from Parry and Religious Animosities, 1736, 18. 
107 Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 25: C723, 10 May 1740. 
108 Gilpin, The bad Consequences of Dissention, 1747, 8, 15-16, 19-20. 
109 A Dissuasive from Party and Religious Animosities, 1736, 3. 
110 A Dissuasive from Party and Religious Animosities, 1736. 9. 
111 Observations on the Conduct of the Tories, the Whigs, and the Dissenters, 1739, 6. 
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complained in his writings published at the end of the 1740s that, because of 
party-zeal, impartial reasoning had become unfashionable.112  
At least two more terms can be added to the spiritual terminology of party 
adherence. Possibly as a reaction to an intensive propagation of High-Church 
ideas in the early 1710s, terms such as party-bigot and party-bigotry were 
occasionally used in contemporary texts to refer to obstinate and intolerant 
religious and/or political belief. In a parallel manner, the rising feelings of 
anticlericalism in the late 1710s and early 1720s may explain the occurrences of 
the term party-zealot.13  
The terms for party adherence with an unambiguously spiritual origin are not 
numerous. When the religious associations of the term party itself and its 
continuous application in politico-religious contexts are taken into 
consideration, however, religious discourse unquestionably seems to have 
played a role in the discourse on political pluralism. Interestingly, the users of 
party terms with a spiritual content were not so often traditionalist Anglicans 
but rather seem to have consisted of moderates opposing both religious and 
political enthusiasm. The use of spiritual party vocabulary was a means through 
which they endeavoured to mould the attitudes of the public. However, it would 
be an oversimplification to suggest that they were merely abusing religious 
language for that purpose, as many of them honestly believed in the analogous 
character of parties political and religious. 
(ix) Medical terms of party adherence 
Party-heat, 1710, c. 1710, 1715 
Party-air, 1711 
Party-rage, 1711, 1715, 1745, 1747 
Party-spleen, 1712, 1733 
Party-mad, 1712 
Party-passion, 1718 
Party-fury, 1718, 1735 
Party-madness, 1729 
Prevalent medical conceptions formed another tradition of discourse familiar to 
most readers. Organic conceptions of society remaining deep-rooted among the 
audience, medical discourse provided those discussing the phenomenon of 
parties with effective metaphors. The claim that medical discourse had 
relevance to discourse on political pluralism may at first appear surprising, and 
it might indeed be unhelpful to discuss medical theories in any greater length 
here, but even a concise analysis shows that some party terms derived a 
considerable proportion of their rhetorical strength from a continuously 
widespread belief in ancient theories of humoral pathology. 
112 Keith, A Collection of Papers and Oder Tracts, 1749, xxiii. 
113 The pseudonymous `Author of, The Harmony of Reason and Christianity' also used the 
expression 'the zealots of the party', A Dissuasive from Party and Religious Animosities, 
1736, 12. 
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For members of the political elite, medical terms of party adherence — though 
sometimes certainly used also in a jocular sense — were expressions describing 
party conflict that were to be taken much more seriously than a twentieth- 
century observer may at first be prepared to recognise. Addison's and the 
Craftsman' s party-spleen[", used with reference to an illness, was clearly a way 
of describing political activism in medical terms. The same concerns terms such 
as party-heat, party-air, party-fury, and the widely employed party-rage. Party- 
heats, for instance, could be described as `symptoms that threaten their being 
hectical in the constitution and incurable'.'I5 The political body as more than an 
artificial one was still present in many a writer's and reader's conscience. 
The term party-rage was used in the early 1710s and again in the late 1740s, 
after the Jacobite rising. Elisha Smith's sermon from 1715 provides an 
illustration of this practice of political `medicine' in relation to both religious 
and political parties. Healing excessive pluralism might even demand violent 
measures within the body politic: "6 
Party-rage is very justly observed to be in the body politic, as ill humours 
and diseases in its blood; which must necessarily be purged out, before 
the soundness of health and firmness of strength can return. But there is 
little hopes of the fever abating, as long as the pulse beats so high. 
For the republicans of the early 1720s, party-rage was not quite as medical a 
phenomenon, but they still used it to refer to 'an implacable and furious hatred, 
and the denunciation of woe and mortal war against all, who do not believe just 
the same with us, and cut their corns as we do'.'" When party-rage as a negative 
term against mistaken plurality of political values reoccurred in sermons 
published in the mid- and late-1740s, it was claimed that various forms of 
irreligion had increased party-rage. William Gilpin, for instance, when 
preaching after an election in 1747, provided a lengthy description of party-
rage, listing its various features and leaving spiritual and humoral pathological 
associations looming in the background. Yet the sermon leaves the impression 
that not all differences in values were deplorable:) l8 
What then are the marks, by which this character of party-rage is 
distinguishable? A mean view to self-interest, a thirst after opposition, 
and an embittered spirit, ... When our differences are guided by some 
base, selfish, unworthy motive, when we oppose in mere trifles, rather as 
it would seem for opposition's sake, than for the hope of any general 
good resulting from it; or when our differing sentiments, upon whatever 
principle they may be founded, grow to such an height as to raise 
114 Concanen suggested in 1727 that some supported the Pretender's party out of spleen. 
[Concanen], The Speculatist, 29 July 1727. 
115 Place, The Arbitration, c. 1710, 3. 
116 Elisha Smith, The Olive Bransch: or, The sure Way to peace, and Abolition of Parties, 1715, 
8. 
117 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW22, 15 June 1720. 
118 Warren. Religion: and Loyalty inseparable, 1745, 8; Gilpin, The bad Consequences of 
Dissention, 1747, 11-12. 
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passions, instill malice, and create prejudices; in these cases, difference 
of sentiments, as it is robbed of honesty, truth and humanity becomes 
nothing but the spirit of party-rage ... indulging in ourselves this violent 
and contentious spirit, is the most effectual method we can take to sour 
our humours, to make ill-nature and contradiction habitual to us, and to 
turn us into wretches, distressed in ourselves, and troublesome to all 
persons around us. The power of custom every one is acquainted with; it 
acts with the force of nature in all constitutions. 
At the end of his sermon, Gilpin made the medical undertone of his discussion 
on adherence to political party explicit, claiming that party-rage was 
comparable to 'the healthful body of this happy community [being] thrown into 
a violent disorder' so that 'the fiery blood runs through every part of it, and not 
only deprives it of ease, but throws it into the most tormenting agonies'.19 
Such medicalisation of party activity could be both physical and mental, the 
old humoral theory conceiving the two as interconnected. It was widely agreed 
in the eighteenth century that excessive passions, and party-passion120 as well, 
were capable of causing madness, party-madness '2' amongst other forms. Such 
medical terms describing a party-adherent's state of mind appear to have been 
the common property of both traditionalist and moderate writers, whereas the 
most radical of writers did not make much use of them. It may well be that the 
radicals could already find more convincing metaphors from the new natural 
sciences for describing diversity in a neutral or even positive sense. Humoral 
pathological metaphors, which presupposed an organic unity of society, could 
provide arguments against diversity, not ones sympathetic to change.12- 
(x) Other terms of party adherence 
Party-virtue, 1705 
Party-pique, 1709, 1710, 1715 
Party judgement, c. 1710 
Party-scale, c. 1710 
Party-shelter, c. 1710 
Party-driving, 1710 
Party-coloured, 1710, 1712 
Party-humour, 1711 
119 Gilpin. The bad Consequences of Dissension, 1747. 17. 
120 Dr. Robert Pitt, writing to Locke around 22 January 1704, forecast that his forthcoming 
pamphlet would exasperate 'the passions of the parties'. The Correspondence of John Locke, 
Vol. VIII, 167; Gilpin preached that one negative consequence of engaging ardently in a 
party was that 'passion, not reason becomes our test of truth' . Gilpin, The bad Consequences 
of Dissension, 1747, 13. 
121 Party-madness was mentioned in one way or another by many writers. For instance, John 
Hardy, a son of an Anglican clergyman but later Presbyterian, wrote to John Locke on 17 
September 1700 that 'all men are mad after parties' in theological issues. The 
Correspondence of John Locke, Vol. VII, 142; Defoe wrote in 1705 that 'all people seem 
mad to be in one party or other'. [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, preface; Addison's influence 
in the discourse on parties long after his death is visible in a poetical statement from 1729: 
'To screen good ministers from public rage, and how with party-madness to engage, we learn 
from Addison's immortal page'. Bramston. Art of Politicks, 1729, 9. 
122 Ihalainen 1997b. 
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Party-lie, 1712 
Party-lying, 1712 
Party-merit, 1715, 1735 
Party-bias, 1715 
Party-justice, 1717, 1735 
Party-depravation [sic], 1718 
Party-prejudice, 1718, 1722, 1733, 1739 
Party-opposition, 1718, 1722 
Party-breach, 1718 
Party-slavery, 1727 
Party-resentment, 1728 
Party-darkness, 1735 
Party-cunning, 1735 
Party-conduct, 1735 
The rest of the party terms describing an adherent's state of mind cannot, 
because of their very variety, be easily categorised. Some groups of party words 
can be distinguished, however. For instance, in a period constantly emphasising 
the importance of virtue, supporters of parties were claimed to have party-
virtues and party-merits which diverged from the common standards. These 
special rules justified party-pique, party judgements, party-lying, party-bias, 
party-justice, party-prejudices, party-breaches, party-resentments, and so on. 
Party-conduct typical of the adherents of the rival party would lead to party-
depravation [sic], party-opposition, party-darkness and even party-slavery. 
Adherents dominated by this kind of party-humour used a party-scale in their 
judgements and gave party-coloured accounts of public affairs. If attacked by 
opponents, they could always trust in the existence of a party-shelter. 
Terms describing the adherents' state of mind were used throughout the 
period though not in particularly high frequencies; party-prejudice was the term 
appearing most often. Many of these terms (lies, lying) were a speciality of 
writers such as Addison, who eagerly vindicated morality and politeness in 
public life and thus wanted to reveal the dark sides of the politics of the rival 
party. Many of them (justice, darkness, cunning, conduct) also occurred in texts 
of Bolingbroke, who had a career as a party politician and became a major 
theorist on parties. Many of Bolingbroke's novel word combinations appeared 
in his Dissertation on Parties, first published as periodical essays in the leading 
opposition journal. 
The party combinations analysed above, demonstrate that political parties were 
still far from an acceptable phenomenon in the early eighteenth century. Yet 
they support the hypothesis of a transformation in prevailing conceptions of 
political parties in this period. The direction of this transformation was from 
conceptions of concrete party conflict towards more organised parties in which 
party adherence was mental rather than physical. Writing formed a primary area 
of party activity, at least as far as printed sources are concerned, and many 
contemporaries were aware of the emergence of a new terminology in political 
language for describing parties. In discussions on parties, members of the 
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political elite used both ideological and practical terminology. When describing 
party adherence with metaphors, they had the old sources of religion and 
medicine but also demonstrated an ability to coin new word combinations for 
that purpose. 
Distinguishing between party and faction 
Even if the term party could occasionally be used in only slightly negative 
senses, the term faction, which occurred almost equally often as an expression 
for the concept of political party, was, without an exception, a highly 
derogatory term. Faction carried negative connotations directed against 
political opponents, its purpose being to question the legitimacy of their 
political motives. When used in political contexts, the term tended to convey an 
opprobrious sense that included imputations of selfish or mischievous ends and 
turbulent or unscrupulous methods. Faction thus referred to a miserable state of 
political discord. According to a prevalent assumption, factional behaviour 
placed private interests ahead of the interests of others, ahead of the public 
good, and even ahead of justice. Faction was seen as 'the driving on a design, 
between several persons, by illegal practices, to the destroying, or opposing of 
what is legally established'.123 Alternatively, it was considered 'the qualifying 
of private passions by public means'.124 Who wished to be thought to belong to 
such a criminal league or confess membership of a group advancing merely 
private interests? Even if some persons could indirectly admit their links to 
parties, no one in Tudor, Stuart or Hanoverian England would have described 
himself as factious or as a member of a faction.'2s 
It has been argued in previous studies on the history of political parties that, 
in the course of the eighteenth century, a clearer distinction between the terms 
party and faction emerged. Parties became gradually distinguished from 
factions by the fact that their unity was based on professed principles rather than 
simply on the advancement of one's own political interests.''-6 A question of 
interest from the point of view of the long-term history of political parties is to 
what extent these distinctions were already drawn in early eighteenth-century 
texts. Many available sources would seem to indicate that no such distinctions 
were yet generally drawn, but that is not the whole picture. A thinker like 
Bolingbroke could already make the distinction ostentatiously evident. 
In studies on historical semantics, the word faction is generally seen as 
having originated from the religious struggles of the Reformation. Some early 
123 [Defoe], Whigs turn'd Tories, 1713, 5. 
124 [Gordon], CL39, 29 July 1721. 
125 OED: faction; Shephard 1992, 739; For further instances of faction as the promoter of private 
interests, see [Dennis], The Danger of Priesteraft, 1702, 9; The States-Men of Abingdon, 
1702, 2; [Defoe], Whigs and Tories United, 1714, 4; Gilpin. The bad Consequences of 
Dissension, 1747, 10. 
126 Harris 1993, 5; For an emerging distinction between the terms party and faction, see also von 
Beyme 1978, Ball 1988 and Ball 1989, cited above in section 8.1. 
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eighteenth-century texts also point that way,''-' and it is important to keep this 
Reformation background and contemporary consciousness of it in mind when 
uses of faction are analysed. Faction had entered the English language later than 
party but seems to have been adopted rather quickly into general use by the end 
of the sixteenth century. It could be used to denote a great variety of different 
groupings in English and foreign history, most of which were predominately 
religious rather than purely political.128 
In early eighteenth-century discussions on contemporary affairs, faction was 
a term universally used for both the matters of state and those of the Church.''-9 
When faction was in question, the two spheres were often deeply intermixed. 
As Paxton wrote in 1703, faction could be seen as 'the natural offsprings of a 
distempered government' that also caused `differences and disputes in 
religion'. Religious disagreements followed because `civil factions will not 
enough interest people, without religious pretences, to keep up divisions'. 
Evidence for this conclusion could be found in ancient Rome where `church 
schisms, or abominable heresies, continually multiplied or revived' at times of 
political crises.130 Paxton's statements are interesting in that they suggest the 
predominance of political over religious faction. Yet the close links of the term 
faction to purely ecclesiastical disputes are also evident, as demonstrated by 
Bishop Burnet's writings from 1682 and 1703. According to Burnet, 'an 
equality among pastors, cannot hold long without faction' and 'the Jesuits 
cherished the faction in Scotland'.131  Another illustration of the sinister 
religious sense of the word faction can be found in Bishop Tillotson's sermon 
dating from the 1670s and warning against `pride and self-conceit, of division 
and faction' in the Church.132 Bishop Nicolson wrote in his diary at the dawn of 
the eighteenth century about how his friends and relatives disagreed on 'the 
Atterburian faction' in Convocation,133 and Whig propaganda warned about a 
127 An instance of this is provided by Moreri-Collier, The Great Historical ... Dictionary, 1701, 
which defined 'the Politicks' as a faction (or party) during the French Wars of Religion. See 
also Three Questions of Present Importance, 1702, 17, for 'three factions in religion' in 
Reformation England. 
128 OED: faction: In early eighteenth-century histories, medieval and early modern England 
appeared as having been full of various factions. Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, 392. 395-6. and 
Higgons, A Short View of the English History, 1727, 108, 216, 224, 249, 251, 275, 286, 300, 
304, 318-9, 322, 327; Religious senses occur in Clarendon's History of the Rebellion, for 
instance, Vol. V, 274, on 'the license that was practised in religion by the several factions' 
during the Interregnum, in Stebbing, An Essay Concerning Civil Government, 1724, passim., 
arid Conscientious Nonconformity, 1737, 26; Bolingbroke referred to 'the republican, 
presbyterian, and independent factions' during the Interregnum in A Dissertation upon 
Parties, 1735, 131; Ancient Corinth, the favourite example for preachers of party and faction 
is illustrated by Plaxton, An Exhortation to Unanimity and Concord, 1745, 2; Mawson called 
an ancient Jewish sect a faction in The Mischiefs of Division, 1746, 12. 
129 For an instance of factions both in Church and state, see Le Chevalier de St. George, 1713, 
60. a translation of The Dictionary ... of Mr Peter Boyle, 1734-1738, Vol. III, 172, and Vol. 
IV, 711, and The Daily Gazetteer, No. 1501, 18 April 1740, BL Burney, Vol. 351; Defoe 
separated religious concerns from 'factions in the state' in The Weakest go to the Wall. 1714, 
37. Mawson also spoke distinctly about `state-factions' in The Mischiefs of Division, 1746. 
14, 24. 
130 Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, 614-15. 
131 OED: faction; HCET: Gilbert Burnet, History of My Own: Time. 1703. 
132 HCET: John Tillotson, Sermon on 'The Folly of Scoffing at Religion', 1671. 
133 The London Diaries of William Nicolson, 16 December 1702, 145. 
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'Sacheverellite faction' around 1710.134 
Better exemplified than by individual ecclesiastical writings, however, the 
continuously strong status of faction as a religious term is by its occurrences in 
the Book of Common Prayer. This summary of the doctrine of the Church of 
England comprised the Act of Uniformity (1662) which began with words 
lamenting the way 'many people have been led into factions and schisms 
[during the Interregnum], to the great decay and scandal of the reformed 
religion of the Church of England, and to the hazard of many souls'. In the 
Restoration period, on every national anniversary of the Gunpowder Plot, 
English congregations were expected to pray in favour of the authorities 'to cut 
off all such workers of iniquity, as turn religion into rebellion, and faith into 
faction, that they may never prevail against us, or triumph in the ruin of (the 
monarchy and) thy Church among us'. The editions of the 1690s of the Book of 
Common Prayer also contained a declaration by William III in which the 
monarch promised 'not to suffer unnecessary disputations, altercations, or 
questions, to be raised [within the Church], which may nourish faction both in 
the Church and commonwealth'.135  Faction as a despised politico-religious 
phenomenon was thus condemned not only in parliamentary legislation and 
royal declarations concerning the state Church but also in prayers supposed to 
be joined in annually by every loyal subject of the monarch. This official 
doctrine on the despicable nature of faction was to be repeated both in Anglican 
sermons and political texts discussing the various aspects of the phenomenon. 
The term faction was familiar to the early eighteenth-century English from 
texts belonging more distinctly to the sphere of politics as well. Members of the 
political elite would come across negative references to factions if they 
happened to consult seventeenth-century political theorists. In his Leviathan, 
Hobbes, for instance, had written about faction as an unlawful conspiracy in 
which a part of a sovereign assembly `consult a part, to contrive the guidance of 
the rest', aiming to abuse the assembly and advance some private interest. He 
had added that `factions for government of religion' were likewise unjust 
because of their violating the peace and safety of the people, and taking the 
`sword out of the hand of the sovereign'.136 Hobbes thus seems to have 
distinguished between factions religious and political, something that many 
early eighteenth-century English did not always care to do. Locke, unlike 
Hobbes, offered nothing much to the debaters on faction, yet he also observed 
factions as `fatal to states'.137 
The same antifactious attitude was readable in almost any late seventeenth-
century literary genre. The unsuitability of factions to the traditional medically 
inclined notion of the body politic is exemplified by William Temple's text 
dating from the days of the Exclusion Crisis and describing faction in a body 
politic as 'a great blow, or a great disease, [that] may either change or destroy 
134 Chuse which you Please, 1710, 7. 
135 The Book of Common Prayer, 1681, 1687 and 1693; A specific reference to monarchy was 
added to the prayer in the edition of 1687. 
136 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, Cambridge 1992 (1651), 164. 
137 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1690, II, §230. 
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the very frame of a body '.138 The poet John Dryden also used the term faction in 
many of his works published in the 1690s.139 In spite of such a vital tradition of 
condemning faction, however, the reality of its existence could not be denied in 
many late seventeenth-century texts. In the royal court, for instance, court 
factions still had a significant role, and Thomas Osborne wrote in the mid-
1670s that it was 'very difficult to steer amongst so many rocks of faction, 
without striking upon some'. The parliamentary factions of Whigs and Tories 
were also becoming increasingly important, as Edmund Ludlow related: `... the 
parliament was fallen into such factions and divisions, that anyone who usually 
attended and observed the business of the house, could, after a debate on any 
question, easily number the votes that would be on each side, before the 
question was put.' '4° 
When definitions in dictionaries are combined, faction appears to have 
typically meant 'a withdrawing a (smaller or greater) number from the main 
body (either of a church or state) governing themselves by their own counsels, 
and (openly) opposing the established government'.141 This kind of rather 
general definition left numerous possibilities for the use of the term in 
unambiguously derogatory senses both in ecclesiastical and secular issues. In 
Kersey's edition of 1731, faction was also defined generally as 'a division 
among the people', which enabled a wide usage, and as 'a separate party',142 
which underscored the distinctly separated status of faction with relation to 
society as a whole. In its most general and not strictly politico-religious sense, 
faction could be defined simply as 'a company or band of men'.143 With such a 
definition, any grouping could be called a faction. The term was conventionally 
considered nearly synonymous with party and sect,'44  and, therefore, dictionary 
editors did not usually consider it necessary to distinguish between the terms. 
Some individual dictionary definitions deserve a closer scrutiny, as each of 
them reveals some special feature of the the term faction in early eighteenth- 
138 COPC: William Temple, Essay upon the Original and Nature of Government, 1679. 
139 COPC: John Dryden, Satires, 1693; OED: faction. 
140 HCET: Thomas Osborne, Selections from the Correspondence of Arthur Capel Earl of Essex 
1675-1677; COPC: Edmund Ludlow, Memoirs, 1698. 
141 Coles 1701; Glossographia 1707; Gordon-Bailey 1730; Bailey 1733; The same definition 
was borrowed by Cocker-Hawkins, 1724, for the word factious. 
142 Kersey 1731. 
143 Phillips-Kersey 1706; Kersey 1715; Gordon-Bailey 1730; Bailey 1733; [Defoe] 1737; The 
general sense of faction is illustrated by Ryder's way of writing about factions in favour of 
some ancient poets. The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 10 October 1715, 116. 
144 The numerous instances in which party and faction appear in practically identical 
significations include the following: [Daniel Defoe], The History of the Kentish Petition, 
Answer'd, 1701, 3; Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, passim.; [Defoe], A New Test of 
the Church of England's Loyalty, 1702, I; A Vindication of the Constitution, 1703, 3; 
Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, 395-6; [Ward], A Fair Shell, but a Rotten Kernel, 1705, preface, 
58-9; Honesty the Best Policy: Or, the Mischiefs of Faction, 1711, 3; [Defoe], The Weakest 
go to the Wall, 1714, 8; [Trenchard and Gordon], IW22, 15 June 1720; Griffin, Whig and 
Tory, 1720. Epilogue; CL, The Third Edition, Dedication, x; CL2, 12 November 1720; C40, 
24 April 1727; C66, 7 October 1727; A Political Lecture, 1733, 14; Plaxton, An Exhortation 
to Unanimity and Concord, 1745, 2, 6; Keith, A Collection of Papers and Other Tracts, 
1749. xxiii. Faction and sect appeared in a synonymous sense in 'An Elegy Balladwise on 
the Death of John Dolben', A Tory Pill, to Purge Whig Melancholy, 1715, 12, and as parallel 
phenomena in Harmony without Uniformity, 1740, 7. All the three terms party, faction and 
sect were synonymous in Who Plot Best, 1712, 2, and Le Chevalier de St. George, 1713, 60. 
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century understanding. Interesting, for instance, is that while no entry for party 
was included in Bullokar-Browne's old dictionary (1719), faction could still be 
defined as 'a sect or division into sundry opinions'. It may have been that 
faction, as an apparently negative term, had been considered a part of the 
English politico-religious language while the more ambiguous expression party 
was not — not at least in the early seventeenth century, when the dictionary had 
been originally compiled. 
Moreri-Collier (1701) presented faction as a synonym for zealots ('a faction 
of wicked people' in the Old Testament) and for schism (caused in the medieval 
Church by French and Italian factions). However, when defining the term 
faction itself, the author was content with mentioning solely an ancient sense of 
it, which deliberately underscored the military associations of the term, creating 
images of senseless fighting and killing that could surpass even the negative 
military connotations of the term party. According to Moreri-Collier (1701), 
factions had been 'the several parties that fought on chariots in the cirque' in 
ancient Rome, fighters that had been distinguished by their various colours and 
that had enjoyed various degrees of popularity among the emperors and the 
audience. The same definition, though distinctly separated from the political 
sense of faction, was mentioned in Chambers (1728). In the Augustan Age, 
which was deeply committed to everything Roman, such an association of 
faction could hardly remain unacknowledged. Members of the political elite 
with a classical education were probably well aware of such a sense.145 From the 
point of view of this sense, faction stood for cruel violence rather than civilised 
political disagreement. 
Cocker-Hawkins's (1704) definition `division from government' for faction 
was interestingly substituted in the 1724 edition with 'making parties and 
divisions in the government'. Without extending the conclusion too far given 
the lack of additional evidence on parallel prepositional expressions, it seems 
obvious that, in the latter edition, faction was considered a more natural part of 
governing than in the former, in which faction was presented essentially as a 
group of people intentionally excluding themselves from government. This 
minor change in definition may well be a reflection of an emerging conception 
of factions as an inevitable feature of government. 
Beginning in the 1720s, some secularisation in definitions for faction is 
observable. Chambers (1728) already saw faction and the still synonymous 
party formed 'in a state' without mentioning possible religious connections. In 
addition to the conventionally repeated definition for faction, Gordon-Bailey 
(1730) listed in a separate entry the synonyms 'a party, a company or band of 
men, a sect; a cabal or party, formed in a state to disturb the public repose'. The 
former sense was general and, with its inclusion of sect, liable to religious 
associations, whereas the latter referred more exclusively to the secular sphere 
of politics. The pejorativeness of this political sense was based on the 
145 A vision resembling gladiatorial spectacles appeared in the prologue for Griffin's play, when 
martial drums call audience 'to see two factions, Whig and Tory fight'. Griffin, Whig and 
Tory, 1720, 7. 
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disturbance of cherished social harmony rather than on associating faction with 
religious disputes. Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) distinguished even more clearly 
between the spheres of religion and politics, stating that faction was 'a party or 
sect, in religious or civil matters; a set of people differing from the public 
establishment'. He also mentioned the familiar fact that faction was often `taken 
in an ill sense for the promoters of riots, rebellions, etc.'. This secularisation of 
the concept faction experienced a further step in Fenning's (1741) definion of 
faction as 'a party in a state; a tumult, discord, or dissension' with no more 
references to sects or other potentially religious phenomena. The 
transformatory process which the concept faction was experiencing is also 
demonstrated by the fact that the otherwise traditionalist Johnson (1755) was 
able to exclude references to religious disputes when defining faction as simply 
'a party in a state'. Yet, in Johnson's definition, there was still no distinction 
drawn between faction and party, a fact that hardly contributed to more positive 
notions of competing political groupings, particularly as Johnson regarded 
faction as synonymous with any tumult, discord or dissension. Gradually, 
however, a distinction drawn in political discourse between faction and party 
was registered in dictionaries. By the mid-eighteenth century, most dictionaries 
such as Martin (1749), A Pocket Dictionary (1753) and Wesley (1764) already 
defined faction as 'a seditious party', that is, something considerably worse 
than party in general. 
The 'word family' of faction was rather restricted. The alternative senses of 
faction listed in dictionaries were not so numerous as those of party, and this 
may be one reason for it being seldom combined with other words, the most 
common phrase being the highly derogatory `spirit of faction'.146 Yet some 
derivatives of faction were extant. Factious was an adjective widely applied to 
the followers of or those inclined to factions or sects. It referred to troublesome 
and unquiet behaviour, contentions, seditions and mutinies.147 Instances of the 
use of this term are interesting in that they suggest that faction was indeed 
something worse than party. In expressions such as `factious party',148 often 
referring to religious disputes, the attribute factious made a party seem worse 
than the sole term party would have connoted. Factious were those who 
advanced their private aims at the cost of others. One writer suggested that 'the 
truly factious' were not very numerous nor very powerful if only stigmatised 
and disregarded. 149 All opponents, whether religious or political, were 
146 See The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 15 April 1716, 220; [Trenchard and Gordon], IW50, 24 
December 1720; C69, 28 October 1727; Higgons, A Short View of the English History, 1727, 
199; Warren, Religion and Loyalty inseparable, 1745, 17; The neighbouring term fraction, 
as defined in dictionaries, had no religious or political senses whatsoever. It was used in only 
one of the consulted sources in such a sense, when Ford wrote that `religion is rent into 
numerous fractions, and men's Christianity is estimated from being of this or that party'. 
Ford, Unity the Greatest Security, 1715, 10. In the deficiency of supporting evidence, 
fraction cannot be regarded as an alternative party word for faction in the period under study. 
147 Cocker-Hawkins 1704 and 1724; Phillips-Kersey 1706; Kersey 1715; Bullokar-Browne 
1719; Gordon-Bailey 1730; Kersey 1731; Bailey 1733; [Defoe] 1737. 
148 [Defoe], The History of the Kentish Petition, Answer'd, 1701, 35; Clarendon, The History of 
the Rebellion, 1702, Vol. II, 70, 417, 459. 
149 [Defoe], The Ballanee, 1705, 7, 36. 
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frequently called factious.» 
Fenning's (1741) definition of the term already appears to be secular, 
factious being `given to faction, or public dissensions; loud and vehement in 
support of any party; proceeding from, or tending to, public discord'. 
Secularisation of the concept did not radically diminish its pejorativeness, 
however, the term factiously remaining `criminally discontented' and 
factiousness `inclination to public dissension; violent clamorousness in support 
of a party'. According to Johnson (1755), a factious person was `given to 
faction, loud and violent in a party, publicly dissentious [and] addicted to form 
parties and raise public disturbances'. What deserves further attention is the fact 
that his quotations describing the senses of faction include three from the 
beheaded King Charles and one from Clarendon, the historian of the Great 
Rebellion, thus closely associating the phenomenon of faction with the 
seventeenth-century Civil War and supporting the continuity of the national 
trauma. 
Dictionaries gave definitions for faction, but how was the term used in 
contemporary political discourse? Above all, faction was a term indicating 
extreme controversy which was used by both parties with different objects of 
criticism but basically the same pejorative content. Whiggish polemicists, for 
instance, did not fail to call Tories 'the criminal faction'. '5' As an anonymous 
author pointed out, the term appeared to be 'in everyone's disposal to fix as he 
pleases' and hence it was `arbitrarily used' to blacken political opponents:15'- 
Another term of offensive kind ... is faction. All sides seem to express 
by it, such malecontents in government as are, through some private 
interest, restless in perplexing and distressing any endeavours for the 
public good. But as everyone puts in equal pretensions to be for the 
constitution, and the good of their country, all disown themselves 
concerned in such a charge, and lay it upon their opposers, or persons of 
contrary sentiments. Just as it fares with heresy and orthodoxy; everyone 
is orthodox to himself, and finds the heretic no where but in the person of 
one who is of a different opinion. 
The analogy drawn between political and religious terms recalls the close 
affinity of the language used in religious and political discourse. As one might 
expect, the author directed this definition of faction against Tories, who, 
according to him, placed the word close to the denominations of Whigs, 
Dissenters, republicans and fanatics whenever they appeared in print.153 
At the beginning of the century, Whiggish writers did not yet distinguish 
clearly between party and faction. The terms appeared as nearly synonymous 
150 See e.g. [Baron], An Historical Account of Comprehension, and Toleration, title; [Leslie], 
The Wolf Stript of his Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 4; Sacheverell, The Perils of False 
Brethren, 1709, 6. 
151 [Oldmixon], The False Steps of the Ministry after the Revolution, 1714, 18. 
152 Reflections on the Management Of some late Parry-Disputes, 1715, 42-3; Similar 
accusations of the abuse of the term were presented by [Defoe], A New Test of the Church of 
England's Loyalty, 1702, 3. 
153 Reflections on the Management Of some late Party-Disputes, 1715, 43. 
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when Steele, referring to Robert Harley's efforts to form a new Tory ministry in 
the summer of 1710, claimed that 'the state affairs' were `canvassed by parties 
and factions',154 and when Addison insisted that positions in the administration 
should not be given merely for being `useful to a party' or following methods 
`grateful to their faction'.155 In Defoe's propaganda against High-Church 
Tories, both party and faction had extremely pejorative connotations, but the 
latter was even more derogatory than the former. As a reaction to Sacheverell's 
famous sermon, Defoe wrote about traditionalist Tories as 'a party' and 'this 
faction (for such they are)' and accused them of engineering `party-tricks' and 
forming 'a faction to disquiet us'. Neither did he hesitate to use descriptions 
such as 'the party now struggling ... against the established Church', 'a 
perjured party' or 'the vile attempts of a wretched party to overthrow a 
nation'.156 In Defoe's one-sided definition, faction was identical to High-
Church Toryism:157 
These I call the faction - and venture to tell the gentlemen that quarrel at 
the word, that if they please to tell us what faction is, I undertake to 
prove, the present party, commonly called High-Church, to be a faction, 
from all the real parts, that a faction can be reasonably said to consist of 
— such as dividing from the constitution, conspiring against the 
sovereign, breaking the public peace, envying the glory and prosperity 
of the government, and refusing to give obedience to the laws .. . 
whenever I say the faction, by way of definition, I profess to mean 
plainly, and desire to be understood, the High-Church party in England, 
and I shall seldom give them any other name. 
Defoe strengthened his smears against High-Church Tories by using the 
definite article in the front of the word party,158 suggesting that there was only 
one party in the country. As a further instance of Whiggish and dissenting 
polemics can be mentioned the dialogue Honour Retriev'd from Faction in 
which the exact meanings of the terms party and faction were discussed. The 
text contained a suggestion that party could be honourable when used in a 
political crisis to oppose a detrimental party that already existed and that such a 
good party should not be called a faction.159 
One of the most original but most inconsistent writers on party was Toland. 
In the very beginning of the century, he was paid for an attempt to silence party 
strife,160 and he wrote in favour of abolishing all parties, using the words party 
and faction interchangeably. Interestingly, he wrote about `religious and 
political factions', thus distinguishing between the two. '6' In the same way, 
154 Steele, TI93, 4 July 1710; Goldgar 1961, 56. 
155 Addison, S125, 2 July 1711. 
156 Daniel Defoe, A Review of the State of the British Nation (R), Vol. 6, No. 94 (R6/94), 10 
November 1709, R6/119, 10 January 1710. 
157 Defoe, R6/103, 1 December 1709. 
158 See, for example, Defoe, R6/100, 24 November 1709, and R6/101. 26 November 1709. 
159 Honour Retriv'd from Faction, 1713, 11-12; For acceptance of a good party as a tool against 
a bad party, see Mansfield 1965, 13-14. 
160 Hill 1976, 88; Downie 1979, 42. 
161 [John Toland]. The Art of Governing by Partys, 1701, 3, 6, 41, 57, 121. 
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Toland used the terms faction and party as synonyms in 1705.162 In 1717, 
Toland was already writing in very different circumstances. He then denied the 
existence of 'any imaginary republican faction' and insinuated that the Tories 
had connections with Catholics who, according to the common wisdom of 
English Protestants, were 'a mere political faction'. At the same time, however, 
he readily declared that the Whigs were 'the party fittest for the king to consult 
and employ' ,163 not hesitating to vindicate a party. This recognition of party as a 
basis for government seems contradictory to the much more conventional view 
of 1701 but is explicable by the changed circumtances. Pocock has suggested 
that, in the text of 1701, the existence of parties in general was to be denounced, 
whereas, in the text of 1717, good men were simply resisting an already existing 
party of bad men.16 ' Toland may, of course, have held a wavering attitude 
towards the acceptability of political party. In 1701, he was bound by strong 
anti-party conventions, whereas, in 1717, this radical Whig could, in a suitable 
situation, argue openly in favour of a party. 
In Tory descriptions of faction, faction was always a Whig phenomenon. 
Anti-Whig attacks included both warnings for the alleged dangerous designs of 
the faction, and allusions pointing at weaknesses in that faction. For the ultra-
traditionalist Hearne, faction was a swearword standing for a conspiracy of 
Whigs and Dissenters that seemed to be fostering all those evils which Hearne 
himself opposed. He and his fellow traditionalists felt that the established 
Church was threatened by 'the prevailing of faction and schism in the nation'. 
Whigs entering governmental offices they called `favourers of the faction', 
faction constituting the opposite of 'the honest gentlemen' whom they 
themselves sympathised.16S This faction, wrote Edward Ward, attacked the 
Church and her clergy, aiming 'to undermine the most orthodox and best of 
Churches, and the most admirable constitution of all the governments in the 
universe'.166 This `republican faction,' preached Sacheverell, defended 'the 
horrid actions and principles of forty-one', that is, Puritanism of the Civil War 
period. Characteristically of traditionalist thought, in his famous sermon of 
1709, Sacheverell compared faction with fatal illnesses of the body.167 
During the Tory rule of the early 1710s, the Whigs were described as 'the 
Whig-faction', 'a faction here at home', 'that set of factious politicians', 'an 
irritated faction', 'a restless and dangerous faction' or 'a sinking faction'. They 
were contrasted as 'more factious' than the Tories who represented 'the greater 
and better part of the nation'. Whigs were presented as `domestic enemies', 'a 
faction, ready to join in any design against the government in Church or state' 
and as a `faction' which was used by `usurpers, or encroaching favourites, and 
162 [John Toland], The Memorial of the State of England, 1705, 4. 
163 [Toland]. The State-Anatomy of Great Britain, [1717], 13, 16, 22; Toland had himself 
worked actively to advance republican and freethinking ideas. 
164 Pocock 1975, 483-4. 
165 Remarks' and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 16 October 1705, Vol. I, 56; 6 September 1706. 
Vol. 1, 286-7; 5 July 1710, Vol. III, 20. 
166 [Ward], A Fair Shell, but A Rotten Kernel, 1705, preface. 
167 Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren, 1709, 13, 23. 
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ambitious ministers'.168 During the Succession Crisis of 1714, the Jacobite 
George Lockhart's memoirs referred to 'a government so embarrassed with 
faction', and the High-Church clergyman Atterbury called the Whigs 'the 
invading faction'.169 Tory clergymen also frequently employed the word faction 
as well as the word party in their sermons when criticising Protestant Dissenters 
or the Whig party.10 As to Whiggish accusations of Tories as a faction, Swift 
used the weapon of irony, trying to prove that the Tories could by no means be 
one: `I took the author for a friend to our faction (for so with great propriety of 
speech they call the Queen and ministry, almost the whole clergy, and nine parts 
of ten of the kingdom)'." 
In the 1700s and 1710s, traditionalist writers did not usually draw 
distinctions between party and faction. The two were used interchangeably to 
describe biblical events, the religious groupings of the reign of Elizabeth I, and 
the events of the Civil War.12 Interestingly, however, Swift's texts contain hints 
of a willingness to distinguish between parties and factions. Swift suggested in 
1711 that the Whigs were actually not a party `according to the common 
acception of the word' but something worse, that is, a faction. Therefore, he 
wrote about `party, or rather of faction (to avoid mistake)', thus implying that 
there was a difference in the pejorative degree of the two terms. In Swift's 
polemic, the Whigs constituted not a party `but a faction, raised and 
strengthened by incidents and intrigues, and by deceiving the people with false 
representations of things'. 13 Much of Swift's political journalism of the period 
1710-14 concentrated on the disastrous consequences of the Whig Junto 
governments of 1694-1700 and 1708-10. In his essays, the Junto appeared as a 
corrupt political interest that had rejected former Whig principles and only 
aimed at gaining riches at the cost of the traditional landed interest.'74 
In his election propaganda of 1710, Henry St. John, later Viscount 
Bolingbroke, was to a great extent following the same traditionalist rhetoric, 
calling the Whig ministry a `faction in opposition to the crown', a 'factious 
168 [King], E4, 24 August 1710, E10, 28 September 1710; [Swift], E36, 12 April 1711; [Swift], 
The Conduct of the Allies, 1711, 15, 45; [Swift], Some Advice Humbly Offer'd to the 
Members of the October Club, 1712, 72, 75-6, 80; Abel Boyer, An Essay Towards the 
History of the Last Ministry and Parliament, 1710, 39-40. Boyer's way of using the 
expression must have been ironical as he was himself a fervent Whig. 
169 COPC: George Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, 1714; COPC: 
Atterbury, English Advice to the Freeholders of England, 1714; Atterbury's pamphlet was 
the only piece of powerful Tory propaganda during the election campaign of late 1714, 
whereas Whig polemic was widespread indeed. Atterbury endeavoured to save the Tory 
party from Whig one-party rule. After having been accused of Jacobitism, he attacked the 
monarch himself in this anonymous pamphlet and provoked a search for the writer. Bennett 
1975, 186, 192-3; Hill 1976, 153. 
170 Needham, Considerations concerning the Origin and Cure of Church-Divisions, 1710, 5; 
Hole, The Danger of Division, 1702, 23; [Tufton], The History of Faction, 1705, Preface. 
171 [Swift], E17, 30 November 1710. 
172 An Antidote against Rebellion, 1704, passim.; [Tufton], The History of Faction, 1705, 12; A 
View of the Present Divisions in Great Britain, 1708, passim. 
173 [Swift], E31, 8 March 1711, E35, 5 April 1711, E36, 12 April 1711; See also E29, 22 
February 1711, E30, 1 March 1711. E34, 29 March 1711, E44, 11 July 1711. 
174 Hayton 1984, 64. 
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cabal' and `conspirators'.175 By the mid-1720s, however, a new period in Tory 
publishing had been opened with the birth of the Craftsman under the 
leadership of Bolingbroke. Not surprisingly, this leading journal of the 
opposition saw the oligarchic Whig government as a faction of which the 
audience should be aware, insisting that the English should no more be led by 
the 'ill designing patrons of faction'.16 Being frequently accused of 
representing a faction themselves,"' the writers of the journal considered it 
necessary to define what real faction was. In their view, opposition could not be 
faction; instead, failure to support the opposition constituted faction:18  
. . to oppose things, which are not blame-worthy, or which are of no 
material consequence to the national interest, with such violence as may 
disorder the harmony of government, is certainly faction. But it is 
likewise faction, and faction of the worst kind, either not to oppose at all, 
or not to oppose in earnest, when points of the greatest importance to the 
nation are concerned. 
Opposition writers were thus redirecting accusations of factiousness so that 
opposition to Walpole could not, by definition, be called a faction. 
When government papers wrote that only opposition against good 
government and just measures constituted faction and hinted that opposition to 
Walpole was an instance of this type of faction,19 the Craftsman answered by 
resisting factions as a threat to the admirable English constitution and by 
defining the position of the opposition to Walpole through positively charged 
concepts of civic humanism:180 
.. , all divisions of people into parties and factions, about unessential 
points of government, or religion, tend to weaken the foundation of 
liberty, and may be made use of by ambitious prince, or wicked 
ministers, to subvert our constitution .. . 
That as all opposition to a good administration is undoubtedly factious 
and wicked, it is equally certain that opposition to a bad administration is 
the strongest, visible mark, which any man can give his country, of 
patriotism and public virtue. 
Parallel arguments were put forward by Fog's Journal as an answer to the way 
'the oppressors have constantly stigmatised the patriots [opposition] with the 
name faction'. By defining what did not constitute a faction, the writer 
attempted to show that opposition to Walpole, which opposed bribery and 
175 [Bolingbroke], A Letter to the Examiner, 1710, in Swift, The Examiner and Other Pieces 
Written in 1710-11, ed. Herbert Davis, Oxford 1940. 
176 C40, 24 April 1727. 
177 See e.g. A Political Lecture, Occasioned by a late Political Catechism Address'd to the 
Freeholders, 1733, 1 and 11, which claimed that the faction of the opposition was attempting 
to abolish English liberty, the governing ministry and reigning royal family altogether and to 
make faction permanent. 
178 C250, 17 April 1731. 
179 The London Journal, No. 711, 10 February 1733, in GM, Vol. III, February 1733, Reel 134; 
The London Journal, No. 735, 28 July 1733, in GM, Vol. III, July 1733, Reel 134. 
180 C368, 21 June 1733. 
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corruption and defended the constitution and the rights of the subjects was far 
from faction, whereas he hinted that government itself might well be run by a 
faction.181 When, in his Freeholder's Political Catechism, Bolingbroke pointed 
out that the Roman Empire had fallen into a state of slavery due to faction,18-
everyone knew which faction in contemporary England was blamed for 
constituting a parallel danger. 
By the days of the Craftsman, the secularisation of the term faction had 
already proceeded far. The paper appears to have been one of the first users of 
the expression `political faction' which, in the 30 January 1727 issue, 
unambiguously separated such political organisations from religious and other 
comparable associations, even if religious and `civil affairs' were continuously 
treated as analogous phenomena. Importantly, this separation was done on the 
anniversary of Charles I's beheading, the day on which the sins of factions 
religious and political had been traditionally treated as intermingled. 
Intellectual change is also revealed by the fact that the connection between 
religious and political affairs was described in terms of a law of nature 
resembling Newtonian mechanics, `principles and opinions ... revolv[ing] in 
certain periods',183 rather than through the traditionalist language of organic 
analogies. 
Unlike traditional Tory polemic, Bolingbroke and the Craftsman also drew 
distinctions between the terms of party and faction. Bolingbroke's unpublished 
memorial from 1717 already expressed an unusually neutral understanding of 
political party. Bolingbroke wrote about 'my party', gave a list of the main 
objectives of his party, admitted the engagement of private interests in the party, 
and even appears to have held the attitude that the way his own party 
understood the public good was not the only right one.184 Some twenty years 
later, when reviewing the history of the reign of Charles II, Bolingbroke argued 
that there had first been parties which had then given rise to factions. In other 
words, parties provided a foundation for factions, the first being less an evil 
than the latter. Characteristically of his criticism towards the Whig 
administration, Bolingbroke also suggested that the real differences between 
the `national parties' had disappeared and that those who attempted to maintain 
the party division had turned from a party into a faction. National interests had 
become subordinate to personal ones by the faction of the Walpolean Whig 
administration. Bolingbroke claimed that 'the boundaries where party ceases 
and faction commences are ... strongly marked',185 though he did not trouble to 
define those boundaries more distinctly than he had done when pointing to the 
different interests served by each. It was only in an essay of the Craftsman 
written in 1739 that the terms party and faction were `defined and 
distinguished': 186 
181 Fog's Journal, No. 319, 14 December 1734. in GM, Vol. IV, December 1734, Reel 134. 
182 Bolingbroke, The Freeholder's Political Catechism, 1733, 10. 
183 C17. 30 January 1727. 
184 COPC: Bolingbroke, A Letter to Sir William Witullutm, 1717. 
185 Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties. 1735, 11, 13, 63, 98. 
186 C674, 9 June 1739, in GM, Vol. IX, June 1739, Reel 137. 
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By party, as I understand the sense of the word, and think I could prove 
it from the English history, was always meant a national division of 
opinions, concerning the form and methods of government, for the 
benefit of the whole community, according to the different judgements 
of men; that their conformity to those principles, as the motive of their 
respective actions, distinguished the party; that from the moment this 
contention for the real service of their country was given up by men 
invested with power, and a corrupt influence, upon which only they 
united, they became a faction; for I conceive a faction to be a set of men 
armed with power, and acting upon no one principle of party, or any 
notion of public good, but to preserve and share the spoils amongst 
themselves, as their only cement; that they may be able to do every thing 
contrary to the interest of the nation, and the bent of the whole people - 
faction is founded upon a share of power, as well as plunder. 
The organ of the opposition to Walpole claimed that this definition of party was 
the correct one and one that had never changed. According to the opponents to 
the Whig administration, party had always meant a nationwide division of 
views concerning both the constitution and practical government. Importantly, 
it was not defined as rising from divisions in religion. As a result of differing 
political values, this definition suggested, such a political division appeared as a 
natural one. Furthermore, as everyone within this division aimed at advancing 
the common good, the undertone of the definition of party was neutral if not 
positive. Its potential for positive associations becomes particularly visible 
when it is contrasted with the definition for faction. The Craftsman argued that 
parties tended to turn into factions once a tiny group holding political power 
quitted their previous political values, failed to advance the common good any 
longer and instead concentrated on guarding their own interests, often via 
questionable methods. In relation to faction as well, no religious associations 
were seen as applicable. Party and faction were secular and distinct concepts 
that should have been used by keeping such important distinctions in mind. 
Bolingbroke also discussed this distinction between party and faction in his 
Idea of a Patriot King (written in 1738, published in 1749), proceeding so far as 
to state that `faction is to party what the superlative is to the positive: party is a 
political evil, and faction is the worst of all parties'.187 The emerging distinction 
between the concepts was thus made explicit, and so was the essentially 
political character of the two. Though Bolingbroke's definition hardly 
represented a universally accepted interpretation of the concept of political 
party, it points to the relative semantic status of each of the terms: party was a 
negative political phenomenon and faction was even more so. As Bolingbroke 
continued, `parties, even before they degenerate into absolute factions, are still 
numbers of men associated together for certain purposes, and certain interests, 
which are not, or which are not allowed to be, those of the community'.'88 
187 Bolingbroke, The Idea of a Patriot King, 1738, 401. 
188 Bolingbroke, The Idea of a Patriot King, 1738, 402; Bolingbroke employed the statement 
'this national party degenerated soon into factions' also in his Of the State of Parties at the 
Accession of King George the First, sa., 435. 
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Importantly, both parties and their degenerate form factions, were presented 
here as political phenomena, not as phenomena with religious connections. 
At the same time, the continuous strength of traditionalist conceptions of 
party and faction are exemplified in the pamphlet The Danger of Faction to a 
Free People, published in 1732 and directed against the opposition to Walpole. 
As customary, arguments against factions in this pamphlet were drawn not only 
from the newly rekindled civic humanism, with reference to true patriotism and 
virtue, but above all from the infinite fountains of ancient medicine and 
Christian doctrine. A fashionable emphasis on liberty is visible in a statement 
recognising the unavoidability of factions under a free government. According 
to the pamphleteer, this form of government let the passions of the subjects 
reign and consequently made them easily dissatisfied with the course of things, 
thus giving chance for the emergence of factions, one of the most alarming 
phenomena in the mixed constitution. Making use of medical metaphors, the 
author claimed that faction was 'a disease of ... inveterate ... nature' and 
argued that it was the responsibility of the monarch to act like a physician, 
observing the weaknesses in the constitution and taking measures to cure 
factious disorders in the body politic which contained the potential for turning 
the entire nation into a diseased man. Exploiting the authority of religion rather 
rudely, the author characterised faction as `hell-born like sin' and maintained 
that `faction is indeed gone forth among us with high hand, like the devil in the 
Revelations'. 189 
Early eighteenth-century political writings very seldom contain statements 
sympathetic towards a continuous existence of parties in English society. 
Instead, there are plenty of instances demonstrating that parties and factions 
were generally conceived as having been formed against or in opposition to 
something or someone, not in favour of some positive aim.190 From the 173Os 
onwards, however, some such statements occurred, but still usually presented 
along with a due abhorrence of some aspects of party. In 1732, James Pitt had 
already suggested that a 'full liberty of examining all doctrines and opinions' in 
a free government caused positive results that outshadowed the `small evil of 
faction'.191 When Bolingbroke stated that `parties we must have', he was 
pointing to parties in favour of and against the constitution, yet continued by 
claiming that the former party division had disappeared long ago and only 
189 The Danger of Faction to a Free People, 1732, 5-7, 22, 25; Identical medicalisation of 
faction can be found in An Essay on Faction, written in verse and published the following 
year. The associations provoked by the poem recall those observed with connection to party 
vocabulary of medical origin. The anonymous poet formulated: 'From man to man the swift 
delusions roll, And factious madness blinds the patriot soul; No more the charms of legal rule 
he sees, But, surfeited with health, invokes disease'. An Essay on Faction, 1733, 4. Also in 
connection with the Jacobite rebellion of 1745, organic analogical political metaphors were 
revived by clergymen at least, Gilpin preaching with reference to factions: 'What an 
impediment private factions are to public business, needs not illustration. Can the limbs be 
disjointed and the body not suffer?' The bad Consequences of Dissention, 1747, 22. 
190 In addition to instances quoted above, see e.g. The Free Briton, No. 224, 14 February 1734, 
in GM, Vol. IV, February 1734, Reel 134, and The London Journal, No. 770, 30 March 
1734, in GM, Vol. IV, March 1734, Reel 134. 
191 Miller 1994, 96. 
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continued to be artificially fomented by the government.192 By contrast, the 
government paper London Journal dared to suggest, while ridiculing the 
statement of Bolingbroke's that former parties were about to disappear, that 
`folly and madness of party will never be cured till human nature is cured; and 
perhaps it is better for liberty, if they never should be cured'.193 The existence of 
a party division into the establishment Whigs on one hand and Tories and 
opposition Whigs on the other suited the interests of the Whig oligarchy to such 
an extent that it made this government writer reject old prejudices against 
political pluralism and put forward the surprising statement that pluralism was 
impossible to remove and that such a removal was not even desirable from the 
point of view of sacred British liberty. Changing circumstances could lead to 
changing views, but there may have been a more profound transformation in the 
background. 
Other mid-1730s statements recognising the inevitability of parties include 
the following: `There is no country but its peace has been disturbed by 
contending parties'.194  By 1736, one writer, while considering party and public 
spirit self-evident counter-concepts, was prepared to point out that `party in this 
country will probably at all times prevail' and 'the prevalence of which has 
been in all times, and must always be, of the most mischievous and dangerous 
consequence to this nation'. What remained to be done by Englishmen was 'to 
watch its pretences and its progress, and be constantly upon our guard, to elude 
its artifices and defeat its success'. The dichotomy into party and public spirit is 
illustrative of the continuous unsuitability of party to the generally held ideals 
of civic humanism: whereas party aimed at personal interests, public spirit 
aimed at taking care of issues; whereas party intended to govern, public spirit 
intended to reform; and whereas passion constituted the principle of party, the 
principle of public spirit was constituted by virtue.195 In 1739, another 
pamphleteer expressed a surprisingly `scientific' view that numerous sects and 
parties would not weaken the nation if 'an unjust, persecuting spirit' was 
rejected and people could disagree in a way similar to philosophers. With such 
a utopian reservation, the party and sectarian differences 196 
would quicken our search after knowledge, cause due examination of 
the points of dispute, produce clear discoveries, and good defences of 
the truth. And from the multitude of vying counsellors, we should 
always be furnished with many wise schemes, and great designs for the 
public benefit. 
The statement, which contained a great deal of optimistic belief in progress, 
demonstrates that an acceptance of pluralism, at least at the level of principle, 
192 Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 167. 
193 The London Journal, No. 760, 19 January 1734, in GM, Vol. IV, January 1734, Reel 134. 
194 The Fog's Journal, No. 310, 12 October 1734, in GM, Vol. IV, October 1734, Reel 134. 
195 The Present Necessity of distinguishing Publick Spirit from Party, 1736, 11-13, 20; 'to 
reform' was a linguistic idiom gradually entering the language of politics in a secular sense. 
196 Observations on the Conduct of the Tories, the Whigs, and the Dissenters, 1739, 5-6. 
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was gaining ground among the political nation. In 1743, an anonymous writer 
already defined party as the pursuit of a 'set of principles, which they take to be 
for the public good' and faction as the pursuit of `private advantage'. 197 Edward 
Spelman pointed out the same year that 'in all free governments there ever were 
and ever will be parties', as `parties are not only the effect, but the support, of 
liberty'. '98 
Synonyms and euphemisms for party 
The terms party and faction, with which the early eighteenth-century English 
conventionally expressed their conceptualisations of political groupings, 
remained for long overwhelmingly pejorative in their connotations. In addition 
to these terms, contemporaries also applied other derogatory expressions in 
descriptions of the phenomenon of parties. Synonyms for party included words 
such as cause and cabal. Division was widely applied, and the term side, which 
often appeared in a party political context, was useful as a rather neutral general 
expression. No matter how deep-rooted the prevalent anti-party attitudes were, 
however, party was not simply a negative phenomenon to many members of the 
political elite. Many had gained office by or at least expected benefit from their 
party allegiance. Therefore, terminology to express a neutral or even positive 
understanding of party was also needed. When communicating their views on 
parties in print and in diaries, early eighteenth-century English often substituted 
milder expressions for words considered too direct. These euphemisms for 
party included words such as friends, honesty and patriotism, the last two being 
derived from the tradition of civic humanism. 
The word cause had been in particularly widespread use during sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century religious controversies. It had then denoted religiously 
motivated movements that had called forth the efforts of their supporters. 
During the Republican rule of the 1640s, it had been specifically applied to the 
Puritan cause.199 This religious association of 'the good old cause' remained 
vital for long; still at the turn of the eighteenth century, the term often denoted 
religious rather than purely political groupings and questions. Both 
traditionalist Anglicans and Dissenters were viewed as defenders of 'the 
cause'.-°° As many early eighteenth-century English felt an aversion towards 
the events of the 1640s, the word carried extra impetus in propagandistic 
197 Miller 1994, 96-7. 
198 Jones I992b, 36. 
199 OED: cause. 
200 Leslie wrote against dissenters in 1707: The poor and shifting reasons they give for the 
conforming to the Church of England occasionally, and yet keeping up a schism against her, 
renders their cause tenfold more senseless and deformed, a monster indeed!' The Wolf Stript 
of his Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 71; In 1710, a traditionalist Tory was defined as 'the 
High-Church champion, defender of the cause' by The Modern Champions, 1710. This 
broadsheet, which was aimed at a large public, did not defend either Whigs or Tories but 
demonstrated how Tories accused Whigs of advocating 'the shameful and detested cause of 
moderation' and Whigs Tories of supporting 'the High-Church Jacobite cause'. 
210 is PARTY. OR RATHER FACTION: PARTIES AND FACTIONS... 
statements, such as in Defoe's attack against the Tories as the High Church. 
Typically of the polemicists of the day, Defoe used a vocabulary resembling 
that of his opponents who tended to conflate ecclesiastical and political issues, 
Defoe's aim being to make readers associate orthodox Anglicanism with radical 
Puritanism of the 1640s. The synonymity of the terms party and cause was also 
evident when he claimed that `their cause is villainous, and that makes the party 
cowardly; ... Assassinations and murder is something more suitable to the 
high-flying cause, and been more in use among their party, than in other 
cases'.201 In addition to party, faction sometimes occurred as a synonym for 
cause. An anti-Whig poem illustrates this synonymity by stating: 'This 
weakness of the throne bred wondrous strife, strengthened the faction, gave 
their cause new life.'202  
The word cause frequently appeared in texts which clearly dealt with 
political rather than purely religious parties — and often in an unsurprisingly 
pejorative sense. James Yonge (1647-1721), a Plymouth surgeon, registered in 
his diary the tragedy of his brother, who had been 'a zealous Whig and thought 
to have got that cause rampant' in the city of Plymouth. When this political 
campaign had failed, leading to mere hatred toward the campaigner among the 
locals, the brother had fallen ill and died.203 In another instance, Ryder gave a 
highly negative connotation to cause when he, in 1716, wrote about the political 
activities of a person lately executed for participating in the Jacobite rising of 
1715. According to Ryder, the Jacobite's speeches had abounded with 
misleading information designed `to advance the party and cause'.204 Ryder 
wrote as if there was only one party — the crushed Jacobites — and as if party and 
cause were synonymous. Finally, in a parallel manner, someone could be 
brought into disrepute by referring to him as something like 'a furious partisan 
of the cause of Whiggism'.205 
When used in political or politico-religious senses, however, cause did not 
always carry the pejorative connotations connected conventionally with party 
and faction. Due to its very general meaning, cause was a particularly useful 
word for political polemicists.206 In expressions such as `majesty's most 
righteous cause', 'the common cause', 'the public cause', 'the Christian cause', 
'the cause of God and true religion' or 'the Protestant cause', the meaning of 
cause was so positive that the expression practically excluded the legitimacy of 
201 Defoe, R6/119, 10 January 1710; other instances of Defoe using the terms party and cause 
synonymously can be found in R6/12, 30 April 1709, and R6/13, 3 May 1709; Party and 
cause appear in synonymous senses also in Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, 560, Place, The 
Arbitration, [1710], 11-13, Honesty the Best Policy, 1711, 7, and The Dictionary ... of Mr 
Peter Bayle, 1734-38, Vol. 2, 799. 
202 [Ward], A Fair Shell, but a Rotten Kernel, 1705, 41; Faction and cause were synonymous 
also in The Dictionary ... of Mr Peter Bayle, 1734-38, Vol. 3, 172. 
203 The Journal of James Yonge, Plymouth Surgeon, ed. F.N.L. Poynter, Hamden Connecticut 
1963, 1698, 207-8. 
204 The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 16 July 1716, 276. 
205 The Craftsman exploited this possibility of putting politicians in a questionable light in C24, 
6 March 1727, and C327, 7 October 1732. 
206 Contemporary dictionaries do not bring much light to the conceptual history of cause as 
political term. Cause was defined in very general terms as `principle, motive, reason. 
subject', for instance. Phillips-Kersey 1706; Kersey 1715; Kersey 1731; [Defoe] 1737. 
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all dissent. In these expressions, cause was made positive by connecting it with 
universally held values such as a respect towards monarchy, traditions of 
fighting on behalf of Protestantism, and the discursive paradigm of civic 
humanism. On the basis of these authoritative discourses, cause could easily be 
defended in election propaganda that aimed at activating the members of a 
party, as did Atterbury in 1714, with special reference to Anglican High-Church 
Protestantism:2207 
I must own, I cannot, without great indignation, observe the lukewarm, 
indolent, cowardly, lazy, desponding, and narrow tempers of some 
among us: to their shame be it said, they profess honest principles, nay, 
and are really honest in their inclinations, but yet relinquish the cause, 
and think they deserve commendation, because they do not concur in the 
iniquity of the times. 
Causes that had been turned positive by the exploitation of religious 
associations were undoubtedly utilised by some Tories to advance their 
politico-religious objectives. Anticlerical writers did not fail to express their 
horror for what they presented as 'the cause of God and of his Church' being 
used as a cover for a cause that was as 'vile and woful' as it was 'impious'.208 
Cabal was another party word derived from both seventeenth-century 
political confrontations and much older religious contexts. Its religious 
associations are visible in dictionaries published in the early part of the century 
which agreed that cabal, or cabal-la, or cabbala, initially stood for the `secret 
science expounding divine mysteries' and built on the mysterious doctrines of 
the Jewish tradition. A dictionary printed at the very beginning of the century 
termed cabal exclusively as 'a certain sect amongst the Jews' engaged with 
magic and witchcraft.209 
Since at least the early 1670s, however, the concept cabal had generally 
referred in political writings to 'a Junto, or private (or secret) council (or consult 
or confederacy), a particular party, set, or gang' or 'a society of men united by 
the same interest'. The synonymity of cabal, faction and party in early 
eighteenth-century understanding is particularly visible in a common entry for 
all in Chambers 1728. A term for the mysterious Jewish doctrine had gained a 
political meaning in 1668-1673, when the ministry had been dominated by 'the 
207 COPC: John Stevens, Journal, 1689; Dryden, Satires, 1693; White Kennett, Complete 
History of England, 1706; Joseph Addison, The Present State of the War, and the Necessity 
of an Augmentation, Considered, 1708; Atterbury, English Advice to the Freeholders of 
England, 1714 (notice also the use of the attribute honest for legitimating the line of one's 
own party); George Berkeley, An Essay Towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain, 1721; 
Bolingbroke, A Letter to Sir William Windham, 1717; Addison, F2, 26 December 1715. F4. 
2 January 1716. 
208 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW35, 14 September 1720. 
209 Moreri-Collier 1701; Coles 1701 and 1732; Cocker-Hawkins 1704; Phillips-Kersey 1706; 
Glossographia 1707; Kersey 1715; Kersey 1731; Martin 1749; A Pocket Dictionary 1753; 
Johnson 1755; For an instance of cabala being used with reference to the Jewish tradition in 
a political periodical, see C9. 2 January 1727; One might add that this magical tradition of 
cabala had not been unfamiliar even to the great figures of the seventeenth-century 
intellectual revolution, including Sir Isaac Newton. 
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cabal', a feared combination of competitive rivals for influence. The name for 
this loose confederacy of leading ministers had been formed as a wordplay out 
of the first letters of the names of the `caballers': Clifford, Arlington, 
Buckingham, Ashley and Lauderdale. The first two had been concealed 
Catholics and the next two Puritan sympathisers. While its members disagreed 
on many questions and intrigued against each other, the only question in which 
the cabal seems to have been united — in addition to their rather cynical attitude 
towards politics, including corruption — was that of religious toleration.210 
Given this suspicious background including heterodoxy and plotting, it is no 
surprise that the compilers of dictionaries agreed that the word cabal was more 
often used in a negative than positive sense. Most dictionaries also included the 
verb 'to cabal' which meant 'to make parties, to plot (or meet or consult) 
privately'. The role of religious toleration forming a uniting force within the 
original cabal may also explain some of the rhetorical power of the term when 
used by Tories: it had been only the questionable idea of toleration that had kept 
the plotting assembly together, which was not unlike accusations directed by 
Tories against Whigs. 
In the course of time, the term cabal was generalised and secularised. 
Chambers (1728) already distinguished between cabal and cabbala by using 
different spelling. By the 173Os and 174Os, the direct association of cabal with 
the Jewish secret sciences was decreasing and an overwhelmingly political 
sense dominating dictionary entries. For Gordon-Bailey (1730), cabal was 'a 
meeting together or consultation, privately on some party matters, also the 
persons caballing'. The verb cabal he understood as 'to make parties, to plot 
privately', and caballer was 'one who joins in cabals; a party man'. In his 
etymological dictionary, Bailey (1733) wanted to record older usages and 
hence presented cabal and cabala as various forms of the same expression that 
stood for either 'a secret science' or 'a juncto, or private council, a particular 
party, set, or gang'. Neither did Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) make a distinction 
between cabal and cabala, but the verb cabal carried an explicitly negative 
political message, meaning 'to plot, conspire, or make parties against either a 
public state, prince, or private persons, either for redressing real grievances, or 
to destroy the government or party against whom it is undertaken'. Fenning 
(1741), who no more cared about cabala in defining the concept cabal, 
expressed the same attitudes by defining cabal as 'a body of men united in some 
design to disturb or change the administration of a state'. He also drew a line 
between the terms cabal and party, stating that the difference was 'in the same 
degree as few from many', that is, cabal was a smaller organised group aiming 
at political change than party. Fenning added that cabal was frequently 
210 Coles 1701; Coles-Johnson 1732; Phillips-Kersey 1706; Glossographia 1707; Kersey 1715; 
Cocker-Hawkins 1724; Chambers 1728; Kersey 1731; Martin 1749; A Pocket Dictionary 
1753; Johnson 1755; Wesley 1764; Jones 1991, 10; Holmes 1993a, 111-12; Bolingbroke 
referred to 'the famous cabal' of the reign of Charles II in his Dissertation upon Parties, 
1735, 38-9, 50, 64; For cabal as a wordplay, see C674, 9 June 1739, in GM, Vol. IX, June 
1739, Reel 137; The wordplay was a particularly successful one, as one of the senses of cabal 
was 'a way of discovering secrets from the letters in a word by which they pretend to unfold 
all the mysteries in divinity'. A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
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employed `figuratively' and then it meant 'an intrigue, or plot to introduce 
change in an administration'. Finally, a clear distinction between cabal and 
party was also made in Johnson (1755). According to Johnson as well, 'a cabal 
differs from a party, as few from many'. Johnson also mentioned a more general 
sense to cabal as any form of intrigue. 
In public discourse, cabal carried a sense of criticism directed at the 
governing elite, a sense that built on a combination of associations derived from 
religious prejudices towards the Jews'-" and on recent historical experience. 
During the first two decades of the eighteenth century, political propagandists 
of both political extremes used the expression in their writings to reproach 
political rivals. Toland listed `parties, factions, clubs, and cabals' as near 
synonyms,'-''- and Defoe criticised `cabals ... against the toleration', using the 
words `cabals, party-making and faction' as equal expressions.213 In August 
1710, St. John called the fallen Whig ministry a `factious cabal', 'the 
conspirators' and `cabals of upstarts'.2214 In Swift's texts, the expression cabal 
held a more negative association to be attached to Whigs than that of the term 
party, as he wrote: `I look upon these champions, rather as retained by a cabal 
than a party'. Consequently, Swift readily used the word in attacks against the 
leading Whigs as 'a routed cabal of hated politicians'.2215  
In the 1720s and 1730s, the word cabal occurred occasionally in oppositional 
writings, particularly those influenced by the strengthening of civic humanism 
in political thought. An edition of Cato's Letters, for instance, was opened with 
assurances that the journal was no product of some faction, cabal or party.216 In 
the Craftsman of the early 1730s, cabal was mentioned a number of times as a 
means, with 'no relation to merit', to proceed to high political positions and as a 
faction-like measure for the governing ministry to strengthen their monopoly of 
power so that they could rule independently of all parties. In his Dissertation on 
Parties, Bolingbroke pointed out that the frequent parliamentary elections 
required by the British constitution prevented the formation of 'a ministerial 
cabal' or at least helped in abolishing one.'-" Ministerial papers replied by 
writing about an opposition that tended to `cabal without any view of serving 
the public, and direct their followers without suffering them to know the 
211 Another instance of the use of anti-Semitic attitudes for the purposes of political propaganda 
can be found in Defoe's Ballance, 1705, 37, which referred to 'the rabbis of the Jacobite 
faction', thus drawing a parallel between a despised ethnic community and those 
Englishmen who supported the divine right of the descendants of James II to the throne of 
England. 
212 [Toland], The Art of Governing by Partys, 1701, 9. 
213 Defoe, R6/17, 12 May 1709, R6/93, 8 November 1709. 
214 [Bolingbroke], A Letter to the Examiner, 1710; The association of Whiggism with low social 
origins was a common device of Tory polemists. Whereas professionals and businessmen 
tended to be Whigs, there were few Whigs among country gentlemen and the inferior 
Anglican clergy. See Corns, Speck and Downie 1982, 12. 
215 [Swift], E26, 1 February 1711, E37, 19 April 1711. 
216 [Gordon], Dedication in Cato's Letters, The Third Edition, 1969, x. 
217 C238, 23 January 1731; C306, 13 May 1732; Fog's Journal, No. 237, 19 May 1733, pointed 
to cabals during the French Wars of Religion; Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 
1735, 101; Bolingbroke used 'cabal' in a general sense also in his Letter on the Spirit of 
Patriotism, 1736, 362; Cabal appeared in a general sense, with reference to the reign of 
Elizabeth, also in Bolingbroke's Idea of a Patriot King, 1738, 413. 
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transactions of their cabals'.218 Otherwise, the term seems to have been rarely 
used. This decline in the frequency of the term cabal in discussions on political 
groupings may be a sign not only of a calming of party strife but also a 
piecemeal growing recognition of various associations working side by side in 
order to achieve some political goals. 
Division was another apparent and by no means less hated substitute for the 
term party. In dictionaries, division, in addition to its very general sense of 
`distributing of any whole into its proper parts', was also defined as 'a going 
into parties', `separation, discord, variance', `disagreement', `odds', or even 
more pejoratively `strife, contention, quarrelling'.219 In one of the dictionaries, 
the synonyms for division included sect and faction, and in some sources party, 
even schism,'-'-0 the term thus being seen as part of the politico-religious party 
terminology. Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) offered a definition slightly 
distinctive from others, depicting division as 'a separating, disuniting, partition, 
distribution, strife, quarrel, faction, sedition'. It is worthwhile to note that the 
editors considered the pejoratively charged terms faction and sedition as 
synonymous to division. Fenning (1741) and Johnson (1755) gave the 
following many-sided description of division: 'the act of separating space or 
body into parts; the state of a thing, whose parts are separated or divided; 
discord, or difference which occasions a separation between friends; a 
distinction'. When defining the social aspects of division, Johnson's only 
sources of quotations were Scripture, referring to a division among the people, 
and the old title Decay of Piety, referring to divisions between the Anglicans 
and Catholics. 
Contemporaries could not but agree, as Toland wrote in 1701, that England 
had a great number of `religious, politic[al], and parliamentary divisions'.221  
Many would only have added some negative attribute such as 'sad' in the front 
of the term division.'" Toland drew a distinction between religious and political 
divisions, something which every contemporary commentator did not care to 
do, and also distinguished divisions in Parliament,223  which had become an 
everyday phenomenon together with annual parliaments after the Revolution of 
1689.224  As division was frequently used by writers of all ideological directions 
to characterise the plurality of views in both Church and state, it is of interest to 
compare these two fields of usage and consider whether distinct meanings had 
really emerged. 
218 The Free Briton, No. 224, 14 February 1734, in GM, Vol. IV, February 1734, Reel 134. 
219 Phillips-Kersey 1706; Glossographia 1707; Kersey 1715; Cocker-Hawkins 1724; Gordon-
Bailey 1730; Kersey 1731; [Defoe] 1737; Martin 1749; A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
220 Bullokar-Browne 1719; Division was listed with sect and party in A Sure Way to Orthodoxy, 
1718, 19-20, 32, with party in C213, 1 August 1730, and with schism in A Free-Thinker at 
Oxford, 1719, 8. 
221 [loland], The Art of Governing by Partys, 1701, 90. 
222 Griffin, Whig and Tory, 1720, 87. 
223 In the affairs of Parliament, division had a long history also as a technical word signifying 
voting in either House. Since 1620, division had been used to denote separating of the 
members into two groups so that their votes could be counted. Division as voting was used at 
both Houses of Parliament. Bishop Nicolson applied the term to voting at the House of Lords 
in The London Diaries of William Nicolson, 17 February 1708, 453; OED: division. 
224 Holmes 1993, 222. 
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The term division was frequently heard in Anglican sermons and appears in 
various other documents left by the servants of the established Church. 
Occurrences of the term in sermons were nothing new, the combination 
`division and faction' having been used by Restoration divines such as 
Tillotson.'" Published literature contained frequent references to divisions and 
subdivisions among Christians throughout Church history. The Church of 
England since the Reformation was seen as particularly troubled by divisions, 
the term division being used in the sense of heresy and schism. Such `divisions 
in the Church of Christ' and `divisions in our most holy faith' were strictly 
condemned as 'the evil spirit of division' ."6 The current division of the Church 
was known to consist, in addition to the division between Anglicans and 
Dissenters, of the division between High Church and Low Church. This latter 
division was declared undesirable by High-Church writers in particular.''-' 
In documents produced by clergymen, division frequently stood for the 
Protestant Dissenters. Naish, for instance, wrote in his diary about Dissenters in 
his parish who, in addition to `their division from the Church', were constantly 
quarrelling among themselves for reasons that had nothing to do with religious 
doctrine, something that Naish took as demonstration of their `perverse temper 
of mind'.'-" Evelyn summarised a sermon in which `divisions and dissentions in 
matters of religion' had been presented as an obstacle to a continuous 
reformation.-'-9 Hearne reported a sermon preached at the main church of the 
University of Oxford having insisted that the auditors should keep their distance 
from Presbyterians and other sectaries who caused divisions and had `already 
once ruined the Church and government"-30 — this being to listeners an 
unquestionable reference to the Civil War. The dissenting point of view was, of 
course, very different, the Dissenters being seen by Defoe as innocent sufferers 
from principally political divisions.'3' 
The clergy used sermons for condemning the `unhappy divisions' among the 
English. Some preachers saw divisions, in organic analogical terms, as having 
caused wounds in the body politic and wished that they might be rapidly cured 
in order that the British nation could recover its original strength.-3'- Others saw 
divisions — on the basis of the biblical teaching that a divided kingdom could not 
stand — as forces that destroyed civil society and government within the nation 
by `run[ning] men first into parties, and then into opposition'. The message was 
that 'the ruins of societies have ever been occasioned by divisions' which led to 
225 HCET: Tillotson, Sermons on 'The Folly of Scoffing at Religion' 1671, and 'Of the Tryall of 
the Spirits', 1679. In the authorised version of the Bible, published in 1611 and still in use at 
the tum of the eighteenth century, there was the passage: 'I heare that there be diuisions 
among you.' (Corinthians 11:18). 
226 Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, 75; Giffard, Family Religion, 1713, 42, 49; See also [Defoe], 
Whigs and Tories United, 1714, 33; Protestant Advice to the Whigs and Tories, 1715, 13; 
The Church of England the Sole Encourager of Free-Thinking, 1717, 13. 
227 [Drake], The Memorial of the Church of England, 1705, 17. 
228 The Diary of Thomas Naish, 30 May 1701, 44. 
229 The Diary of John Evelyn, 16 August 1702, Vol. V, 513. 
230 Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 16 December 1705, Vol. I, 130. 
231 [Defoe], The Weakest go to the Wall, 1714, 8, 10. 
232 Smith, The Olive Branch, 1715, 8; Balquy, The Duty of Benevolence, 1727, 18. 
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God taking away his peace from the people, and, in the case of England, 
claimed one preacher in 1715, 'the judgement of God ... is upon us for our 
iniquities'.233  One more way to approach the problem of religious divisions was 
to expound it as a consequence of 'the corruption of human nature' on one hand 
and of a direct `instigation of the Devil' on the other. The first epistle to the 
Corinthians, when suitably interpreted, provided a basis for such explanations: 
`There must be also heresies, or', added the preacher, 'as the word denotes, 
divisions among you, that they which are approved, may be made manifest 
among you' .234  
Preaching against division gained new force with the Test Act controversy of 
the 1730s. Basing his sermon on a passage from the Epistle to the Romans, one 
preacher insisted that to avoid the misfortunes that faction was capable of 
causing, the listeners should have `mark[ed] them which cause division', 
particularly when divisions were created in a country governed by a 
government with a rational basis. This preacher did not mince his words when 
vindicating the established order against oppositional forces. Stating that `there 
is scarce a crime in the black catalogue of sins which the authors of such 
divisions are not guilty of', he gave a long list of various consequences of their 
actions.'" 
Sermons against division appeared in numbers also in connection with the 
Jacobite rising of 1745. For instance, one clergyman insisted on unanimity and 
concord among the English on the basis of St Paul's teaching that `there be no 
divisions among you; but ... you be perfectly joined together in the same mind, 
and in the same judgment'.236  Another preacher of the late-1740s declared that 
the biblical words `where bitter zeal and strife is, ... there is confusion and 
every evil work' originally stood for religious divisions but concerned civil 
government as well. However, he provided the following comparatively secular 
definition for division:23' 
By divisions [in civil government] ... I mean such, as when men 
confederate together, to subvert settled governments, either by force and 
violence, or any other unwarrantable means, or set themselves to 
condemn indiscriminately all the measures of an administration, 
actuated only by the wild passions that in all ages have produced the 
most tragical events, I mean those of ambition and revenge. 
Mawson's explicit message was that divisions, i.e. parties, had encouraged the 
Jacobite rising of 1745, and it was through unity that further rebellions could be 
prevented.23s 
233 Ford, Unity the Greatest Security, 1715, 6, 15-16; See also Needham, Considerations 
concerning the Origine and Cure of our Church-Divisions, 1710, 4-5; Claydon 1996, 129. 
234 Bradford, Christian Religion the Occasion: not the Cause of Division, 1716, 13, 18. 
235 A Discourse on the Wickedness and Danger of Fomenting Divisions in a State, 1733, 3, 5, 11. 
236 Plaxton, An Exhortation to Unanimity and Concord, 1745, 1-2, 6. 
237 Mawson, The Mischiefs of Division, 1746, 4, 8, 11. 
238 Mawson, The Mischiefs of Division, 1746, 24. 
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Parallel terminology of division can also be found in more politically 
directed texts of the period. History provided an endless number of examples of 
divisions with severe consequences.'-39  King Charles l's Political Catechism 
had declared `faction and division' an evil most typical of aristocracy, divisions 
being created between the monarch and Parliament and within Parliament.240 
Clarendon's History of the Rebellion and Edmund Ludlow's memoirs both 
mentioned `division and faction' in Parliament, the former adding 
`subdivisions' that were occasioned by diversity in religious opinions.211  
Particularly at times of war — which was practically a normal state in 
eighteenth-century Britain — language of division was a natural part of everyday 
political rhetoric. The Spanish War of Succession gave rise to constantly 
repeated complaints against 'our unhappy divisions' which Louis XIV, 'the 
common invader of the liberties of Europe', was utilising to achieve a 
dominance of the Continent.242 The nation was seen as `divided, subdivided, 
and torn asunder with factions and parties, to the scandal of our holy religion, 
the disturbance of the state, the obstruction of public peace, the joy of our 
enemies, the reproach of our understandings, the hindrance of trade, and the 
confusion of our interest at home and abroad'.243  Defoe regretted, in 1702, 
`intestine divisions' and `sharp and shameful divisions' which he claimed were 
disturbing English war efforts on the Continent:2244  
A nation divided in the constituent parts of its government, can admit no 
harmony amongst its subjects, but from the king on the throne to the 
beggar on the dunghill, every individual must suffer more or less, by 
such a division, yet such is our misfortune, that we are divided in our 
parliaments, divided in our councils, and this division runs through all 
the counties, cities, corporations and societies in the kingdom, and 
creates and nourishes heats, jars, and animosities among people of all 
rank. 
Also in 1715, Defoe pointed out that divisions caused disturbances within the 
nation and increased the risk of foreign invasion 245 Similar lamentations of 
political division as a threat to national security can be found in numerous texts 
by writers such as Addison, according to whom''
-
46 
there cannot a greater judgment befall a country than such a dreadful 
spirit of division as rends a government into two distinct people, and 
makes them greater strangers and more averse to one another, than if 
239 See e.g. [Acherley], Reasons for Uniformity in the State. 1741, preface, and Mawson, The 
Mischiefs of Division, 1746, 14. 
240 Henry Parker, Charles I, King, A Political Catechism, 1643, reprinted in 1710, 8, and 1740, 
12. 
241 COPC: Ludlow, Memoirs, 1698; Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, 1702, Vol. II, 389, 
Vol. III, 453. 
242 Three Questions of Present Importance, 1702, iii. 
243 Honesty the Best Policy, 1711, 3. 
244 [Daniel Defoe], The Dangers of Europe, front The Growing Power of France with Some Free 
Thoughts on Remedies, 1702, preface and 18. 
245 [Defoe], The Political Sow-Gelder: Or, The Castration of Whig and Tory, 1715, 17, 21. 
246 Addison, S125, 24 July 1711. 
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they were actually two different nations. The effects of such a division 
are pernicious to the last degree, not only with regard to those 
advantages which they give the common enemy, but to those private 
evils which they produce in the heart of almost every particular person. 
In political propaganda, divisions were presented as a creation of the rival party. 
A Tory publication would habitually insinuate that it was in the interest of 
Whigs to promote 'national and Church divisions'.247  For Bolingbroke, division 
was a central concept in his writings on political parties, the opprobrious terms 
division and faction appearing in close connection. Bolingbroke also applied a 
couple of times the expression 'political divisions',248 with the obvious purpose 
of distinguishing between religious and political reasons for pluralism. By the 
early 1730s, the Craftsman and some other papers were ready to report how the 
'mischievous spirit of division' had been declining for some time.249 However, 
the defenders of the government argued that it was the opposition headed by the 
journal - the opposition being used in a determined form - which was to be 
blamed for 'our present divisions at home'.'-50 When answering the Craftsman' s 
polemic, one of the leading government papers ostentatiously applied 
Bolingbroke's expression 'political divisions' as opposed to religious ones that 
had been discussed previously in the same essay."' The application of such an 
expression on both sides of the political divide illustrates a growing awareness 
in differences between religious and political divisions. 
The talk of 'our unhappy divisions', whether within the nation at large or 
within the governing Whigs, was to continue throughout the 1730s and 
1740s.252 The radical theological interpretation of the author of Harmony 
without Uniformity (1740), in which division was recognised as a natural 
phenomenon, appears to have been a solitary case amongst condemnations of 
247 Robert against Ferguson, 1704, 4. 
248 Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, passim; 'National divisions' seems to have 
been a particular favourite expression of Bolingbroke's. Ibid., 12, 25, 86; In The Idea of a 
Patriot King, 1738, 412, Bolingbroke also employed the expression 'popular divisions'; The 
expression 'political divisions' appeared at least in ibid., 74 and 86. 
249 C213, 1 August 1730; Parallel views about the reconciliation of divisions, seen as a result of 
unifying foreign policy, were expressed in The Free Briton, No. 224, 14 February 1734, in 
GM, Vol. IV, February 1734, Reel 134. 
250 The Danger of Faction to a Free People, 1732, 27-8; Up to at least the mid-1720s, the term 
opposition had been used for the act of opposing, not for any organised group of opposers. 
The definite expression 'the opposition' started to appear in print around 1731 and became 
common usage by 1737, referring to all opponents of Walpole. What had occasionally been 
'an opposition' raised by groups out of office turned into 'the opposition' working much 
more consistently. Foord 1964, 107, 154-5; In the consulted dictionaries, one of the first 
references to political opposition was the definition 'the struggle of one party against 
another' in A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
251 The London Journal, No. 762, 2 February 1734, in GM, Vol. IV, February 1734, Reel 134. 
252 See e.g. The London Journal, No. 743, 22 September 1733, in GM, Vol. III, September 1733, 
Reel 134; The Old Whig, No. 44, 8 January 1736, in GM, Vol. VI, January 1736, Reel 136, 
with reference to the proposal of repealing the Test Act; The Present Necessity of 
distinguishing Publick Spirit from Party, 1736, 3; Warburton, The Alliance between Church 
and State, 1736, 3; Observations on the Conduct of the Tories, the Whigs, and the 
Dissenters, 1739, 6; The Compton Sense, No. 360, 7 January 1744, in GM, Vol. XIV, January 
1744. Reel 138; Bolingbroke, The Idea of a Patriot King, 1738, 402. 
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division. This author found, on the basis of Genesis, no negative consequences 
in division:253 
There was no sooner one person created, but the Creator divided him 
into two; and no sooner made two, but he united them into one. Thus 
people may be divided into two or more different societies, and yet be 
one in heart, affection and benevolence. 
In other words, the existence of a plurality of human groupings did not mean 
that the groups were incapable of agreeing on basic values that kept society 
together. Plurality of values was not dangerous but rather a natural state of 
affairs. This conception made no breakthrough in the early eighteenth century, 
but the period experienced an important development, a growing separation 
between religious and political divisions. 
Side was a party word with an remarkably neutral sense. Because of its very 
general character it lacked inherently pejorative associations typical of other 
terms. Expressions such as 'this side, and that' 254  were natural in a political 
system based on a two-party division. The origin of side as a party word is also 
evident: it stood for the opposite sides on which the rival parties were seated in 
Parliament. One member of Parliament had made a distinction between the two 
sides of the House of Commons already in 1673,255 and printed sources from the 
turn of the century contain numerous references to parties as sides. Burnet 
referred, with that expression, to groups which had participated in political 
conflicts during the reign of Charles II. Evelyn's diary discussed the events of 
the Glorious Revolution with references to `dissatisfaction on both sides'.256 
Swift mentioned how the Tory lords in Parliament summoned after the Glorious 
Revolution had been `looked upon with an evil eye by the warm zealots of the 
other side', the Whigs. Party-political polemics of the early 1710s were 
delineated with the term sides by Swift, Addison and Defoe,257 and the 
synonymous character of the terms party and side is also visible in Steele's 
statement 'when a man declares himself openly on one side, that party will take 
no more notice of him, because he is sure; and the set of men whom he declares 
against, for the same reason are violent against him'.258 This use of the term 
253 Harmony without Uniformity, 1740, 2. 
254 The expression was used to describe the party division in Place, The Arbitration, [1710], 5. 
255 Harris 1993, 1. 
256 HCET: Burnet, History of My Own Time, 1703: Evelyn, The Diary of John Evelyn, 1689-
1690. 
257 Swift, E15, 2 November 1710, E43, 31 May 1711; A nonjuror was someone who refused to 
take an oath of allegiance to William and Mary in 1689 because such an oath would have 
violated the oath sworn to James II, the previous monarch; Addison, 5125, 24 July 1711; 
See, for example, Addison to George Stepney [Vienna], Whitehall 6 November 1705, The 
Letters, 53, and Addison to Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland (London), Dublin Castle, 5 
May 1709, The Letters, 134; COPC: Defoe, An Apeal to Honour and Justice, 1715. 
258 Steele, T193, 4 July 1710; Other instances of the synonymity of party and side can be found 
in the epilogue to Griffin's Whig and Tory, 1720, in [Trenchard and Gordon], IWI, 20 
January 1720, in C40, 24 April 1727, and in Gilpin, The bad Consequences of Dissention, 
1747, 14; Side might in an occasional poem also appear as a synonym to faction and sect. 
'An Elegy Balladwise ...' in A Tory Pill, to Purge Whig Melancholy, 1715, 12. 
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sides as an alternative expression for parties continued still in the 1740s259 but is 
rather uninteresting as far as developments in the meanings of the concept of 
political party are concerned. 
Much more interesting substitutive vocabulary can be found amongst 
euphemisms for party. One of the most obvious of these was the general 
expression friends, used in a specific sense. In a fairly unorganised political 
system, friends was a term through which political identities were defined. The 
term friends could be applied to defining a party and creating unity in a way that 
avoided awkward associations connected with other party words. Friends was 
also a useful expression for excluding outsiders as friends of the rival party. 
Holmes has previously paid some attention to the synonymity of party 
and friends,260 whereas Robert Shephard's study on early modern court factions 
gives reason to consider whether friends, instead of referring to all the adherents 
of a party, only concerned a tiny circle of party leaders. Among court factions — 
which provided a natural source for later party terminology — the friends of the 
leader had consisted merely of his close associates treated as near equals. The 
friends shared the same education or had reached their status due to their 
abilities or their agreeable views in politics and religion. A clear hierarchical 
distinction separated the friends from mere followers or servants. Friendship in 
court factions stood for mutual assistance in gaining benefits,26' and the same 
was also true of early parties. The early eighteenth-century party euphemism 
friends obviously still carried much of the same connotations the term had 
conveyed when used within court factions.262 
The synonymous character of the terms party and friends is demonstrated by 
textual variations in Swift's Examiner essays. The original paper number 26 
and also the collected edition of 1712 contained the sentence 'if your party ever 
happen to turn up again'. However, in later editions the same sentence read 'if 
your friends ever happen to turn up again'.263 This verbal conversion already 
made the sentence less negative. Swift's understanding of party as friends was 
explicit also in his reference to a leading Whig who could 'not expect to 
continue in the government, nor would [he], when all his friends were out'.264 
Other instances of the use of friend as a term of party politics can be found in the 
papers of Hearne, who saw particular friendship among the Whigs. Hearne also 
wrote in his diary how, in the common room of his college, it was usual 
`amongst friends' to 'talk of the Whigs and Dissenters',265 that is, to speak ill of 
politico-religious rivals within and outside the University. Likewise, Nicolson 
reported in his diary how a leading Tory clergyman had called the current 
leading minister 'his friend'266  in an evidently political sense. 
259 Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann, London, 4 February 1742, Selected Letters, 23. 
260 Holmes 1987, 16. 
261 Shephard 1992, 725-8, 735. 
262 Shaftesbury, for instance, called the Whigs 'our party' and Whig party leaders 'our friends'. 
Klein 1994, 139. 
263 Compare the original Swift, E26, 1 February 1711, to notes on later textual variations in 
Herbert Davis's edition of his works. 
264 Swift to Addison, Dublin, 22 August 1710, The Letters, 465. 
265 Remarks and Collections of Timmas Hearne, 29 September 1705, Vol. 1, 50. 
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PARTY, OR RATHER FACTION: PARTIES AND FACTIONS... . 221 
Addison's correspondence illustrates how the phrase friends could signify 
both fellow members of the writer's own party and those of the rival party. 
Addison wrote about the Irish Whigs referring to `their friends in England' and 
to 'my Lord Lieutenant's friends'. He reported on the successes of the Whigs by 
revealing the `unspeakable diligence in all my Lord Lieutenant's friends to 
work this point to his satisfaction'. Sometimes he mentioned 'our great officers 
of state', and after the beginning of the Whig monopoly of power in 1715 he 
openly spoke about 'our friends' and 'our ministers'. Addison's loyal 
Whiggism, as well as the euphemistic character of the term friends, became 
explicit when he gave his excuses for being absent from a vote in the House of 
Commons: `I do not remember that since I have been in the House I have 
separated from my friends in a single vote'. Elsewhere, he referred to 'Mr 
Harley and his friends', to 'this gentleman [archdeacon Percivall] and his 
friends', to Irish Tories and `their friends in England', to 'his [Mr Ludlow's] 
friend Mr Sanders who is one of the most able and active men in his party', and 
to 'all the friends and adherents of two former governors'. He also described a 
parliamentary division in words which illustrate the close connection between 
the terms party and friends:267 
Mr Medlycott's election has made a great noise. All the Scotch members 
present were for him, notwithstanding which he would have lost it, had 
not Sir H. Dutton Colt's friends gone to a new opera which was acted 
that night, while Mr Medlycott's friends stuck close to a man. These 
gentlemen however have been so reproached by their party for this piece 
of negligence, that it will have a good effect upon them for the remaining 
part of the Parliament. 
Another report on parliamentary proceedings indirectly shows that both the 
Whigs and the Tories could be regarded as parties and the existence of these 
parties be expressed in friend terminology.268  The same sense of the phrase 
friends as fellow adherents of a party appears also in one of Addison's 
267 Addison to Charles Montagu, Earl of Manchester (Venice), 24 February 1708, The Letters, 
91: Addison to Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland (London), Dublin Castle, 13 June 1709, 
The Letters, 148-9; Addison to John Somers, Baron Somers of Evesham (London), Dublin 
Castle, 4 July 1709, The Letters, 164; Addison to Sidney, Earl of Godolphin, Dublin Castle, 
2 August 1709, The Letters, 169; Addison to Charles Spencer (London), Dublin Castle, 2 
August 1709, The Letters, 170; Addison to Sidney (London), Dublin Castle, 10 August 
1709. The Letters, 174-5: Addison to Sidney (London), Dublin Castle, 12 August 1709, The 
Letters, 177; Addison to Charles Montagu, Earl of Halifax (London), Dublin Castle, 1 
September 1709, The Letters, 184; Addison to Charles Spencer (London), Dublin Castle, 8 
June 1710, The Letters. 223; Addison [to Charles Delafaye, Bath], London, 8 June 1715, The 
Letters, 339; Addison to Charles Delafaye [Bath], [London], 18 June 1715, The Letters, 343; 
The division discussed in the quotation had concerned a petition arising from the 
Westminster election. Thomas Medlycott had been elected by Tory votes, but the election 
result had been questioned by the Whig candidate Henry Dutton Colt. Consequently, the 
case had been given to the House of Commons to decide. Counting on their majority in 
Parliament, some 35 Whig members had been absent attending an opera performance. The 
loss of the vote had caused plenty of altercation within the Whig party. Speck 1984, 111; 
Italics in the quotation by PI. 
268 Addison to Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland (London), Dublin Castle, 23 May 1710. The 
Letters, 219. 
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published essays. Referring to a stereotype of country Tories, Addison wrote 
that 'some of Sir Rogers friends are afraid of the old knight is imposed upon by 
a designing fellow [,] ... some discarded Whig'.269  Other terms in Addison's 
letters that were used in a meaning close to that of party adherence include 
relations, adherents, personal acquaintences and correspondents.2270 The 
opposite expression to friends in polemical texts could be enemies or 
adversaries.271  
Examples of friendship-based party vocabulary in published literature 
include Toland's allusion that party leaders cheat `their friends'272 and Defoe's 
way to divide the people into 'the friends of the government' and `another sort 
of people among them, who are kept together as a party, and supported in their 
aversions to the government'. Defoe also referred to the `politic[al] friends' of 
the High Church.273  Clement discussed the Whig ministry and `their friends',274  
and Swift referred to 'the Whig leaders' and `their friends'.'-75  In a Whiggish 
polemical poem, a Tory asked: 'What would my friends the Tories think?'276  In 
a dialogue produced by the same propaganda machine, two Tories spoke 
interchangeably about 'our friends' and 'our party'.277 In an analogous manner, 
Tory propaganda put words in the mouths of Whigs who maintained that 'a 
show of a party' would raise the `spirits of our friends'.J278 A publication of the 
late 1720s referred to Jacobites as the friends of the Pretender,279 and the 
influential Craftsman wrote about `friendship between politicians' which could 
be either `practical or theoretical'.280 In the early 1730s, governmental writers 
opposing the Craftsman insisted that friends of the current administration and 
those of the country were the same,281 excluding political alternatives. Party 
terminology derived from the general and traditionally used expression friends 
thus seems to have been common throughout the early eighteenth century. It 
offered an alternative and less direct way for expressing one's own party 
identity and for associating someone with a rival political grouping. 
Civic humanism and classical republicanism in particular have been 
interpreted as having offered much of the basis for eighteenth-century 
oppositional thought. Even if it is not the purpose of this study to focus on the 
tradition of civic humanism, it is important to briefly discuss a couple of 
269 Addison, Sl31, 31 July 1711. 
270 Addison to Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland (London), Dublin Castle, 13 June 1709, The 
Letters, 149; Addison to John Somers, Baron Somers of Evesham (London), Dublin Castle, 4 
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271 Addison to Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland (London), Dublin Castle, 20 May 1710, The 
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euphemisms for party, expressions the essentially positive content of which was 
based on that tradition. In the case of euphemisms such as honesty and 
patriotism, civic humanism provided indirect legitimation for party. 
A particularly preferred euphemism for expressing shared party identity was 
the adjective honest. Unlike so much of political vocabulary, it was an 
undisputed term capable of creating associations that were consistently 
emphatic. All contemporaries would with high probability have agreed that 
honest referred to such admired qualities as being `good, virtuous, just, 
upright'. Everyone should, of course, have been honest.282 
In the language of politics, the attribute honest legitimated the existence of 
the writer's own party. Everyone wished to be regarded as honest, honesty 
being 'the best policy at all times, and in all places'. Honest was listed together 
with the attributes wise, judicious and religious, whereas it was contrasted with 
`cunning, violent, selfish, and hypocritical'. Honesty was associated, at least 
among traditionalist writers, with truth, religion and Christianity whereas the 
opposite was seen to consist of `deceit, fraud, worldly politics, and knavery'. 
Defoe went as far as to suggest that a man could be appreciated independently 
of his party inclination provided he was honest. Generally, however, the 
attribute honest and the noun honesty directed suspicion towards rival groups as 
potentially dishonest and consequently not deserving appreciation as legitimate 
competitors for political power.2283 Hence the applicability of the term among 
writers with differing ideological backgrounds was high. One of the clearest 
instances of the euphemistic character of the term is Addison's expression 'an 
honest party of menf 284 which enabled him present the Whig party in an utterly 
respectable light. 
At the very beginning of the century, a propagandist stated that he was `no 
otherwise a party-man, than as I am a well-wisher to the honest part of the 
nation in general'. With this `honest part' he meant those who were `serviceable 
to the present government out of a principle of affection, and duty, and not 
interest'.2S5 The same idea was echoed forty-five years later when Gilpin stated 
that being 'a party-man' for the defence of honesty was a positive issue and 
encouraged `every honest man' to form a party in favour of what mid-
eighteenth-century England valued, that is `virtue and religion, ... liberty and 
public good'.286 To put it other way, the adjective honest, with all the admirable 
282 Kersey 1715; Kersey 1731; [Defoe] 1737; A Pocket Dictionary 1753; Honesty the Best 
Policy, 1711, 3. 
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Defoe saw honest men in every party, and 32, where he argued that `where party-business is 
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that of honest men; I wish him head of no other party'. Goldgar 1976, 177. 
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qualities associated with it, was capable of turning the otherwise detestable 
denomination party-man into an acceptable expression. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the efficacy of the term honest in justifying the 
ideology and actions of one's own party can be found in the notes of the ultra-
traditionalist Hearne. For instance, in Hearne's papers, the attribute honest was 
capable of transforming a dubious party-political practice into an acceptable 
enterprise.'287  It also served to emphasise the contrast between the politicians of 
Hearne's own political group (who were losing power) and the new 
government. Reluctant to endorse any principles that were later to be called 
parliamentarism and party system, Hearne wrote, with reference to a change of 
ministry: `There will be a total removal of all honest men, and ... the favourers 
of the faction will [be] put in their room'.288 Hearne hardly wrote about Tories at 
all. Seldom did he write about High-Church men either. Instead, referring to 
persons who supported High-Church and Tory attitudes, he wrote truly 
positively about `honest men', `honest members', `honest Church of England 
men' and 'true sons of the Church of England', who typically appeared as 
conscientious and ingenious country gentlemen.'" When writing about the 
contrast of the two rival parties, he called one 'the Whiggish party' or `Low-
Church men' and the other 'the honest men', 'the honest part of the nation' or, 
sometimes alternatively, 'the High-Church men'. Emphasising the contrast 
between `party' and `honest men', he recorded a detailed description of how 
'the Whiggish, fanatical party' had manhandled 'an honest gentleman' who had 
been campaigning for a parliamentary seat.29° 
For some other writers, honest was not so exclusive a term as it was for 
Hearne. Some saw `honest and well-meaning' persons on both sides being 
misled by party-men. For them, 'the honest part of the nation' consisted of 
287 On 10 October 1705 (Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, Vol. I, 54), Hearne 
enclosed a Tory propaganda poem illustrative of the potential of the term honest for Tories. 
The poem defended a disastrous Tory attempt to `tack' an Occasional Conformity bill to war 
supply (Bennett 1975, 79-80; Holmes 1993, 344): 
The crown is tacked unto the Church, 
The Church unto the crown, 
The Whigs are slightly tacked to both, 
And so may soon come down. 
Since all the world is a general tack 
Of one thing to another, 
Why then about one honest tack 
Do fools make such a pother? 
288 Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 16 October 1705, Vol. I, 56. 
289 Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 17 November 1705, Vol. I, 79; 31 January 
1706, Vol. I, 174. Some honest gentlemen were nonjuring as well. 24 March 1706, Vol. I, 
208; 21 April 1706, Vol. I, 230-1; 22 December 1706, Vol. I, 313; On the side of printed 
literature, similar use of the expression 'a very honest, peaceable man' as an euphemism for 
Tory can be found in A Presbyterian Getting On Horse-Back, 1717, 34. 
290 Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 26 January 1706, Vol. I, 169; 26 April 1706, 
Vol. I, 234-5; 27 February 1707, Vol. I, 336-7; another fellow traditionalist, who had 
suffered at the hands of political rivals, Hearne was ready to call 'a martyr'. In a parallel way, 
in a piece of Tory propaganda published some ten years later, an honest Tory was said to 
have been abused by Whigs that had behaved 'as if they were some of them that seized our 
Saviour'. Both were describing a politico-religious conflict in religious terminology derived 
from the authoritative sources of Church history. Remarks and Collections of Thomas 
Hearne, 8 February 1706, Vol. I, 180; A Presbyterian Getting On Horse-Back, 1717, 34. 
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people who were not truly committed to either party. These truly honest men 
were unable to support a party in all questions, as every party sometimes 
affronted the values of honesty. Country Whig writers of the 1720s in particular 
presented honesty as a natural quality of men, the public at large, 'even one 
honest man of the meanest understanding' being capable of judg[ing] honestly 
in public affairs'. They insisted that 'an honest Briton' should `learn to value an 
honest man of another party more than a knave of our own'. Of course, such 
views sympathetic towards the extension of political discourse found their 
opponents who could not accept so naive a trust in the honesty of 'the mob of 
England'.291  
If honesty was such an effective term for turning loathsome party activity 
into respectable action, patriotism was a more disputed one for doing the same. 
Patriotism, unlike so many of early eighteenth-century political terms, seems to 
have purely secular origins, being derived from the civic humanist tradition. 
This term has achieved attention in previous research on the secular tradition of 
political thought.2292 Some further remarks on the basis of the sources consulted 
for this study are, however, of interest. 
During the first two decades of the eighteenth century, the term patriot 
occurred every now and then in published literature. It was not yet considered a 
term with particular importance in discourse on political pluralism, even though 
it was sometimes presented as a positive counter-concept for the negative party-
man.293  There was a tendency among supporters of each of the parties to make 
the term their exclusive possession. Tories in particular seem to have turned to 
this concept when seeking for legitimation of Tory views and politicians. 
When, in 1702, a pamphlet vindicating 'true patriots of our established Church, 
English liberty, and ancient monarchy' was published, patriot was a term 
highlighting the political integrity of leading Tory politicians.294 In his diary, 
another Tory, Hearne, termed those who had voted in favour of the bill for 
preventing occasional conformity as `worthy patriots'.295  In 1710, a piece of 
most rigid Tory propaganda, underscoring the threats that Whigs caused to 
monarchy, wrote about 'the royal martyr King Charles the First, and those other 
worthy patriots that suffered for their loyalty and firm adherence to the Church 
of England'.'-96  Disputes about the right to call oneself patriot were also rising. 
In his sermon of 1713, Sacheverell denied the right of 'an abandoned faction', 
that is Whigs and Dissenters, to call themselves patriots.297 
291 [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, 26, 39-40; Place. The Arbitration, [1710], 5, 8; The Humble 
Confession and Petition of a Whig with his Eyes Open, 1712, 8-9; [Defoe], The Political 
Sow-Gelder, 1715, 13; Cato's Letters, The Second Edition, 1720, preface, iii, v; CL2O. 11 
February 1721: C2I, 17 February 1727; C29, 13 March 1727; C204, 30 May 1730; A Letter 
from Waitwell Longhead ... to his Friend Sir Politick Wou'd be, 1731, 3. 
292 Skinner 1974, 99-100, 112. 
293 [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, 29; [Defoe], The Political Sow-Gelder, 1715, 11; The same 
contrast is visible in The Present Necessity of distinguishing Publick Spirit from Party, 1736, 
14-15. 
294 The Old and Modern Whig Truly Represented, 1702, title. 
295 Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 27 October 1705, Vol. I, 59. 
296 Monarchy Sacrific'd, 1710, title. Note the questioning religious content of the verb sacrifice. 
297 Sacheverell. False Notions of Liberty in Religion and Government Destructive of Both, 1713, 
22. 
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It is established among historians that the terms of patriotism formed a 
central part of the armoury which the opposition to Walpole had in its 
possession.'298  Patriot was no neologism introduced by the opposition of the 
1720s; yet the frequency of its use achieved a wholly new extension among the 
oppositional writers headed by Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke's restrictive use of 
patriot as a synonym for a supporter of opposition provoked more widespread 
disputes over the proper sense of the word and led to the word being used in 
highly ironical senses. According to Kathleen Wilson, patriotism stood for 
'love of country, protection of the constitution and the liberties it guaranteed, 
and a devotion to the public good, unscathed by personal interest or private 
aggrandisement'. Talk about patriotism could unite different political 
groupings because Englishmen of the 1720s shared a positive understanding of 
the term. Patriotism could hide various partisan interests under the positive 
ideals of the love of country and the protection of the constitution. Patriotism 
stood for action for the public good and setting aside all private interests. Who 
would not have wished to be called a patriot? In opposition rhetoric it was, of 
course, Walpole's government which provided the best illustrations of the 
counter-concept of patriotism, that is, measures violating English liberties and 
constitutional traditions.299 
The rise of patriot to its position as a central political term really seems to 
have happened with the publication of Cato's Letters in the early 1720s300 and 
was perpetuated by the essays of the Craftsman from the late-1720s onwards.301  
Without proceeding to an extensive analysis of the concept patriotism in the 
oppositional ideology of Bolingbroke's circle, it can be argued that the concept 
was used so repeatedly in their writings that it unavoidably started to lose its 
effectiveness. On one hand, the Craftsman complained how 'real patriots' had 
been attacked by the writers of the government and 'the principles of 
patriotism' ridiculed, stated that 'true patriot' was 'a character indeed 
somewhat scarce', called for 'real patriotism and a truly public spirit', longed 
for 'the warmest patriotism and sincerest concern for the public good', and 
found 'the most eminent patriots' in the ancient world. On the other hand, it 
wrote ironically about establishment Whigs as `zealous patriots' or sometimes 
spoke openly about `anti-patriots',302 referring to the current ministry. 
The Craftsman's way of using the term patriot could not pass unnoticed 
amongst the defenders of the Whig establishment. One writer probably had 
Bolingbroke in mind when he wrote: `If such a sycophant [of the vulgar] be a 
man of fortune and figure, and not employed in the administration of public 
298 See Foord 1964, 154, for instance. 
299 Wilson 1995, 23, 123-4. 
300 In Cato's Letters, the term patriot was at least twice used in a rather obscure and possibly 
ironical sense to question the integrity of politicians under criticism. CL20, 11 February 
1721; CL27, 25 March 1721. It was defined as a person for whom 'to serve his country is his 
private pleasure' and who 'does good to [mankind] by gratifying himself' Quoted in Burtt 
1992, 74. 
301 However, Chambers 1728 did not yet define patriotism. 
302 C2, 9 December 1726; C19, 10 February 1727; C21, 17 February 1727; C29, 13 March 1727; 
C359, 19 May 1733; C722, 3 May 1740, BL Burney, Vol. 349B. 
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affairs, he is among the populace in a free country generally distinguished by 
the name of patriot'.303 Another author referred to what he considered the 
original ancient meaning of the term patriot as `those men who have been 
eminent in defending, or illustriously bold in obtaining ... [the] liberties ... of 
[the] country'. The author regarded it as unacceptable that the supporters of the 
`faction' — obviously meaning the opposition led by Bolingbroke — called 
themselves patriots.304 One more writer in favour of the government condemned 
the opposition's way of using the term and instead described patriotism, used as 
a `mask' by the opposition, as the `foster-father' of faction which `affects the 
name and qualities of its imaginary parent'. As to true patriotism, the writer 
maintained, it was based on truth and virtue and campaigned for the public 
good, whereas Bolingbroke's troops did neither.305 The term patriot finally 
achieved such a degree of politicisation that Henry Fielding, when starting a 
new paper called the True Patriot in 1745, underscored its non-partisan nature 
and defined it as 'love of one's country carried into action'.306 Dictionaries of 
the mid-eighteenth century also seem to have avoided giving patriotism any 
other definitions than `acting like a father of his country'.307 
Talk about patriotism provided an alternative secular way of defending a 
'good' political party. However, the term could be received in conflicting ways, 
and it did not yet form the only or even dominant way of conceptualising 
political party in the early eighteenth century. Instead of mere patriotism, party 
involved faction, cabal, cause, division, side, friendship and honesty as well, 
not to mention its looming associations with heresy, schism and sect. 
303 For criticisms of The Craftsman's use of the term patriot, see [Concanen), The Speculatist, 13 
July 1728, and A Letter from Waitwell Longhead, 1731, 10; An identical argument that 
claims of patriotism were merely a plot of the opposition to achieve popularity appeared in 
The Present Necessity of distinguishing Publick Spirit from Party, 1736, 14-15. 
304 The History of Modern Patriots, 1732, 2, 4. Modern was an essentially pejorative attribute 
here. 
305 The Danger of Faction to a Free People, 1732, 7-8: The expression 'patriot mask' was also 
used in An Essay on Faction, 1733, 9. 
306 Miller 1994, 95. 
307 Martin 1749; A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
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Associations of Party 
Denominations 
Whig and Tory as connectors of religious and political 
discourses 
An important way of conceptualising political parties was to attach proper 
names to them. Such names were not adopted voluntarily by party conventions 
but were given by opponents on the basis of their prejudices towards the rival 
party. These party names and contemporary definitions for them are revealing 
as to how political parties were understood. Associations derived from the 
spheres of religion and politics were initially intermixed in them, but signs of a 
tendency towards a separation between Church parties and political parties, and 
a connected secularisation of political parties, are traceable. 
The use of party-names had had a long history by the early eighteenth 
century. Most seventeenth-century terms of group identity had originated in 
Reformation discourse and continued to be associated with religious 
controversy. Stereotypes based on religious associations remained forceful 
because, being ambiguous, they provided a complete description of the 
ideology of the opponents. They were often based on ambivalent references to 
background doctrines and on an exploitation of implications that could lead to 
senseless extensions of meaning.' 
The two contending parties in early eighteenth-century England were 
referred to as Whigs and Tories, and both labels were applied to opponents with 
the purpose of questioning their respectability. The derogatory origins of the 
terms were familiar to informed readers.' They were known to be nicknames 
derived from past religious confrontations in Scotland and Ireland,' and they 
entered English political discourse at the time of the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-
81.4 Until the Revolution of 1688, however, Whig and Tory remained rarely 
used nicknames and conceptually subordinate to the language of Church 
politics. Their etymologies as Irish Catholic and Scottish Covenanter rebels 
well fitted with the concerns of the day, though it was the terminology of 
religious parties of the Civil War period that was most commonly used in 
political debates. These denominations include the `Church of England and 
loyal party' and 'old cavalier party' for the anti-dissenting side and `fanatic and 
1 	 Albers 1993, 333; Condren 1994, 49-50. 
2 	 A Memorial of the Present State of the British Nation, 1722, 9, suggested that `some' still 
remembered the origins of the names; The etymology of the terms was discussed in [Toland], 
The Art of Governing by Partys, 1701, 35, 37, 44, 119; [Toland], State-Anatomy of Great 
Britain, [1717], 14-18; [Clement], Faults on both Sides, 1710, 12-13. 
3 	 See Bramston, The Art of Politicks, 1729, 5. 
4 	 Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs, Vol. I, 1681, 124, 198-9. 
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Presbyterian party' for the pro-dissenting side. The terms Whig and Tory 
entered parliamentary language only after the Glorious Revolution,' replacing 
the older division into Court and Country.6 
Those who had seen the introduction of the terms Whig and Tory had 
considered them 'of very scandalous significations'. Neither party had initially 
approved its appellation, the connotations of which were highly pejorative.' 
Commentators associated the divisive names with a civil war, as abusive words 
were expected to be followed by violence,' or at least the calling of names was 
condemned as ridiculous. Halifax, for instance, lamented how the English 
'played the fool with throwing Whig and Tory at one another, as boys do 
snowballs'.9 Many also cherished hopes of a swift disappearance of the terms. 
Halifax saw denominations as weapons in a propaganda war and stated: 'They 
are not of long continuance, but after they have passed a little while, and that 
they are grown nauseous by being so often repeated, they give place to 
something that is newer. Thus, after Whig, [and] Tory ... have had their time, 
now they are dead and forgotten'.10 
Contrary to Halifax's wishes, however, Whig and Tory were neither dead nor 
forgotten but were to revive with unforeseen intensity by the turn of the 
eighteenth century. The parties had begun as genuine ideological 
disagreements, and though these differences may have been balanced by some 
shared socio-economic interests of the political elite, the party labels survived. 
Most political writers saw politics as a struggle between Whigs and Tories and 
did not hesitate to exaggerate the dangers connected with the doctrines of the 
rival party." Each party created caricatures of the opponents with which all 
5 	 Willman 1974, 251, 254, 262; Hill 1976, 21: Goldie 1990, 78-9; Hams 1993, I, 8; Hill 1996, 
12. 
6 	 Court and Country denoted the supporters of a strong monarchical executive power and 
backers of Parliament respectively. In the 1690s, both the Whigs and Tories were divided 
between their Court and Country wings. Though occurring occasionally in early eighteenth-
century texts, the terms referred to rather incoherent groupings. The terms survived, but they 
became used polemically rather than as expressions describing party structure. Hill 1976, 27; 
Horwitz 1977, 317; Clark 1980, 299, 302-3: Jones 1984, xiv; Hayton 1984, 37; Speck 1988, 
185: Harris 1993, 1, 52-3, 141, 148, 162, 165; [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, 6; [Defoe]. The 
Weakest go to the Wall, 1714, 15; C103, 22 June 1728; Roger Acherley, The Britannic 
Constitution: Or, the Fundamental Fornt of Government in Britain, The Second Edition, 
1759, 573; Compare The Diary of John Evelyn, 30 December 1701, Vol. V, 484, and 
[Toland]. State-Anatomy of Great Britain, [1717], 18; Court and Country were also used in 
place of the term opposition to distinguish those supporting the king and his ministers from 
everyone else. Beattie 1970, 5-6; Foord 1964, 107, 154; Gunn 1972, 6; Dickinson 1977. 91; 
Clark 1980, 299; Hill 1996, 12-13; The early 1730s experienced attempts to reintroduce this 
older distinction by the opposition to Walpole. Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 
1735, 26; The Craftsman for 4 August 1739, in GM, Vol. IX, August 1739, 424-5, Reel 137; 
Compare with The London Journal. No. 734, 21 July 1733, in GM, Vol. III, July 1733, Reel 
134. 
7 	 [Defoe], Whigs turn'd Tories, 1713. 11, claimed that both the terms Whig and Tory had been 
'owned and gloried in ... under those agreeable expositions, which each side give to their 
party-name'. However, that was still seldom done in published texts. 
8 	 Willman 1974, 263; Charles Davenant's dialogue The True Picture of a Modern Whig, 1701, 
6. suggested that a civil war was the real aim of the Whigs. 
9 	 Halifax, 'The Character of a Trimmer', The Works of George Savile Marquis of Halifax, ed. 
Mark N. Brown, New York 1989. Vol. I, 179. 
10 	 Halifax, 'The Anatomy of an Equivalent', 1688, The Works of George Savile Marquis of 
Halifax, Vol. 1, 265. 
11 	 Gunn 1972, 4-5. 
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opposition activities were associated» These stereotypes reveal a great deal 
about the ideology of their creators, as Swift pointed out: 'A Whig forms an 
image of a Tory, just after the thing he most abhors; and that image serves to 
represent the whole body' .13 
The first part of the 1690s also saw the emergence of a party system in 
Parliament. The terms Whig and Tory came to symbolise an increasing amount 
of shared attitudes towards major political questions within each party,14 and, 
although for much of William's reign (1689-1701) contemporary terminology 
reflected the complexity of partisan groupings, few observers were able to write 
about politics without using party labels. Whig and Tory might be called 
improper and vulgar expressions, but they were anyway employed to draw 
distinctions between the major political groupings.15 The use of both terms was 
so common that their pejorativeness weakened unavoidably, even to the point 
that some writers could proudly apply one of the terms to denote themselves. 
In early eighteenth-century political literature, the party names were applied 
in a way that shows the essential meanings of the words having retained tones 
derived from the Exclusion Crisis. There were 'two great parties, of late known 
by the names of Whig and Tory', both `reproaching and branding each other 
with names of ignoring and reproach'. So much so that, during the 
parliamentary session of 1708 when the parties were particularly factious 
(sometimes both parties opposing the ministry) an angry polemist pointed out 
how `there is nothing but Whig and Tory, High Church and Low Church, heard 
among us'.16 Many wished that they had been able to avoid 'the invidious 
names of Whig and Tory, High and Low Church, and other discriminating 
appellations' but had to recognise that 'the best and the politest in their 
discourses and writings are forced to use them, to avoid tedious 
circumlocutions'." When, some time before the end of the reign of Anne, 
Bishop Burnet wrote about the terms Whig and Tory, he had to concede that 
`terms that I have much spoken against, and even hated' had to be used 'to 
avoid making always a longer description' as both were 'now become as 
common as if they had been words of our language'.18 
Whig and Tory had indeed become part of the English language. The names 
of the parties deserve special attention, as they constitute an exemplary case of 
the close interplay of religious questions and party politics. These connections 
become easier to understand when the shared memories concerning the 
traumatic events of the 1640s and 1650s are taken into consideration. The 
reading audience of the reign of Anne was exposed to often repeated references 
to the politico-religious conflicts of the Civil War. Religion (anti-Catholicism) 
12 Corns, Speck and Downie 1982, 2. 
13 Swift, E33, 22 March 1711. 
14 Clark 1980, 296. 
15 Horwitz 1977, 317. 
16 OED: Tory, Whig; Occasional Thoughts Concerning Our Present Divisions, And Their 
Remedies, 1704, 5; A View Of the present Divisions in Great-Britain, 1708, 3; Hill 1976, 
112-13. 
17 	 Abel Boyer's Political State of Great Britain for 1711 as cited in Speck 1970, 1. 
18 	 Gilbert Burnet's History of My Own Time as quoted in Richards 1972, 154. 
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had also played a significant role in the emergence of the Whigs and Tories 
towards the end of the reign of Charles II. '9 Although the division partly 
followed the older division into Court and Country, it must not be interpreted as 
a purely constitutional conflict. Even though some Whigs were radical 
parliamentarians and some Tories defended absolute monarchy, the more 
traditionalist Whigs and more moderate Tories wished to maintain much of the 
English constitution untouched.20 As the relatively peaceful processes of the 
Glorious Revolution and Hanoverian Succession show, the majority of the 
English elites shared the ideal of a mixed constitution. Religion was a more 
divisive issue, and this tendency can be seen nowhere as distinctly as in the 
language of party. 
Considering the extent to which Whig and Tory had become part of everyday 
language, a surprising observation is to be made when dictionaries are 
consulted for definitions of Whig and Tory. Despite the historical reality of 
party divisions and the constant application of the terms Whig and Tory in 
political discourse, both were totally overlooked in such originally seventeenth-
century dictionaries as Coles (1701), Cocker-Hawkins (1704), Glossographia 
Anglicana Nova (1707), Bullokar-Browne (1719), and even by Kersey (1732). 
The lexicographers' reaction to the terms was obvious: Whig and Tory were for 
long not considered respectable enough or sufficiently important terms to be 
accepted as a part of the English language and entered in dictionaries. 
The word Tory, applied to the supporters of the more traditionalist of the two 
parties, had originated from the seventeenth-century dispossessed Irish, who 
had become outlaws and lived by plundering and killing English settlers and 
soldiers. These Irish Tories had become familiar to the seventeenth-century 
English reading audience as despised Catholic extremists and robbers. 
However, the meaning of the term was considerably extended during the 
Exclusion Crisis at the turn of the 1680s to denote those Englishmen who 
opposed the exclusion of Catholic James, Duke of York, from the succession to 
the crown. One reason for this adaptation of the term may well have been the 
fact that many of James's friends were Irish. This new Tory party opposed the 
goals of the Whigs, popular sovereignty and contract theory in particular. It was 
characterised by the support of the Anglican clergy for the union of traditional 
monarchy and the established Church. This union included the defence of the 
doctrines of divine hereditary right, passive obedience and the rejection of any 
concessions to religious sects.'-' 
Soon after the Exclusion Crisis, an observer expressed the conceptual shift in 
party names in these simplifying terms: `Instead of Cavalier and Roundhead, 
now they are called Tories and Whigs'.'-Z Such statements illustrate the strong 
19 Holmes 1975, 5-6. 
20 Harris 1993, 108. 
21 	 For the reasons for the birth of the Tory party, see Holmes 1993, 127, 139-41. 
22 	 OED: Tory; Higgons, A Short View of the English History, 1727, 326; The theory of a direct 
development from the Royalists to the Cavaliers, the Court party and later the Tories, and 
from the Puritans to the Roundheads, the Country party and the later Whigs, was repeated in 
C17. 30 January 1727 (the anniversary of the execution of Charles 1); Bulmer-Thomas 1965, 
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association between the emerging new party names and the detested names of 
the parties in the Civil War. Naturally enough, when creating a stereotype of 
Tory, Whig polemicists were eager to draw connections between the Cavaliers 
and the Tories.23 Whigs claimed that Tory principles posed a threat to the 
Revolution Settlement of 1689 and to the coming Protestant Succession, 
leading to tyranny and Catholicism.24 For vindicating the privileges of the 
Church of England, Tories were called high-flyers. For being potentially 
favourable to the Restoration of the Catholic line of Stuarts, they were often 
termed as Jacobites.25 The stereotype Tory was a monarchist, a land-owner, a 
favourer of Catholicism, hysterically afraid of Protestant plots, supporter of 
priestcraft, a potential Jacobite, a xenophobic, and an isolationist.26 During the 
Whig ascendancy, a Tory could easily be branded a traitor,27 and the real or 
imagined threat of a Stuart Restoration was frequently turned against the 
opponents of the Whig ministry: 'The Jacobites and Tories are the same men, 
only with this difference, that the Jacobites are real enemies professed, and the 
Tories real enemies not professed'.28 The party denominations still carried a 
meaning: As a Tory was understood essentially as a secret adversary to the 
established political order, it made sense to distinguish between political 
groupings as Whigs and Tories. 
The reality of the stereotype of a Tory was, of course, questionable. Few of 
the Tories genuinely sympathised with Catholicism, but they were dedicated to 
those traditionalist political theories of the Anglican Church which underlined 
monarchical right and authority. They were adherents to an ideology of passive 
obedience and non-resistance to monarchs and accepted the doctrine of the 
divine right of monarchs. Furthermore, the Tories were a party of intolerant 
Anglicanism. This conviction made them oppose any attempts to alter the 
sacred order of succession or to reduce the exclusive religious authority of the 
Anglican Church.29 
It is striking that dictionaries refrained for so long from listing Tory among 
their entries in a situation where public discourse provided an abundance of 
instances of the use of the term. Tory was accepted into dictionaries only after 
the most intense party strife was already abating. In 1715, Kersey did mention 
4; Willman 1974, 251-2; Corns, Speck, Downie 1982, 19; See also Bolingbroke, A 
Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 37; Later in the same text (54), however, Bolingbroke 
denied a complete resemblance between the Tories and Cavaliers and the Whigs and 
Roundheads. 
23 Corns, Speck, Downie 1982, 18; continuity from Cavaliers and Roundheads to Tories and 
Whigs was suggested by a Tory character in the Whig propaganda dialogue The True Picture 
of an Ancient Tory, 1702, 11; The writer of Observations on the Conduct of the Tories, the 
Whigs, and the Dissenters, 1739, 13, asked for permission to speak about Tories as a party as 
old as the Cavalier side of the Civil Wars. 
24 	 Swift summarised their accusations against Tories in the words `popery, arbitrary power, and 
the Pretender'. [Swift], E39, 3 May 1711; Richards 1972, 92. 
25 	 Robert against Ferguson, 1704, title; [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, title and 43; [Trenchard], 
CL80, 9 June 1722; C40, 24 April 1727; Bolingbroke, On the Spirit of Patriotism, 1736, 357. 
26 Redwood 1976, 20-1; Downie 1979, 7-8. 
27 	 Gordon's Creed of an Independent Whig, 1720, 23-4, declared that Tory and traitor were 
`synonymous terms'. 
28 The London Journal, No. 723, 5 May 1733, in GM, Vol. III, May 1733, Reel 134. 
29 Holmes 1975, 6; Hill 1976, 21; Harris 1993, 82. 
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Tory but still refrained from expressing the political sense of the term, referring 
with Tory merely to 'an Irish robber, or bog-trotter'. In a handbook for 
secretaries (1721), Tories were presented as `Irish outlaws'. By the 1720s, 
however, Tory was entering dictionaries as a political expression as well. 
Whereas Cocker-Hawkins (1704) printed nothing about the expression, the 
edition of 1724 already contained an entry for these `Irish thieves and cut-
throats' and even stated the political sense of Tory, the word being `applied now 
to one party in England, in revenge for their being by them denominated 
Whigs'. 
The breakthrough of the term Tory in dictionaries occurred in the late 1720s 
together with Chambers's (1728) lengthy article on the etymology of the term 
and history of this `party or faction'. The article describing the 'two celebrated 
parties' was based on French sources because 'the division has gone so deep, 
that it is presumed, no Englishman, who has any concern or principles at all, but 
inclines more to one side than the other' and could thus provide a neutral 
description. Quoting Frenchmen was a safe solution to the problem of defining 
the party denominations, as two accounts of English parties had been published 
on the Continent in 1717. The continental observers interpreted the Whigs and 
Tories in the context of at least a hundred years of domestic political strife and 
two hundred years of disagreements on the proper extent of Reformation. Tory 
and Whig appeared as direct continuations of Cavalier and Roundhead of the 
Civil War and the Episcopalians and Presbyterians of the Reformation; the first 
consistently defending the interests of the monarch and the established Church, 
the latter those of the people and radical Protestantism. 
In several dictionaries published in the 1730s, the term Tory was already 
discussed at a length appropriate for a society in which parties and party 
denominations were a reality. According to Gordon-Bailey (1730), a Tory was3° 
a name which the Protestants of Ireland gave to those Irish robbers, etc. 
that were outlawed for robbery and murder; also the enemies of King 
Charles I accusing him of favouring the rebellion and massacre of the 
Protestants in Ireland, gave his partisans the name of Tories; but of late 
the name has been transmitted to those that affect the style of High-
Church men, and since the death of King James II to the partisans of the 
Chevalier de St. George [=the Pretender]. 
The reference to Tory having been used already during the Civil War illustrated 
where the roots of the term were to be found. The contrast between Protestants 
and Catholics is also noteworthy. Gordon-Bailey stated that those called Tories 
pretended to defend the Anglican Church yet actually wished for the return of a 
French-supported Catholic monarch. In a parallel manner, Bailey (1733) first 
referred to the Irish connection but then stated that Tory was 'now a nick-name 
given to such as call themselves High-Church men, or to the partisans of the 
Chevalier de St. George', i.e. the Catholic Pretender. 
30 An identical explanation of the origin of the term had appeared in [Defoe], Whigs turn'd 
Tories. 1713, 11. 
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Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) also emphasised the dynastic definition of Tory 
to such an extent that he played down the religious element of party 
confrontations, stating that Tory 
at first meant those Irish papists who murdered and plundered the 
Protestants, but of late years it has meant all those Englishmen of any 
profession in religion that espoused the cause of the Pretender, in 
opposition to the House of Hanover. 
`Murdering Protestants' was an extremely negative expression in a 
conspicuously Protestant political culture, but supporting the exiled claimant to 
the throne was hardly less than that. Fenning (1741) offered a further alternative 
political approach to defining Tory, setting references to both confessional and 
dynastic rivalries aside and concentrating more objectively on the tenets of a 
Tory and on the reality of the party conflict of the day. According to Fenning, a 
Tory was 'a person who pretends to adhere to the ancient constitution of the 
state, to the apostolic hierarchy of the Church, and professes to oppose the 
measures of the Whigs'. Fenning was not convinced by the sincerity of Tory 
commitment to the ancient constitution or to the traditions of the Anglican 
Church. What was more certain was that the Tories opposed whatever the 
Whigs were aiming to achieve. 
Johnson's Tory inclination can be seen in his dictionary where Tory was 
introduced as 'a cant term, derived, I suppose, from an Irish word signifying a 
savage'. Johnson saw Tory as a denomination that was not to be taken seriously 
when used for abuse, and he consciously played down the strong religious 
associations created by the etymology of the word. He was the only 
lexicographer that displayed Tory as a term of honour, as 'one who adheres to 
the ancient constitution of the state, and the apostolical hierarchy of the Church 
of England, opposed to Whig'. The connotations of the term differ dramatically 
from those provided by Fenning, a Tory now understood as giving honest 
allegiance to the inherited order of both the state and Anglican Church — not 
whatever Church — unlike the Whigs.31  
In spite of these political definitions for Tory, the term was not universally 
recognised by editors. Kersey (1731) still saw Tory exclusively as 'an Irish 
robber or bog-trotter', no party references being visible, and Coles-Johnson 
(1732), though declaring itself `newly corrected', completely neglected such an 
entry.32 For Defoe, who published a new dictionary in the late 1730s, Tory still 
remained 'a word used by the Protestants in Ireland, to signify the common 
robbers', the religious association of the term appearing as considerably strong. 
Martin (1749) continued the tradition of denying the reality of parties by 
defining Tory as an Irish robber and 'a royalist, in the time of King Charles I', 
thus ignoring nearly eighty years of party struggle. 
In dictionaries, the manner of discussing the origin and meaning of the term 
Tory was sometimes timid, but that was not the case in printed polemic. In a 
31 	 A parallel definition for Tory appeared also in A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
32 Kersey 1731; Coles-Johnson 1732. 
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Whiggish dialogue from 1702, Tory appears as a character who revered 
Scripture as an unquestionable authority, confused the fear of God with 
honouring the monarch, considered the execution of Charles I as the starting 
point of all troubles, and concentrated on lamenting such 'sins of the people'. A 
Whiggish counterpart answered with a fanciful politico-religious interpretation 
of the origin of the term Tory, maintaining that the fratricide Cain33 had been the 
first of the Tories, that Tories had been historically called `Cainites', and that 
Tory and murderer were terms of synonymous root. The Whig maintained and 
the Tory character also soon conceded that, at the time of the Irish massacre 
during the Civil War, the term Tory had been applied to murderers, Tory being 
'an Irish word, and signifies the same in Irish as Cain does in Hebrew, or 
murderer in English'. After such a pseudo-religious start, criticism against 
Tories was primarily secular. The emphasis was laid on constitutional issues in 
which the Tories, universally understood, were accused of contributing to 
absolutism and `slavery'. The religious element was reintroduced with the 
Tory's confession towards the end of the dialogue that Tories were ready to 
cooperate with a ruler without minding his religion.34 This was simply one way 
to say that Tories were not loyal to Protestantism which was seen as an 
inseparable part of the English free constitution. 
The term Tory most often appeared in Whiggish texts and referred to political 
opponents. By the early 1710s, however, a leading Tory propagandist could 
privately discuss the two parties almost as equal competitors for political 
power. Swift reported how 'the Queen passed by us with all Tories about her; 
not one Whig:... and I have seen her without one Tory'.35 In his published 
works, he denounced the party character of the Tories by writing about `those 
who were called the Tories', whereas he referred to Whigs as 'the late party' 
who had been in control of ministerial power.36 For Bolingbroke, the 
relationship to the party name Tory became complicated towards the end of the 
1710s, when he wrote his vindication in exile, disillusioned by the way, as he 
saw it, his party had deserted him. He was more inclined than any other writer to 
talk candidly about 'the Tory party' and even admit having once been a Tory 
himself.3i 
The term Whig has an analogous word history to that of Tory. Ever since the 
1640s, it had referred to `whiggamores', sectaries and rebellious adherents of 
the radical Protestant cause in the Scottish moorlands. In connection with the 
Exclusion Crisis, it was applied by political opponents to the Exclusioners, i.e. 
to those who opposed the succession of James, Duke of York, to the crown, on 
the grounds of his being a Roman Catholic.38 The Whigs wished to restrict 
33 In seventeenth-century historical imagination, Cain was considered the person who had first 
started a heresy and thus become the father of all heretics (Harrison 1990, 105). This 
assumption was applicable to political polemic as well: Tories appeared here as heretics. 
34 	 The True Picture of an Ancient Tory, 1702, 3-4, 8, 20, 50, 53. 
35 OED: Tory. 
36 Swift, E24, 18 January 1711. 
37 COPC: Bolingbroke, A Letter to Sir William Windham, 1717. 
38 OED: Whig: Bulmer-Thomas 1965, 4; Willman 1974, 252-3: Corns. Speck and Downie 
1982. 9. 
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monarchical power and — either to foster the principle or simply to gain votes — 
called for a measure of toleration for the Protestant Dissenters. Thereby they 
received support from former Puritans and Dissenters.39 
In addition to opposing Catholicism, advocating Low-Church principles and 
having some tolerance towards sectarianism, the most radical of the Whigs 
vindicated alternative political theories of republicanism, popular sovereignty 
and contractual government. The more moderate avoided support for theories 
entailing a right of resistance but wished to see a degree of secularisation in 
monarchical power. Even such moderate ideas were interpreted by Tories as a 
tendency to innovate in succession and as a constant readiness for rebellion 40 
The Tories charged the Whigs for having anti-monarchical and anti-Church 
ideas which threatened the natural and divine order. The typical Whig was 
described as willing to cut royal power, as sympathetic to religious dissent, as 
an anti-Catholic, as a supporter of contractual notions of political power, as a 
vindicator of continental warfare and as a representative of the newly emerged 
moneyed interest that benefited from the public credit.41 For being sympathetic 
towards Protestant dissent, he was called a fanatic, and for advocating limited 
monarchical prerogatives, he was branded names such as Commonwealthsman, 
an enemy to all sorts of monarchy, republican and `forty-one man'.42 As Swift 
pointed out, 'we charge the [Whigs] with a design of destroying the established 
Church, and introducing fanaticism and freethinking in its stead. We accuse 
them as enemies to monarchy; as endeavouring to undermine the present form 
of government, and to build a commonwealth, or some new scheme of their 
own, upon its ruins'.43 The Craftsman also summarised the stereotypical picture 
of a Whig as 'a man of republican principles, a Presbyterian, and a sworn enemy 
to the Church of England and the regal prerogative'. A Whig was easily also 
called an `atheist, or libertine, and an enemy to all government whatsoever'.44 
Whig entered dictionaries with a delay comparable to that of Tory. No 
consulted dictionary printed an entry for Whig before 1715, even though by 
then the term had been part of political discourse for thirty-five years. When 
entries started to appear, political senses were for long surpassed by unspecific 
etymological explanations. As late as 1731, Kersey's dictionary passed by all 
party-political senses and instead echoed an old definition of whig as `whey, 
butter-milk, or very small beer'. This neglect is peculiar as Kersey had been the 
39 Thomas Naish recorded in his diary a story according to which the lower house of 
Convocation 'had been abused and scandalised by some Whiggish people as if they favoured 
Presbyter[ianism]'. Importantly, such opposition to Anglicanism was recorded on a day 
when the nation was commemorating the downfall of monarchy and the established Church 
with the execution of Charles I. The Diary of Thomas Naish, 30 January 1703, 49. See also 
Holmes 1975, 6; Harris 1993, 82; Holmes 1993, 125-7. 
40 Hill 1976, 21; Redwood 1976; Holmes 1993, 138-41. 
41 Richards 1972, 92; Downie 1979, 7-8. 
42 	 [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, 43; [Trenchard], CL80, 9 June 1722; Higgons, A Short View of 
the English History, 1727, 326, maintained that the Whigs followed in detail `their 
predecessors in 41'. 
43 	 Swift, E39, 3 May 1711; For parallel arguments, see The True Picture of an Ancient Tory, 
1702, 5. 
44 C40, 24 April 1727. 
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first to introduce the term in 1715. Writing in the beginning of Whig rule, he 
explained the etymology of the denomination and underplayed its derogatory 
power. Kersey omitted negative references to Scottish rebels, referred to the 
above-mentioned harmless things and added that Whig had been used as 'a 
nickname, given to those that were against the court interest'. In Kersey's view, 
Whig as a term of abuse belonged to the past. In 1715 and even more in 1731, 
they were the proper representatives of the court interest. Kersey and most other 
editors did not define the Whig ideology, referring ambiguously to Whiggism 
as 'the tenets and practice of the Whigs'. No dictionary accorded the term 
Toryism a comparable entry, even though such a term for Tory ideology was in 
use.45 Whiggism appeared as the only established political `doctrine', no matter 
how unspecific. 
When a definition of Tory was added to the third edition of Cocker-Hawkins 
(1724), no separate entry was given to Whigs. The Whigs were mentioned only 
in passing under an entry dedicated to their political rivals, which may imply 
that the editor regarded Tory as a continuously applicable nickname, something 
that Whig was not. The Whigs had been — in the past — 'a people in Scotland, of 
whom many were executed . . . for [being] rebels, in opposing their 
government'. The Secretary's Guide (1721) was another wordbook that listed 
Tory but excluded Whig. Secretaries were perhaps not supposed to use in their 
writings the name of the party that governed the country even though many 
leading Whigs already applied the term to themselves. In the late 1720s, 
however, definitions of Whig and its derivatives became more detailed. 
Chambers (1728) was the first dictionary dedicating to it more than passing 
reference and yet in a way that did not discriminate between the two parties. 
This sort of neutrality was made possible by quotations from French sources. 
Chambers's account of the origin of the terms did not contain anything not 
already known to an informed audience. 
In the 1730s, Whig already belonged to the standard vocabulary of 
dictionaries. Though Gordon-Bailey (1730) simply stated that a Whig was 'one 
of a party opposite to the Tories', he already provided entries for terms such as 
whiggish, whiggishly and Whiggism. Whiggish was 'a nickname, the opposite 
to that of Tory, and is applied to those that were against the court interest, in the 
time of King Charles II, King James II, etc., and for it, in the reign of King 
William and King George', and, by implication, continued to represent the 'ins' 
of Hanoverian England. Whiggism was briefly 'the principles of the Whigs', no 
reference being made to their sympathy for religious toleration or their concern 
for trading interests, for instance. It was the relationship to the governing 
monarch which made the difference. A similar approach underscoring the Whig 
relation to the court interest characterised Bailey's (1733) and Defoe's (1737) 
definitions. Neither were the religious associations of the term entirely 
disregarded. When defining Whig, Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) mentioned 
45 	 One of the very few instances of the use of the term Toryism was that by Bolingbroke in his 
Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 28; The consulted sources also contain an instance of the 
alternative derivation `Torydom'. Place, The Arbitration, [1710]. 4. 
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three religious connections, including Scottish sectarianism, English Protestant 
dissent and anti-Catholicism: 
Whig a party-name or distinction at first given to the field conventiclers 
in the west of Scotland, upon account of their feeding much upon sour 
milk; and now generally means a Dissenter from the Church of England, 
though sometimes it means only one who is strenuous against the 
Pretender, and his party. 
The linguistic transition from a religious term of abuse to a more general 
religiously flavoured nickname and further to an increasingly secular party 
denomination is visible. 
Before long, the etymologies for Whig turned so numerous that no definite 
conclusions about its origin could be based on dictionaries. More interesting 
than the actual origin of the term are the ways in which editors attempted to 
explain such a common but problematic expression. Fenning (1741), for 
instance, offered an explanation based on a Scottish Whig author:46 
Whig a party formerly opposite to the court. Burnet shows the true 
original of this word to be owing to the whiggamores, or carriers in 
Scotland, who were contractedly called wiggs ... [as] whiggam [was] a 
word they used in driving their horses. 
Fenning's choice of a quotation from Burnet avoided inconvenient religious 
associations by giving a harmless and even positive etymology to Whig. 
Furthermore, Whigs had formerly opposed the court but were by definition no 
more doing so, and the assumption in the background was that, being identical 
with the current government, they could never again disagree with the court 
interest. 
The most realistic definition for the ideology of the Whigs that any dictionary 
— or much of political polemic for that matter — could provide was the one 
printed in A Pocket Dictionary (1753). This secular definition avoided direct 
associations with religious questions and instead underscored the commonly 
shared, though unspecific, values of English liberty. Like Martin (1749), it still 
disputed implicitly the continued existence of a Whig party by using the past 
tense in the definition: 
Whig a party name first given to some in Scotland, who kept their 
meetings in the fields, from their common food being sour milk; a party 
name in the last reigns given to those who maintained, that liberty was 
the birthright of every man, and that kings being created for the good of 
46 	 A similar interpretation of the term Whig as a denomination for Scottish religious enthusiasts 
had already appeared before in print. Defoe had formulated the origin of the party name in 
the following terms in 1713: `... they, in the government of Scotland first used the name of 
Whig, which they applied to those, by them esteemed enthusiasts, who generally kept their 
meetings in the fields, and their common food was sour milk, and from that sort of diet were 
called Whigs. For Whig in Scotland signifies sour milk or sour whey'. [Defoe], Whigs turn'd 
Tories, 1713, 11. 
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the people, and the preservation of liberty, could not have a divine right 
to become tyrants, or to subvert that constitution they had sworn to 
protect. 
Martin's definition was not equally secular, as it saw Whig as a nickname of 
'the fanatics, that were against the king's interest'. 
Johnson's (1755) approach to term Whig, when compared to his sympathetic 
treatment of Tory as loyalty to the established order, appears as particularly 
tendentious. Whig could be `whey' but above all it was 'the name of a faction'. 
Johnson's way of quoting Burnet at length, unlike Fenning's shortening, 
reminded the readers about the fundamentally religious associations of the 
term, Whig being derived 
from a word, whiggam, used in driving their horses, all that drove were 
called whiggamores, and shorter the whiggs. Now in that year before the 
news came down of Duke Hamilton's defeat [1648?], the ministers 
animated their people to rise and march to Edinburgh; and they came up 
marching on the head of their parishes with an unheard-of fury, praying 
and preaching all the way as they came . . . This was called the 
whiggamor's inroad; and ever after that, all that opposed the court came 
in contempt to be called whigs: and from Scotland the word was brought 
into England, where it is now one of our unhappy terms of disunion. 
In other words, the term Whig had originated in a rebellion against the 
established order motivated by sectarian enthusiasm and led by clergymen 
hostile to the Anglican Church. Johnson wished his readers would associate 
these threats with the English Whigs. He strengthened the association by 
carefully chosen quotations from Swift, perhaps the most ardent critic of the 
Whigs ever since the early 1710s, and excluding all alternative views. Swift's 
statement `whoever has a true value for Church and state, should avoid the 
extremes of Whig for the sake of the former, and the extremes of Tory on the 
account of the latter', was relevant advice for the readers of the 1750s, 
particularly when Tory threats to the state unquestionably belonged to history. 
Preconceptions unfavourable to Whigs were further strengthened by Swift's 
claim that `I could quote passages from fifty pamphlets, wholly made up of 
Whiggism and atheism', the two being constantly linked in Tory propaganda. 
Religious connotations which Tory polemicists attempted to associate with 
Whiggism are also explicit in a booklet published in the late 1700s, at a time of 
repeated campaigns against occasional conformity. Whig was defined from an 
ostentatiously religious point of view, appearing as an opportunist whose 
religiousity was pretended and only motivated by a search for private economic 
advantage. A Whig was presented as identical with a Protestant Dissenter and a 
despised occasional attender for Anglican communion with the sole purpose of 
evading the legal restraints for non-Anglicans entering public office:47 
47 	 Hickelty Pickelty: Or, a Medly of Characters Adapted to the Age, 1708, 3-4. 
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A Whig Is one that divides his religion between his conscience and his 
purse, and comes to church not to serve God, but himself. The face of the 
law makes him wear the mask of the Gospel, which uses not as a means 
to save his soul, but his place. He loves merit well, but not so well as to 
lose by it. He pawns his faith for an office, and brings in his body to save 
his bail. He goes to church to fit him for an employ, kneels with the 
congregation, but prays by him; and asks God forgiveness for coming 
there. If he is forced to stay for a sermon, he hangs down his head and 
frowns out the three quarters of an hour, and when he comes home 
thinks to make amends by abusing the preacher. Charity is directly 
against his principle, yet he swallows the communion, notwithstanding 
his qualm to it. When he smooths the way to preferment, he would make 
a bad martyr and good traveller, for his conscience is so large he can 
never go out of the way. And in a Jewish government, [he] would 
venture circumcision, with a mental reservation, to be chief minister of 
state. 
For as long as the name of one of the two leading parties could be defined in 
purely religious terms as above - even if by the rival party - it is unfounded to 
talk about an emergence of genuinely `political' parties, not to say a universal 
acceptance of a concept for political pluralism. 
In every early eighteenth-century quotation of the word Whig in the OED, 
with one exception in a quote from Hume, the sense is pejorative. Whiggish 
could be used as a synonym of `factious, seditious, restless, uneasy'. The word 
was mainly applied by political opponents, while the adherents of the party long 
avoided the use of the word or substituted it with other expressions.48 Published 
literature seldom contained explicit statements of the writer's own 
'Whiggishness'. The radical impression given to Whiggism still made Steele, 
an active Whig, write in 1713: `I am, with relation to the government of the 
Church, a Tory, with regard to the state, a Whig'.4° But clearly the Whigs were 
less reluctant than the Tories to adopt the party name attached to them, provided 
that they denied all negative associations connected with it.50 An early example 
of a positive definition of Whiggism can be found in a pamphlet in which the 
writer stated that, if behaving rationally and being unable ever to rebel against 
the monarch were Whiggism, he proudly adhered to Whiggism.51  
After the Hanoverian Succession, a triumph for Whigs, the tone in Whiggish 
texts changed. In 1716, Addison attempted to convince his readers about the 
superiority of Whig policies when compared with the policies of the Tories by 
writing very positively about the 'Whig-scheme' which he claimed to have 
been beneficial to the country for several centuries. He did not hesitate to 
48 OED: Whig, Whiggish. 
49 Steele, GI, 12 March 1713. Defoe also pointed out two years later that the best English 
statesmen were both Whigs and Tories — Whigs in questions concerning the state and Tories 
in issues related to the Church. [Defoe], The Political Sow-Gelder, 1715, 31. 
50 Hill 1976, 25. 
51 The Humble Confession, 1712, 45; T. Wagstaffe's letter to Hearne, 3 March 1714, Remarks 
and Collections of Thomas Hearne, Vol. IV, 316, contains a dubious report about Lord 
Wharton having owned to the Queen that he was a Whig. Such an arrogant act was quickly 
condemned by the traditionalist audience. 
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mention terms such as 'the Whigs', `Whig-ministry' and even 'the Whig-party'. 
By 1716, it had become respectable to be a Whig and even to state it in public. 
This respectability of party adherence was based on the definition that `by 
Whigs I always mean those who are friends to our constitution, both in Church 
and state'. The definition was so broad that the Tories consequently became 
suspected of being `enemies to the present establishment'. Addison's 
conclusion was that both the Whigs and the majority of Tories were 'true lovers 
of their religion and country' who had been `divided by accidental friendships 
and circumstances' rather than `by any essential distinction'.52 The success of 
Whiggism after the ascension of a new German monarch also encouraged 
Ryder to record such overwhelmingly positive attributes as 'a strong active 
Whig' and 'an honest, true Whig' in his diary 53 
From the early 1720s onwards, when Whig governments had become a rule, 
it became fashionable to declare oneself a Whig. Whiggism had become the 
only established political doctrine, and disputes now centered on what real 
Whiggism was. The much read manifesto of radical Whiggism, Cato's Letters, 
proudly associated the principles of a Whig with 'the doctrine of liberty',54 a 
political mantra with an unspecified meaning echoed by most writers.55 The 
circle of the Craftsman already wished to appear as 'very good Whig[s], with 
honest principles', contrasting the opposition principles of 'old Whigs' with the 
government's questionable principles of `modern Whigs' who had deserted 
true Whiggism.56 The Old Whig, a paper presenting oppositional views at the 
time of the Test Act controversy of the mid-1730s, suggested that the term 
Whig had originally meant 'an inviolable attachment to the people's liberties' 
while, in the 1730s, it was `retained by men propagating all the slavish doctrines 
of ecclesiastical and political tyranny, and sapping the foundations of liberty, by 
denying the right of private judgement'. To underline the interconnection 
between religious and political freedom, the writer continued: 'Thus too the 
name of Protestant is prostituted to the purposes of superstition, priestly 
domination, etc.'.57 The opposition claimed that both the glorious terms of 
Whig and Protestant were abused by the government at the cost of liberty while 
a true Whig would defend both religious and political liberty. 
52 Addison, F54, 25 June 1716. 
53 	 The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 30 January 1716, 174, 8 November 1716, 361. 
54 [Trenchard], CLI3, 21 June 1720; Other partial statements emphasising the Whiggish zeal 
for liberty include Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 19. 
55 The concepts of freedom and liberty were understood differently by different late 
seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Englishmen. Some few saw them in terms of 
inherent natural human rights, whereas a great majority of Englishmen continued to 
conceive liberties (in plural) as privileges of an individual or a group. Freedom was mainly 
seen in negative terms as defense against the crown and the masses. Miller 1992, 54-4. 
56 	 C 118, 5 October 1728; C368, 21 June 1733; Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 
1735; C674, 9 June 1739, in GM, Vol. IX, June 1739, 313, Reel 137. 
57 The Old Whig, No. 20, 24 July 1735, in GM, Vol. V, July 1735, 372, Reel 135. 
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Debate on the character of party denominations 
The word history of the terms Whig and Tory reveals the rather dubious 
politico-religious background of the party names that dominated the political 
scene. The names were based on both religious and constitutional associations 
attached to them in the course of history. Different writers intentionally 
emphasised either group of associations. An analysis of these associations helps 
in deciphering to what extent the supporters of each party understood the party 
confrontation as a religious and to what extent as a secular matter. 
Purely religious interpretations of Whig and Tory can be found in abundance 
in Hearne's diary. Hearne was unwilling to draw any distinctions between his 
religious and political opponents, emphasising in Whiggism what he 
considered religiously unsound and seeing what he understood as threats to the 
Church and monarchy as inseparable. It was not unusual for him to use 
expressions such as 'a Whig and a countenancer of fanatics', 'the fanatics and 
the Whigs', 'the Whigs and Presbyterians' and 'the Presbyterians and the rest of 
the Whigs' to express his religiously motivated hatred towards the adherents of 
the rival party. For Hearne, fanatic and Whig meant very much the same. He 
eagerly contrasted Whigs not with Tories but with 'the true Church of England 
men' with whom he himself steadily identified. Hearne's manner of 
considering religious integrity of first importance is also revealed by the fact 
that he called Whigs `pretended hypocritical saints' — saints referring to 
Interregnum sectarians — on the basis of a rumour that a Whig MP had been 
dancing on Sunday. A stereotypical Whig, as viewed in Hearne's diary, had 
`little or nothing of religion'.58 
Parallel arguments against Whiggism as religious unsoundness occurred in a 
number of Tory publications. Whigs were viewed as abetters of Dissenters;59 
they were pictured as `angry at any defense made in behalf of the Church of 
Christ'; and the alleged union between the Whigs and Dissenters was compared 
to that of Herod and Pontius Pilate against Christ and his Church.60 Particularly 
in the crisis year 1710, when all arguments related to the future of the Church of 
England seemed to gather wide popular support, religion was offered as the 
58 Instances include Heame's comments on one Francis Fox whose behaviour in relation to 
religious rites Hearne interpreted as a sign of his being 'got in with the Whigs'. Remarks and 
Collections of Thomas Hearne, 24 August 1705, Vol. 1, 34. Whigs appeared in primarily 
religious context also in the following cases: On 8 September 1705, Vol. I, 43, and on 17 
September 1705, Vol. I, 45, Hearne called people Whigs because of their attitude towards 
some recently published confessional book. On 23 September 1705, Vol. I, 48, and 29 
September 1705, Vol. I, 50, Hearne declared a preacher Whiggish. See also: 8 October 1705, 
Vol. I, 53; 9 October 1705, Vol. I, 54; 10 October 1705, Vol. 1, 54; 14 October 1705, Vol. I, 
56; 3 November 1705, Vol. I, 65; 5 November 1705, Vol. I, 66; 17 January 1706, Vol. I, 164; 
19 March 1706, Vol. I, 205; 24 March 1706, Vol. I, 208; 23 June 1708, Vol. II, 115; 22 
December 1709, Vol. II, 330; 24 February 1710, Vol. II, 348; 2 March 1710 (Sacheverell 
riots), Vol. II, 350. Possibly the only instance of Hearne using the term Tory was recorded on 
19 November 1705, Vol. I, 86; For explicit association of Whigs and Presbyterians, see also 
the lines of Edward Ward's High-Church character the poem Helter Skelter, or the Devil 
upon two Sticks, [late 1700s]. 
59 	 [Drake], The Memorial of the Church of England, 1705, 4; See also Trapp. Most Faults on 
One Side, 1710, 31. 
60 	 [Leslie], The Wolf Stript of his Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 17, 60. 
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major dividing issue between the two parties. The conflict between Whigs and 
Tories was associated with the condemned separation into High Church and 
Low Church. The attitude towards the Dissenters was seen as the sole matter 
that caused the division in both, even to the point that a writer declared: 'Had we 
no Dissenters, we should have no Whigs or Tories'.61  
Emphasising the religious associations of Whig and Tory was clearly a Tory 
weapon in the propaganda war. Yet suggestions based on religion could not go 
unnoticed among the Whigs either. Associations between fanaticism and 
Whiggism were consistently repudiated. Some Whigs would rather have used a 
phrase such as 'the Whig-Church interest' or 'the Church-Whigs' as much more 
positive expressions for defining their relationship to the established Church.6' 
It should also be born in mind that, in reality, Whiggish support for the 
Dissenters could not be taken for granted,63 and that Whiggish writers also made 
use of the religious associations of the party division whenever it was in their 
interest to do so. 
As far as alternative secular associations of Whig and Tory are concerned, 
Whiggish writers evidently favoured these, but an increasing number of Tories 
also wished to view political divisions through constitutional rather than 
religious lenses. The character of political discourse was in the process of 
transformation. In his Civil Polity (1703), Paxton put forward a noteworthy 
point about a shift that was taking place in the character of the party conflict 
between Whigs and Tories:64 
... the very nature of the dispute between the two parties is gradually 
changed: For now it is not, as formerly, so much upon the score of 
religion, (although that is continued, or rather revived) as it is upon 
points of government. 
This statement is very important. Firstly, it reflects an awareness of change in 
the relationship between politics and religion, a change that can be translated as 
secularisation of politics. Secondly, it emphasises the gradual character of the 
shift from a religion-dominated political discourse towards an increasingly 
61 Trapp, Most Faults on One Side, 1710, 42. 
62 	 See e.g. The London Diaries of William Nicolson, 6 December 1705, 324, which reports Lord 
Sommers having criticised the use of the terms as reproach, and 13 December 1705, 327, 
recording a visit of Coll. Studholme; The expression 'Whig Church' was questioned as 
meaning the same as 'any Church, no Church, or all Churches', i.e. shaking the foundation of 
the established Church, by Baron in An Historical Account of Comprehension and 
Toleration, 1705, 8; The Church of England Man's Memorial, 1719, 19, still continued 
degrading the term Whig Church; The expression Church-Whigs appeared in Defoe's 
Political Sow-Gelder, 1715, 32, and in The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 30 January 1716, 176. 
This expression distinguished between Whigs conforming to the Anglican Church and 
dissenting Whigs. 
63 	 See e.g. [Defoe], The Weakest go to the Wall, 1714, 40, and Ryder's comments on attempts to 
remove the Schism and Occasional Conformity Acts in 1716. The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 30 
January 1716, 176, and 8 November 1716, 361. 
64 Paxton, Civil Polity, 1703, 588. Paxton's analysis on the political lines followed by each of 
the rivalling parties was simplistic. He presented the Tory party as consisting of those who 
advocated an extension of the royal power, whereas Whigs he saw merely as campaigners for 
limiting the same. 
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secular political discourse. Thirdly, however, it recognises the continuance and 
even revival of religious issues in political discourse. Paxton's account offers 
only one point of view; yet other primary sources support his condensed 
analysis of the on-going transformations in political discourse. 
As the Whigs wanted to play down suggestions of a religious basis for the 
party conflict, their commonplace accusation was that the Tories were abusing 
religion as a means to win popular support.° Instead, the Whigs willingly 
overemphasised the constitutional aspects of the party division. Toland 
presented it as a `state-distinction', no matter how much the Tories 
endeavoured66 
to persuade the populace, that Whig and Tory is a religious distinction, 
when it is purely civil; the body of the Church of England being the real 
Whiggish party, and the Dissenters from it not being reckoned Whigs by 
any means of account of their dissent, but because they join with the 
others for civil liberty and the Protestant succession. 
After denying religious causes of party conflict, Toland presented the Whigs as 
defenders of the constitution against Tories, who also threatened the Protestant 
interest. A Tory he defined as a person 'who retained his old notions of passive 
obedience, unlimited prerogative, the divine right of monarchy, or who was 
averse to liberty of conscience'. In his propagandistic words, 'the Whigs 
declare for settled laws, against arbitrary will, maintained by the Tories, and the 
limited, conditional, legally hereditary monarchy . . . against a monarchy 
indefeasibly hereditary, unlimited, and absolute, claimed by the same Tories'. It 
was important to add that the Whigs were 'no democratic commonwealthmen, 
but zealous supporters of the ancient constitution and King, Lords and 
Commons' and defenders of `liberty and property'. Unsurprisingly, the Whigs 
appeared in Toland's text as 'the party fittest for the king to consult and 
employ'. Instead of calling for a dissolution of parties, this writer vindicated the 
existence of the Whig party and party distinction.67 
The significance of the religious origin of party terminology was minimised 
by the Whigs. Clement pointed out that Whigs and Tories were `taken from 
words signifying parties differing in their religious sentiments' and 
consequently 'the world has been led into, and still persists in a mistake, as if the 
one sort were altogether Dissenters, and the other included all that were true 
Church of England men'. He concluded that the two parties were 'more truly to 
be accounted factions in the state than in the Church' 68 The Whiggish attitude 
in favour of a primarily dynastic and constitutional character of the party 
65 	 Addison's irony from the time of the Sacheverell affair is illustrative of Whig insinuations. 
Addison hinted to alleged Catholic sympathies among the Tories when he made a fictitious 
Roman correspondent enquire after 'the two religious orders which are lately sprung up 
amongst you, the Whigs and Tories, with the points of doctrine, severities in discipline, 
penances, mortifications, and good works, by which they differ one from another'. 
[Addison], T129, 4 February 1710; See also Corns, Speck and Downie 1982, 20. 
66 	 [Toland], State-Anatomy of Great Britain, [1717], 16. 
67 	 [Toland], State-Anatomy of Great Britain, [17171,  14-18. 
68 [Clement], Faults on both Sides, 1710, 13. 
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division is also illustrated by the statement from 1734, according to which the 
basic distinction between a Whig and Tory ever since the Revolution of 1688 
had been that 'the Tory is for restoring the pretended issue of King James, and 
the Whig for adhering to the settlement then made'.69 
This `constitutionalisation' of the party conflict did not remain the sole 
property of the Whigs. Some publications favourable to Tory thought paid 
attention to constitutional issues as well, emphasising continuity in inherited 
political values. One pamphlet simplified the contrast between Whigs and 
Tories to the Tory maintenance that the constitution had not changed as a result 
of the Revolution of 1688 nor the Protestant Succession of 1714. The Tories 
venerated the institution of hereditary though limited monarchy. Even if the 
royal line had changed, the constitution had not and should never change, 
maintained the Tories 70 Such a veneration of continuity of the political system 
represented a commonly shared ideal. The implicit point of the statement was 
obvious: the Whigs wished to see changes in the ancient constitution, 
something that no proper Englishman could regard as acceptable. 
The most important terms in the constitutional party dispute included 
`loyalty' which could be interpreted differently depending on the prevalent 
attitude in each party towards the theory of the divine right of the monarchs. 
The question of loyalty was, to a large extent, theological: did the monarch rule 
by 'His permissive power' or 'by His appointment'? Whereas Whig polemic 
presented the Whiggish version of loyalty as legally bound, and might even 
equate loyalty with Whiggism by using the expression `the loyal party' in a 
synonymous sense," Tory propaganda consistently questioned Whiggish 
loyalty, suggesting that what Whigs really aimed at was a revolutionary change 
both in 'the constitution of our government, nay even the doctrines of the 
Scripture'. This would have meant commonwealth in the state and irreligion in 
the Church.''- In Tory propaganda, the character of a Whig was ostentatiously 
contrasted with that of 'the loyal Churchman'.73  
A more impartial constitutional approach to parties would have it that both 
parties could be considered `guardians of the constitution' though defending 
different parts of it. Whereas the Whigs would have placed all power in the 
hands of the people (something that hardly any establishment Whig really 
wished), the Tories would have centered it in the hands of the monarch 
(something that not even most of the Tories were prepared to do). Both parties 
thus achieved an indirect justification for their existence as preservers of the 
69 	 The Daily Courant. 1 January 1734, in Supplement for the Gentleman's Magazine 1734, Reel 
134. 
70 The True Genuine Tory-Address, 1710, 11. 
71 	 Exemplified by The True Picture of an Ancient Tory, 1702, 5-6; Ryder saw Whiggish 
mughouses during the Succession Crisis as a good way of fostering loyalty. The Diary of 
Dudley Ryder, 20 July 1716, 279. See ibid., 7 June 1716, 253, for equating loyalty and 
Whiggism. See also [Defoe], A New Test of the Church of England's Loyalty, Dublin, 1702, 
title. 
72 	 Ward wrote in 1705 in A Fair Shell, 39: `Whiggish loyalty most bright does shine, when they 
are just baffled in some base design'. According to The True Genuine Tory-Address, 1710, 3, 
Whigs hated `those Tory-words dutiful and loyal'. See also page 11. 
73 	 Whiggism laid open, And The Loyal Church-Hum's Health, [1710], title. 
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limited monarchical constitution.74 Such an approach comes close to an 
interpretation of political parties as parties in a contract. However, this 
approach was relatively seldom advocated in early eighteenth-century sources. 
Many authors cherished hopes of a quick disappearance of the party 
names and with them the party conflict altogether. A traditionalist author 
pointed out that Queen Anne had `nothing more at heart, than that the names 
Tory and Whig may be buried in oblivion'.75 Whig and Tory were called 
`opprobrious names' and `contumelious nicknames'.76 They were characterised 
as `foolish names', `trifling and insignificant words' and `names invented in 
hell', the etymology of which `carries in it both ill-nature and scandal'. Defoe 
went so far as to suggest that 'our distinction is only ill names misapplied'." 
Many endeavoured to convince the audience that the two parties, or at least the 
majorities of their adherents, actually had shared goals, that most of the 
accusations on both sides were unfounded, and hence the existence of two 
parties was needless.78 A commonplace argument was that the principles of 
each of the parties had changed so much that the old denominations had a long 
time ago lost their original significations, become useless, and could be laid 
aside.79 Tories and Whigs could be claimed to share many values, both 
conforming to the Church and state, and any accusations based on either 
constitutional or religious disagreements being thus unfounded.80 The neglect 
of party denominations was also called for to facilitate a unified fight against 
`popery and slavery', the immemorial enemies of all English parties.$' 
However, the most obvious though never outspoken motive for calls to quit 
party denominations was the desire of election winners to create a sense of unity in 
the country. This was a strategy employed by the politically superior party to 
persuade the minority party to give up opposition. After a Tory victory in 1710, 
Swift characterised party-names as `foolish', `cantwords', `conceited appellations' 
and `fantastic names', calling for their rejection.82 Likewise, a Whig polemist 
suggested after the Whig ascendancy to power in the mid-1710s: 'Let us hear no 
more of Whig, and Tory; High Church, and Low'.83 Yet much of Whig and Tory, 
as well as High Church and Low, was heard until at least the early 1720s. 
74 Place, The Arbitration, [1710], 7, 9; A parallel definition of the original constitutional 
principles of each of the parties was given by Gordon in CL96, 29 September 1722. 
75 	 Boyer, An Essay Towards the History of the Last Ministry and Parliament, 1710, 40. 
76 	 [Toland], The Art of Governing by Partys, 1701, 35, 119. 
77 	 [Defoe], The Dangers of Europe, 1702, 18; [Defoe], The Political Sow-Gelder, Or, The 
Castration of Whig and Tory, 1715, 2-8. 
78 	 Place, The Arbitration, [1710], 4; See also CL20, 11 February 1721; [Gordon], CL66, 17 
February 1722; [Trenchard], CL69, 10 March 1722; [Trenchard], CL80, 9 June 1722; C29, 
13 March 1727; C40, 24 April 1727; C103, 22 June 1728; C172, 18 October 1729; C213, 1 
August 1730; C355, 21 April 1733; C366, 7 July 1733; Stevenson, Zeal and Moderation, 
1728, 32; Observations on the Conduct of the Tories, the Whigs, and the Dissenters, 1739, 39. 
79 	 Swift, E43, 31 May 1711; [Atterbury], English Advice to English Freeholder, s.a., 4. 
80 	 [Defoe], The Political Sow-Gelder, 1715, 29-31, 35. 
81 	 [Defoe], Whigs turn'd Tories, 1713, 22. 
82 	 [Swift], E35, 5 April 1711, E43, 31 May 1711; [Swift], The Conduct of the Allies, 1711, 5; 
[Swift], Some Reasons to Prove, That no Person is obliged by his Principles, as a Whig, To 
Oppose Her Majesty or Her Present Ministry. In a Letter to a Whig-Lord, 1712, in Political 
Tracts 1711-1713, ed. Herbert Davis, Oxford 1951, 123. 
83 	 Now, or Never: Or, Seasonable Thoughts for the Present Times, 1714, 24. 
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Parties in the Church 
For an understanding of the associative powers of Whig and Tory, a brief 
analysis of the linked terms High Church and Low Church is also essential. As 
seen in the chapter 'Defining the sphere of religion', the Church of England had 
a long history of divisive conflicts concerning the need to further the 
Reformation. Many of the early eighteenth-century tensions were continuations 
of such fundamental disagreements and of further politico-religious tensions 
created by the Civil War and the Restoration Settlement which had initiated a 
permanent conflict between the established Church and religious dissent, and 
another disagreement between the opponents and favourers of dissent within 
the Church. The High Church had a majority among the inferior clergy, the Low 
Church among the bishops 84 
The division into High and Low Churchmen emerged after the passage of the 
Act of Toleration in 1689. High Churchmen continued to urge a return to the 
monopoly of the Church of England supporting a unitary state. They wished to 
conserve monarchical authority and refused to grant Dissenters the right of 
organising separate Churches or entering public office. By contrast, Low 
Churchmen endeavoured to accommodate the Church to an increasing religious 
pluralism. They supported the Revolution Settlement, recognised religious 
dissent and called for a limited toleration. The two groupings remained united 
by a shared willingness to safeguard the dominant status of the Anglican 
Church, by orthodox doctrine and by a reluctant attitude towards any further 
extensions of toleration. By 1701, however, the division reached a highly 
exacerbated state, the High Churchmen considering themselves defenders of 
the inherited institution and doctrines of the Church against intruding fanatics, 
and the leading Low Churchmen preventing High Churchmen to proceed 
within the hierarchy of the Church.85 
84 Speck 1978, 83-4; De Krey 1985, 112; Rupp 1986, 53; Harris 1993, 6-7, 42. 
85 
	
	
Holmes 1975, 6, 21; Bunt 1992, 19-20; Rose 1993, 175; Walsh and Taylor 1993, 46; Defoe 
discussed the emergence of High Church and Low Church in The Weakest go to the Wall, 
1714, 26; The rise of the religious parties into the center of political life is visible in Edward 
Clarke's letter to John Locke, 29 January 1702, reporting that a bill requiring an oath of 
loyalty to the Church had been rejected in Parliament much to the annoyance of 'the High 
Churchmen'. The Correspondence of John Locke, Vol. VII, 316; Evelyn recorded the 
emergence of the party distinction into High Churchmen and Low Churchmen, 
supplementing the distinction into Whigs and Tories, as late as 11 October 1705, The Diary 
of John Evelyn, Vol. V, 612; As an illustration of the reality of religious parties within the 
Church, the Archbishop of Canterbury Tenison asked Thomas Naish whether he was 'a High 
Church preacher'. Naish was saved from this unfavourable suspicion by a servant of the 
Archbishop's who denied the charge. The Diary of Thomas Naish, 24 November 1707, 59. 
Other illustrations are offered by William Nicolson, Bishop of Carlisle, who recorded a 
conversation with divines in high positions who were 'all High Church' and commented 
briefly on evenings spent 'in disputed between High and Low Church' or with 'much banter 
on High and Low Church'. The London Diaries of William Nicolson, 11 November 1705, 
301, 4 February 1706, 371, and 16 February 1707, 423. See also ibid., 3 March 1711, 554, 
and 17 March 1711, 560, for the conflict between High Church and Low Church. Remarks 
and Collections of Thomas Hearne contain several references to rivalry between religious 
parties, out of which that of 3 April 1706, Vol. I, 217, and 20 April 1706, Vol. I, 229, are 
illustrative, showing how both parties endeavoured to place their own men in high 
ecclesiastical positions. 
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The constant use of terminology derived from the word Church in political 
discourse illustrates the continuous significance of religious issues in politics. 
The question of the extent of freedom to religious minorities and the health of 
religion continued to be highly sensitive issues among the lay politicians and 
ordinary voters. In the beginning of the century, disagreements on these issues 
deepened the division between the Whigs and Tories86 to such an extent that a 
pamphleteer argued that 'all the noise about High and Low Church ... signifies 
no more than Whig and Tory'.87 In 1708, an anonymous observer wrote with 
reference to parties in England:88 
... the Church is principally engaged in the dispute, and yet the state 
equally with the Church, is involved in the dangerous consequences 
thereof ... They are merely on the account of religion; for so I take the 
invidious distinction of High Church and Low Church plainly to import; 
The centrality of the terms High Church and Low Church to the party-political 
debate of the 1700s and 1710s is further illustrated by comments from three 
contemporary authors. According to Tindal, `nothing is more disputed at 
present than who is the best Churchman, both High and Low Church laying 
claim to it'. Swift reported ironically that, in London, 'the very ladies are split 
asunder into High Church and Low, and out of zeal for religion, have hardly 
time to say their prayers'. In another letter, he reported whole Leicester being 
divided into 'High and Low'. In Addison's view, 'the terms High Church and 
Low Church, as commonly used, do not so much denote a principle, as they 
distinguish a party'.89 In a further comment, it was suggested that 'all condemn 
the distinctions of High and Low Church, when at the same time they scruple 
not to defend or plead the cause of one side or other' .90 
Dictionaries, once again, completely neglected entries for the names of the 
religious parties, which illustrates the inconvenient character of the 
denominations and the unwillingness of the editors to get involved in 
potentially dangerous religious strife. The entry closest to High Church was 
Fenning's (1741) and Johnson's (1755) definition for high-flyer as 'one that 
carries his opinions to extravagance'. One explanation for this silence may be 
that the use of the terms High Church and Low Church declined rather 
dramatically after the Hanoverian Succession.9' No editor cared to list a word 
86 Holmes 1987, xx. 
87 Cited by Gascoigne 1989, 91; See also De Krey 1985, 74. 
88 	 A View of the Present Divisions in Great Britain, 1708, 16-17. 
89 OED: High-Church; Swift to the Rev. William Tisdall, London, 16 December 1703, The 
Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, Vol. I, 39; Swift to Archbishop King, Leicester, 6 
December 1707, ibid., Vol. I, 59. 
90 An Antidote against Rebellion, 1704, 23. 
91 Among the scarce references to `the High-Church party' after 1720 can be mentioned the 
following: A Memorial of the Present State of the British Nation, 1722, 21, attempted to 
convince the readers that High Church had overcome Low Church; Observations on the 
Conduct of the Tories, the Whigs, and the Dissenters, 1739, 6, in which the party was 
characterised as a continuously existing force; and Harmony without Uniformity, 1740, 3-4, 
which discussed metaphorically `birds of prey, as the eagle and other high-flyers' who were 
the only birds incapable of living in harmony with the rest of the animal world. Likewise, 
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that was, as was generally perceived, happily falling into oblivion. The rise of 
the terminology of religious parties at the turn of the century reflects the revival 
of religious issues in political discourse, whereas its decline illustrates the 
pacification of religious debate with political implications. 
High Churchmen believed in the interdependence of the monarchy and 
Anglicanism and consequently advocated a uniform state Church. They 
opposed comprehension or toleration of diversity in Church polity and 
demanded a strict enforcement of the laws against Dissenters 92 High Church 
aimed at the restoration of the concept of a national Church in a Christian 
kingdom. Their actions were motivated by a conviction that the established 
Church was in acute danger caused by intellectual challenges to the truths of 
Christianity. They were prepared to realise their religious ideals through 
political action, if necessary.93 
The term High Churchman first appeared in 1677. It was occasionally used as 
a counter-concept of `moderate men' but became more generally applied only 
after the Revolution of 1688.94 Early eighteenth-century definitions for High 
Church are few. One of them was provided by Acherley (1741) who argued 
that, in constitutional issues, the High party `retained the old notions of the 
Church power, dominion, and supremacy, above the king' and it was 
distinguished from the (much more recommendable) Low party also in its 
attitudes towards `national liberties, and to a Popish monarchy'. In religious 
questions, one of the major failings of the High party, as understood by 
Acherley, was it having been so `unkind to the Protestant Dissenters, disowning 
any affinity with them, as if they were not Protestants, and treating them with 
unfriendly pressures' 95 The same anti-Catholic and pan-Protestant assumptions 
underlying the concept High Church were expressed in a definition for the 
related expression `high-flyer' which appeared in an earlier pamphlet:96 
A high-flyer is a paper-kite. The Pope is the lanthorn at the tail of it, and 
the higher he flies the faster he draws popery after him. He screw up 
religion at such a pitch, that it may be ready to break upon the first 
opportunity that offers to his interest. The good of the Church is his 
pretence, but ambition his end. And when the scale is loaden with 
honours, you are sure of his casting vote. He stickles hard against 
Dissenters, but is in charity with Rome, and to extirpate the first, would 
submit to the last. He measures the good of his country by the h[e]ight of 
Acherley's Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 1, still listed High Church and Low 
Church as,`run[ning] through the whole body of the people'. There were also reprints of texts 
originally published during the first two decades of the century, reissued without 
commentary and with the purpose of negating the need of party denominations before the 
ensuing general elections, in which the old division into High Church and Low Church still 
appeared. See C59, 19 August 1727, and C713, 1 March 1740. 
92 See OED: High-Church, High-Churchman. 
93 Rupp 1986, 53, 56, 70. 
94 	 For the first occurrence of the term, see Goldie 1990, 81; Gascoigne 1989, 28. 
95 	 Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 4. 
96 Hickelty Pickelty, 1708, 11-12; For High Churchmen being considered papists, see also 
Nicolson reporting a speech by Hooper, the Bishop of Bath and Wells, The London Diaries 
of William Nicolson, 6 December 1705, 322, several places in Ward's unpaginated 
propaganda poem Helfer Skelter, [late 1700s], and The Humble Confession, 1712, 9. 
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his passions, or the depth of his pocket, and if they two be satisfied, he 
cares not who rules. He quarrels about names and ceremonies, till he 
justles religion out of doors, and she is nowhere to be found less than in 
those that profess her most. He is, and he is not, as occasion serves, and 
like the Jews for their Messiah, in readiness for a new revolution. 
This High-Church stereotype consisted also of pictures of worldly and 
intolerant ultra-traditionalism and willingness to cooperate with Catholics and 
Stuarts to restore both.97 
In public discourse, pejorative connotations were associated with the 
appellation High Church, and it became practically synonymous with that of 
Tory, so that someone could be described as 'a very High Churchman, a great 
Tory'. Religious and political meanings became deeply intermixed in the term 
so that it could refer to certain devotional practices or views but often stood for 
the religious dimension of the Tory party.98 Whiggish and dissenting writers 
used it as a hostile nickname, much like the earlier terms high-flyer, high-flying 
and high-flown Churchman.99 Drake complained that Churchmen were 
reproached by 'the Dissenters and their hirelings' with nicknames such as 
`high-flying' which were used to misrepresent 'all care of the present 
constitution, ecclesiastical or civil'.100 
High Church first denounced the appellation for good. In his famous sermon 
of 1709, Sacheverell asked: 'Have they not lately villaneously divided us with 
knavish distinctions of High, and Low Churchmen' ?1°' During the ensuing 
election campaign, the Examiner gave definitions to these terms, claiming that 
words such as 'high flyer' were designedly `applied as to convey a wrong idea 
into the mind' and thereby increase divisions. The right idea was that the High 
Churchmen were 'only for continuing things as they are'. The division into 
High and Low Church was presented to mean the same as 'high subject' and 
low subject'. The proper division with respect to the Church would have been 
into 'true Churchmen, false Churchmen, and no Churchmen'. As the Church 
had `multitudes of sincere and affectionate friends' and 'true Churchmen', in 
other words, High-Church 'Tories, so it had 'many inveterate and malicious 
97 Albers 1993, 320-1. 
98 
	
	
This instance is from The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 12 September 1716, 325; Nockles 1993, 
336; Walsh and Taylor 1993, 34. 
99 Addison to John Somers, Baron Somers of Evesham (London), Dublin Castle, 12 August 
1709, The Letters, 177; Defoe, R6/Preface, no. 94, 10 November 1709, no. 101, 26 
November 1709; COPC: Defoe, An Apeal to Honour and Justice, 1715. 
100 [Drake], The Memorial of the Church of England, 1705, 9; Hearne, for instance, at first very 
much approved Drake's pamphlet which revealed 'the designs of the Whigs for destroying 
the Church'. A few days later he wrote down the news he had heard concerning indignation 
the pamphlet aroused at court and the consequent order to find the persons behind this 
anonymous publication. The following year, it was already suggested that the writer 
presented Low Church and had wished to do harm to High Church. In reality, Drake was a 
Tory. Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 9 July 1705, Vol. I, 3, 12 July 1705, Vol. 
I, 4, 26 April 1706, Vol. 1, 234; A parallel argument about High Church being used as a term 
of approach by the enemies of the Church was put forward by John Byrom in his letter to 
John Stansfield, dated in Cambridge on 17 December 1709, Selections from the Journals and 
Papers of John Byrom, Poet-diarist-shorthand writer 1691-1763, ed. Henry Talon, 1950, 
34. 
101 Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brehren, 1709, 19. 
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enemies', or Dissenters and radical Whigs, and `great numbers of men, who 
though they are not upon principle, enemies to the Church, yet link themselves 
in interest with those that are', that is, Low-Church Whigs.102  
After the introduction of the antithetic term Low Churchman,103 however, 
High Churchman gradually began to appear in a more appreciatory sense. 
Charles Leslie wrote in 1704: `I venture, for it is a venture at this time, to own 
the name of a High-Churchman. No man thinks it a disparagement to be high, 
that is zealous in any good thing'. An anomymous writer pointed out that 'a 
High-Church clergyman is a holyman in his conversation'. Positive statements 
about being a High Churchman may have made even such genuine 
traditionalists as Hearne record events in which 'the High Church party' or 
'High Churchmen' were involved. After the Sacheverell affair, a supporter of 
High Church defined a High-Church clergyman as `fully convinced [that] the 
Church of England is a right and true Church, orthodox and sound in her 
doctrine'. High Churchmen wished to guarantee that these inherited doctrines, 
as interpreted by the representatives of High Church themselves, would 
continue without alteration. Such a wish would be supported by a considerable 
majority of the English population. In published statements, and even in a diary, 
however, many would still add a reservation by rendering the expression in the 
form 'one called a High Churchman',10s as the attitude towards the party-names 
remained condemnatory. Drake, for instance, declared the distinction into High 
and Low Church as 'dangerous' as well as `impertinent and groundless', though 
adding that, if such names were nevertheless used, only orthodox priests of the 
established Church deserved the denomination.' 05 
Although the Tories usually avoided the term that the Whigs used for them, 
they did not hesitate to employ the expression `Churchmen', 'the Church party' 
or 'the Church of England party' when defending the policies of their party. The 
term `Church party' was frequently used as an euphemism for the Tory party 
and even more distinctly as an opposite for the Whig party or simply the 
dissenting party. With suitable attributes, even a party term could be turned into 
a respectable signification. Hearne, for instance, wrote sympathetically about 
`loyal Church Parliament men' and 'an honest Church of England man'. An 
even more positive expression was created when all reference to party was 
dropped out. In Hearne's words, the Whigs willingly opposed in Parliament the 
choice of 'a true friend of the Church' to the Speaker of the House. The slogan 
102 [King, ed.], E8, 21 September 1710, E12, 12 October 1710. 
103 De Krey 1985, 81. 
104 OED: High-Church; The Character of a High-Church-Man, 7, 1708; Remarks and 
Collections of Thomas Hearne, 4 July 1705, Vol. I, I, and 5 October 1709, Vol. I, 279. On 1 
October 1706, Vol. I, 291, Hearne wrote about someone who pretended to be 'a very high 
Churchman' but was really not. On 1 May 1706, Vol. I, 230, he added the reservation 'as 
they are called' to the expression 'the High-Church party'; [Leslie], The Second Part of the 
Wolf Stript of His Shepherds Cloathing, 1707; Honesty the Best Policy, 1711, 6; The Humble 
Confession, 1712, I I, contained a reference to a person who 'prides himself in the name of 
High Church'. 
105 [Drake], The Memorial of the Church of England, 1705, 16-17; 'The unhappy distinction of 
High and Low Churchmen' was regretted also in Remarks and Collections of Thomas 
Hearne, 3 April 1706, Vol. I, 217. 
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of the Tory party in connection with this vote seems to have been something 
like `Church and honesty',106 both euphemisms turning party into a positive 
phenomenon. Likewise, Swift and Atterbury indirectly admitted that the 
Churchmen formed a party when they used the expressions `Church party' and 
'the Church interest'.107 The terms party and interest at once received a much 
more legitimate sense when applied to established Anglican values. If a party 
represented the majority and worked for the established Church, it was 
acceptable. 
Low Churchmen differed less than High Churchmen from Protestant 
Dissenters and defended limited toleration for them, as many Low Churchmen 
believed in the importance of free inquiry in the search for religious truth. 
Because of their moderate policy in relation to comprehension of Dissenters to 
the established Church, they were sometimes also called moderate men, either 
in a good or bad sense.108 Their actual moderation was limited, however. Low 
Churchmen also wanted religious control within the state to continue. They 
differed from High Church in that they did not regard dissent but rather 
heterodoxy as the major threat to the Church. In politics, they were dedicated to 
defending the Protestant Succession and hence supported the Whig party. '°9 
An illustrative contemporary formulation for Low Church can be found from 
Acherley (1741). Anti-Catholicism, a Church subordinated to secular control, 
anti-absolutism, rising nationalism, and pan-Protestantism were the phenomena 
that characterised what Acherley saw as an ideal Anglican:10 
The Low party . . . [is] rigid against popery, and against Church 
dominion above the king, or over the fellow-subjects, jealous of the 
national liberties, resolute for a Protestant monarchy, and favourable to 
the Protestant religion, as it is professed in the Protestant Churches of 
106 Instances of the use of the term `Church party' as a synonym for Tory and opposed to 'the 
Whiggish party' include Luttrell's account of nominating candidates for the general election 
in the City of London in 1701, in A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs, Vol. V, 18 
November 1701, 110-11. A Tory and Churchman, and the Tories and the Church party, 
appeared synonymous in The Whigs Thirty Two Queries, And as many of the Tories in 
Answer to them, 1701, 8, 19. See also [Davenant], The Old and Modern Whig Truly 
Represented, 1702, 4; A Modest Defence of the Government, 1702, 4-5, 8, 17; Remarks and 
Collections of Thomas Hearne, 25 October 1705, Vol. I, 58, 27 October 1705, Vol. 1, 59, 3 
November 1705, Vol. I, 64, 21, 13 November 1705, Vol. I, 70, April 1706, Vol. I, 231; 10 
December 1709, Vol. I„ 324. On 1 November 1705, Vol. I, 62, Hearne recorded a poem 
dedicated to the Tory candidate who lost the election for the Speakership. The poem advised 
him ironically: 'The Church and honesty disown, do this and then the chair is thy own'. A 
Vindication of the Constitution, 1703, 15, treated the terms `Church party' and `Dissenting 
party' as the original opposites that had later become nicknamed as Tories and Whigs. 
107 [King, ed.], E4, 24 August 1710; Swift, The Conduct of the Allies, 1711, 11; E43, 31 May 
1711. Also in his private correspondence, Swift saw the Whigs being opposed not by Tories 
but by 'the Church party'. Journal to Stella, 9 February 1712, Vol. II, 488; COPC: 
Atterbury, English Advice to the Freeholders of England, 1714. 
108 For the synonymity of moderate and Low Churchman, see Sage, The Reasonableness of a 
Toleration, 1705, preface, and Tindal, A New Catechism, 1710, 3; For the union of 
dissenters, their political adherents and the Low Church, see The Humble Confession, 1712, 
9; Walsh and Taylor 1993, 37. 
109 Chamberlain 1995, 195-6, 209. 
110 Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 4. 
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Scotland and Holland, and lately in the reformed Churches of France, .. . 
treating the Protestant Dissenters as brethren, with an indulging and 
tolerating temper. 
Many a High-Church writer would rather have stated that being a Low-Church 
clergyman meant negligence of that ecclesiastical and secular legislation that 
formed the foundation of the only right Church of England," or that the Whigs 
and Low Churchmen together were 'a party forming against the old principles 
in Church and state' 
The senses of the word Low Church varied drastically depending upon who 
the user was. Among High-Church and Tory writers the connotations were 
unambiguously pejorative. Low Churchmen appeared as traitors within the 
Church that were ready to tolerate not only dissent but even deism and 
atheism.13 The stereotype of Low Churchman built on their alliance with the 
Presbyterians, both carrying the guilt of murdering the King in 1649, 
advocating a heterodox theology and forming a threat to the safety of the 
established Church."4 Someone could be described as 'so wretched a Low-
Churchmen, as to dispute all the articles of the Christian faith'. Hearne reported 
having heard a sermon in which the alleged designs of 'the Low Churchmen 
and fanatics' to discriminate against 'all persons well-affected to the Church' 
were bitterly criticised, thus reflecting the widespread High-Church suspicion 
of a conspiracy between the Low Churchmen and Dissenters against the 
established order in the national Church. In order to emphasise the 
interconnection between their political and religious enemies, Tory writers 
might characterise a person 'one of the violentest Whigs and most rascally 
Low-Church men of the age' or write about 'the Whiggish or Low-Church 
party'. The most ruthless Tory propaganda did not hesitate to declare: 'The 
ugliest monster I can think of, is a republican, factious, dissenting, Church of 
England clergyman, alias a Low Churchman'.15 Deficiency of integrity in 
religion automatically entailed a suspicion of the political integrity of the 
person. Dissent and republicanism went hand in hand. 
Needless to say, Whigs rebutted on 'the imputation of fanaticism and Low 
Church fixed upon them'. A Whig would rather define Low Churchman as a 
clergymen 'that treated the Dissenters with temper and moderation'.16 The 
Whig were highly sensitive of the significance of terminology derived from the 
111 Honesty the Best Policy, 1711, 7. 
112 Swift, E36, 12 April 1711. 
113 Chamberlain 1995, 195. 
114 Goldie 1990, 79; Albers 1993, 321-2. 
115 OED: Low-Church; Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 20 January 1706, Vol. I, 
166, and 1 October 1706, Vol. I, 291. Other references to Low Churchmen as opposed to 
`honest' men and the connection between the Low Church and the Whig party can be found 
in ibid., 26 January 1706, Vol. I, 169, 4 April 1706, Vol. I, 219, 30 April 1706, Vol. I, 230, 24 
January 1707, Vol. I, 322, 10 February 1708, Vol. II, 93; 19 January 1710, Vol. II, 336, and 
Dr. T. Smith to Hearne, ibid., 18 February 1710, Vol. II, 346; Honesty the Best Policy, 1711, 
16; For a connection drawn between Low Church and fanatics, see The London Diaries of 
William Nicolson, 6 December 1705, 322, summarising a statement by Hooper, the bishop of 
Bath and Wells. 
116 OED: Low-Church, Low-Churchman. 
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Church in public discourse. Steele's discussion of the term Church, for instance, 
illustrates an awareness that Church was a concept fiercely disputed and abused 
in party strife for political purposes. Steele's argument represents the point of 
view of the party that had suffered most from the application of Church-
terminology in public discourse:"7 
There is not a term in our language which wants explanation so much as 
the word Church. One would think when people utter it, they should 
have in their minds ideas of virtue and religion; but that important 
monosyllable drags all the other words in the language after it, and it is 
made use of to express both praise and blame, according to the character 
of him who speaks it. By this means it happens, that no one knows what 
his neighbour means when he says such a one is for or against the 
Church . . . This prepossession is the best handle imaginable for 
politicians to make use of, for managing the loves and hatreds of 
mankind to the purposes to which they would lead them. 
Steele's point about the abuse of Church-terminology for political purposes 
certainly carried a lot of truth in it. Yet such applications were also made 
automatically, with genuine conviction, conceptions of a separation between 
political power and the religious life of the nation having not been universally 
adopted. The Church really mattered, even to a great majority of politicians. 
The ultimate purpose of the Whigs, when taking up the issue of the use of the 
term Church for political purposes, was to play down the religious dimensions 
of party conflict, which had proved fatal to them in 1710, and to exaggerate the 
somewhat artificial constitutional aspects of party conflict. This intention is 
reflected in a Whig propaganda poem published around 1714 and directed at a 
large public. In the poetic dialogue, a Whig, step by step, convinces an initially 
suspicious Tory of the uselessness of the terms High Church and Low Church to 
such an extent that the Tory finally swears that he will vote Whig in ensuing 
elections. Toryism is subtly made to advocate Catholicism and the pretending 
House of Stuarts:11s 
Tory: Should I with those who are Low Church drink, 
what would my friends the Tories think? 
Whig: I may as well demand of thee, 
what thoughts the Whigs would have of me. 
Whig: Thy Church and mine is the very same, 
though High and Low they do it name. 
Tory: Indeed, my friend, if that be so, 
much pains is taken to make it two. 
117 [Steele], G80, 12 June 1713. 
118 Whig and Tory, [1714]. 
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Whig: Those very men thou are taught to hate, 
are truest friends to Church and state. 
Tory: Least Popery should get fooling here, 
for Whigs I will vote each tripple year. 
Whig: And let no other names be known, 
than honest men, and foes to the crown. 
The same theme of the Tories abusing the term Church for political purposes 
appears in a pamphlet discussing 'the notorious abuse of the words Church, 
schismatic, fanatic' and 'the present conduct of those called High-Church'. The 
author's willingness to distinguish between religious and political 
considerations is noteworthy:19 
... there certainly never was a word more tortured, and made use of to so 
many ill purposes as the word Church has of late been ... the word 
Church ... has inflamed and embittered the minds and tempers of those 
whose office it professedly is to teach charity and goodwill [i.e. the 
clergy] ... This term which used to convey some thoughts of religion, 
now seems to be stripped of all such considerations ... [Christian belief] 
will not go one jot towards procuring a person the appellation of a 
Churchman, if he falls not in likewise with some political schemes of 
those who make this outcry ... the word Church, and the bad use a party 
have made of it, even to the great disturbance of neighbourly society, 
and civil government; .. . 
In 1716, Addison criticised Tories for monopolising the term Church and 
insisted that the Whigs should have shown that Tory accusations of Whig 
irreligiousity were unfounded. In that way, the term Church as a synonym for 
Tory would become only an `empty denomination'.120 The theme of the misuse 
of Church for sinister motives remained a topic for radical Whiggish 
publications. Gordon's Creed of an Independent Whig declared, for instance: `I 
believe that the word Church, an innocent word in its nature, has done more 
mischief, than ever I fear it will do good', expressing one's exaggerated 
anticlerical horror of what the clergy had been capable of causing by the use of 
that word.121 All in all, the Church continued to play a major role in the 
formation of party identity well into the eighteenth century. 
119 Reflections on the Management Of some late Party-Disputes, 1715, 2-3, 17. 
120 Addison, F29, 30 March 1716. 
121 Gordon, The Creed of an Independent Whig, 1720, 17; a similar statement concerning the 
abuse of the word Church appeared at about the same time in [Trenchard and Gordon], IW23, 
22 June 1720. 
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Debate on Fanaticism, 
Moderation and Possibilities 
for Toleration 
Dangers of enthusiasm and fanaticism 
In addition to politico-religious terms already analysed, other important 
religious expressions were also applied in political contexts. In the discourse on 
political pluralism, these expressions usually depicted adherence to the rival 
party. Prominent among religious terms of party adherence were enthusiasm, 
fanaticism, zeal, moderation and toleration. 
Public discourse on enthusiasm was an inheritance from the seventeenth 
century, when England had experienced several outbreaks of `enthusiasm' that 
had seriously endangered social peace. The term had been used against those 
radical forms of Protestantism which claimed extraordinary access to the divine 
and sometimes involved uncontrolled passions. Soon this negative label 
became applied more generally, at first to Puritanism and, after the Restoration, 
to all forms of nonconformity. The Restoration saw an expansion in criticism of 
enthusiasm. The renewal of the events of the preceding decades was so much 
feared, that everything seen as corresponding enthusiasm was opposed. 
Enthusiasts became suspect of a universal conspiracy aimed at the destruction 
of all orderly government and religion. Even slight dissent could be interpreted 
as conspiratory radicalism. 
The fears of enthusiasm remained vital in the eighteenth century. 
Enthusiasm, rejecting reason, involving divine inspiration for an individual 
interpretation of the obligation to the authorities and thereby justifying attempts 
to overturn the established order, was understood as constituting a genuine 
threat to civil society. The governing elite in both parties believed in the 
necessity of controlling it.' Locke, for instance, argued that the opinions of an 
enthusiast were founded purely on 'the conceits of a warmed or overweening 
brain'. An enthusiast claimed that whatever opinions he insisted on and actions 
he carried out, were achieved through illumination from the spirit of God, and 
hence his views were incontestable by any human being.' 
1 	 Trenchard referred to the unanimity in resisting enthusiasm when he argued that, during the 
constitutional crises of the later seventeenth century, both Whigs and Tories had aimed at 
preserving the English monarchy and the organisation of the established Church against the 
attempts of its `enthusiastic friends and enemies'. [Trenchard], CL69, 19 March 1722; 
Bolingbroke characterised the Civil War period as 'the fury of faction and enthusiasm'. 
Bolingbroke, A Dissertation Upon Parties, 1735, 30; Redwood 1976, 72-3, 75; Pocock 
1988, 169; Spellman 1993, 78; Miller 1994, 144; Klein 1994, 160-2. 
2 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, 4.19.3, 4.19.6-7; Locke's 
understanding of enthusiasm is also discussed in Yolton 1993, 324. 
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In religious controversy, the term enthusiasm was used to refer to any dissent 
from the Church of England. Whereas the established Church underscored the 
primacy of scriptural revelation, some radical Protestant sects did believe in the 
possibility of individual revelation without Church and state acting as 
mediators. Among the supporters of the established Church, enthusiasm came 
to refer to such mistaken zeal among various heretics. With its association with 
old anti-sectarian polemic, enthusiasm was used against religious deviants as a 
more negative alternative to traditional accusations of `frenzy', `fury', 
`fanaticism' and `zeal'. As an unspecific term of abuse, it was applied to any 
uncomfortable religious phenomenon. As John Byrom, himself considered an 
enthusiast, pointed out in 1751: `Enthusiasm is grown into a fashionable term of 
reproach' applicable to anyone.3 The Whigs, some of whom were Presbyterians 
or sectarians or their sympathisers, underscored that they had nothing to do with 
'the spirit of enthusiastical ... fancy and frenzy'. They rather suggested that it 
was the persecuting policy advocated by the High Church that gave rise to 
enthusiasm.' 
Though enthusiasm could justify radical political action, there were few 
direct references to political enthusiasm in the early eighteenth century. In the 
1700s, however, supporters of High-Church values easily branded their 
opponents with the label, and Tories associated Whigs with religious 
enthusiasm.' An illustration of this politico-religious labelling can be found in 
Charles Leslie's pamphlet (1707) in which he suggested that Whigs and 
Dissenters continued to promote the republican, sectarian and enthusiastic 
values of the 1640s and 1650s. Rebellion against civil government and 
enthusiasm in religion had been and would stay as necessarily connected. 
Enthusiasm was, in this traditionalist interpretation, a `political' phenomenon 
as well:6 
Enthusiasm ... extends itself both to Church and state. A Whig is a state 
enthusiast, as a Dissenter is an ecclesiastical. They will be tied to no rules 
or government but of their own framing, and alterable at their pleasure. 
They have said we are gods, and who are lords over us? Hence they will 
not be obliged to any Church or communion. And this is the true ground 
of all their dissentions, and of all the loofness and wickedness of the age, 
to have no principles, but guided wholly by our own humour or fancy, 
which is properly enthusiasm. 
Leslie was extending the reference of the term enthusiasm from religious to 
political issues. The comparability and interconnection between the two areas 
of life was taken as self-evident. For Tory readers who despised Whigs and 
3 	 Spoo 1964, 54-7, 60-1; Pocock 1988, 169; Pocock 1993, 61-2. 
4 	 Three Questions of Present Importance, 1702, 10; [Defoe], The Remedy Worse than the 
Disease, 1714, 13. 
5 	 Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 28 August 1709, Vol. II, 244, 24 November 
1709, Vol. 11, 313; see also [Defoe], Whigs turn'd Tories, 1713, 11. 
6 	 [Leslie], The Wolf Stript of his Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 3-5; Sacheverell expressed a 
parallel horror at the rise of `enthusiastic sects' during the Civil War in his False Notions of 
Liberty in Religion and Government, 1713, 19; other lamentations of the negative 
consequences of enthusiasm include A Letter to the Revd Mr Law, 1719, 8. 
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feared the return of the anarchy of the mid-seventeenth century, Leslie's was a 
convincing argument. Later in the eighteenth century, however, statements 
portraying political opponents as enthusiasts were rare. In 1734, a Whig 
governmental paper endeavoured to blacken Bolingbroke by suggesting that he 
was 'a mere enthusiast',' but this may have been a vain attempt to exploit an old 
association against a Tory opponent. As conceptions of the separate character 
of the spheres of religion and politics were strengthening, explaining political 
opposition with references to religious enthusiasm lost credibility. 
Though enthusiasm remained an overwhelmingly negative term, there were 
some attempts to change its meaning. Shaftesbury dared to oppose the 
polemical sense of the term and endeavoured to revive an ancient positive sense 
instead - though with limited success. For Shaftesbury, enthusiasm was a 
central feature of humanity, 'a very natural honest passion' and the kind of 
devotion related to sociability. Such recommendations of 'enthusiasm as the 
best for state' were, however, countered by arguments that `every kind of 
enthusiasm [was] dangerous to a state', as illustrated by fate of Charles I. On the 
other hand, Shaftesbury's writings also widened the applicability of the 
polemical sense of enthusiasm, as they turned the term against the Church 
herself and criticised the High Church for enthusiasm. The `high-flyers' now 
also became called `enthusiasts', `zealots' and 'fanatics'.8 Anticlerical 
suggestions of enthusiasm in the background of the High-Church also appeared 
in Gordon's Cato's Letters.' 
A further aspect of enthusiasm was that of another traditionalist discourse, 
medicine. Enthusiasm was considered a strong emotion that belonged to the 
sphere of medicine as well as to that of religion, hence it was also discussed in 
medical terms. Enthusiasm was not seen merely as the work of the devil; it 
could also be interpreted as a state of mind affected by bodily humours.10 It was 
believed that any excessive passion was capable of causing madness, and that 
enthusiasm was a form of madness. Mandeville, for instance, pointed out that 
violent passions tended to advance some people into the state of enthusiasm, 
and Blackmore medicalised appearances of enthusiasm among religious 
sectarians." Theologians such as Warburton and Peter Annet called enthusiasm 
a `disease' and an 'infection'.''- Long discussions on enthusiasm as religious 
delirium and a form of madness were also provided by Gordon and Trenchard 
in the early 1720s. An enthusiast was anyone who attempted to make others 
follow his opinions.13 
7 	 The Daily Courant, 13 November 1734, in GM, Vol. IV, November 1734, 602-3, Reel 134. 
8 	 Daily Courant, 17 April 1735, in GM, April 1735, Vol. V, Reel 135; Spoo 1964, 61-2: Klein 
1994, 165-7. 
9 	 [Gordon], CL66, 17 February 1722. 
10 For explaining enthusiasm, see Spoo 1964, 57-8. 
11 	 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 1714, 227; Richard Blackmore, A Treatise of the Spleen 
and Vapours: or l,ypocondriacal and hysterical affections, 1725, 262. 
12 Warburton, The Alliance between Church and State, 1736, 36; Annet, Judging for 
Ourselves; Or Free-Thinking, The Great Duty of Religion, 1739, preface. 
13 Gordon, The Humourist, 1720, 6; [Gordon], CL123, 6 April 1723; [Trenchard], CL124, 13 
April 1723; Bolingbroke wrote about 'enthusiasm and madness' of the Civil War in his 
Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 36; A fierce attack on religious, political and medical 
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In dictionary entries, references to politics were not made, but the medical 
aspect of enthusiasm as `religious madness' or `melancholy ... mixed with 
devotion' 14 remained relevant. The positive sense of the term was also listed in 
some entries. Chambers (1728), Gordon-Bailey (1730) and Dyche-Pardon 
(1740/1750) all saw enthusiasm as 'a prophetic or poetic rage or fury, which 
transports the mind, raises and enflames the imagination, and makes it think and 
express things extraordinary and surprising'. An enthusiast was 'one who 
pretends to be inspired by the divine spirit, and to have a true sight and 
knowledge of things; and who is transported with imaginary revelations'. 
Chambers added that the word was generally understood in an ill sense, 
referring to the Quakers, Anabaptists and other radical sects. Bailey (1733) saw 
enthusiasm as 'an inspiration, whether real or imaginary, fanaticism; a 
ravishment of the spirit; a poetical fury' and enthusiast as `one who fancies 
himself inspired with the divine spirit, and so to have a true sight and 
knowledge of things'. Dyche-Pardon probably expressed much of 
contemporary feeling by denouncing enthusiasm of all types but more 
particularly religious enthusiasm. This rejection of excessive religiousity as 
questioning both revealed religion and human reason and threatening even the 
political system may have been strengthened by the rise of Methodism in the 
late 1730s:15 
the word is generally applied to those persons who pretend to have 
divine revelation, to support some monstrous, ridiculous, or absurd 
notions in religious matters, and thereby takes away both reason and 
revelation, and substitutes in the room thereof the groundless fancies, 
and obstinate result of self-willedness, by using extravagant gestures 
and words, pretending to things not only improbable, but also 
impossible. 
Dyche-Pardon's attack on enthusiasm was echoed by his statement that 
enthusiast `commonly means a person poisoned with the notions of being 
divinely inspired when he is not, and upon that account commits a great number 
of irregularities both in words and actions'. Fenning's entry in 1741 expresses 
similar rejection of enthusiasm as an essentially religious delusion: 
Enthusiasm strong but vain pursuasion [sic] that a person is guided or 
inspired in an extraordinary manner, by immediate impulses and 
operations of the Holy Ghost; an extraordinary emotion or elevation of 
the soul, which warms and heats the imagination, and enables it to 
conceive and express things both exalted and surprising. 
enthusiasm as a threat to society was contained in The Old Whig, No. 155, 23 February 1738, 
in GM, February 1738, Vol. VIII, Reel 137, and No. 156, 2 March 1738, and No. 157, 9 
March 1738, both published in the number of March 1738. Enthusiasm appeared as madness 
and parallel to plague. 
14 Chambers 1728; Wesley 1764. 
15 
	
	 See essays of The Old Whig mentioned in note 13 and nearly simultaneous on 'the pernicious 
nature and tendency of Methodism' in Common Sense, 19 April 1739, in GM, May 1739, 
Vol. IX, Reel 137. 
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If, in the 1740s, someone still attempted to label political opponents enthusiasts 
in a religious sense, he clearly took the risk of applying an old-fashioned 
expression that was unlikely to convince the audience. 
Johnson (1755) already clearly distinguished between various senses of 
enthusiasm. Enthusiasm could refer theologically to 'a vain belief of private 
revelation; a vain confidence of divine favour or communication', more 
generally to 'heat of imagination; violence of passion; confidence in opinion', 
or, in relation to poetry, to `elevation of fancy; [and the] exaltation of ideas'. 
Particularly general was the definition of enthusiastic as `vehemently hot in any 
cause'. This development towards an increasingly secular and positive concept 
of enthusiasm is illustrated by the Craftsman's point that 'no nation ever arrived 
to a great pitch of glory [in politics], which was not actuated by a spirit of 
enthusiasm'.16 By 1740, enthusiasm in a non-religious sense could even appear 
as necessary for achieving positive goals in politics. 
The nearly synonymous expression fanatic, which was frequently used in the 
1700s, had initially denoted someone possessed by either deity or devil. On the 
Continent, the term had been used for religious sectaries during religious wars 
with reference both to their religious irrationality and the potential political 
consequences of their existence. In England, the term came to use in the 1640s, 
referring to those with an excessive and mistaken enthusiasm, especially in 
religious matters. 
Fanaticism was viewed as a phenomenon that had risen in the seventeenth 
century. As Clarendon pointed out in his history of the Civil War, 'new terms 
and distinctions were brought into discourse, and fanatics were now [in 1644] 
first brought into appellation'. Due to its negative sense of a strong adherence to 
some idea, fanatic had become a central concept of discrimination in discourse 
between political and religious antagonists. The defenders of the established 
order did not separate theological motives from political ones when damning 
the `madmen' of the Nonconformist minority." The term came to stand for 
Dissenters and their Low-Church Anglican sympathisers alike. Soon after the 
introduction of the party names, fanatic became a synonym for Whig as well.18 
As the Dissenters tended to be faithful supporters of the Whigs, the Whigs were 
referred to as 'the dissenting party' and simply as 'the fanatics'. It was easy for 
traditionalists to refer to `fanatics and bloody peace-breaking Whigs' who were, 
at any time, ready for a republican rebellion of the type of 1649 when Charles I 
was executed.19 Swift described the way the Whigs appeared to be vindicating 
16 C723, 10 May 1740, BL Burney, Vol. 349B. 
17 	 Conze and Reinhart 1975, 303-308; OED: fanatic; Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, 
Vol. III, 1702, 453; Evelyn reported having heard a sermon in which fanaticism was taken as 
a phenomenon that had appeared in the seventeenth century to disturb the peace of the 
Church of England. The Diary of John Evelyn, 17 October 1703, Vol. V, 546. 
18 Goldie 1990, 79. 
19 	 De Krey 1985, 21; The statement on fanatics and Whigs comes from a pamphlet of Defoe's in 
which he summarised Tory arguments in an intentionally exaggerating manner. [Defoe], A 
New Test of the Church of England's Loyalty, 1702, 2, 7; William Nicolson reported about 
the use of the term `fanatic' as a reproach against dissenters, Whigs and even the Low Church 
in The London Diaries of William Nicolson, 6 December 1705, 322, 324; For Hearne, Whig 
and fanatic were nearly synonymous. See Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 23 
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`fanaticism and infidelity in religion; and anarchy, under the name of a 
commonwealth, in government'. According to Swift, such ideas were 
propagated by writers who were `fanatics by profession'.20 
The frequent use of the term fanatic already decreased its power as a 
derogatory expression, but still Whiggish and dissenting authors complained of 
its abuse. Presbyterian writers eagerly denounced all their connections with 
`sectaries or fanatics'.21 Fanatic remained a disputed concept, and the debaters 
were well aware of this, widening or restricting its meaning and underscoring 
positive or negative connotations as best suited them:'-2 
[A] term which has made a great noise in the world, been ... little 
understood, and ... much misapplied ... is fanatic ... By fanatic, .. . 
according to the strict meaning of the word, is to be understood a person 
enlightened or taught by some supernatural means ... where it is applied 
with propriety, as custom has now settled its meaning, we understand by 
it, such a person as has run into such delusions in religious matters, and 
advances such notions as are inconsistent with, or destructive of moral 
obligations, and the ties of civil society. 
The author was particularly critical of how the Tories used the term to delude 
readers and blacken the image of the Whigs.23 Another Whiggish definition 
denied all allegations of a connection between fanaticism and Whiggism:24 
... fanatics of most kinds have usually taken the advantage of some 
great convulsion or division in the state to broach their extravagancies; 
well knowing, that while the minds of the people are unsettled, they will 
the more readily embrace any new opinions ... Fanaticism implies an 
uncommon pretence to religion and sanctity, and sometimes inspiration 
itself, together with an evident mixture of madness or infatuation, 
accompanied for the most part with a restlessness and turbulence of 
spirit, which is inconsistent with the peace of society, and any settled 
form of government. 
Dictionaries defined the term fanaticism since the mid-1710s, after decades of 
intense politico-religious debate during which it had not been applied merely in 
a theological sense. For Kersey (1715), fanaticism was `pretended inspiration'. 
Fanatics he presented rather restrictively as 'a reproachful title, commonly 
given to Quakers, Muggletonians, etc.'. Bullokar-Browne (1719) saw no reason 
to restrict the use of the word to mistaken religiousity but instead defined 
September 1705, Vol. 1, 48, 28 September 1705, Vol. I, 50, 29 September 1705, Vol. I, 50, 23 
December 1705, Vol. I, 139, 20 January 1706, Vol. I, 166, 19 March 1706, Vol. 1, 205, 26 
April 1706, Vol. I, 234, 26 April 1706, Vol. I, 237, 1 October 1706, Vol. I, 291, 27 February 
1707, Vol. I, 336, 22 March 1708, Vol. II, 100, for references to fanatics; Other instances of 
connecting `Whigs and fanatics' include Leslie, The New Association, 1702, Trapp, Most 
Faults on One Side, 1710, 31, and Higgons, A Short View of the English History, 1727, 327; 
According to The Character of a Modern Tory, 1713, 20, `fanaticism' belonged to the 
`jargon' of Tories. 
20 Swift, E15, 16 November 1710. 
21 	 Three Questions of Present Importance, 1702, 29-30. 
22 	 Reflections on the Management Of some late Party-Disputes, 1715, 29, 33. 
23 	 Reflections on the Management Of some late Party-Disputes, 1715, 33, 43. 
24 [Ambrose Philips], The Free-Thinker, No. 31 (FT31), 7 July 1718. 
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fanatical or fanatic generally as `distracted, mad, frantic, out of his wits'.'-' 
Between the editions of 1706 and 1720 of Phillips-Kersey, the vocabulary of 
fanaticism was one of the additions. A fanatic appeared as a person 'that 
pretends to revelations and inspirations, a religious coxcomb', whose `tenets or 
opinions' constituted fanaticism, and whose reference group were the fanatics, 
'a reproachful title, commonly given to Quakers, Muggletonians, Anabaptists, 
and other sectaries that dissent from the Church of England'. 
From the late 1720s onwards, dictionaries always contained an entry for 
fanaticism.26 What was new in Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) was a clear 
restriction of fanaticism to the sphere of religion. Fanaticism was 
`extravagance, wildness, or enthusiasm in religious matters', fanatic 'a 
professor or believer of odd, romantic, out of the way notions in religion' and 
fanatic `whimsical, inclined to enthusiasm or romantic notions, especially in 
religion'. Fenning (1741) confirms this restriction of the concept of fanaticism 
to religion, it being defined merely as `religious madness'. A fanatic was 'a 
person who has wild notions in religion; an enthusiast', and the adjective fanatic 
stood for `entertaining wild, imaginary, and enthusiastic notions in religion'. By 
the mid-century, fanaticism appeared as a synonym for `enthusiasm; religious 
frenzy' and fanatic for 'an enthusiast; a man mad with wild notions of religion'. 
Such definitions in Johnson (1755) left little room for calling political rivals 
`fanatics'. At the same time, occurrences of the term fanaticism declined 
rapidly. The consulted material contains few instances of the term after 1720, 
which suggests that it was losing its role as a polemical weapon against political 
opponents. Even in religious discourse, instances become difficult to find. 
Right degree of zeal 
Among religious terms applied in political contexts, the word zeal is one of the 
most frequent to appear. Debate on the proper amount of zeal in issues both 
religious and political was typical of an age looking for a permanent solution to 
excesses of zeal experienced in preceding centuries. Zeal and party adherence 
remained closely connected in contemporary minds. 
The term zeal occurs regularly in texts dealing with questions of pluralism, as 
sectarianism was associated with a distorted type of zeal. A variety of other 
religious usages for the term were also available?' As this term of biblical origin 
could carry both highly positive and negative connotations, it proved useful in 
25 Possibly to encounter suggestions that Methodism was fanaticism, Wesley 1764 still defined 
fanatic as merely `mad', thus following this old way of definition. 
26 Chambers 1728; Gordon-Bailey 1730; Kersey 1731; Bailey 1733; [Defoe] 1737; Martin 
1749; A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
27 
	
	 An instance of this commonplace association between sectarianism and zeal can be found 
from Synge, The Case of Toleration, 1726, 25, who pointed out that some tended to regard 
all sectaries as zealous to convert others and to strengthen the position of their own grouping; 
For other religious uses of zeal, see COPC: John Tillotson, Of the Education of Children, 
1694; Gildon, Miscellaneous Letters and Essays, 1694; John Strype, Memorials of Cranmer, 
1694; Abel Boyer, Memoirs of the Life and Negotiations of Sir William Temple, 1714: John 
Lewis, Life and Sufferings of John Wicliffe, 1720. 
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secular polemic as well, including discussions on adherence to political parties. 
Zeal might refer to rivalry and partisanship, but, zeal in favour of a `right cause' 
appeared as utterly positive. Zeal was characteristically a `party virtue' which 
one's own side praised while the other condemned. Zeal was 'in itself a thing 
indifferent, and made good or bad, only with respect to the end it aims at, and 
the means it makes use of to accomplish it'.28 Zeal was a perfect term for 
political rhetoric. 
Negative associations of zeal could be derived from the Bible. The biblical 
basis of the term is visible in Moreri-Collier (1701) who presented zealots as 'a 
faction of wicked people' in the time of Roman attacks against Jews. The 
politico-religious faction of Jewish zealots, though pretending that they were 
working 'out of zeal for the glory of God', had been characterised by sedition, 
robbery, plunder, cruelty and impiety. It was the zealots who had caused 
divisions within Israel and contributed to its falling under the domination of the 
Roman Empire.29 The history of zealots provided a powerful analogy for 
eighteenth-century thinkers who willingly turned to the history of Israel for 
comparisons which might help in interpreting their own political realities. For 
instance, Mawson (1746), preaching in the aftermath of the Jacobite rising of 
1745, suggested that the biblical message on the evil character of zeal and 
zealots concerned acute political as well as religious issues.3 ' Elsewhere, the 
same sense of the `desperate faction of the zealots, who ... soon put the whole 
nation into flames' was present. The word, which was often `taken in an ill 
sense, for a separatist or schismatic, a fanatic', became redirected from religious 
discourse to the more secular discourse of party politics.31 Being called a `zealot 
of the party' almost always meant a highly negative statement. 32 
In other dictionaries originating from the seventeenth century, zealot might 
appear in a more general sense of 'one that is jealous or zealous', 'a bigot' or 
'hot, furious, fervent, passionate in their way and opinion'.33 Dictionary entries 
illustrate a tendency for the term to become more general and, at the same time, 
more secular in meaning. In this case, such generalisation and secularisation 
may have increased the usefulness of the term in political party rhetoric. 
Phillips-Kersey (1706), for instance, placed the term primarily in the area of 
religious discourse but did not exclude other uses, stating that a zealot was 'a 
zealous person, a great stickler or party-man, chiefly in matters of religion'. As 
to the prevalent connotation of the term, Phillips-Kersey added that zeal was 
`often taken in an ill sense, for a separatist or schismatic, a fanatic'. 
Glossographia Anglicana Nova (1707), Kersey (1715 and 1731) and Bailey 
28 	 William King, The Advantages of Education, Religious and Political, 1706, 27; Mawson, 
The Mischiefs of Division. 1746, 4. 
29 Moreri-Collier 1701; The Jewish connection was also mentioned in Chambers 1728. 
30 	 Mawson, The Mischiefs of Division, 1746, 3-4, 12 
31 OED: zealot. 
32 	 Three Questions of Present Importance, 1702. Compare the use of the term on iii and 10; A 
Free-Thinker at Oxford, 1719, 61; Weekly Miscellany, No. 68, 30 March 1734, in GM, Vol. 
IV, March 1734, 151, Reel 134; A Dissuasive from Party and Religious Animosities, 1736, 
12. 
33 Coles 1701; Cocker-Hawkins 1704 and 1724. 
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(1733) all agreed on such a definition but added an even more general and, what 
is noteworthy, overwhelmingly positive description of zeal as 'an earnest 
passion for anything, (more) especially (for one's) religion'. Burrough, for 
instance, expressed his positive understanding of the term in a similar way, 
stating that 'zeal in general may be defined an earnest concern for or against a 
thing, and a vigorous pursuit of such concern'.34 Glossographia also added the 
words 'or the good of one's country' to the definition, thus drawing a parallel 
between religious and political activism and providing a good starting point for 
the application of zeal as a political concept. Reference to political zeal was not 
included in most dictionaries, but this does not mean that the editors saw the 
term as purely religious, and lacking in political applicability. 
The meaning of zeal remained rather ambiguous throughout the early 
eighteenth century. For Gordon-Bailey (1730), a zealot was 'a zealous person, a 
great stickler for a party, principle or opinion'. Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) still 
defined zeal in biblical terms: 
Zeal has various significations in Scripture; sometimes it means a 
fervent or earnest desire to promote or propagate any doctrine or 
opinion; sometimes the anger or indignation that is expressed against 
any thing; sometimes it means jealousy, sometimes envy, etc. 
The applicability of the term zealot was not restricted to the sphere of religion, 
as it could mean very generally 'one that is a great favourer of, stickler for, or 
promoter of any opinion'. Likewise, Fenning (1741) and Johnson (1755) saw 
zeal as 'a passionate ardour or affection for any thing, person, or cause',35 
pointing out that zealot was `generally used in dispraise'. Even if Johnson's 
quotations for zeal-vocabulary were mainly derived from religious texts, 
religious associations were gradually loosing their dominant position. A 
quotation from Swift associating political and religious party activity yet using 
the term zealous in a positive general sense is illustrative of this development: 
'To enter into a party as into an order of friars, with so resigned an obedience to 
superiors, is very unsuitable with the civil and religious liberties we so 
zealously assert'. 
Zeal was used in distinctly political contexts in expressions such as 'the zeal 
of the Whig side' and Tory zeal 'for the honour of the prince and the safety of 
the Church'.36 References to mistaken zeal for party at the cost of public good 
were many.37 More particularly, the Civil War was seen as having been fought 
34 J. Burrough, Zeal and Moderation Reconcil'd, 1718, 5. 
35 A parallel definition had appeared in Chambers 1728. 
36 COPC: Kennen, Complete History of England, 1706; Atterbury, English Advice to the 
Freeholders of England, 1714. 
37 
	
	 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1690, 255; Robert against Ferguson, 1704, 21; Place, 
The Arbitration, [17101, 12; Addison wrote against Tory religious zeal and party zealots in 
Addison to John Somers, Baron Somers of Evesham (London), Dublin Castle, 4 July 1709, 
The Letters, 164; Addison to Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland (London), Dublin Castle, 
27 May 1710, The Letters, 220; Addison, S185, 2 October 1711, S201, 20 October 1711, 
S445, 31 July 1712, S459, 16 August 1712; A Memorial of the Present State of the British 
Nation, 1722, 19; C29, 13 March 1727; C40, 24 April 1727; A Dissuasive from Party and 
Religious Animosities, 1736, 3; Observations on the Conduct of the Tories, the Whigs, and 
the Dissenters, 1739, 6; Mawson, The Mischiefs of Division, 1746, 8. 
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with party-zeal. Mawson (1746), for instance, opposed the rebellion of 1745 by 
recalling the 1640s as a warning against mistaken religious zeal.38 Whenever 
possible, Tories were prepared to depict Whigs as having been (in the 
seventeenth century) 'very zealous, a preaching, praying, canting tribe' that had 
'set up for reformers, and found everything, even the crown itself faulty'.39 In 
Swift's essays, zeal could express disagreement with the policy of the 
competing party, both the Whigs and Tories pretending 'a mighty zeal for our 
religion and government'. As to the Whigs, he attacked them for `their zeal for 
frequent revolutions'. 40 Whigs and Dissenters, in turn, criticised Tories for a 
mistaken persecuting type of zeal as against alternative forms of Protestantism. 
In 1705, Defoe stated that those who supported 'a hotheaded zeal in difference 
of opinions', as opposed to those advocating moderation, were not following 
the teachings of Christianity. In an Oxford sermon preached the same year, the 
audience was told not to be zealous and abuse those in power.4' 
The religious background of the term zeal provided the basis not only for its 
negative but also for positive senses. The term was known to occur also in 
positive senses in the Bible. Zeal could stand for 'such an eagerness of desire, or 
affectionate concern, for any thing, as is attended with a passionate warmth in 
the pursuit, or defence of it'. More particularly, such positive zeal generally 
concerned the interest of the Christian religion 42 Zeal for God, religion and 
Church as well as zeal against anything disturbing true religion were distinctly 
positive expressions for a great majority of writers.43 Since the 1690s, the Book 
of Common Prayer contained a prayer for the double anniversary of the 
Gunpowder Plot and William III's landing in which the congregation wished 
for a `spirit of fervent zeal for our holy religion', similar to that experienced in 
connection with the two national crises, to continue.44 This positive religious 
sense of zeal may have facilitated the use of the term in positive political senses 
as well. Bolingbroke, for instance, emphasised the positive political zeal of the 
Hanoverian Tories,45 and Defoe wrote positively about zeal against Catholicism 
and the House of Stuart.46 
38 	 Mawson, The Mischiefs of Division, 1746, 5. 
39 	 The True Picture of an Ancient Tory, 1702, 11. This is a Tory statement in a dialogue most 
probably written by a Tory; See also A Dissuasive from Party and Religious Animosities, 
1736, 9. 
40 [Swift], E15, 16 November 1710, E38, April 1711. 
41 [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, 48; This sermon is reported in Remarks and Collections of 
Thomas Hearne, 23 August 1705, Vol. 1, 33. Hearne, as a fervent opponent of Whigs, was 
irritated by the sermon and certainly found Tory zeal critical about political leaders justified; 
see also Observations on the Conduct of the Tories, the Whigs, and the Dissenters, 1739, 17-
18, and Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 5. 
42 Stevenson opened his sermon with a quotation from Galatians 4:18: 'But it is good to be 
zealously-affected always, in a good thing'. Stevenson, Zeal and Moderation reconcil'd, 
1728, 3; Mawson preached on James 3:15: `For where envying and strife is, there is 
confusion, and every evil work'. Mawson, The Mischiefs of Division, 1746, 3. 
43 	 Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 9 October 1705, Vol. 1, 54; Burrough, Zeal and 
Moderation Reconcil'd, 1718, 1-2, 10; Stevenson, Zeal and Moderation reconcil'd, 1728, 28. 
44 	 The Book of Common Prayer, 1693 and later editions. The prayer is missing from the 1681 
edition, i.e. it was probably added to the book after the Glorious Revolution. 
45. COPC: Bolingbroke, A Letter to Sir William Windham, 1717; Zeal is used in both positive and 
negative senses in Bolingbroke's Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, passim. 
46 	 COPC: Defoe, An Apeal to Honour and Justice, 1715. 
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Mistaken religious zeal, when connected to politics, could, of course, also 
lead to disasters.67 Dissenting writers such as Defoe might cynically point out 
that religious zeal had often been mixed with politics by politicians to win 
public support and achieve political ends. `Religious zealots of all sorts' 
became accused for being uncompromising advocates of their cause.48 The 
anticlerical writers of the Independent Whig offered a particularly disparaging 
description of the abuse of the term zeal:49 
I do not know any word, in any language, which, next to the word 
Church, has so much wickedness and roguery, to answer for, as the word 
zeal. It is indeed an important and dreadful monosyllable, which, when 
used with proper gestures and emphasis, can turn a cutthroat into a saint, 
and a madman into a martyr. It can commit bloodshed and butchery, 
with innocent hands; destroy life and property, with a good conscience; 
and dispeople nations with applause. 
In other words, the term was abused by designing religious leaders to mislead 
the masses. The writers were referring to the way the High Church was said to 
discriminate between other religious inclinations. Nevertheless, they defined 
`true' zeal as a particularly recommendable phenomenon: 'True zeal is a sincere 
and warm concern for the glory of God, and the spiritual welfare of mankind'. 
For these republicans, zeal was 'a virtue full of affection, meekness, humanity 
and benevolence' S° 
An alternative positive use of the term zeal, which directly concerned the 
sphere of politics and was distinctly secular, can be found in variations of the 
expression 'zeal of a true public spirit'. This expression, influenced by rising 
classical republicanism and suitable for the pursuit of a civil religion, was used 
by Hoadly, for instance, in a sermon in 1717. With public spirit, Hoadly meant 
a `desire of the happiness of others' and `generous and diffusive love of 
mankind's' Other ways of expressing this positive patriotic sense of zeal 
include Tindal's 'zeal for the interest of their country', Acherley's admiration 
of Whigs being `zealous in the cause of liberty',"- and the Craftsman's 
`unbiased zeal for the public' as opposed to adherence of a party. Related to this 
sense of zeal was also the Craftsman's manner of viewing the Puritans of the 
reign of Charles I. On the 78th anniversary of Charles I's beheading, the journal 
already dared to suggest that the Puritan zeal against the measures of the court, 
47 This was pointed out also by Stevenson, even though he took zeal, when temperate, as a 
necessary phenomenon. Stevenson, Zeal and Moderation reconcil'd, 1728, 19, 28. 
48 [Defoe], The Remedy Worse than the Disease, 1714, 28-9; A poem published in 1715 
referred to the role of religious zeal in motivating people's political actions: 'Faction grew 
strongest to prevail, Still covered over with holy zeal; Which quick as sulphur does inspire 
The mob, and sets them all on fire'. The Country Hobb upon the Town Mobb: Or, the Party 
Scuffle, 1715, 8; A Dissuasive from Party and Religious Animosities, 1736, 3-4. 
49 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW23, 22 June 1720; An analogous statement concerning mistaken 
zeal for God appeared in Gordon's CL123, 6 April 1723. 
50 1W23, 22 June 1720. 
51 	 Benjamin Hoadly, The Nature and Duty of a Public Spirit, 1717, 13, 32. 
52 Matthew Tindal, An Account of a Manuscript, entitul'd, Destruction the Certain 
Consequence of Division, 1718, 17; Acherley, Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 19. 
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which had extended royal prerogative and violated the rights of subjects, had 
been praiseworthy.53 Such a statement fitted the interest of the opposition of the 
late 1720s but may have hurt the feelings of traditionalist elements of the nation 
still repenting the national sin of murdering Charles I, God's anointed. Instead, 
at the time of the Jacobite rising of 1745, most Englishmen would probably 
have agreed with Warren's statement that all English subjects shared a `zeal' for 
George II and his government.54 
Interesting, from the point of view of both the gradual secularisation of 
society and the generalisation in meaning of the term zeal, is a statement written 
soon after the South Sea Bubble (1720), a significant stock market crisis 
affecting even contemporary political culture:55 
... at present a great share of our zeal and violence for the Church, is 
changed into a zeal for the stocks; and the reason is plain, there is 
nowadays more to begot by alley than the altar .. . 
This statement reflects awareness of structural transformations enhanced by 
economic change; as a result of the financial revolution, the `alleys' of London 
had become the world's leading center of finance. At the same time, public 
discourse was, after centuries of disputation about matters of the `altar', 
becoming less concerned with religious issues and turning instead to economic 
issues such as corruption. A single statement alone is not sufficient evidence for 
a transformation from a concentration on religion to concentration on economic 
issues, particularly as the author greeted this transformation with cynicism. As 
an anticlerical writer, he opposed excessive religious zeal, but, as a critic of 
growing financial power, which appeared to him as a dangerously destabilising 
force, he also opposed the excessive zeal for business at the cost of religious 
values. As a spokesman for moderate Anglicanism and great landowners, he 
wished to see zeal for the altar and that for the alley be overtaken by republican 
values such as `public spirit' and `patriotism'. 
Moderation as virtue and vice 
In late seventeenth-century public discourse, disagreements on the correct 
treatment of religious Dissenters gave rise to an increasing use of terms such as 
moderation and toleration, both of which quickly found their way into 
connected political debates. Moderation formed a counter-concept for zeal and 
an alternative expression for the concept toleration. Moderation, although not 
meaning the same as an acceptance of pluralism, inherently contained the 
possibility of an existence of several religious alternatives. By implication, the 
53 C17, 30 January 1727; C66, 7 October 1727; governmental writers wrote sneeringly about 
the opposition's 'zeal for liberty'. The Present Necessity of distinguishing Publick Spirit 
from Parry, 1736, 15; 'Zeal for the public' and 'a spirit of faction' were contrasted by Warren 
in the sermon Religion and Loyalty inseparable, 1745, 16-17. 
54 Warren, Religion and Loyalty inseparable, 1745, 17. 
55 	 [Trenchard and Gordon], A Collection of all the Humorous Letters, No. 5, 1721. 
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adoption of the term and shifts in its meaning towards an increasingly positive 
direction may also have contributed to the development of more sympathetic 
attitudes towards pluralism in general, including the plurality of political 
values. 
Initially, moderation had formed a counter-concept for rigidity, high-
handedness and immodesty.56 However, an important conceptual 
transformation can be dated to the early eighteenth century. When late 
seventeenth-century Low-Church divines began to call for moderation, they 
meant comprehension of such Dissenters within the Church whose doctrine did 
not differ considerably from that of the established Church.57 In the course of 
the eighteenth-century, these divines came to constitute the elite of the Church 
and started to develop 'a cult of religious moderation' as a reaction to Tory 
exploitation of fears of the `Church in danger' for political purposes. Whereas, 
in the very beginning of the century, moderation carried pejorative 
connotations of Whiggish halfheartedness, and the High Church chose 'No 
Moderation' as a motto for their campaign in 1702, in the course of the century, 
Low-Church writers increasingly presented moderation as a cardinal Christian 
virtue. There may well have been political motives behind this emphasis on 
moderation: the Whiggish political elite longed for political stability, and an 
avoidance of quarrelsome ideological issues was a good way of advancing that 
purpose. Their long-standing campaign for moderation was so successful that, 
by the mid-1740s, an observer could suggest that the English clergy as a whole 
had grown more moderate.58 
The campaign for moderation was successful in that, from the beginning of 
the century, moderation became a popular catchword, particularly in Whiggish 
and dissenting rhetoric. It was also used by traditionalists as a weapon against 
their major ideological opponents. The applications of the concept being so 
contradictory, statements in favour of moderation and attacks against it should 
be seen in the context of the on-going politico-religious debate. Condren has 
rightly pointed out that the use of the term moderation in discourse, unlike one 
might first expect, often `signals areas of heated disagreement and 
frustration' .59 
Moderation was an important ideological concept for many political 
polemicists. Defoe offers an illustrative instance. Moderation became a key 
term to him, yet a vague and inconsistently used one that he seldom bothered to 
define. Defoe used the concept already in the early years of the century when 
working as a ministerial writer for Harley, advocating internal stability within 
Britain and propagating fierce warfare against France. Defoe's concept of 
56 Condren 1994, 159. 
57 Chamberlain 1995, 195. 
58 	 Walsh and Taylor 1993, 53. 
59 	 Condren 1994, 156, 159; an example of the centrality of the term moderation in the politico-
religious discourse of the first two decades of the eighteenth century is offered by an 
ephemeral broadsheet which described a duel between a Tory and a Whig character, the first 
attacking 'the shameful and detested cause of moderation' and the latter fighting for 'the 
upright and blessed principles of moderation'. The Modern Champions, 1710, no pagination. 
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moderation may actually have been initiated by the leading minister Harley 
himself. Defoe's claims for impartiality and moderation were supported by an 
almost complete exclusion of the then current party names from the paper. The 
purpose of the use of the term moderation was evident: to make any criticism 
against the paper ineffective by maintaining that the paper represented the 
purest form of moderation.60 
Moderation remained a central term in Defoe's later works as well. This 
aspect can be seen in An Apeal to Honour and Justice (1715), a text with which 
Defoe intended to defend himself against accusations of libel. Defoe called for 
the voice of `moderate principles' to be heard. He warned the readers that the 
period of moderation achieved as a result of the Hanoverian Succession would 
not last for long, as there were people who wished to revive old religious 
disputes. In Defoe's rhetoric, moderation appeared as the sole virtue by which 
the internal peace of the nation could be preserved.61  
Other dissenting, anticlerical and Whiggish writers soon joined Defoe's calls 
for moderation as opposed to High-Church principles. Toland described party-
men as those who `abhor moderation'. Addison vindicated moderation and 
liberty of conscience which he saw as interconnected. An anonymous Whig 
insisted that `those who profess and act moderation' (i.e. Whigs) should not be 
called a party. Furthermore, moderation was also echoed in Whiggish popular 
ballads directed to the audience at large."- As a result of all this polemic on 
moderation, the concept became associated with Whiggism to such an extent 
that Hearne regarded a preacher's tendency to lay the emphasis on moderation 
in his sermon as a certain sign of his Whiggish inclinations 63  
When defined in Whiggish texts of the early part of the century, moderation 
might stand for the rule 'that we admit no heat against our neighbour for 
differing with us in opinion, or principle of religion'. This definition was based 
on an assumption that such a `heat' was generally attended by passion, and all 
that was passionate was also irrational. Moderation in matters of opinion was 
needed, argued these defenders of moderation, because being mistaken and 
differing in opinions was natural to human beings. Furthermore, immoderation 
was viewed as an unchristian attitude, whereas the `truly moderate', or those 
who were not ready to persecute their neighbours for holding different views, 
were depicted, in this Whiggish approach to moderation, as better Christians.64 
In Whiggish political texts, moderation appeared as virtue in a person's 
`religion and political relation considered as a member of either Church or 
state'. Moderation was a virtue that regulated human passions and made people 
60 Richards 1972, 59-60, 62-4; Downie 1979, 65, 73, 81. 
61 COPC: Defoe, An Apeal to Honour and Justice, 1715; Phillipson has argued that Defoe's 
calls for moderation were attempts to create a political culture which would temper party 
zeal. Phillipson 1993, 223. 
62 	 Toland, The Memorial of the State of England, 1705, 4; Addison, T257, 30 November 1710; 
Reflections upon the Huptour of the British Nation in Religion and Politics, 1714, 15; The 
Country Courtship, or, The Maiden's Choice, Who prefer'd a Moderate Man before a Whig 
or Tory, 1713. 
63 	 Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 23 August 1705, Vol. I, 33, and 23 September 
1705, Vol. I, 47-8. 
64 [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, 44-5, 48. 
270 o DEBATE ON FANATICISM. MODERATION AND POSSIBILITIES... 
duly concerned with each issue, that is, made them avoid both indifference and 
extremity. Moderation, as here defined, was to be recommended both in 
religion and in politics. The justification for this highly sympathetic view of 
moderation could, when wished, be found in the Bible." 
Moderation was such an important term for the Whig party66 that, for some 
whiggishly inclined persons, the expression `moderate man' seems to have 
become an euphemism for one's own position in the religious questions that 
divided the views of the governing elite. John Hardy, for instance, commented 
in his letter to John Locke on a text he had recently read which dealt with 
religious questions and had been welcomed by 'all moderate men' 67 In some 
pamphlets published at the very beginning of the eighteenth century, 'the 
moderate party' was openly contrasted with 'that violent party, which calls 
itself the Church of England'. `Moderate man' thus became synonymous with 
the term `Low-Church man'.68 
The supporters of the High Church, or the major opponents to `moderate 
men', also adopted the expression moderation for calling their ideological 
rivals. For them, of course, `moderate principles' in both religion and politics, 
as opposed to orthodox Anglicanism, were something to despise and far from a 
virtue. Traditionalist writers might question the very justification of the term 
when applied to Whigs by pointing out poetically: 'A Whig and moderate, a 
pleasant fiction, for it is a terms an errant contradiction'. In a Tory pamphlet 
defining the much contested terms of the crisis year 1710, 'a moderate man' 
was straightforwardly defined as 'one who has no moderation'. According to 
the Tory press, moderation was a `fallacious name' that Whigs readily used 
with the purpose of concealing their real motives69 against the established 
Church so much loved by the Tories themselves. Some of the best examples of 
this criticism of the Whiggish `pretence of moderation' can be found in 
Hearne's diary which contains references to `fanatical moderators' working 
against the Church and to the questionable character of `Presbyterian 
moderation'. In Hearne's descriptions, a person who supported `moderate 
principles' advocated republicanism and opposed the Church of England. As a 
person, Hearne characterised a `moderate man' with lukewarmness and 'a cool, 
heavy, flat temper'.70 
65 Chuse which you Please, 1710, 5-6; The Humble Confession, 15, with reference to 
Philippians 4:5. 
66 A further illustration of this centrality of moderation to Whiggism can be found in Swift's 
suggestion that the leading Whigs had been accused by their own supporters for lack of 
moderation. Swift to Archbishop King, London, 12 February 1708, Correspondence of 
Jonathan Swift, Vol. I, 70. 
67 	 John Hardy to Locke, 17 September 1700, The Correspondence of John Locke, Vol. VII, 
142. 
68 	 [Dennis], The Danger of Priesteraft, 1702, 7; Sage, The Reasonableness of a Toleration, 
1705, preface; Tindal, A New Catechism with Dr. Hickes's Thirty Nine Articles, 1710, 3. 
69 The Modern Whig Dictator, 1702, 9; [Ward], A Fair Shell, but A Rotten Kernel, 1705, 
preface; [Drake], The Memorial of the Church of England, 1705, 36; Reflexions upon the 
Politeness of Manners, 1707, 129; The True Genuine Tory-Address, 1710, 12. 
70 Naish reported how bishops had made some vote for a person of `moderate principles' 
against their will and how 'some person of moderate principles' was favoured in a 
nomination at the cost of traditionalist Churchmen. The Diary of Thonas Naish, 24 
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Orthodox Anglicans were generally critical of the term moderation, which 
was viewed merely as a word 'in fashion'" that had 'come to town again'. 
Drake's Memorial of the Church of England (1705) suggested that moderation 
had recently been 'the word, the passpartout, that opened all the place doors',72 
that is, men holding `moderate principles' had been favoured in nominations at 
the cost of Orthodox Anglicans. The Whigs were told to have introduced the 
concept of moderation in 1703, to have abandoned it in 1705 when gaining 
power, and to have reintroduced it in 1710 after losing political positions.73 In 
1710, a Whiggish character in a Tory propaganda dialogue confessed that his 
special purpose had been 'to make the modern Whigs everywhere cry up 
moderation', a term that had been misleadingly attractive in appearance in the 
eyes of the public tired of difficulties caused by factions. Another obscure piece 
of Tory propaganda from the same year recommended, with the words of a 
hellish politician, that the Whigs should take 'the mask of moderation' back to 
use and vigorously attack both Church and state. According to the Tory press, 
moderation had been recommended to the people by the Whigs though true 
moderation was never what the Whigs really intended.74 
To many other Tories as well, moderation became a term of reproach, the 
morality and Christianity of which was questioned on the basis of its meaning 
`indifferency in a good cause, relaxing the discipline of the Church, or 
betraying it to its enemies'.75 It was suggested that a conspiracy existed between 
`moderate Churchmen' and religious enthusiasts, both of whom aiming at 
subverting the established order in ecclesiastical and political matters.76 In 
Swift's words illustrating the abundant use of ecclesiastical vocabulary `these 
very sons of moderation' (or Whigs) and 'men of incensed moderation' had 
been `pleased to excommunicate every man who disagreed with them in the 
smallest article of their political creed'.77 High-Church preachers made use of 
the Bible to attack the concept of moderation.78 In political battles as well, the 
concept played a role at least to the end of the 1710s. Atterbury, for instance, 
November 1707, 59-60, and 10 December 1707, 62. Remarks and Collections of Thomas 
Hearne, 29 September 1705, Vol. I, 50, 20 January 1706, Vol. I, 166, 28 January 1706, Vol. 
I, 172, 2 March 1706, Vol. I, 196, 28 April 1706, Vol. I, 237, 10 January 1708, Vol. II, 88, 16 
March 1710, Vol. II. 360; Chuse which you Please, 1710, 5, offered a parallel description of 
the notions of a 'Sacheverellite', who, according to this Whiggish pamphlet, took 
moderation criminal both in ecclesiastical and political affairs and believed that all moderate 
men were either religious Dissenters or republicans, if not both. 
71 	 [Tufton], The History of Faction, 1705, 70; Another description of moderation as a 'name 
... in fashion' has been recorded in Gascoigne 1989, 75; An instance of Tory hatred of 
moderation is William Shippen's satirical poem against Whiggish moderation with the title 
Moderation Display'd, 1705, 7. 
72 	 [Drake], The Memorial of the Church of England, 1705, 7. 
73 Trapp, Most Faults on One Side, 1710, 23; The True Genuine Tory-Address, 1710, 6. 
74 	 [Davenant], Sir Thonas Double, 1710. 7, 24; Advice front the Shades Below. 1710, 15. 
75 The True Genuine Tory-Address, 1710, 6. 
76 	 [Leslie], The New Association Of those called, Moderate-Church-Matt, with the Modern 
Whigs and Fattaticks, 1702, 1-2. 
77 	 Swift discussed, as he wrote, the `endless unprofitable haranguing about moderation' among 
Whigs in E12. 12 October 1710, E19, 14 December 1710, E30. 1 March 1711, and E43, 31 
May 1711. 
78 	 Edmund Chishull, Modesty and Moderation; Or, the True Relative Duty of the Tolerated and 
Establish'd Parties in any Society of Men, 1712, 5-7. 
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claimed in the heat of the Succession Crisis in 1714 that `Whiggish moderation' 
threatened every subject.79 
Moderation was clearly a concept that was widely debated for as long as 
religious tensions were high. Once religious fervour calmed down, the 
frequency of the occurrences as well as disputes about its proper definition 
settled down. At the same time, appeals for moderation were supported by a 
widely shared conception of the Church of England as an ideal middle position 
between superstition and enthusiasm. The English compromise between 
religious unity and religious freedom, realised in the Acts of Uniformity and 
Toleration respectively, became glorified. Such `moderation leading in 
religion' seemed to bring stability to the political system that might otherwise 
be characterised by strife.ß0 
As early as in 1718, a pamphleteer presenting an optimistic dissenting view 
wrote about 'the moderate and good-natured temper of the times' that, he 
believed, would soon remove the conflict between the established Church and 
Dissenters. In reality, moderation seems to have remained a disputed term at 
least until the end of the 1720s. This is shown by Burrough's sermon from the 
same year in which High-Church arguments about the character of moderation 
were once again repeated. According to Burrough, it was mistaken to call the 
defence of the established Church immoderate at the same time when 
`lukewarm indifference in matters of religion ... is mistaken for the laudable 
virtue of moderation'. To him and many a fellow High-Church Anglican, 
moderation was 'such a prudent temper of mind, as with a holy and regular zeal, 
steers its course in the middle way between the two extremes of a cold 
indifference, and an implacable furious bigotry'. According to Burrough, such 
true moderation between sectarian enthusiasm and Catholicism was 
represented only by the Church of England herself, not by Dissenters or their 
sympathisers.81 A similar type of reconciliation of the terms zeal and 
moderation in favour of the Anglican Church was attempted by Stevenson in a 
sermon he preached in 1728. According to Stevenson, moderation would lead 
to indifference in religion if it was not attended by a proper amount of zeal.82 As 
a further sign of the continuously disputed character of the concept moderation, 
in 1720 the Independent Whig raised the issue of moderation by claiming, with 
reference to the High-Church clergy, that moderation had been made 'a vice, 
and esteemed to be lukewarmness, and an indifference to religion and 
goodness'." 
In contrast, the few occurrences of the term moderation in texts from the 
1730s and 1740s would indicate that the term was applied much more rarely 
and mostly in positive senses. In connection with the revival of religious 
questions in the mid-1730s, for instance, moderation could be depicted together 
79 	 COPC: Atterbury, English Advice to the Freeholders of England, 1714. 
80 Walsh and Taylor 1993, 55-6; Addison, S3, 3 March 1711. 
81 	 The Church of England's Apology, 1718, 30; Burrough, Zeal and Moderation Reconcil'd, 
1718, 1-2, 20. 
82 Stevenson, Zeal and Moderation reconcil'd, 1728, 28. 
83 [Trenchard and Gordon], 1W22, 15 June 1720. 
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with charity and justice as qualities that could overcome the hated party-spirit in 
society. In 1739, a pamphleteer celebrated the way many had moved 'from a 
persecuting spirit, to a happy temper of moderation'. This transformation, 
argued the author, had been a long one and was by no means complete by 
1739.84 Moderation had become an overwhelmingly positive attribute which 
was willingly applied in advertising the writer's own political direction. In 
1740, the Daily Gazetteer recommended itself to the readers as a paper written 
with a particular 'spirit of moderation'. In 1745, Fielding's True Patriot 
published a letter in which the paper was thanked for perfectly Christian 
moderation towards all parties.85 
Whigs glorified moderation throughout the early eighteenth century and 
Tories vilified it at least until around 1720. How, then, was such a highly 
contentious term treated in contemporary dictionaries? The easiest solution for 
editors was, of course, to refrain from defining the term. The consulted 
dictionaries seem to have followed this line up to the mid-1710s, when 
definitions of moderation as `temperance, prudence, discretion' 86 started to 
appear. Interestingly, moderation was accepted to cited dictionaries at a stage 
when its use in public discourse may already have been in decline. Together 
with the vocabulary of fanaticism, moderation was one of the few additions to 
Phillips-Kersey (1720) when compared with the edition of 1706. In addition to 
the mentioned positive adjectives, Phillips-Kersey, typical of an age committed 
to the questions of virtue, defined moderation as 'a virtue that governs all the 
passions', a definition repeated by Gordon-Bailey (1730). Moderate for 
Gordon-Bailey as well as Bailey (1733) meant `temperate, sober, that does not 
exceed', whereas Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) defined the same as 'reasonable, 
equitable, that keeps within due bounds, that does not break out into 
extravagancies of any kind'. Dyche's entry for moderation was characterised 
by an overwhelmingly positive attitude towards the general phenomenon: 
Moderateness/moderation that happy disposition of mind that sedately 
considers the reasonableness, justice, and equity of a thing that a person 
does or forbears, and that makes proper allowances for the actor and 
action. 
Fenning (1741) similarly echoed his admiration for moderation, seeing it as 'the 
state of keeping a due mean between extremes; forbearance of extremity; 
calmness, temperance, or equanimity'. Fenning, like most other dictionary 
editors, consciously avoided direct references to the religious or political 
connections of moderation. Much of the intensity of the politico-religious strife 
84 	 Free Briton, No. 191, 19 July 1733, in GM, Vol. III, July 1733, Reel 134; A Dissuasive from 
Party and Religious Animosities, 1736, 18. 
85 The Daily Gazetteer, No. 1531, 16 May 1740, BL Burney, Vol. 351; The True Patriot, No. 7, 
17 December 1745, BL Burney. 
86 Kersey 1715; Bullokar-Browne 1719; The Secretary's Guide 1721; Kersey 1731; Bailey 
1733: [Defoe] 1737. An interesting addition by Bailey and Defoe was 'government' as a 
synonym for moderation. Both must have meant 'government' in a very general sense with 
no reference to political government. 
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around the concept, which had been so characteristic of the early part of the 
century, had withered away by the 1740s, and the term appeared as increasingly 
non-political.87 Tory views of moderation did not find their way into 
dictionaries. Neither did Whigs continue their requests for moderation as 
intensively after 1720. 
Johnson's Dictionary (1755) emerges as an interesting exception in the 
otherwise consensual line of relatively non-political definitions of moderation. 
Johnson, who had obviously rejected early eighteenth-century Tory hatred 
towards moderation, added to definitions the positively charged expression 'the 
contrary temper to party violence', thus expressing a sense familiar to informed 
readers but omitted by their lexicographers wishing to stay outside political 
controversy. A number of Johnson's quotations for moderation and moderate 
were derived from seventeenth-century theological discourse and referred to 
the moderation of Anglicanism as opposed to the immoderation of Catholicism 
and Protestant sects. In this context, moderate appeared positively as 'not 
extreme in opinion; not sanguine in tenet' or `placed between extremes; holding 
the mean'. The religious background of the term was noticeable, but so is the 
political and increasingly secular sense of the term. Pope's verse `In moderation 
placing all my glory, while Tories call me Whig, and Whigs a Tory' and Swift's 
report from Parliament where 'a number of moderate members managed ... to 
obtain a majority' illustrate the political applicability of the term. 
One of the few instances of the concept moderation having been used in an 
unambiguously political sense can be found in Bolingbroke's remarks on 
history that were originally published in the Craftsman in the early 1730s. 
Without giving any references to religious issues, as customary when the 
concept moderation was in question, Bolingbroke wrote about 'true political 
moderation' that, according to him, consisted of opposing the policy of the 
government only when the national interest was in danger and then only with 
measures proper for the extent of the danger.88 In other words, opposition to 
Walpole headed by Bolingbroke represented the true form of political 
moderation as opposed to all other claims for moderation. The anti-Walpolean 
opposition thus attempted to adopt the positively charged concept for their 
exclusive use while consciously rejecting its religious implications. 
Limits of toleration 
By the dawn of the eighteenth century, toleration had become a principal term 
of English politico-religious discourse. The term had its roots in continental 
Reformation controversies in which it had gained an essentially negative 
connotation. In the seventeenth century, English ideas of toleration were part of 
87 Parallel non-political definitions of moderation appeared in Martin 1749 and A Pocket 
Dictionary 1753. 
88 [Bolingbroke], C250, 17 April 1731. 
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a European discourse characterised by a slow transformation from a 
confessional state towards a more tolerant one. Generally speaking, prevalent 
trends of thought continued to oppose the very idea of toleration. Toleration 
was understood to stand for enduring an evil. Calls for allowing variety in 
religious opinions were associated with subversive thought and considered a 
threat to both religion and political stability. In England, it was mainly among 
dissenting thinkers, often refugees from the Continent, that arguments in favour 
of toleration first started to appear.89 
In the early eighteenth century, the issue of toleration was regarded as an 
ancient one. Clarendon, for instance, wrote in his history how foreign 
Protestants had been tolerated in Elizabethan England and how this toleration 
had created anxiety among the Anglican clergy for the possibility of toleration 
also being extended to English dissenting Protestants.90 Fears of the rise in the 
status of dissenting Protestants had come true in the Civil War, an event that 
also played a major role in the early eighteenth-century understanding of 
toleration. 
For Interregnum Puritans as well, toleration had been a despicable word. 
Their attempts to enforce Calvinism throughout England gave rise to abundant 
texts defending religious toleration and confessional pluralism. Once subjected 
to discrimination, radical sects started to use toleration as their watchword, even 
though their demands for toleration were not based on any genuine conviction 
of a need of religious liberty but rather on the circumstances of sectarian rivalry. 
Most sects remained fundamentally intolerant. Still, in pro-toleration texts, 
belief in a necessary connection between religious and political freedom won 
increasing support.9' 
In the early eighteenth century, it was frequently argued that Dissenters had 
themselves been unwilling to tolerate rival Churches once they had gained a 
strong political status during the Interregnum. In the words of Drake's 
pamphlet, all Churches, and the English Protestant Dissenters in particular, had 
in their turns `experimentally demonstrated' that 'they will not so much as 
tolerate the exercise of the rites of a dissenting Church, though in subjection'. 
What annoyed Drake was that the English elite had nevertheless `perpetuated 
the toleration to the Dissenters'.92 In a pamphlet contrasting the texts of 
Presbyterians after the parliamentary victory in the Civil War and during the 
Sacheverell controversy in 1710, it was pointed out 'how very violent the 
Presbyterians in 1645... were, against any toleration in religion, when they had 
the power in their hands; and how very clamorous they are now for it'.93 
89 Luther had created the term `tollerantz' in 1541 and used it negatively with reference to the 
Catholic Church. Schreiner 1990, 477, 489; Redwood 1976, 89; Martin 1990, 67-8, building 
merely on the OED; Grell, Israel and Tyacke 1991, 14-15. 
90 	 Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, Vol. II, 1702, 417. 
91 Zaret 1989, 169-70; Besier 1990, 499; Tyacke 1991, 29; Trevor-Roper 1991, 390; Schochet 
1992, 127. 
92 	 [Drake], The Memorial of the Church of England, 1705, 9, 16, 36. 
93 	 Bodkins and Thimbles: or, 1645 against 1710. Containing the Opinions of the Old and New 
Presbyterians, Touching Toleration, Separation, Selriset; And the Necessity of Uniformity in 
a National Church: Faithfully set down in their own Words, 1710, preface. 
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Neither did the Restoration bring any extended toleration for the sectaries. 
Quite the contrary, the religious monopoly of Anglicanism was reintroduced 
and Dissenters became subject to persecution unknown in the Interregnum. 
Among Restoration general public, the concept of toleration gained an even 
stronger pejorative connotation, when it was applied in declarations issued by 
Stuart monarchs in favour of Catholics and sectaries. The monarchs were 
suspected of aiming at intolerant Catholic absolutism with which the pretended 
toleration was associated 94 
In late seventeenth-century England, the concept of toleration was used in a 
variety of ways. All religious groups used the term loosely and synonymously 
with indulgence. Only gradually did the indulgence granted to Dissenters turn 
in common parlance into toleration95 Toleration could refer either to any relief 
of religious Dissenters, to comprehension of the Presbyterians to the established 
Church, or sometimes even to the recognition of nonconformity in legislation. 
Importantly, however, toleration hardly ever referred to an equal right of 
religious liberty for everyone. Its synonym `liberty of conscience' was used in 
equally imprecise senses, referring to a just claim, within limits set by order and 
public peace, to hold religious beliefs that differed from the established 
practices. Neither did `liberty of conscience' refer to unlimited religious 
freedom, as it was almost universally held that full membership in civil society 
entailed a membership in the established Church and vice versa.96 
In late seventeenth-century continental legal and political theory, it was 
increasingly argued that the defence of the right faith and securing the eternal 
life of the subjects were no major responsibilities of state. As natural religion 
gradually replaced dogmatical doctrines, governments could reject attempts to 
achieve confessional conformity. This type of toleration was no more seen 
merely as a way of winning time until a return to original religious harmony but 
as a way of establishing a lasting peace. Toleration was gradually turning into a 
concept expressing a permanent coexistence of Churches and differing 
interpretations of truth 97 It should be noticed, however, that this transformation 
was completed in no country by the mid-eighteenth century. 
In England, the most articulate and best-known arguments in favour of 
toleration had been put forward by Locke, who had maintained that 'the mutual 
toleration of Christians in their different professions of religion' was 'the chief 
characteristic mark of the true Church' on the basis of both gospel and reason98 
94 Besier 1990, 499; Trevor-Roper 1991, 390. 
95 
	
	
Indulgence, the most usual synonym for toleration, which had been widely used in the reign 
of James II, was, by the early eighteenth century, much less common. Its religious origin can 
be seen in Gordon-Bailey's (1730) and Bailey's (1733) almost identical definitions of 
indulgence as `fondness, favour, gentleness, aptness to bear with or tolerate; also pardon and 
forgiveness of sins'. Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) expressed the same in the following words: 
'an allowance or permission of mere favour and goodness' . According to Fenning (1741), 
indulgence had a rather general and not necessarily religion-associated meaning as 
`compliance with, or granting the desires and requests of others through fondness; 
forbearance, or connivance at faults; a favour granted'; see also Martin 1749; A Pocket 
Dictionary 1753; Webb 1992, 159. 
96 Schochet 1992, 127, 137; Schochet 1995, 127, 141-2; Schochet 1996, 170. 
97 Schreiner 1990, 489. 
98 Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 1689. 
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In addition to toleration among sects holding different beliefs, Locke discussed 
toleration by the civil power of differing religious practices. He opposed all 
attempts to force people to adopt a 'true religion' and emphasised the essential 
distinction between religion and civil government. According to Locke, the 
state could not and should not even attempt to save souls, and, in normal 
circumstances, civil authorities had no right to intervene religious issues. 
Neither had religious sects any right to compel others to adopt their beliefs. 
Locke supported the moderate or Low-Church elements of the Church of 
England but advocated a more radical version of toleration, openly attacking 
persecuting divines. Universal religious liberty, however, remained out of 
question even for Locke. By toleration he referred to allowing Protestant 
sectarian pluralism as well as to the Low-Church idea of comprehension of 
Christians (not Catholics) within the Church of England 99 
Because of his suspected heterodoxy, the reception of Locke's views on 
toleration was generally reserved.100 There were, however, some exceptions. 
Shaftesbury became another prominent advocate of toleration who dared to 
argue that 'variety of opinion was not to be cured', that 'it was impossible all 
should be of the one mind', and that 'there can be no rational belief but where 
comparison is allowed, examination permitted, and a sincere toleration 
established'.101 Tindal also earned a questionable reputation as a defender of 
toleration. During the Church-in-danger controversy, he denied the existence of 
danger and argued instead that toleration had removed the Dissenters' 
prejudices towards the established Church and had made them ready to return to 
the Church of England on the condition that the High Church did not reactivate 
religious dissent with its uncompromising conduct.102  
Indeed, toleration achieved a firmer, though far from established, status with 
the passing of the Act of Toleration in 1689. This Act was an unwelcome and 
even disreputable compromise for most contemporaries who continued to talk 
about indulgence, not toleration, being granted to Dissenters as a relief from 
discriminatory legislation that actually remained in force. The suspension was 
conditional, and indulgence could be withdrawn by the civil authorities at any 
time. Oaths had to be taken, congregations registered, doors kept open during 
worship. Restrictions to hold public office were not removed.103 Some 
authoritative statements from the 1700s illustrate how toleration could not be 
assumed to form a self-evident part of the English political system. Queen 
Anne, when giving one of her first speeches after coming to the throne, was 
99 Goldie 1991, 362; Schochet 1992, 127; Goldie 1993b, 144, 161-2; Yolton 1993, 123-7; 
Schochet 1995, 127. 
100 See, for example, Edward Byrom's letter to his son John Byrom, Manchester, 16 September 
1709, Selections from the Journals and Papers of John Byrom, 33, in which Locke was 
called 'a Socinian or an atheist'; Clark 1985, 280, 294; The Diary of Dudley Ryder 1715-
1716, 21 August 1715, 82, offers an example of Locke's support of 'universal unlimited 
toleration' being admired — and misunderstood; Trenchard and Gordon dared to speak in 
favour of Locke in IW45, 23 November 1720. 
101 [Shaftesbury], Miscellaneous Reflections, 1714, in Characteristicks, Vol. III, 104, 319. 
102 Tindal, A New Catechism, 1710, 3. 
103 Spurr 1991, 376; Trevor-Roper 1991, 402. 
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reported as having made a particular promise that she would maintain the 
toleration established in the reign of her predecessors. 104 In 1705, the chaplain to 
the Speaker of the House of Commons reminded the audience of the existence 
of toleration that had been granted but at the same time deplored 'the infinite 
mischief' and 'the wicked effects' of distinguishing between various religious 
groups.'°' 
Toleration, or indulgence as many Tories wished to call the phenomenon, 
and particularly its excessive extent, continued to be lamented in numerous 
traditionalist texts.106 Whigs were accused for their alleged view that `toleration 
must include ... a liberty to Socinianism, deism, Hobbism, atheism'.107 A real 
traditionalist invasion against toleration started in the late-1690s with 
Atterbury's Letter to a Convocation-Man (1697) in which `universal unlimited 
toleration' was presented as an euphemism for attacks against political and 
ecclesiastical power and for attempts to create more widespread religious 
indifference.108 The Sacheverell affair in particular demonstrates the existence 
of differing interpretations of the Act of Toleration. The Whigs did not 
distinguish between indulgence and toleration, whereas several Tories 
preferred the term indulgence, maintaining that no toleration had been awarded 
by law.109 Sacheverell carried out a traditionalist attack against the toleration 
granted after the Glorious Revolution in terms of an organic analogy:110 
Schism, and faction, are things of impudent, and encroaching natures, 
they thrive upon concessions, take permission for power, and advance 
toleration immediately into an establishment. And are therefore to be 
treated like growing mischiefs, or insestious [sic] plagues, kept at a 
distance, least their deadly contagion spreads. 
Even some supporters of the High Church were surprised at such an open denial 
of the justification for toleration."' 
Arguments against toleration were repeatedly heard during the Tory 
government of 1710-14. The `indulgence' enjoyed by Dissenters was cancelled 
with the Occasional Conformity Act of 1711 and Schism Act of 1714. George 
Sewell, for instance, defended the bill and answered claims that the proposed 
law would destroy toleration by pointing out that such a shift would only mean 
that 'the government which was pleased to grant that indulgence, thinks fit to 
retract it', toleration being nothing more than 'a temporary indulgence' for 
exercising religion to those unable to conform for the sake of their conscience, 
104 Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs, 27 February 1703, vol. V, 273. 
105 The Diary of John Evelyn, 11 November 1705, Vol. V, 615. 
106 [Ward], A Fair Shell, but a Rotten Kernel, 1705, preface; Sage, The Reasonableness of a 
Toleration, 1705; [Baron], An Historical Account of Comprehension, and Toleration. Part I, 
1705; Rectius Declinazdunz, 1709, 15. 
107 [Davenant], The Old and Modern Whig, 1702, 18. 
108 Atterbury, A Letter to a Convocation-Man, 1697, 3. 
109 Tyacke 1991, 47. 
110 Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren, both in Church and State, 1709, 23. 
111 D. Evans to Hearne, Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 10 November 1709, Vol. 
II, 304-5. 
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awarded in an expectation of a speedy return to conformity. Sewell disputed 
what he presented as Dissenters' attempt to `enlarge its meaning to signify 
everything they want, as they restrain others to what limited sense they please'. 
In his High-Church opinion, free dissenting education could by no means be 
included in the confines of toleration.112 Dissenting education was banned, and 
it was only the repeal of these acts in 1719 that re-established religious 
toleration in English legislation. Still, the issue of toleration remained a topic of 
public discourse throughout the century."3 
Toleration was a term that few early eighteenth-century dictionaries, no 
matter how critical the editor was towards the phenomenon itself, could omit 
for good. In older dictionaries, toleration was standardly defined simply as 'an 
indulgence' (Coles 1701) or `indulgence, liberty of conscience, sufferance' 
(Cocker-Hawkins 1704), thus no conceptual separation between these various 
terms was made. The basic attitude in the background of definitions for 
toleration was implicitly negative: Phillips-Kersey (1706), Glossographia 
Anglicana Nova (1707), Kersey (1715 and 1731), and Bailey (1733) all 
regarded it as `suffering, permitting or allowing of', with an implicit 
assumption that the phenomenon itself was not approved. Likewise, Bullokar-
Browne (1719) mentioned the senses 'an enduring, a sufferance', and Dyche-
Pardon (1740/1750) still repeated the definition `permission, sufferance, 
allowance, connivance'."4 
Basic definitions of toleration did not move in any radically novel directions 
during the first half of the century. It is noteworthy, however, that entries for 
toleration began to refer explicitly to both political and religious toleration, thus 
reflecting a distinction drawn by Locke, among others. Chambers (1728) was 
the first to introduce this distinction in an English dictionary, expressing a 
basically positive attitude towards toleration. According to him, toleration had 
been a central concept in religious disputes among Protestants ever since the 
Reformation. Chambers maintained that 'all who have reasoned consistently 
from the principles of the Reformation, have been for toleration; as well as 
perceiving they had no right to oblige any body to follow their particular 
sentiments'. The real matter of dispute was, where the limits of toleration 
should have been set. Reviewing Jacques Basnage's writings, Chambers stated 
that ecclesiastical toleration allowed different and even opposite sentiments 
among the members of the Church, whereas civil or political toleration 
permitted them in civil society. Political toleration entailed that any sect not 
holding doctrines dangerous to the welfare of the state enjoyed the protection of 
law independently of their religious beliefs. 
Gordon-Bailey made a similar distinction between the types of toleration 
(1730): 
112 Sewell, Schism, Destructive of the Government, 1714, 8, 17, 20. 
113 Spurr 1991, 376. 
114 In medieval Latin, 'tolerare' had been used as a synonym for 'permittere', for instance, but 
distinguished sharply from 'approbare'. Schreiner 1990, 449; Analogous definitions for 
toleration appeared in Martin 1749, A Pocket Dictionary 1753 and Wesley 1764. 
280 n DEBATE ON FANATICISM, MODERATION AND POSSIBILITIES... 
Civil toleration signifies impunity and safety in the state, for every sect 
which does not maintain any doctrine inconsistent with the peace and 
welfare of the state. 
Ecclesiastical toleration is an allowance of opinions, which, not being 
fundamentals, do not hinder those who profess them, from being 
members of the Church. 
This distinction between an allowance of religious diversity within a state and a 
tolerance of a variety of opinions within the established Church was also made 
in the Weekly Miscellany (1735) which argued that ecclesiastical toleration 
meant 'the receiving anyone to Church communion' while civil toleration stood 
for 'the allowing a man all the privileges belonging to an establishment'. 
Ecclesiastical liberty was necessarily restricted by the duty of the Church to 
control the soundness of faith and morals, and civil toleration had to be likewise 
limited, because every society had the right of protecting the true religion by 
making it an established one.15 Such anti-dissenting definitions of 
ecclesiastical and civil toleration were countered by claims that religion and 
politics were separate spheres and that the state had no major duty to maintain 
religion. "6 
Both civil and ecclesiastical toleration still concerned religious issues. Yet 
the distinction is important. `Civil toleration', when discussed in a `political' 
sense independently of the traditionally dominant `ecclesiastical toleration', 
could be potentially extended to cover an increasing variety of secular opinions. 
Furthermore, developments within religious discourse in the eighteenth century 
towards a growing acceptance of `ecclesiastical toleration' may have 
contributed to an increase in `civil toleration'. The two types of toleration were 
continuosly linked in the minds of Englishmen but were more equal than they 
had been in the very beginning of the eighteenth century, when `ecclesiastical 
toleration' still was the dominant idiom."' Indeed, considerable secularisation 
and generalisation occurred in the concept of toleration later in the eighteenth 
century. Whereas the concept had traditionally been used in a `Church-
political' sense concerning to what extent it was possible and reasonable for the 
state to practise religious toleration, secularisation and generalisation of the 
concept made it applicable to all spheres of discourse, including philosophical 
and political discourse, for letting those thinking and acting differently do so."$ 
115 Weekly Miscellany, No. 112, 1 February 1735, in GM, Vol. V, February 1735, Reel 135. 
116 [Agricola], `Remarks on the Weekly Miscellany of Feb. 1', GM, Vol. V, March 1735, Reel 135. 
117 Another novelty that appeared at the level of dictionaries was the distinction between 
toleration and tolerance introduced by Fenning (1741) and Johnson (1755). Whereas 
Fenning and Johnson expressed the essential contents of the noun toleration in defining it 
conventionally as `allowance given to something not approved' and the verb to tolerate in 
explaining it as 'to suffer or allow without opposition' or 'to allow so as not to hinder; to 
suffer', they added an interpretation of tolerance as 'the power or act of abounding or 
suffering' or 'the power of enduring; act of enduring'. The difference in the meaning of the 
two terms remained small. Toleration retained its status as the more widely applied concept 
in public discourse throughout the early eighteenth century, whereas tolerance was used 
seldom. Even then, it referred to matters neither religious nor political. 
118 Besier 1990, 495. 
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Such secularisation and generalisation did not happen overnight. Some mid-
eighteenth-century English lexicographers still took distinctly traditionalist 
stands when defining the disputed concept of toleration. Johnson (1755) made a 
misleading use of quotations, ignoring, for instance, numerous positive 
references to toleration contained in Locke's texts and quoting instead a 
pejorative sentence from his writings on education that states: `Crying should 
not be tolerated in children'. The rest of Johnson's quotations repeated highly 
derogatory senses of toleration and the related verb, representing a religion-
connected interpretation of the concept: 
Men should not tolerate themselves one minute in any known sin. 
Decay of Piety. 
We are fully convinced that we shall always tolerate them, but not that 
they will tolerate us. 
	 Swift. 
I shall not speak against the indulgence and toleration granted to these 
men. 
South's Sermons. 
In Johnson's quotations, intolerance found justification in the higher goal of 
resisting sin and in the unwillingness of the tolerated sects to tolerate the 
established Church. Neither was a distinction made between indulgence and 
toleration. Equally revealing as to the connotations of toleration is John 
Trusler's discussion of difference between the verbs to tolerate and to suffer:119 
We tolerate a thing, when, knowing it, and, having sufficient power, we 
do not hinder it. 
The words, tolerate and suffer, are never used, but, with respect to bad 
things, or, such, as we believe so; .. . 
The legislative power is, sometimes, obliged to tolerate certain evils in 
order to prevent worse. It is, sometimes, prudence to suffer even abuse in 
the discipline of the Church rather than destroy its unity. 
The connotations of toleration remained highly pejorative. Toleration was an 
unwanted state of affairs necessitated only by willingness to prevent 
developments to what was seen as an even worse situation, that is, the 
dissolution of a unitary state or Church. 
For a considerable majority of Hanoverian Englishmen, toleration in the 
sense of 'not hindering' remained a question causing constant uneasiness 
because of the strong underlying ideal of uniformity. Claims for 'an absolute, 
unrestrained toleration' were consistently refuted and the right of the authorities 
to promote 'true religion' by human legislation assertively vindicated. 
According to the Anglican rector Stebbing (1724), for instance, to tolerate 
meant `not to hinder a thing when it is, or so far as it is, in our power to hinder 
119 Trusler, The Difference, Between Words, 1766, 200-1. 
282 • DEBATE ON FANATICISM, MODERATION AND POSSIBILITIES... 
it'. It was in the power of the political establishment to prevent Dissenters from 
entering public offices, and this was a bar that Stebbing and his numerous 
congenial souls strongly supported. Yet even writers such as Stebbing rather 
consistently denounced the use of violence for forcing people's consciences to 
uniform patterns of religious thought, even in cases in which persecution was in 
the interest of 'true religion'.120 
No matter how cautiously dictionaries handled the term toleration, and even 
if the term was easily `cavilled at','-' defences of toleration also appeared. Some 
writers drew the conclusion that reason made toleration essential:'-'- 
If both parties refuse to meet each other, and to walk together in a middle 
way, the weaker party must needs be tolerated. There is indeed a third 
way, by subverting the rejected side; but we believe, that in the present 
case it is so abhorrent to human reason and Christian charity, that we will 
not take it into consideration. 
The author argued in favour of toleration in spite of the widely shared 
assumption, already stated by John Corbet in 1660, that123 
multiformity of religion publicly professed does not well comport with 
the spirit of this nation, which is free, eager, jealous, apt to animosities 
and jealousies, besides that it has ever had a strong propesion [sic] to 
uniformity ... toleration being not the daughter of amity but of enmity at 
least, in some degree, supposes the party tolerated to be a burden, .. . 
Defoe ventured to write about 'the happy state' and `heavenly principle of 
toleration' during the Schism Bill controversy of 1714, thus searching for a 
divine justification for protecting Dissenters from religious discrimination. 
According to Defoe, an establishment of toleration would immediately have led 
to social harmony, people being able to attend different Churches yet working 
together to foster economy. Indeed, Defoe maintained that 'real absolute 
toleration' of both different religions and diversity within the same religion was 
the best means of preserving the national Church. He also provided a distinct 
counter-concept for toleration. According to Defoe, persecution demonstrated 
the dark side of human nature. Interesting is his statement that persecution 
`obstructs all progress in knowledge, or advancement of learning and sciences'. 
Although Defoe no more than his contemporaries should be seen as a future-
oriented believer in progress, seventeenth-century intellectual developments 
had increased confidence in the possibility of progress. Defoe's argument was 
actually rather commonplace among defenders of toleration, pointing to the 
stability and welfare of Holland, an idealised country where 'men enjoy a full 
and impartial toleration' .124  
120 Stebbing, An Essay Concerning Civil Government, 1724, 170. 176-7. 
121 Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, 1735, 35. 
122 Three Questions of Present Importance, 1702, 36; Toleration to dissenters was also vindicated 
in Whigs and Tories United: Or, the Interest of Great-Britain Considered (1714). 12. 
123 
	
Three Questions of Present Importance, 1702, 36. 
124 [Defoe], The Remedy Worse than the Disease, 1714, 5-6, 29, 38, 44; Other defenders of 
dissenters during the Schism Bill controversy included Whigs and Tories United, 1714, 12. 
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A writer who advocated limited toleration as a compromise between 
religious persecution and full freedom of religious thought probably best 
reflects the reality of religious toleration in eighteenth-century England. On the 
one hand, he maintained, in accordance with Locke and other defenders of 
toleration, that liberty of conscience was a primary natural right that could not 
be disputed. Violence only prevented the expression of real thoughts whereas it 
could not change people's beliefs. On the other hand, he considered the 
tendency to persecute another feature natural for human beings. The 
reconciliation of these two assumptions formed the major reason for limited 
toleration: 125 
... as every man has a good opinion of himself and his party, he 
pretends, that an unbounded liberty ought to be granted to him alone, 
and that it ought to be denied to all such as are of an opinion contrary to 
his. Others, again, run into the other extreme, and assert, that an equal 
privilege ought to be allowed to all parties; and so, that error should have 
as much law of its side, as the truth ... If the former be followed, there 
will never be toleration, nor peace, among men; by reason everyone will 
pretend, that the point wherein he differs from his adversaries, is of too 
great importance, ever to suffer him to bear with men of contrary 
sentiments ... If we side with the latter, we hamper ourselves in the most 
dreadful consequences; because it necessarily follows, from the 
principle of universal toleration, that the course of error will never be 
stopped, nor blasphemy hindered; .. . 
Aware of the threats to toleration posed by High-Church attacks such as 
Sacheverell's, the writer yet demanded that toleration should be carefully 
observed once it had been awarded.126 
In the early 1720s, toleration was most strongly advocated by the radical 
republican press. These anticlerical papers might state, for instance, that `every 
religion which refuses to tolerate other religions, charges itself, by so doing, 
with tyranny and imposture'.127 Despite constituting only a tiny and 
unrepresentative minority, even an anomaly,128 the followers of Locke and 
Shaftesbury were visible in contemporary discourse, advocating a radical view 
of the relationship between the state and subject. Being a good subject was 
increasingly seen as an ability to contribute to the political community, not as 
the right choice of Church:129 
the magistrate has nothing to do with speculations that purely concern 
another life: Nor is it of any consequence to him, whether his subjects 
have a greater fondness for a cloak or a surplice: Their affection to the 
political power, and their capacity to serve it, are only to be consulted 
and encouraged. 
125 Le Parterre de Fleurs, 1710, 111, 113-14. 
126 Le Parterre de Fleurs, 1710, 116. 
127 [Trenchard and Gordon], A Collection of all the Humorous Letters, No. 5, 1721. 
128 Clark 1988, 279, 289. 
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In the mid-1730s, viewpoints in favour of limited toleration, yet opposing any 
extensions of it, were again on the agenda when the possibility of the repeal of 
the Test and Corporation Acts was discussed. Presbyterian sermons and 
writings dating from the time of the Interregnum were reprinted in an attempt to 
demonstrate how Dissenters had been willing to deny toleration to any deviant 
religious group once in a dominant position. The pseudonymous `sincere lover 
of present constitution' argued that Dissenters had good reason to be satisfied 
with that `indulgence and toleration' English legislation had already granted 
them and that no one was ready to deny.130 Warburton wrote in his famous 
defence of an alliance between Church and state in favour of the prevailing 
system which included both an established Church and 'a full toleration to all 
the rest' who were, however, to be strictly excluded from public offices. 
According to Warburton's argument, which opposed any change in the Test and 
Corporation Acts, allowing Dissenters to enter positions with political power 
would have been the beginning of serious mischiefs to the entire society.131 
A writer more sympathetic towards the repeal of the laws discriminating 
against Dissenters in political life might cite the writings of Bolingbroke who 
had once stated, rather over-optimistically, that no Englishman wished to make 
Dissenters' lives more difficult, as `experience has removed prejudices' 
towards them. According to Bolingbroke, indulgence had created the results 
that persecution could never reach. Some favourers of toleration seem to have 
believed that the policy of toleration, as opposed to the policy of force, was 
leading to a reconciliation between various lines of Protestantism and even to a 
disappearence of distinctions.132 Other defenders of toleration were pleased 
with what they saw as an extension of people's rights in religious matters by 
writers such as Locke, now openly recommended and cited, and a growing 
conviction that persecution for religious reasons was against both the teachings 
of Christianity, the principles of the law of nature and the welfare of the state. 
The reign of Anne was already seen by some of these observers of the late 
1730s as a reverse in this basically positive progress of toleration.'33 
In principle, the idea of a natural right to toleration had hardly become more 
acceptable by the 1750s. In practise, however, by the the mid-eighteenth 
century, the discriminatory features of the legislation could be avoided in a 
number of ways.134 From the 1760s onwards, toleration to religious dissent was 
increasingly considered an interest of the state, as fears for political 
consequences of religious pluralism were in decline. Toleration was still 
understood to involve serious risks, but, at the same time, it was seen by many 
as a means of decreasing the dangers of conflict. Some thinkers followed Locke 
by interpreting civil and spiritual as separate but parallel spheres on the basis 
that civil interventions in religious matters were unlikely to produce desired 
130 Grey, A Caveat Against the Dissenters, 1736, 1. 
131 Warburton, The Alliance between Church and State, 1736, 63. 
132 A Dissuasive from Party and Religious Animosities, 1736, 17. 
133 Observations on the Conduct of the Tories, the Whigs, and the Dissenters, 1739, 11-12, 16-
17. 
134 Trevor-Roper 1991, 402. 
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effects. Others argued for the same on the basis that every individual had a 
natural right to search for religious truth, or, for that matter, any truth, on his 
own. Freedom of thought was represented as a specifically Protestant right.135 
135 Miller 1994, 303-4, 312, 314. 
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Associations between 
Freethinking and Political 
Pluralism 
Semantic field of freethinking 
At the end of the seventeenth century, English intellectuals were involved in 
two conflicts that were also reflected in political discourse. One of these is 
known as the `battle of the books', the other as the deist controversy. In the 
former dispute between the ancients and moderns, the ancients maintained that 
ancient wisdom remained superior in all branches of knowledge, whereas the 
moderns suggested that human knowledge could increase. In the latter 
confrontation between Anglicans and deists, Protestant Christianity seemed to 
be at stake.' 
Favourable conditions for an increase in the popularity of deism had been 
provided by the Civil War which had first created possibilities for freedom of 
discussion. At least in London, the public had been able to choose their 
religious community and express religious feelings more openly once a 
multitude of separatist congregations had emerged.' The existence and increase 
in the number of persistently vocal religious sects weakened the status of the 
traditional theory of uniformity. The Civil War, and potentially also the 
Scientific Revolution, fostered republican and to some extent even democratic 
thought, particularly among religious radicals, and provided the critics of the 
established order with an ideological basis. Furthermore, those travelling on the 
Continent had observed that several religious truths existed side by side,' 
though seldom tolerated within one country. 
Most Restoration politicians strived for uniformity. Nevertheless, scepticism, 
rationalism, natural religion and deism became fashionable in some elite circles 
after the Restoration. The anticlerical writings of these radical freethinkers, a 
considerable amount of which came into circulation after the lapse of pre-
publication censorship in 1695, as well as their uncontrollable coffee house 
discussions, formed an unprecedented challenge to the worldview cherished by 
the Anglican Church. These publications and discussions dared to question the 
ideal of a confessional state and even to suggest that the Church should be seen 
1 	 These two intellectual disputes were connected but in a rather surprising manner: whereas the 
deists were inclined towards the ancients, Anglicanism was defended most actively by the 
modems. The capability of Anglicanism to reconcile its doctrine with mechanical natural 
philosophy meant that Christian orthodoxy in its English form allowed, at least potentially, 
the idea of progress, whereas the radical deists, though `modern' in many other aspects, 
preferred assumptions of a timeless past. Levine 1995, 220-1. 
2 	 Burke 1989, 42-3. 
3 	 Jacob 1981, 6, 29-30, 32, 47; Horstmann 1980, 85-6, 146; Hill 1995, 54. 
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merely as an institution of social and political convenience .4 
Continental trends of thought contributed to the rise of English deism, while 
specifically English features also developed. Whereas Pierre Bayle's deistical 
arguments for toleration were negative and sceptical, the English deists thought 
more positively, asserting that a natural knowable basis for human belief and 
action existed. That basis had merely been obscured by censorship and the 
intolerant clergy.' To some extent at least, the deists vindicated secularisation 
by calling for a novel belief structure independent of the Church and political 
authority.6 When criticising the religious monopoly of the Church of England, 
they advocated the toleration of intellectual and religious pluralism within the 
political system? 
Clergymen of the 1690s became concerned about what they saw as the 
spread of atheism at every level of society. Orthodox writers were agreed that 
the time in which they lived was one of conspicuous irreligion. Freethinkers 
were known to organise suspect meetings at coffee houses, and such meetings 
were held as indicative of numerous underground gatherings. Consequently, 
freethinkers were accused of forming a cabal or party. There may indeed have 
been cooperation within the tiny circle of freethinkers, but they never became 
particularly organised, not to say conspiratorial. Neither did they ever achieve 
popular support worth mentioning, but rather remained an anomaly. 
The small but vociferous group of radical freethinkers consisted of persons 
such as Anthony Collins, Matthew Tindal and John Toland. These men 
followed ideas introduced during the political and scientific revolutions, 
criticising established theology, the prevalent Anglican interpretation of 
Newton's work and the political activities of the clergy. Instead, they adopted a 
pantheistic-materialistic conception of a universe where matter was in 
continuous motion without divine intervention. In politics, they advocated a 
secular order and representative system, where the ultimate source of power was 
the people, not God. The deistic belief in the ability of human reason to achieve 
religious truth could thus be extended to the lesser sphere of politics as well. 
No matter how modest the real threat of freethinking was, it appeared as 
dangerous in the eyes of the establishment. This was not only due to its 
unorthodox theology. Equally threatening was its association with radical 
republican politics. Such an association was reasonably justified, given the 
involvement of Toland, for instance, in propagating both republican and 
pantheistic thought. From the political point of view it is noteworthy that 
Toland belonged to a radical faction of Whigs.' Some later republicans 
4 	 Stromberg 1954, 132; Redwood 1976, 32, 35, 41, 221; Jacob 1976, 201-2; Champion 1992, 7. 
5 	 Popkin 1991, 210-11. Popkin, unlike Levine, suggests that English deists believed in the 
possibility of progress. 
6 	 Force 1981, 227. 
7 Champion 1992, 230. 
8 	 Jacob 1976, 205-6, 208-9, 227, 230; Jacob 1981, 22, 25, 62, 65, 80, 88, 151; Harrison 1990, 
88-9; Russell 1993, 664-5; Levine 1995, 229; For a connection between religious and 
political radicalism, see also Clark 1985, chapter 5 and Champion 1992, 13-15, 23, who has 
suggested that republicanism and freethinking were 'conceptually' interrelated; for 
freethinkers being characterised as a 'party', see The True Patriot as quoted in GM, Vol. 
XVI, January 1746, Reel 139. 
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propagated the gospel of freethinking as well. Trenchard and Gordon, for 
instance, insisted that people should be educated to think freely and to 
appreciate other men's right to do so. They depicted a constant interest in events 
and debate on all political and religious issues as essential 9 
In early eighteenth-century England, liberty of thought was debated more 
anxiously than perhaps in any other historical period.10 Margaret Jacob has 
provided the clearest model for interpreting this debate. She has argued that, 
both the religious and political establishments were in the hands of Newtonians 
who regarded Newton's cosmic order as controlled by the will of God, a natural 
model for a Christian human society. Political power had been given into the 
hands of the natural rulers by Providence. The Newtonians were usually 
moderate Whigs who, in spite of some shared ideological background, opposed 
the radical freethinking wing of Whiggism. These establishment Whigs 
supported moderate Anglicanism and constitutional monarchy and rejected 
both the radicalism of religious sectarianism and democratic republicanism. 
Their opponents the Tories had formerly been devoted to divine right theories 
but had turned into populist critics of Whig governments. The Tories were 
devoted Anglicans who based their theories of society on non-mechanical 
systems of nature. They opposed both the radicals and the Newtonian Whigs, 
considering both as one entity and charging all Whigs for favouring 
freethinking, irreligion, libertines, atheists and deists. Such accusations were 
not completely unfounded, as the radical dimensions of urban Whig culture had 
offered favourable circumstances for the growth of religious heterodoxy." 
The governing elite, which perceived freethinking as an agent dissolving the 
established order, tried to protect itself against the scepticism of the freethinkers 
by advocating uniformity based either on orthodox Anglicanism, like most 
Tories did, or on rhetoric of unique English liberty, which was a favourite topic 
for most Whigs. Attitudes opposing heterodoxy became reflected in 
contemporary terminology. Derogatory labels such as deist, atheist and 
libertine came into common use; yet the exact meaning of each became 
confused in the controversy. Even the freethinkers themselves were not always 
certain what their own denomination `freethinker' actually stood for. Hence 
they could be criticised for using a term that was indefinite and could be used in 
various manners and contexts.''- 
By the early 1690s, the concept freethinking emerged as a response to the 
necessity of having an up-to-date denomination for those who denounced 
traditional Christian values. The term was first used for a loose, tiny, prophetic 
sect which made a living in scribbling. This neologism became associated with 
atheism, and its centrality is illustrated by being called a `modish phrase' and 
the period being characterised as a `freethinking and freer practising age' .13 In 
9 	 Robbins 1959, 120-1. 
10 Horstmann 1980, 146. 
11 	 Jacob 1981, 65, 91, 93, 95-6, 98-9, 118; See also Dickinson 1981, 34, and Clark 1985, 46. 
123-5. 
12 Lund 1995, 5-6. 
13 	 OED: free-thinker, free-thinking, free-thought (1708, 1716); Horstmann 1980, 13, 140; 
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the 1720s, Mandeville made a figure representing traditionalist Anglicanism 
speak about `these wicked times of scoffers and freethinkers',14 and, in 1740, 
the governmental organ the Daily Gazetteer wrote about 'this freethinking 
age' .'s 
Despite its common use in politico-religious discourse, the term freethinker 
was listed in only six of the consulted dictionaries and in only three published in 
the period 1700-175016 - a fact illustrating the disputed dirty-word character of 
the term and possibly a shared willingness to deny the existence of the entire 
phenomenon of growing religious diversity. It demonstrates how slowly 
politico-religious neologisms could become `officially' incorporated in the 
English language. The first reference to freethinking in an English dictionary 
occurred in the work of Chambers (1728), who presented it as a synonym for 
deist." It was Fenning (1741), who also included new entries such as `coffee 
house' and `tolerance', that first defined the term in an entry of its own: 
Freethinker a person who is not biassed by any prejudice; a term, 
perhaps improperly, assumed and given to persons who deny 
Revelation, and are no friends to Christian religion. 
Fenning's basic definition is positive, reflecting an early Enlightenment ideal of 
independent reasoning as opposed to blind adherence to party leadership. 
However, this positive approach is accompanied by an awareness of the 
disputed position of the term. The term was commonly used in a highly 
derogatory sense, questioning the acceptability of the entire phenomenon of 
freethinking. No dictionary published after 1740 could omit this latter sense 
which was much more familiar to the public at large.18 Not all authors wrote as 
positively about freethinking as Fenning. The duality within his definition 
illustrates the inherent ambiguity of this much disputed term. 
Terminological innovations incorporated by preceding dictionaries could not 
be omitted by Johnson (1755). Faithful to his traditionalist world-view, Johnson 
offered only the pejorative sense of freethinker, considering it synonymous to 
libertine, 'a contemner of religion', and leaving out references to more 
extended usages of the word. Johnson's quotations for freethinker were 
borrowed from Addison and Swift, the first representing freethinker as a 
modern equivalent of atheist and the latter ridiculing freethinking logic for 
causing the entire order of society to collapse. These restricted definitions 
suggest that, at least in Johnson's interpretation, freethinker was initially a 
Miller 1993, 599-601; Russell 1993, 672. Differing timings have been given in previous 
research for the first occurrence of the term, the earliest being Jacob's 1692. Jacob 1976, 
202-3. Toland was called a 'candid freethinker' in 1697. Horstmann 1980, 13: Miller 1993, 
599-601; Russell 1993, 672. 
14 
	
	 Mandeville, 'An Essay on Charity, and Charity-Schools', [1723], in The Fable of the Bees, 
287. 
15 The Daily Gazetteer, No. 1669, 24 October 1740. 
16 Each dictionary listed in the introduction was checked for the word freethinker and related 
terminology. 
17 This synonymity was also stated in Wesley 1764. 
18 Freethinking was briefly defined also in Martin 1749 and A Pocket Dictionary 1753. 
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purely religious term and remained so, even though it had occasionally been 
used in political discourse to conceptualise the phenomenon of growing 
diversity in politics. 
It is argued in this chapter that the early eighteenth-century understanding of 
growing political pluralism was related to negative reactions to pluralism in 
religion, including the rise of freethinking. The rise of political pluralism, 
political consciousness and participation in political discourse occurred 
concurrently with the growth of alternative forms of Christianity and the 
emergence of deism. Because of the intimate connection between religious and 
political discourses, religious freethinking and political pluralism were 
conceived as parallel developments if not as two forms of the same 
phenomenon. This latter interpretation was supported by the suspect politico-
religious activities of figures such as Toland. Both religious freethinking and 
rising political pluralism were part of a process of modernisation that inspired 
contemporaries with a fear of innovation and change, and hence it was logical 
to conceptualise them, to some extent, with the same terminology. Furthermore, 
as John Redwood has pointed out, political parties became involved in the deist 
controversy, as many issues could be debated by asking whether the policies 
proposed by each party were leading the nation closer to or further from God. In 
such debates, politicians eagerly turned to accusations of atheism as a weapon 
against their political opponents.19 In ideological disputes, it was conventional 
to use religious terminology, to equate freethinking with atheism and atheism 
with anarchy.20 
The use of the religion-based neologism freethinker in political contexts 
demonstrates the association between religious and political fragmentation. The 
vocabulary of religious pluralism was employed to describe political pluralism. 
Connotations linked with the former were also linked with the latter, reinforcing 
ideas of a unitary society and revealing prejudices towards the assumed decline 
in the status of the established Church and the growth of political diversity. 
Addison gave one of the best characterisations of the early eighteenth-century 
state of political diversity, condensing much of contemporary understanding of 
political pluralism21  
there is scarce any man in England, of what denomination soever, that is 
not a freethinker in politics, and has not some particular notions of his 
own, by which he distinguishes himself from the rest of the community. 
Our island, which was formerly called a nation of saints, may now be 
called a nation of statesmen. 
Addison was suggesting that Englishmen — as opposed to foreigners — thought 
freely about political questions, held dramatically diverse political views and 
were thereby separated from one another. In a sense, many English thinkers had 
19 Redwood 1976, 36. 
20 Phiddian 1989, 76. 
21 Addison, F53, 22 June 1716; The phrase `nation of saints' probably refers to the religious 
sectaries of the Civil War period. 
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abandoned religious enthusiasm of the Civil War in favour of political 
speculation, a fact that certainly sounded like freethinking. Addison's 
expression `freethinker in politics' was not merely metaphorical'-'- — the spheres 
of religion and politics being closely interrelated - but an easily understandable 
way of conceptualising political pluralism. It never became widely applied but 
was accepted by contemporaries, reappearing as late as in 1757 in the title 
Political Freethinker. 
Addison's reference to a transformation of England from 'a nation of saints' 
into 'a nation of statesmen', which was repeated in an essay of the Craftsman in 
1729 with a slightly less critical undertone,'-3 was an attempt to conceptualise 
secularisation and the connected growth of political pluralism. Addison's 
argument receives support from some recent studies on secularisation of 
politics. The proportion of religious titles turned into decline in the late 
seventeenth century, whereas the secular press developed into a considerable 
competitor to the pulpit as a distributor of news, as an informer of `statesmen'. 
Coffee houses — frequented by freethinkers as well — appeared better places for 
collecting information than church-yards after services. For the newspaper 
press, unlike the pulpit, nothing was completely sacred. Periodical publications 
created a sense of an accelerated tempo in the affairs of the world, each paper 
necessarily containing `new' information that those willing to keep themselves 
informed should consult. As a consequence of an addiction to news, a mental 
change gradually occurred so that being informed in everyday events became 
more important than being wise in eternal truths.24 This, in turn, could be 
interpreted as freethinking. 
As the exact meaning of the neologism freethinking had not been fixed, and 
as the dictionaries which dared to contain an entry for it disagreed on its 
meaning, the term could easily be used for various purposes. Likewise, its 
synonymous expressions carried conflicting connotations that could be 
exploited in political debates. The most important synonyms for freethinking 
were atheism, libertinism and deism. 
In early modern England, atheism in its modern sense as a total denial of the 
existence of God was practically impossible. At least proclaiming such was out 
of question. Widespread application of the term in politico-religious discourse 
cannot thus be considered an indication of a proliferation of atheism in the 
modern sense. The almost universal concern for the danger of growing atheism 
rather reflects the strength of commonly shared traditionalist values. 
The eighteenth century opened with a widespread feeling of an 
unprecedented growth in atheism and deism. This concern is reflected in the 
22 Metaphors can, of course, also be illuminating. They can be markers of some creative 
concept giving access to ideas and perceptions that might otherwise be difficult to trace. In 
fact, metaphors can even offer a key to understanding the whole of a text. Nash 1989, 145. 
Metaphors provide a means to extend vocabulary and produce new nuances of meaning to 
describe novelties in political circumstances, either to praise or condemn. The growth of 
political pluralism was a phenomenon that could be conceptualised — and condemned — 
through metaphorical expressions. 
23 C170, 30 August 1729. 
24 Eisenstein 1984, 93; Sommerville 1992, 182-3. 
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papers of men as diverse as John Evelyn, William Nicolson, Thomas Hearne 
and John Byrom. As an aged man, Evelyn spent much time in religious 
contemplation, but that does not alone explain a conspicuous awareness of the 
rise of atheism appearing in the last volume of his diary. Evelyn frequented 
Anglican masses and reported having heard sermons and catechisings that 
specifically concentrated on the rise of atheism. He had lived through 
seventeenth-century crises but still maintained in the early 1700s that his 
country had never experienced 'a more profane, and atheistical age: most of the 
youth [are] atheist[s], theists [=deists], Arians and sectaries'. Atheism appeared 
to the old man as `wickedness began to prevail exceedingly in England'. 
Concrete measures against atheism such as the foundation of societies for the 
reformation of manners were also recorded in the diary.25 
Nicolson, as the Bishop of Carlisle and a Low-Church member of the House 
of Lords, was another informed observer of intellectual trends. He reported in 
1705 a reply to the Queen's speech in the House of Lords in which 'the 
prevailing growth of atheism' had been particularly lamented 26 On the 
traditionalist Tory side, Hearne together with his High-Church and Jacobite 
friends genuinely saw the growth of atheism as a threat to the Church.27 Byrom, 
another diarist sympathetic to Jacobitism, once received a letter from his father 
urging him to avoid everything connected with atheism, that `snare of the devil, 
thrown among sharp wits and ingenuous youths to oppose their reason to 
revelation, and because they cannot apprehend reason, to make them sceptics, 
and so entice them to read other books than the Bible and the comments upon 
it'.2s 
In periodical literature, proclamations of 'a damned atheistical age' 
continued to appear in the 1720s, though some writers questioned the basis of 
such claims.29 In sermons, atheism was depicted as one of the greatest threats to 
the Church and entire society,30 and its growth remained an important topic, 
being raised in connection with the rebellion of 1745, for instance: `Atheism 
and irreligion, infidelity and vice, have made a large and formidable progress in 
our land. This deluge of impiety must have ill effects, as it tends to increase ånd 
inflame party-rage' .3' Throughout the century, atheism was condemned as a 
desperate alternative,32 but it continued to be regarded as a universal problem by 
a considerable majority of the political elite. 
Ever since its first appearence in the mid-sixteenth century, the term atheism 
had been used to refer to `godless' attitudes and behaviour that the orthodox 
feared. It was used in a broad, loose and abusive sense. It could be used to refer 
25 	 The Diary of John Evelyn, Vol. V, 4 February 1700, 378, 25 March 1700, 390-1, May 1700, 
408, 26 July 1702, 510-11, 31 October 1703, 548. 
26 	 The London Diaries of William Nicolson, 6 December 1705, 320. 
27 	 Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 6 September 1706, Vol. I, 286. 
28 Edward Byrom to John Byrom, Manchester 16 September 1709, Selections from the 
Journals and Papers of John Byrom, 33. 
29 [Concanen], The Speculatist, 30 April 1726. 
30 Laurence, Christian Religion the best Friend to Civil Government, 1717, 6. 
31 Warren, Religion and Loyally inseparable, 1745, 8. 
32 	 Mawson, The Mischiefs of Division, 1746, 26. 
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to open irreligion, and it was a brand for those who questioned arguments 
supportive of theism and for those advocating non-religious theories of the 
origins of religion. However, the term was also used to describe phenomena that 
did not necessarily imply an enmity to religion: any deviation from orthodoxy, 
any cynical attitude towards Christian beliefs, or even any readiness to tolerate 
other beliefs. Traditionalist propagandists drew no distinctions between 
atheists, Socinians or Quakers but rather suggested that they were all results of 
schism, as illustrated by their shared opposition to the established truths of 
Church and state. 
Orthodox writers created a stereotypical image of an atheist as one who 
questioned the existence of God, the authority of the Bible, the immortality of 
the soul, and the eternal life. An atheist was considered to prefer natural 
explanations, to reject the established religion as priestcraft and have a strong 
inclination to worldliness. When someone was accused of being an atheist, the 
implication was that he was assaulting fundamental Christian doctrines not 
merely through his writings but also through his deeds. Theoretical irreligion 
and behaviour breaking norms were considered necessarily linked. 
Atheism was an inclusive concept offering a stereotype for describing 
various sins in thought and practice suspected of threatening religion. The 
inherited mixture of condemnatory attitudes enabled traditionalist polemicists 
to point to the potential atheism of views that at first sight appear as completely 
innocent or non-religious. The concept enabled them to express concerns about 
any development that might have religious implications. The paranoid fear of 
infidelity made writers use the term to describe harmless secularist tendencies 
in areas which coincided with the stereotype of an atheist, and politics was 
certainly such an area. In the background loomed a fear that any religious doubt 
could turn into overt irreligion. The use of imprecise expressions against 
condemned atheists was also facilitated by the fact that distinguishing the 
heterodox from the orthodox had, in a time of growing religious diversity, 
become difficult. 
From the point of view of political discourse, it is significant that an atheist 
was regarded as an advocate of Machiavellian thought. He could thus be 
presumed to favour radical Whiggism or republicanism,33 and, consequently, a 
Whig could easily be accused of atheism. A model case was offered by Toland, 
who was both a Whig and heterodox. Toland himself, of course, denounced 
atheism and claimed that the growth of atheism was a consequence of defects in 
the religious system introduced by priestcraft.34 
In political polemic, atheism was a serviceable term of derision, one of the 
strongest available, even though its frequent use reduced its polemical power. 
Tory propaganda did not fail to portray the Whigs as 'an illiterate, atheistical 
party' or claim that there were `Whig-libertines' and 'Whig-atheists' working 
33 Redwood 1976, 29-30, 221; Hunter 1985, 135-6, 138-9, 141-2, 153-4, 156; Harrison 1990, 
34; Lund 1995, 6-7; Hill 1995, 56; For the applicability of the term atheism, see also The Old 
Whig, No. 20, 24 July 1735, in GM, Vol. V, July 1735, Reel 135. 
34 [loland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, 176. 
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among them.35 Swift suggested that this Whiggish atheism was not so much a 
matter of religion but of policy. The Whigs had united with atheists and 
freethinkers in a conspiracy because they shared political views and hardly 
differed in religious affairs either. Swift and other traditionalist polemicists 
were determined to find connections between all forms of religious and political 
dissent.36 
Locke and his followers paid attention to the status of atheism as a term of 
abuse. In his Two Treatises of Government, denying Robert Filmer's 
accusations of atheism, Locke suggested that Filmer himself was abusing 
Christianity to advance his own interest and charging with atheism those who 
declined to submit to his doctrines.37 In his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, Locke referred to the tendency among the supporters of an 
established opinion to charge those who dared to dissent with terms such as 
atheist. Locke denounced such usage.38 Atheism he condemned as a crime and 
sort of madness that deserved no toleration.39 The Independent Whig, a 
populariser of Lockean thought, also lamented the way men of sound 
knowledge were so generally accused of atheism. The anticlerical journal itself, 
however, made repeated use of the same expression, accusing High-Church 
clergymen of being worse than atheists.4° 
The meaning of atheism did not go through noteworthy changes during the 
first half of the eighteenth century; the relevance of atheism in political polemic 
simply declined as secularisation took further steps. Atheism was not defined 
by every dictionary, but those who ventured to write an entry agreed on the 
definition. Atheism was 'the opinions and practice of those that deny the being 
of a God' and atheist 'one who holds and maintains such wicked doctrines; a 
godless fellow, a miscreant, an infidel'. In addition to consisting of `disbelief' 
and `wicked tenets', atheism was depicted generally as a `damnable opinion'." 
According to Chambers (1728) and Gordon-Bailey (1730), an atheist had 'no 
religion, true or false'. Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) attempted to demonstrate 
the illogical character of atheism by referring to its disbelief in 'a first, 
immaterial cause of all things' and its vain attempts to demonstrate the 
impossibility of God. Johnson's (1755) quotations for atheism could hardly 
have been more condemnatory. In sermons, theological writings and poetry, he 
found a great number of references to atheism. At least two of these quotations 
also had political implications, stating, in the words of Tillotson, 'it is the 
common interest of mankind, to punish all those who would seduce men to 
atheism', and, in the words of Bentley, that 'no atheist, as such, can be a true 
35 	 Trapp, Most Faults on One Side, 1710, 29; [Davenant], The True Picture of a Modern Whig, 
1701, 34. 
36 Lund 1995, 9. 
37 	 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1690, 1, § 154. 
38 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, 1.2.25. 
39 Yolton 1993, 23. 
40 	 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW5, 17 February 1720; IW 18, 18 May 1720; IW22, 15 June 1720; 
IW42, 2 November 1720. 
41 	 Phillips-Kersey 1706; Glossographia 1707; Kersey 1715; Bullokar-Browne 1719; Chambers 
1728; Gordon-Bailey 1730; Kersey 1731; Bailey 1733; [Defoe] 1737; Fenning 1741; Martin 
1749; A Pocket Dictionary 1753; Johnson 1755. 
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friend, an affectionate relation, or a loyal subject'. Resisting atheism was 
presented as a concern of society as a whole, and atheism was seen to be 
depriving a person of social qualities essential for a loyal subject. No attempt 
was made to define atheism without simultaneously condemning it. 
Atheism might appear in connection with the term libertinism in texts 
representing any line of thought. The extremely pejorative connotations of the 
two terms then supported each other.42 Like atheism, libertinism carried 
connotations of a sceptical attitude towards the established conceptions of 
religion, nature and society. Unlike the nearly synonymous freethinker, it was 
defined in most dictionaries, which were also rather unanimous as to the 
meaning of this older expression. Etymologically, the term was explained to 
have emerged during the abhorred sectarian phase of the Protestant 
Reformation. Moreri-Collier (1701), for instance, told how libertines had 
originally been 
a sect of heretics ... who about 1525 divulged their errors in Holland and 
Brabant. They maintained, that whatsoever is done by men, is done by 
the spirit of God: and from thence concluded, that there was no sin, but 
those that thought it so, because all came from God. 
Chambers (1728) and Dyche-Pardon (1740/1750) added that, for the libertines, 
`religion [had been] a mere state trick', thus illustrating a political connection of 
the otherwise religious term. Such an association naturally facilitated the use of 
the term in political propaganda. 
In addition to connotations parallel with those of atheism, libertinism also 
had a specifically sexual sense,43 referring to licentious behaviour. This was 
expressed indirectly in definitions where a libertine appeared as 'a loose and 
dissolute epicure', 'a dissolute, or lewd liver', 'one of a loose and debauched 
life and principles', 'one who pays no regard to the precepts of religion', 'one 
who acts without restraint', or 'one of a loose life, or careless of religion'. 
Libertinism meant 'a dissolute life, and conversation', `sensuality, licentious-
ness', `irreligion', and `false liberty of belief and manners, which will have no 
other dependance but on particular fancy and passion; a living at large, or 
according to a person's inclination/following one's own pleasures, without 
regard to the divine laws'. Neither is considerable change observable in 
definitions for libertinism. It was continuosly understood in pejorative religious 
terms.44 
42 	 See, for instance, [Toland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, 176; [Dennis], The Danger of 
Priesteraft, 1702, 9; [Rogers], The Republican Conclave: or, the Present State of Whiggism 
in England, 1707, 14; Reflexions upon the Politeness of Manners, 1707, The Epistle 
Dedicatory; [Trenchard and Gordon], IW, Dedication, 1721, xli; IW42, 2 November 1720; 
C40, 24 April 1727. 
43 Hill 1995, 61. 
44 Coles 1701; Cocker-Hawkins 1704 and 1724; Phillips-Kersey 1706; Glossographia 1707; 
Kersey 1715; Bullokar-Browne 1719; Gordon-Bailey 1730; Kersey 1731; Bailey 1733; 
[Defoe] 1737; Dyche-Pardon 1740/1750; Fenning 1741; A Pocket Dictionary 1753; Johnson 
1755; Wesley 1764. 
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The term libertine did have its political uses, as already seen in the expression 
'Whig-libertines'. In a comedy acted in a London theatre in 1720, a character 
abusing religion for political purposes and admiring constant change was 
branded with the opprobrious title of a libertine 45 In contrast, in the republican 
Independent Whig of the same year, the notion that libertines were irreligious 
and completely mistaken was questioned.d6 Libertinism also came up in public 
discourse when Mandeville was accused for libertinism by the Grand Jury of 
Middlesex after the publication of his Fable of the Bees." The attitude of the 
Craftsman towards libertinism was more conventional. It was mentioned 
together with vices such as corruption and luxury that had led to a loss of liberty 
and destruction of the Roman constitution. The organ of the opposition pointed 
to an inevitable connection between these developments,48 suggesting that 
prevalent libertinism endangered the free constitution of Britain. In other 
words, libertinism was presented as a symptom of a severe political crisis. 
Like libertinism, deism was a well-known and uniformly defined yet 
ambiguously used religious term that occasionally entered political texts. A 
new phase in the history of English deism started with the publication of 
Toland's Christianity not Mysterious (1696) which was followed by a fifty-year 
controversy between suspected deists and their opponents. The major argument 
of the tiny deist direction of thought was that moral order was based on God-
given laws of nature, not on revelation or organised religion.49 Such views were, 
of course, entirely unacceptable to the orthodox majority. 
Deism was often associated with the assumed growth of atheism, and an 
awareness of its existence added to fears of the growth of irreligion. Chambers 
(1728), a freethinker himself, argued: 'The number of deists is daily increasing. 
In England, a great part of the men of speculation and letters, are pretended to 
incline that way'. In reality, deism was a heterogeneous phenomenon, 
consisting of extreme manifestations of rationalising tendencies within 
religious thought. Attempts to demonstrate the rationality of religion might turn 
into deism once the sufficiency of revelation as a sole source of religious truth 
was questioned. Deistical ideas sometimes rose among the orthodox 
themselves. Most deists, however, were freethinkers who shared radical 
thoughts such as strong anticlericalism, a belief in the positive effects of 
toleration, and an insistance on the right of free enquiry. In spite of a genuine 
belief in the existence of God and acceptance of a moral law by most deists, 
they were believed to question all revelation and miracles, and to represent God 
as a mere first cause of the universe." 
Few early eighteenth-century dictionaries failed to define deism.5' Moreri- 
45 Griffin, Whig and Tory, 1720, 10. 
46 [Trenchard and Gordon], 1W45, 23 November 1720. 
47 	 Mandeville, 'A Vindication of the Book ...', [ 1724], in The Fable of the Bees, 388. 
48 C4, 16 December 1726. 
49 Webb 1992, 161. 
50 Redwood 1976, 30; Rupp 1986, 277; Harrison 1990, 62; Levine 1995, 229. 
51 Cocker-Hawkins 1704 and Glossographia 1707; Cocker-Hawkins's edition of 1724 already 
contained an entry for deists, defined conventionally as `those that will not own the divinity 
of Jesus Christ, or his equality with God the Father; Antitrinitarians'. 
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Collier (1701) already considered it a universal and undeniable phenomenon: 
Deists A certain sort of men who abound among all sects of Christians, 
who believe that there is one God, providence, virtue, and vice, the 
immortality of the soul, and rewards and punishments after death; but 
believe nothing else of the Christian religion, nor any other. 
Such a definition was a remarkably neutral one, even though the defects of 
deistic conceptions and their undesirability in a Christian society were evident. 
The definition was modified by Gordon-Bailey (1730), for instance, with a 
reference to the emphasis on reason typical of deists who `reject revelation, and 
believe no more than what natural light discovers to them'. The shortest 
definition of the damnable tenets was provided by Coles (1701) who defined 
deists plainly as `antitrinitarians', as persons who denied one of the most 
fundamental doctrines of Christianity. Johnson (1755) generalised the meaning 
of the term a bit, defining a deist as 'a man who follows no particular religion, 
but only acknowledges the existence of God, without any other article or faith'. 
In other dictionaries, deism was often denounced in words that hardly 
distinguished it from atheism." 
The only additions that appeared in dictionary entries for deism were 
Chambers's (1728) and Dyche-Pardon's (1740/1750) interpretation of deism 
and freethinking as synonymous expressions. Chambers also dared to introduce 
the major ideas of deism in an objective manner. He pointed out that the 
multiplicity of religions and weaknesses in defences of revelation made deists 
call for a return to the simplicity of nature and monotheism. The deists insisted 
that liberty of thinking and reasoning suffered from religion imposed upon 
people. Chambers was cautious to underscore that deists did not lack all religion 
but merely suggested that each person should have been allowed to serve God 
in the way he considered the right one. Dyche-Pardon also referred to 
anticlericalism characteristic of deists. Dyche did not dedicate to freethinking a 
separate entry in his dictionary, which suggests that he considered freethinking 
merely a new English synonym for deism. For him, a deist was 'a professor, 
encourager, and supporter of deism' who might also be called a freethinker. 
In politico-religious discourse, deism was employed less frequently than 
other terms of the semantic field of freethinking. It was not defined but usually 
appeared in the same context with other terms of irreligion such as atheism and 
libertinism, interpretable as their synonym rather than as an independent 
doctrine.53 On the traditionalist side, deism was listed as a heresy among other 
52 Martin 1749; A Pocket Dictionary 1753; Wesley 1764. 
53 
	
	
See, for instance, Reflexions upon the Politeness of Mainers, 1707, The Epistle Dedicatory; 
[Leslie], The Second Part of the Wolf Stript of His Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 3; 'An Elegy 
Balladwise on the Death of John Dolben, Esq., who departed this life at Epsom, on Monday 
May 28th, 1710', A Tory Pill, to Purge Whig Melancholy, 1715, 12; Swift regarded atheism, 
deism and freethinking as near synonyms, a freethinker being a disguised atheist; Likewise, 
Addison wrote about `infidels, whether distinguished by the title of deist, atheist, or 
freethinker'. T111, 24 December 1709; According to C398, 16 February 1734, in GM, Vol. 
III, February 1734, Reel 134, deism was `generally but a softer term for atheism'; Hunter 
1985, 156. 
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heresies that threatened the English nation. It was presented as one of the terms 
of disguise used by the Whigs and Dissenters to hide their conspiracy 54 In Tory 
propaganda of the 1700s, it was an easy way of blackening Whigs by depicting 
them as champions of `republican deists' or listing them together with atheists, 
deists and commonwealthmen. Even in this kind of polemic, however, a 
distinction between real atheism and deism started to emerge.55 On the 
Whiggish side, deism was a seldom used term likely to provoke suspicions in 
readers.56 The deists themselves avoided the use of the denomination in their 
texts. 
The meanings of the terms atheism, libertinism and deism were settled, 
though not always distinct from each other, in early eighteenth-century public 
discourse. In contrast, the meaning of the recent neologism freethinking was 
widely disputed between radicals, traditionalists and moderates. For the sake of 
comparison, contributions to the discourse on freethinking have been divided 
into respective groups in the following analysis. Introduced first will be some 
innovative definitions of freethinking put forward by radical writers. Next the 
traditionalist polemic against freethinking will be analysed, and then, 
establishment attitudes to freethinking. Finally, the analysis will contain further 
remarks on statements sympathetic towards freethinking. This division of 
contributions to the discourse on freethinking follows Jacob's model 
introduced above. Though somewhat simplistic, and possibly exaggerating the 
significance of the small group of freethinkers, Jacob's model is nevertheless 
helpful. 
Innovative definitions of freethinking 
Freethinking was no new phenomenon in the early eighteenth century; yet the 
publicity it achieved and reactions it caused were. Also new was the term itself, 
and its proper definition became an object of fierce dispute. The number of 
genuine freethinkers remained remarkably small throughout the period, 
although the politico-religious debate demonstrates that Collins, Toland and 
Tindal were widely read. The importance of these writers was often belittled, 
but they could still be perceived as threatening the very basis of Church and 
state.57 Their writings certainly contributed to an idea of toleration, although a 
breakthrough could occur only after changes in attitudes among the orthodox. 
When defining liberty in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
Locke had dedicated considerable attention to a free man's power to think or 
not to think according to the preference of his own mind. He had also 
54 Atterbury, A Letter to a Convocation-Man, 1697, 2, 6. 
55 	 [Davenant], The Old and Modern Whig Truly Represented, 1702, 2; [Leslie], The Wolf Stript 
of his Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 25; [Leslie], The Second Part of the Wolf Stript of His 
Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, the subtitle; The Glorious Life and Actions of St. Whigg, 1708, 
29. 
56 	 Ryder wrote in his diary that many lawyers and physicians in London were inclined to deism. 
The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 11 December 1715, 148, and 2 January 1716, 161. 
57 For the importance of the freethinkers, see Lund 1995, 10. 
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underscored an essential connection between freedom on the one hand and 
thought on the other: `Liberty cannot be where these is no thought' S8 Locke 
himself did not write about freethinking, but many of his disciples became 
important adherents of it, or at least they were categorised as such. Toland, for 
instance, first earned a reputation as a freethinker as a result of his controversial 
Christianity not Mysterious (1696) in which he endeavoured to demonstrate 
that 'the use of reason is not so dangerous in religion as it is commonly 
represented' .59  
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury, a pupil of Locke's and a 
patron of Toland's, also had close contact with the freethinking circle and knew 
continental radicals such as Bayle and Leclerc. Shaftesbury's philosophical 
writings, published in 1708-14, were conspicuous reminders of the existence of 
radical, chiefly Whiggish, intellectual undercurrents. Although Shaftesbury 
vindicated freethinking and freedom of speech, and neither was his own 
religion orthodox, he wished to distinguish himself from freethinkers such as 
Toland, Tindal and Collins in matters of religion. This attempt produced little 
result, as his treatises received a violent response both from the traditionalist 
Tories and from the moderate Whigs. What caused this reaction was not so 
much his sympathy towards principles of reason but rather his articulate 
demand for religious toleration, approval of freethinking, and his open 
disapproval of the persecution of Nonconformists. 
In Shaftesbury's ideal state, the Church enjoyed no autonomous political 
power and was unable to compel people to conform. Shaftesbury discussed 
religion and morality as distinct from one another, and the language he used 
was secular to a great extent. Shaftesbury wanted religion to operate within 
society according to the principles of sociability and politeness, avoiding 
enthusiasm, intolerance and conflicts.60 Likewise, Shaftesbury was capable of 
discussing religion, politics and morals as if they had few points of contact. His 
argument that there were natural differences in opinion among people in 
religion, politics and morals was also radical.61 Shaftesbury even dared to 
speculate on the dangerous question of whether it was impossible for an atheist 
to be virtuous.6'- 
In his Letter Concerning Enthusiasm (1708), Shaftesbury argued strongly in 
favour of an inevitability of the freedom of thought. In ancient Greece, for 
instance, `visionaries and enthusiasts of all kinds were tolerated'. This 
58 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, 2.21.8, 2.21.12. 
59 [Toland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, viii. 
60 Horstmann 1980, 152, 155, 159; Sambrook 1988, 276; Champion 1992, 212; Klein 1994, 
157-8, 284; Robbins 1959, 129, characterised Shaftesbury as optimistic, liberal and realistic, 
which is obviously an anachronistic overstatement. 
61 
	
	
[Anthony Ashley Cooper Earl of Shaftesbury], Sensus Conununis: An Essay on the Freedom 
of Wit and Humour. Lt a Letter to a Friend, 1709, in Characteristicks, Vol. 1, 79-80. See also 
123 on which Shaftesbury wrote about ethics and politics as if they were two separate things; 
In Miscellaneous Reflections on the preceding Treatises, 1714, in Characteristicks, vol. III, 
271, he wrote about religion and politics as distinct: 'But whatever may be the state of 
controversy in our religion, or politic concerns, ...'. On 310 he wrote on morals and politics 
as if they were separate. 
62 [Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury], An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit, 
1709, in Characteristicks, vol. I, 7. 
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toleration of contending sects had given rise to `wonderful ... harmony and 
temper'. Vindicating a secular basis for politics, Shaftesbury ironically 
suggested that the mixture of politics and religion and clerical calls for 
uniformity of his day were actually innovations:63 
a new sort of policy, which extends itself to another world, and considers 
the future lives and happiness of men rather than the present, has made 
us leap the bounds of natural humanity ... And now uniformity in 
opinion (a hopeful project!) is looked on as the only expedient against 
this evil. The saving of souls is now the heroic passion of exalted spirits; 
and is become in a manner the chief care of the magistrate, and the very 
end of government itself. 
In 1709, Shaftesbury advocated 'a freedom of raillery, a liberty in decent 
language to question every thing'. He despised the way the adherents of the 
High Church maintained that free speculation would destroy the Church and the 
whole of society.64 In a treatise published posthumously in 1714, he concluded 
that `there can be no rational belief but where comparison is allowed, 
examination permitted, and a sincere toleration established'. No authority on 
earth, not even the High-Church clergy, could stop people from thinking freely, 
however much they abused `those naturally honest appellations of free-livers, 
freethinkers, latitudinarians, or whatever other character implies a largeness of 
mind and generous use of understanding'. For Shaftesbury, a freethinker was 
'the noblest of characters'; `variety of opinion was not to be cured'; and 'it was 
impossible all should be of the one mind'.65 Shaftesbury's writings were an 
open vindication of pluralism in religious matters and possibly also in other 
spheres. It is no wonder his texts were declared more than twenty years later 
'one of the chief causes of the infidelity of the present age' that formed a threat 
not only to Christianity but to 'all society and government' .66  
In 1713, the publication of Anthony Collins's Discourse of Free-Thinking 
initiated an even more widespread controversy. Collins built his work on 
discussions with London deists and published it at a time when the concept of 
freethinking was increasingly used in a derogatory sense. To counter this 
development, Collins conspicuously defined the concept in an extremely 
positive light, as representing rationality, toleration and free enquiry. The 
anticlerical tone of the treatise and its publication during an acute political crisis 
guaranteed a wide response,67 including numerous other works expounding 
freethinking. In his book Collins defined freethinking as68 
63 [Shaftesbury], A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm, 1708, in Characteristicks, Vol. I, 18-9; For 
similar arguments see Sensus Communis, n Characteristicks, Vol. I, 83-4 and 
Miscellaneous Reflections, 1714, in Cluzracteristicks, Vol. III, 103. 
64 	 [Shaftesbury], Sensus Communis, in Characteristicks, Vol. I, 1709, 69. 
65 	 [Shaftesbury], Miscellaneous Reflections, 1714, in Characteristicks, vol. III, 104, 299, 305-
6, 311, 319. 
66 Daily Courant, 17 April 1735, in GM, Vol. V, April 1735, Reel 135. 
67 Rupp 1986, 264-5. 
68 	 [Anthony Collins], A Discourse of Free-Thinking, Occasion'd by The Rise and Growth of a 
Sect call'd Free-Thinkers, 1713, 5. 
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the use of the understanding in endeavouring to find out the meaning of 
any proposition whatsoever, in considering the nature of the evidence 
for or against it, and in judging of it according to the seeming force and 
weakness of the evidence. 
He vindicated individual liberty to think freely by using arguments that, in 
religious terms, were seemingly conventional. Collins was also a religious man 
in his own peculiarly unorthodox way. According to Collins's interpretation,69 
if the knowledge of some truths be required of us by God; if the 
knowledge of others be useful to society; if the knowledge of no truth be 
forbidden us by God, or hurtful to us; then we have a right to know, or 
may lawfully know, any truth whatsoever ... we have a right to think 
freely, .. . 
In his Farther Discourse of Free-Thinking (1713), Collins continued to 
denounce the suggested antichristianity of freethinking by referring to 'the 
freethinkers of old Israel, old Greece, and old Rome, who were the ornaments of 
their respective ages and countries'. In Collins's pantheistic interpretation, all 
of these ancient freethinking authors had agreed with the doctrines of 
Christianity and had posed no danger to the Church 7° 
Much of Collins's two treatises concentrated on religious questions, but his 
freethinking notions also had political implications. Collins himself emphasised 
connections between various fields of enquiry and wished to show that his 
thesis was applicable to all of them,7' evidently including politics. From the 
political point of view, Collins supplied an interesting reply to the argument that 
'to allow and encourage men to think freely, will produce endless divisions in 
opinion, and by consequence disorder'. Collins's unconventional point was that 
'mere diversity of opinions has no tendency in nature to confusion'. Aware of 
the power of ancient examples, he once again referred to Greece where several 
groupings had existed side by side. In spite of disagreements even on 
fundamental principles, their diversity of opinions had never caused confusion. 
This ideal state had been achieved because people had allowed each other 'to 
think freely, and to have different opinions'. Implicitly pointing at the High-
Church Tories, Collins made his arguments ever more provocative by claiming 
that `confusion, disorder, and every evil work' were caused by restraints upon 
thinking, not by freethinking. Hereby Collins denied the right of the Church to 
set restrictions on thinking. He recommended liberty of thinking as a remedy to 
all disorders.72 In Collins's thought, freethinking, instead of abolishing society, 
was a beneficial phenomenon in which the people could place their hope. 
Collins's Farther Discourse of Free-Thinking also contained claims that 
concerned popular participation in politics, a phenomenon that aroused 
conflicting passions among the governing elite. Collins was ruthlessly 
69 	 [Collins], A Discourse of Free-Thinking, 1713, 6. 
70 	 [Anthony Collins], A Farther Discourse of Free-Thinking: In a Letter to a Clergy-Man. With 
some Considerations on Mr. Pycroft's Treatise Upon the same Subject, 1713, 9-10. 
71 Horstmann 1980, 24, 26. 
72 	 [Collins], A Discourse of Free-Thinking, 1713, 101-3. 
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questioning some of the very fundamentals of the power and values of the 
establishment when he argued that freethinking among the men of the street 
would save both the religious and political system:73  
Now as to all useful application of mind to preserve ourselves, either as 
a Church, or a state, from danger, I look upon the body of the common 
people of Great Britain to have their share in freethinking; and thereby 
they will preserve the Church and state too from danger. 
... the body of the common people, when they shall get out of the fear 
into which they were lately misled, will return to their habit of 
freethinking. 
Collins was not the first freethinker to refer provocatively to the common 
people in an optimistic manner. Toland too had addressed his Christianity not 
Mysterious to plain people who discussed religious issues no matter how the 
clergy attempted to exclude them from such discourse.74 Toland and Collins 
were both informing the common people about matters that, amongst the elite, 
were not regarded as proper topics for plebeian discussions. 
Appeals to commoners made freethinking alarming in the eyes of the 
political elite who shared the unstated assumption that the orthodox faith 
provided an essential system for the control of lower orders. If reverence 
towards religion among the common people disappeared, they were likely to 
soon loose that towards political rulers as well. It was therefore not merely the 
private beliefs of the freethinkers that made them threatening but their very 
willingness to communicate their ideas to the general public. Members of the 
political elite became genuinely afraid that spreading freethinking might 
endanger social and political stability,75 and hence it was impossible for them to 
accept arguments espoused by Shaftesbury, Toland or Collins. The significance 
of Collins's Discourse is demonstrated by the wide discussion which followed. 
During the discussion, the book was maligned by a number of notable critics, 
including Steele, Swift and George Berkeley. As a result of this violent debate, 
the irreligious and antichristian connotations of the word freethinker finally 
became widely known.76 
An illustration of the reception of freethinking writings in London coffee 
houses is provided by Ryder's diary. Not a genuine freethinker himself, this 
Presbyterian Dissenter was interested in the writings and activities of the 
freethinkers. An associate of Ryder, a sceptic himself, described 'the club of 
freethinkers' as a 'set of men who laugh at the prejudice of mankind in favour of 
revelation and talk with the utmost assurance as if they had the clearest 
demonstration that the Christian religion is an imposture'. Ryder believed that, 
on the basis of a willingness to censor Christian doctrines and `convert' others, 
someone could be thought a freethinker. This interest in freethinking stretched 
so far that Ryder, as a member of a group of Dissenters campaigning for the 
73 	 [Collins], A Farther Discourse of Free-Thinking, 1713, 21-2. 
74 Horstmann 1980, 141. 
75 Harrison 1990, 96; Miller 1994, 158, on Charles Davenant's views. 
76 Horstmann 1980, 188; Jacob 1981, 157; Russell 1993, 665, 667. 
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repeal of discriminatory legislation, proposed that their paper vindicating the 
principles of private judgement and liberty of conscience should have been 
called the Freethinker instead of the originally proposed Protestant." With his 
proposition, Ryder may have intended to aim the title more provocatively upon 
the Anglican establishment. On the other hand, in a Protestant political culture, 
Protestant was one of the most positive of terms, and treating Protestant and 
freethinker as alternative expressions demonstrates how freethinking could 
appear as an extremely positive phenomonen to a radical Dissenter." 
Freethinking in traditionalist polemic 
Collins's book was almost universally condemned 79 However, criticism 
against it, rising from Whig and Tory circles of the political elite, was not 
unanimous. Collins, like most other freethinkers, was known to have Whig 
sympathies, and his ideas of free thought provoked orthodox supporters of the 
unity of Church and state. Traditionalist Anglicans willingly interpreted any 
deviance from the established religion — particularly if suspected of atheism as 
in the case of Collins — as an illustration of political disloyalty. From the point of 
view of the Whigs, the situation at the time of the publication of Collins's work 
in 1713 was difficult. They were in a minority position out of government, did 
not enjoy popular support comparable to the Tories, and wanted no associations 
being drawn between themselves and Collins's alleged atheism. In contrast, the 
Tories easily found use for associations between Collins's politico-religious 
heterodoxy and Whiggism. That was just what Tory writers had consistently 
attempted to create and Whig authors to refute. The controversy which 
followed thus by no means merely concerned religion; it also concerned what is 
now known as political ideology.80 
The fundamental ideological position behind Tory polemic against 
freethinking was that morality and religion were inseparable. Neither could 
politics be regarded as a sphere independent of either. As the cohesion of a 
traditional society appeared to be under threat, the Tories feared that England 
was turning into a pluralistic and fragmented society. They believed that 
toleration of diversity in religion, as proposed by the freethinkers, was identical 
to accepting the dissolution of traditional unitary society.81  
77 Mr. Goodall's words in The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 18 August 1715, 79-80; Ibid., 23 
September 1715, 104, 8 November 1716, 361-2. 
78 	 It is doubtful whether these schemes ever led to a foundation of such a paper. Ryder himself 
began to regret his involvement once it was rumoured that he was attending a club formed 
against not only atheism and deism but also against conformity. Ryder denied the religious 
character of the club and decided to frequent it no more in order to avoid being associated 
with it. The consulted bibliographies do not lend support to a publication titled The 
Freethinker before 1718. When a paper carrying the title came out in 1718, it was written by 
Ambrose Phillips rather than this group of Dissenters; The Diary of Dudley Ryder, 7 
December 1716, 374. 
79 Most of the responses were negative. Richard Bentley, however, suggested that the right to 
think freely might be agreeable whereas free thought did not necessarily lead to deism. 
Harrison 1990, 80. 
80 Phiddian 1989, 63, 67-8. 
81 	 For Tory fears of pluralism, see Browning 1982, 1, 14. 
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The Tories, however, did not write against freethinking merely out of 
religious conviction; they were also eager to exploit every hint of Whiggish 
irreligiousness as a means to defame the character of individual Whig 
politicians or to reproach the policies of the Whig party as a whole. Religious 
motivation in political actions tended to be negative rather than positive. 
Religion was an ideal weapon with which to attack an opponent, as it made use 
of the power of strong associations.82 
Although most Tories knew that all Whigs were not freethinkers, they also 
knew that freethinkers tended to support Whigs. Tory propaganda could not 
avoid making use of fears towards freethinking as dreadful atheism by hinting 
that all Whigs were freethinkers. Tory polemic had traditionally presented the 
Whigs as political radicals aiming at a renewal of the horrors of the 
Cromwellian regime, as social upstarts with obscure origins, and as deviants 
from Anglican norms. These associations were based on the fact that a few 
Whi,gs genuinely held such views or had low social status. Seldom being 
republicans, the Whigs vindicated a limited monarchy. Although not always 
Dissenters themselves, the Whigs could not accept excessive religious 
persecution. Not representing any one social group, the Whigs had many 
professional men and businessmen in their ranks. The target reader or listener of 
Tory polemic was clearly an Anglican country gentleman or clergyman who 
feared that the inherited socio-political order, as well as his own position, were 
threatened by political and religious radicals. In polemic these feared men of 
innovation were called republicans, Dissenters, atheists, or freethinkers.83 In his 
sermon of 5 November 1709, Sacheverell referred to religious Dissenters and 
political Whigs as `hypocrites, deists, socinians, and atheists' who were to be 
blamed for what he saw as Anglican `altars and sacraments' being 
`prostituted'.84 The conviction of the existence of an atheistic and deistic 
conspiracy against the religious, social and political order was echoed in other 
traditionalist papers even if not as presumptuously.85 
In Swift's writings, suggestions of heterodoxy and potential atheism were 
usual insults against Whigs both as individual politicians and as a party. During 
the election campaign of 1710, when a Tory victory was predictable, Swift 
wrote a libel on Thomas Wharton, a major Whig leader, portraying him as 'a 
Presbyterian in politics, and an atheist in religion' who was only interested in 
'vice and politics'.86 Both `Presbyterian' and `atheist' had highly pejorative 
connotations in the understanding of the Anglican audience. Being 'a 
Presbyterian in politics' stood for adherence to the denounced republicanism of 
the Interregnum. As an atheist, the Whig politician was also associated with 
irreligion and spiteful behaviour. Such accusations could build on the fact that 
82 Holmes 1975, 8, 22. 
83 Corns, Speck and Downie 1982, 9-10, 12, 17. 
84 	 Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren, both in Church, and State, 1709, 7-8. 
85 	 Hearne to Dr. T. Smith, Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, Vol. II, 329-30. 
86 	 [Swift], A short Character of his Excellency Thomas Earl of Wharton, Lord Lieutenant of 
Ireland, 30 August 1710; Wharton was the most libelled member of the Whig Junto. Corns, 
Speck and Downie 1982, 16. 
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Wharton was indeed a sceptic, and few of his fellow party leaders were 
particularly devoted to religion.87 
The Whigs as a collective body came under Swift's attack in a disguised 
letter to the Examiner in which a supposed Whig interpreted apostle Paul's 
teachings in a heterodox manner, maintaining that 'there must be heresies in the 
Church, that the truth may be manifest; and therefore by due course of 
reasoning, the more heresies there are, the more manifest will the truth be 
made'. Thereby, Swift charged Whigs for propagating religious heterodoxy and 
associated them with the group of radical Whigs, `the tribe of freethinkers', 
with whom the Whigs formed a conspiracy for handing irreligious works to the 
innocent public. Swift maintained that the Whig party was ready to accept 
`every heterodox professor either in religion or government',88 approved 'all 
sorts of Dissenters' and allowed 'the several gradations of freethinkers' to join. 
In fact, thought Swift, they were ready to extend their `liberty of conscience' 
more than the hated King James II had ever dared, `having granted it to all the 
classes of freethinkers'.89 Swift contrasted these despicable enemies with the 
Tory government in which there were no freethinkers 90 
In the early 17 10s, freethinking was widely discussed in traditionalist texts. It 
was lamented how the clergy had been `despised and ridiculed by the factious 
freethinkers' distributing their `atheistical poison' to subvert Christianity.91 A 
poem titled Free-Thinkers assaulted freethinking as a mere new form of atheism 
advocated by drunkards who abused defenceless youth by teaching them 
immoral, atheistical and republican doctrines. A conversion to freethinking was 
claimed to entail economic ruin, waste of time in coffee houses, addiction to 
reading newspapers and excessive use of stimulants. In turn, it was suggested to 
ensure Whig patronage. In politics and religion, the freethinkers supported 
anyone who served their private interest: `Scorning all ties, divine or civil .. . 
this freethinking is the devil'. If the state of affairs turned unfavourable to them, 
they could always return to freethinking Holland, their country of origin, if not 
to hell itself.92 
The Tory campaign against 'that atheistical gang'93 or 'the new sect of 
freethinkers'94 gained additional force from the publication of Collins's 
provocative works in 1713. Churchmen condemned 'excessive liberties' taken 
87 Holmes 1975, 8. 
88 [Swift], E33, 22 March 1711. 
89 [Swift], E35, 5 April 1711, E39, 3 May 1711. 
90 	 [Swift], E22, 4 January 1711, E26, 1 February 1711, E33, 22 March 1711, E35, 5 April 1711, 
E39, 3 May 1711; in his letter to Ambrose Philips on 14 September 1708, Swift referred 
ironically to 'free Whiggish thinking'. The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, Vol. I, 100; 
In 1709, he attacked a Whig leader in his Project for the Advancement of Religion and the 
Reformation of Manners: 'It is true he is a man of pleasure, and a freethinker; that is, in other 
words, he is profligate in his morals, and a despiser of religion; but in point of party, he is one 
to be confided in; he is an asserter of liberty and property; he rattles it out against Popery, and 
arbitrary power, and priestcraft and High-Church.' Cited by Goldgar 1961, 46. 
91 Honesty the Best Policy, 1711, 5-6. 
92 Free-Thinkers. A Poem in Dialogue, 1711, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12-15, 18, 23, 27-8. 
93 	 Heame's expression in Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, 6 May 1713, Vol. IV, 
172. 
94 	 A New Voyage to the Island of Fools, 1713, 45. 
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by 'our pretended freethinkers',95 doubting whether that was real freethinking. 
The rival view would have it that it was the Church of England that represented 
genuine freethinking. The Anglican Church was presented as a true Church just 
because she, unlike her rivals, encouraged her members to contemplate 
questions of doctrine. Atheists, deists, libertines and even Latitudinarian 
Anglicans were seen as united in the same anti-Church party claiming to be 
freethinkers, but actually aiming at the destruction of proper Anglican 
freethinking.96 Freethinking, as used by the pretended freethinkers, was 
presented as `free-acting, free-printing, free-publishing, free-propagating, 
detestable opinions, destructive of the belief of all revelation, and of natural 
religion and law'.97 Sacheverell, when preaching to the House of Commons, 
condemned Collins with ambiguous references to 'this synagogue of libertines' 
and `blasphemies, heresies, schisms, and errors of all kinds' entertained by 'our 
modern infidels'. He took Collins's book as an open challenge to the 
foundations of government both in the Church and state. Freethinker he saw 
inevitably as a free-actor neglecting all authority and advocating `confusion, 
anarchy, and libertinism', the very characteristics of the Civil War period, a 
divine deliverence from which was celebrated on the day of Sacheverell's 
sermon.98 
Associations between the Whigs and freethinkers became increasingly open. 
It was suggested that, when favouring freethinking, the Whigs aimed at gaining 
support among the populace in order to overcome the Tories 99 To counter 
Collins's claims that religious diversity contributed to political stability, Tory 
writers emphasised the union between the Church and state and denounced 
diversity of opinions, often in terms of both classical republicanism and 
Christianity.10° Swift wrote a mock version of the Discourse, the title of which 
insinuated that the Whigs were endeavouring to popularise freethinking: Mr C-
ns's Discourse of Free-Thinking, Put into plain English, by way of Abstract, for 
the Use of the Poor. Swift's irony `revealed' a Whiggish political conspiracy 
against the Church of England and the political nation. Talking as a supposed 
Whig, Swift wrote:101 
95 Samuel Pycroft, A Brief Enquiry into Free-Thinking in Matters of Religion; And some 
Pretended Obstructions to it, 1713, 2. 
96 	 The Church of England the Sole Encourager of Free-Thinking, 1717, the subtitle and 6 and 
24-5; the list of condemned irreligious authors presented by this pamphlet contained 
philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Spinoza but also minor figures such as Milton, 
Toland and Tindal. 
97 	 Free Thoughts upon the Discourse of Free-Thinking, 1713, 5. 
98 	 Sacheverell, False Notions of Liberty in Religion and Government, 1713, 7-8, 19. 
99 	 An Answer to the Discourse on Free-Thinking: Wherein The Absurdity and Infidelity of the 
Sect of Free-Thinkers is undeniably Demonstrated, 1713, preface. 
100 Free Thoughts upon the Discourse of Free-Thinking, 1713, 49-50, 52. 
101 [Jonathan Swift], Mr C-ns's Discourse of Free-Thinking, Put into plain English, by way of 
Abstract, for the Use of the Poor, 1713, 3; Nash has written on Swift's irony: `... irony says 
what it does not mean and means what it does not say. And yet, ... there is no clear locus of 
the ironic, no key word, no linguistic focus that announces the trope of irony. Our 
interpretation is based on our assumptions about Swift's assumptions about everybody's 
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Our party having failed, by all their political arguments, to re-establish 
their power; the wise leaders have determined, that the last and principal 
remedy should be made use of, for opening the eyes of this blinded 
nation; ... [a] system of their divinity, should be published, .. . 
In Swift's `abstract', freethinking arguments in favour of diversity of opinions 
became completely senseless, leading to anarchy both in religion and politics. 
The freethinker of Swift's spoke out:1°' 
When every single man comes to have a different opinion every day 
from the whole world, and from himself, by virtue of freethinking, and 
thinks it is his duty to convert every man to his own freethinking (as all 
we freethinkers do) how can that possibly create so great a diversity of 
opinions, ... Besides, difference in opinion, especially in matters of 
great moment, breeds no confusion at all. Witness Papists and 
Protestants, Roundhead and Cavalier, and Whig and Tory now among 
us. 
Swift's irony was motivated both by religious and political considerations. The 
Whiggism of the leading freethinkers certainly played a major role. It was in the 
interest of Tory polemicists to demonstrate links between political Whiggism 
and deism or even atheism. Such a strategy was clearly based on an assumption 
that the audience regarded political and religious deviance as interrelated. 
Anticlerical accusations of the freethinkers could also be encountered by 
questioning their integrity and wisdom and by equating them with the stupid 
mob.103 
Because of its very fierceness, traditionalist polemic could not go 
unanswered. Some freethinkers attempted to answer it by presenting the term 
freethinker as a 'new fashioned term of reproach' which the party of High-
Church Tories abused for striking both their religious and political opponents. 
Instead, they continued to suggest that freethinking was a most suitable quality 
for a rational person to be carried with pride. A freethinker was one who made 
judgements on the basis of evidence, not on authority. '°4 For many Whigs, 
however, traditionalist writings on freethinking were uncomfortable. They 
regretted freethinking anticlericalism which had alarmed the clergy to attack 
'all Whiggish freethinkers'.'05 It may well have been that Tory accusations 
against `Whiggish freethinkers' made Addison denounce freethinking and 
instead contend that the Tories themselves were freethinkers, not so much in 
religion but even more in politics. 
102 [Swift], Mr C-ns's Discourse of Free-Thinking, 1713, 18. 
103 Rupp 1986, 266; Harrison 1990, 80. 
104 Reflections on the Management Of some late Party-Disputes, 1715, 46-7. 
105 Now, or Never: Or, Seasonable Thoughts for the Present Times, 1714, 9, 13. 
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Establishment attitudes to freethinking 
Jacob has seen the hostility between radical freethinkers and establishment 
Whigs as a major trend in early eighteenth-century intellectual history. This was 
because the freethinkers provided an alternative to Newtonianism10G which had 
otherwise made a relatively painless breakthrough among the English 
intellectual elite. It was only gradually that Newtonianian influences on 
political discourse became visible; yet some indications to that direction are 
traceable. Berkeley, for instance, opposed what he considered a cynical 
freethinking view of politics107 and drew instead an analogy between Newton's 
law of gravitation and the structures of human society:'°8 
Philosophers are now agreed, that there is a mutual attraction between 
the most distants parts at least of this solar system. All those bodies that 
resolve round the sun are drawn towards each other, and towards the 
sun, by some secret, uniform and never-ceasing principle ... Now if we 
carry our thoughts from the corporeal to the moral world, we may 
observe, in the spirits or minds of men, a like principle of attraction, 
whereby they are drawn together into communities, clubs, families, 
friendships, and all the various species of society ... the good of the 
whole is inseparable from that of the parts; in promoting therefore the 
common good, every one does at the same time promote his own private 
interest. 
Holding a conception of society which underscored human inclination for 
unity, the establishment Whigs had great difficulties in accepting vindications 
of a complete freedom of thought. Even if some sympathy towards religious 
pluralism occurred,109 their status as would-be administrators made them 
denounce connections with freethinking. 
Addison, the main propagandist of the Whigs in the 171Os, had used the term 
freethinker before introducing the expression `freethinker in politics' (1716). 
The connotations of freethinker had always been pejorative in his texts; an 
atheist, freethinker or deist appeared as nothing like a philosopher or a man of 
sense. Addison associated freethinking with young age, modest education and 
atheism and blamed it for causing schisms in families and in society as a whole. 
He opposed freethinking also by claiming that it was easily accepted by people 
of humble social standing such as servants, country people, or women. This was 
merely a rhetorical device for convincing the target reader — an educated mature 
affluent Anglican city gentleman — that it was not suitable for him to believe 
freethinking nonsense.10 The gravity of the question of freethinking is 
illustrated by Addison's dedication of an entire periodical essay of Christmas 
Eve 1709 to argue against `infidels, whether distinguished by the title of deist, 
atheist, or freethinker'. He presented freethinking as a dangerously fashionable 
106 Jacob 1976, 208, 210. 
107 Redwood 1976, 67. 
108 [George Berkeley], G126, 5 August 1713. 
109 Browning 1982, 13, 16. 
110 Addison, TI08, 17 December 1709. 
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mistake in an otherwise glorious epoch. Disbelief disturbed the nation as a 
result of a few enthusiastic authors aiming at a destruction of common sense. 
Their learning was false, they deserved no sympathy, and should have been 
excluded from society."  
In his comedy the Drummer (1716), Addison used the expression 
`freethinker in politics' when entertaining the audience with a freethinker 
character. This ridiculous character, who held absurd views on the 
fundamentals of Christianity, strengthened attitudes towards freethinking as 
dreadful and senseless atheism. Addison assumed that the audience would 
laugh at a representative of the despised group, at something which it actually 
feared. In the play, Mr Tinsel — a name not unlike Tindal or Toland — explained 
to his distressed mistress that atheist was an obsolete word and he was instead a 
freethinker whose learning was derived from the small group of radical 
freethinkers which met at coffee houses:12 
Lady I vow, Mr Tinsel, I am afraid malicious people will say I am in love 
with an atheist. 
Tinsel Oh, my dear, that is an old-fashioned word — I am a freethinker, 
child. 
Tinsel To tell you the truth, I have not time to look into these dry matters 
myself, but I am convinced by four or five learned men, whom I 
sometimes overhear at a coffee house I frequent. 
The humorous, and at the same time critical, elements of this passage consisted 
of the freethinker's stubborn denial of the shared Christian truths and his failure 
to utilise his own reason, which made him blindly imitate a separatist group. 
The terms atheist and freethinker were used as exact synonyms. 
Steele was another leading Whig propagandist discussing freethinking in his 
writings. He maintained that in the biblical and ancient world, as well as in 
Reformation Europe, pious freethinking had opposed corrupt practices and 
been entirely in keeping with Christianity. As to the neologism freethinker, it 
was abused by a tiny group of detestable radicals, `thoughtless atheists, and 
illiterate drunkards', who knew nothing about real freethinking, as a mere 
atheist or infidel was not 'a freethinker in any tolerable sense'. 'I' Steele himself 
used freethinker as a term of abuse in a great variety of contexts. He could call 
two ladies marrying the same man `freethinkers',14 or he could give a 
description of 'a young gentleman, who talks atheistically all day in coffee 
111 Addison, TI11, 24 December 1709. 
112 Joseph Addison, The Drummer; or, the Haunted-House. A Comedy, as it is acted at the 
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1716, 202. 
113 Steele, TI2, 7 May 1709; [Steele], S234, 28 November 1711. 
114 Steele, T69, 17 September 1709. 
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houses, and in his degrees of understanding sets up for a freethinker' ."5 Like 
Addison, he associated freethinking with youth, modest understanding, atheism 
and coffee houses. 
When some readers took offence at the critical use of the term, Steele assured 
that he was an admirer of ancient freethinkers - defenders of established 
religion - who should have been distinguished from atheistical and anticlerical 
early eighteenth-century freethinkers. Freedom of thought was essentially 
Christian, and more particularly Protestant, while the modern freethinkers of 
the coffee houses appeared as deluders of the plain people and abusers of 
human nature. `These grave philosophical freethinkers' and `speculative 
libertine[s]' were ridiculous enemies to religion who misled their followers.16 
The most notable opponent of radical materialism was the Anglican 
clergyman and Newtonian philosopher Berkeley who, in spite of his Tory 
political views,"' contributed to the Guardian, a leading Whig periodical. 
Berkeley also held a notion of past freethinking and blamed radicals for the 
term freethinker having been `degenerated from its original signification' so 
that it was `supposed to denote something contrary to wit and reason' ."8 The 
modern freethinkers had misunderstood freedom of thought when interpreting 
it mere opposition. Fortunately, they found support only among the ignorant 
lower orders, which made them all too marginal to really harm the established 
religion.19 Parallel arguments against `modern' freethinking as a 
misinterpretation of the proper sense of the `noble' term, against turning 
freethinking into anticlericalism and libertinism and against allowing it to 
become a mischievous activity of the ignorant also appeared in later decades. It 
was argued that freethinking, in its original sense, had been 'that laudable spirit 
which first inspired this nation to break off from the tyrannic superstition of the 
Church of Rome'. In its mistaken form, however, excessive liberty of thinking 
led first to scepticism, then to infidelity, and finally to atheism. '2o 
In the 1710s, freethinker was still a neologism the exact meaning of 
which was disputed. Hence the term could easily be used for various purposes, 
including political propaganda. In spite of occasional references to positive 
ancient freethinking, the connotations of freethinking remained ostensively 
pejorative in contemporary discourse. Freethinking was associated with 
atheism, schism, the abuse of freedom, moral baseness and a threat to virtue in 
religion and society. Freethinkers were accused of either teaching nonsense to 
the vulnerable public and of zeal to make converts or of blind adherence to 
115 Steele, T77, 6 October 1709. 
116 Steele, T135, 18 February 1710; Steele, T187, 20 June 1710; [Steele], G3, 14 March 1713. 
117 Goldgar 1961, 112. 
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119 [Berkeley], G39, 25 April 1713, G55, 14 May 1713, G62, 22 May 1713, G70, 1 June 1713, 
G88, 22 June 1713. 
120 Weekly Miscellany, No. 22, 12 May 1733, in GM, Vol. III, May 1733, No. 32, 21 July 1733, 
in GM, Vol. III, July 1733, No. 36, 18 August 1733, in GM, Vol. III, August 1733, and No. 
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leaders who only deceived their followers. Freethinking was also linked with 
low social standing, young age, poor schooling, poor logic, prejudice and 
intolerance. Furthermore, freethinkers were presented as excessive drinkers. 
Coffee houses appeared as the bases of religious freethinkers.121 
The same coffee houses were presented as the places where amateur 
politicians, or `coffee house politicians', met. Descriptions of lower order 
middling and even involvement in party politics often contained associations 
with agitation, division, enthusiasm, party quarrels, constant scepticism and 
opposition, wasting time by reading propaganda, ridiculous behaviour, low 
social status, young age, inproper education, lack of logic and excessive 
drinking.122 These negative attributes were strengthened by the pejorative 
connotations of the concept party and by the fact that coffee house politicians 
were usually blamed for being adherents of the opposing party. The similar 
connotations of the terms freethinker and coffee house politician, as well as 
their frequent use in close proximity, led to situations in which there was little 
difference in meaning between the two. In the mind of a reader, party-political 
speculations seemed analogous to freethinking, both appearing as highly 
questionable activities. Criticism of the political activities of the adherents of a 
rival party could thus build on religious associations. 
Around 1710, the discourse on freethinking had gained new force due to 
Shaftesbury's recent publications. At the same time, the controversy on the 
safety of the Church was reaching its climax as a consequence of the 
Sacheverell affair. This state of affairs made Addison and Steele attack both the 
traditionalist High-Church Tories as `politicians' and the radical Whigs as 
`freethinkers'. One of Addison's favourite methods of scoring propaganda 
points was to write dream visions. One such essay introduced a tottering 
building of the `Temple of Vanity' which was frequented by `hypocrites, 
pedants, freethinkers, and prating politicians'. All were `mischievous 
pretenders to politics' who were indifferent to virtue and consequently 
resembled Machiavelli. They acted unlike law-givers, heroes, statesmen, 
philosophers and poets' who served mankind and advanced the interests of their 
country.123 The terms freethinker and politician were employed in the same 
context and shared negative associations. Freethinker also appeared as a 
somewhat political term, being connected with `pretending to politics' and 
'Machiavellism'. Even if the terms were not fully identical, their appearance in 
the same context enabled associations to be conveyed from one to the another. 
A few days later, Steele appealed for an immediate arrest of'24 
121 See for example Steele, T12, 7 May 1709; Addison, T108, 17 December 1709; Steele, T135, 
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any politician whom they shall catch raving in a coffee house, or any 
freethinker whom they shall find publishing his deliriums, or any other 
person who shall give the like manifest signs of a crazed imagination. 
In Steele's statement, the terms politician and freethinker shared an association 
with `crazed imagination'. An average reader knew that both `raved in coffee 
houses' and `published deliriums'. Once again the connotations of the two 
terms came close to each other. Later in 1710, Steele characterised a 
philosopher (the sense of the word here being belittling) and `somewhat of a 
politician' in terms that made a reader associate him with freethinkers:'25 
one of those who sets up for knowledge by doubting, and has no other 
way of making himself considerable but by contradicting all he hears 
said. He has, besides much doubt and spirit of contradiction, a constant 
suspicion as to state-affairs. 
Steele's portrayal of political interest among the public was amazingly 
analogous to customary characterisations of religious freethinking. Popular 
politics, and particularly the Tory campaign against the Whig ministry, 
appeared as an obscure philosophy based on perpetual questioning of either the 
fundamentals of Christian religion or the politics of a ministry controlled by the 
contending party. 
Addison's essay of 1712 further illuminates the semantic associations 
between widespread curiosity in religious freethinking and political 
speculation. Addison created a literary character in whom the negative 
attributes of a freethinker in politics and one in religion were combined. These 
attributes included an incapacity to participate in a sophisticated discourse, a 
lack of proper respect and education, a lack of genuine learning, constant 
scepticism as to the basic principles of both Church and state, and the confusion 
of matters political and religious. '26 
Tom Puzzle ... has read enough to make him very impertinent: His 
knowledge is sufficient to raise doubts, but not to clear them. It is a pity 
that he has so much learning, or that he has not a great deal more. With 
these qualifications Tom sets up for a freethinker, finds a great many 
things to blame in the constitution of his country, and gives shrewd 
intimations that he does not believe another world. In short, Puzzle is an 
atheist as much as his parts will give him leave. He has got about half a 
dozen commonplace topics, into which he never fails to turn the 
conversation, whatever was the occasion of it: Though the matter of 
debate be about Doway or Denain, ... his discourse runs upon the 
unreasonableness of bigotry and priestcraft. This makes Mr Puzzle the 
admiration of all those who have less sense than himself, and the 
contempt of all those who have more. 
125 Steele, TI71, 13 May 1710. 
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The combination of the concepts freethinker and politician was a phenomenon 
peculiar to Addison and Steele, leaders of Whig propaganda in the early 1710s. 
It cannot be considered a universal practice, even though descriptions of lower 
class freethinkers, whose behaviour was completely altered after involvement 
in religious speculations, appeared still in the 1730s.127 Addison and Steele's 
combinations were made possible by the particular context of writing and the 
use of the term politician in a specific ironical sense of a Tory coffee house 
politician. It was also facilitated by the numerous parallel associations 
connected with the two concepts. The confluence of freethinker and politician 
is an exemplary case of the potential of religious terminology in early 
eighteenth-century political discourse; a potential which could be exploited by 
all the political groupings of the period. 
Freethinking as the core of British liberty 
As the descriptions of `genuine' freethinking as opposed to mistaken `modern' 
freethinking demonstrated, all definitions of freethinking were not 
condemnatory. Towards the end of the 1710s, an interesting attempt to change 
the meaning of the concept towards a more positive direction occurred. In the 
1720s and 1730s, freethinking was also not infrequently interpreted as a 
positive rather than a negative phenomenon. 
The more radical Whigs were disappointed at the manner with which the 
establishment Whig writers attacked freethinking in the most esteemed 
periodicals of the early 1710s. Shaftesbury regretted how `several gentlemen, 
even of those who passed for moderate ... seemed ... to agree ... that some 
way should be thought on, to reconcile differences in opinion'.128 It was 
complained that the Whig essayists had given the Tories weapons with which to 
strike all the Whigs:'29 
It is a pity that so good an authority as the Spectator should give this turn 
to the word freethinker, but it is to be hoped that gentleman was not 
aware of the mischief this party of men have done with it since. It may be 
a warning to writers of such note hereafter, how they give any handle to 
those who are watchful for all occasions of the like kind. From those pert 
empty creatures, who had not sense enough to distinguish thinking 
freely, from thinking not at all, or believing nothing, whom that 
ingenious author ridiculed under that mock-name, the High-clergy have 
as wantonly as unjustly thrown it upon persons of the best under-
standings, and all such who think too justly to be imposed upon them. 
A more radical Whiggish definition for freethinking was provided by Philips, 
an associate of the circle of Addison and Steele, in a new periodical entitled 
provocatively the Free-Thinker in 1718. Though criticised by traditionalists, his 
127 Universal Spectator, No. 268, 24 November 1733, in GM, Vol. III, November 1733, Reel 
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definition of freethinking probably appeared as acceptable to many members of 
the political elite, being capable of capturing some fashionable ideas. This new 
definition of freethinking may well have been introduced by the Whig 
establishment with the purpose of preventing the troublesome concept being 
used either by the radical freethinking Whigs or the major political opponents 
of the establishment Whigs, the High-Church Tories. This conscious shift in the 
meaning of the concept freethinker was to be carried out by employing rhetoric 
of a unique British liberty. 
Philips rejected the pejorative associations between freethinking and atheism 
which had dominated the discourse for some twenty years. Instead, he 
presented freethinking as an ideal of the age, basing this definition on the 
existence of genuine freethinking in the golden past. For Philips, freethinking 
was the use of one's own reason free of prejudices and passions. Changing the 
prevalent sense of the concept, however, was far from an easy task:130 
It is easy to foresee, that the title, under which this paper appears, will . . 
. make it be thrown aside with indignation by several well-meaning 
persons; when at the same time it shall be received with alacrity by some 
sanguine philosophers ... The freethinker has, of late years, been so 
much the subject of satire and ridicule, and his character exposed with so 
much wit and humour by some ingenious writers, and so blackened with 
reflections drawn from religion and politics by other more serious 
authors, ... [that] a term of honour ... has ... in time, by the 
misapplication of it, become a term of reproach. Thus freethinking 
(which in itself is undoubtedly the glory and perfection of human nature) 
is at last worn into disgrace, through the rashness of some, the fears of 
others, the vices of many, and the specious pretences of crafty and 
designing men ... for the benefit of mankind, I endeavour to rescue this 
word from infamy, and make it a name of praise and reputation, by 
taking it out of the hands of libertines, by clearing it from the aspersions 
of bigots, and by reconciling it to the virtuous and the wice, who only 
have a just claim to it, in its genuine sense. 
Philips claimed to be raising freethinking to the positive level at which, he 
argued, it had been before the recent confrontation of deists and the High-
Church clergy. Philips's freethinking was to be regulated by law and reason, 
benefit society in many ways, and distinguish Britain, as 'the land of 
philosophers', from all foreign countries. Unlike Addison and many other 
writers, Philips saw freethinking and philosophy as synonymous:13i 
To think freely ... is ... to think ... like a philosopher: It is not to think 
without the checks of reason and judgement; but without the 
incumbrances of prejudice and passion ... It must be granted, society 
has suffered, in several instances, by gratifying every man in the full 
liberty of divulging his thoughts; but then, it has profited a thousand 
times more, by virtue of that very indulgence. Freethinking is the 
foundation of all human liberty: Remove the one, and the other cannot 
130 [Philips], FT!, 24 March 1718. 
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stand ... The island of Great Britain may, not improperly, be called the 
land of philosophers; it being the only spot of ground, ... where a man is 
not obliged to direct himself in any degree of his reason, before he can be 
a good subject. 
In his construction of a new ideal of freethinker, Philips made use of associations 
attached to the prevalent conception of a freethinker, giving them a new positive 
and somewhat humorous undertone. Philips's new freethinker was '32 
... by nature very curious and inquisite; in so much as to be thought 
impertinent by some. He takes nothing upon trust: He will see 
everything with his own eyes; hear everything with his own ears; and 
apprehend everything by his own understanding. This odd cast of mind 
often engages him in disputes, and makes him censured sometimes by 
his best friends, as obstinate and perverse in his opinion, only because he 
is somewhat slow of apprehension; and can neither reject off-hand, nor 
believe at sight. 
Furthermore, Philips also excluded some negative qualities from this newly-
born character of his. Freethinking could not involve engagement in a party, 
either political or religious. A real freethinker could converse politely and 
moderately on politics and religion, basing his arguments on 'the mild force of 
reason, and the plain evidences of revelation'.'33  
Philips's reintroduction of what he called the original meaning of 
freethinking had some success in the sense that the periodical continued for 
another year and a half, which was a relatively long life for a periodical in early 
eighteenth-century England. In his concluding essay, Philips continued to 
define freethinking and emphasise the special status of Britain in comparison 
with other countries:'34 
... the English tongue alone has by a happy conjunction of two ideas, 
which are the glory of human nature, improved the borrowed phrase, 
philosopher, into freethinker: A phrase, which not only denotes the full 
sense of the former; but likewise shows, wherein the very nature and 
perfection of philosophy consists ... He alone is properly a wise man, a 
philosopher, or lover of wisdom, who disdains to submit his reason to 
the prejudices of custom, of education, of authority, of interest, or of 
passion: who (to the utmost of his ability) examines into all things 
impartially, before he determines either to approve, or to reject, them ... 
The status of the term freethinker in the contemporary debate on diversity of 
opinions is revealed in Philips' claim that without his defence of freethinking'35 
... we had probably, ... thrown the name of freethinking out of the 
language; which would have rendered it more practicable (in process of 
time) to banish out of the nation, the manifold privileges, arising from 
the freedom of thought. 
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The reception of Philips's unconventional claims of freethinking as the core of 
British liberty was not unanimously positive. High-Church writers answered it 
by the means of irony. One author started by congratulating Philips for 
`rescuing that noble appellation of freethinker from the universal contempt and 
odium' and for `restoring it to its genuine and natural signification', but then 
continued to describe how the term freethinking136 
was fallen into the hands of men, who are so violently prejudiced against 
vulgar notions, as others are for them; and consequently are as far from 
-thinking freely as the most zealous bigots. These men were the cause of 
its becoming a reproach, but by your prudent management it is turned 
into a title of respect, and now signifies the same as wiseman. 
The message was that the High-Church Tories did not adhere to freethinking 
notions characteristic of Whiggish commoners. The author maintained that 
England enjoyed a considerable freedom of thought in spite of the small number of 
freethinkers. In other words, freethinking had nothing to do with the unique 
liberties that the Britons enjoyed. The Tories advocated no freethinking as 'all their 
notions of politics are imbibed in their infancy, and never thoroughly examined'. 
In other words, Tory ideology was inherited and thus a natural one. As to the 
`Church' Whigs, they allowed freethinking only in their words. All in all, it was 
only a tiny group of radicals who maintained freethinking ideas.137 
In both opposition publications of the 1720s and governmental papers of the 
1730s, freedom of thought — if not always freethinking as such — appeared in 
contexts that made it an unambiguously positive concept. The Independent 
Whig recommended the Free-Thinker to its readers for vindications of public 
liberty.138 Its anticlerical authors criticised religious schools for not allowing 
freedom of thought which was essential to the `sacred privilege' of public 
liberty. Religion and liberty in Protestant England depended on the commonly 
encouraged free reasoning, that is, freethinking. Free and Protestant were once 
again presented as near synonyms:139 
Here in England, why are we free, why Protestant; but because we are 
guided by reason, and judge for ourselves? And none amongst us 
complain of the liberty of the press, or the growth of freethinking, but 
those who would found a dominion upon stupidity and persecution. 
Such freedom of expression was also defended in the Craftsman, though not by 
exalting the concept of freethinking. The Craftsman maintained that the English 
possessed a right to debate freely on 'all matters of government and religion' 
and to express their opinion on 'all political transactions'. This liberty of 
thinking and publishing thoughts on whatever subject made all other religious 
and political liberties possible. However, the opposition did not allow a 
136 A Letter to the Free-Thinker, 1718, 7. 
137 A Letter to the Free-Thinker, 1718, 8-9, 12-14. 
138 [Trenchard and Gordon], IW1, 20 January 1720. 
139 [Trenchard and Gordon], 1W5, 17 February 1720; Gordon, CL15, 4 February 1721; IW35, 14 
September 1720. 
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freedom to question the fundamentals of either politics or religion.140 
Christianity and the mixed constitution could not be undermined. Finally, an 
organ of Walpole's government stated in 1733 that `there are more men in 
England, who think freely, than in former times; yet these are but few, and those 
chiefly in cities and great towns'. Furthermore, those people thinking freely 
were Whigs, in a positive sense. '4' 
A further illustration of the positive potential of the concept of freethinking is 
Thomas Dawson's discussion on 'the modern way of freethinking' (1731). The 
operation of the soul being free, and it being impossible to restrain thinking in 
any way, Dawson argued that freedom of thought was a natural state for human 
beings. One was a proper freethinker when one's understanding was `really at 
liberty to make a serious and careful examination both of the truth and 
certainty'. In contrast, it was not freethinking to ignore evidence and to judge 
instead on the basis of passions such as partiality, humour and interest. Neither 
was it proper freethinking to be indifferent to commonly shared religious 
beliefs.142  
Dawson's interpretation suggests that parties either religious or political did 
not fit into the early eighteenth-century ideal of freethinking. No direct causal 
relationship between a more positive interpretation of freethinking and the later 
acceptance of parties existed. Even though freethinking and parties were both 
aspects of pluralism, they did not become linked in contemporary 
consciousness in any positive way. Neither did support for idealised 
freethinking necessarily entail support for what could be called modernity. 
Dawson, for instance, defined freethinking also in relation to attitude towards 
change, maintaining that an `affection to novelty' was not freethinking. 143 
In the early years of the eighteenth century, England experienced several 
instances of radical religious freethinking. These gave rise to an unparalleled 
debate on the freedom of thought. This debate also stretched to political 
discourse because of the continuously close relationship between the spheres of 
religion and politics. Freethinking provided authors such as Addison and Steele 
with an avenue for pejorative conceptualisations of political pluralism. In the 
long run, however, freethinking statements of the unavoidability of diversity in 
opinions had a more fundamental yet indirect effect in favour of an emerging 
positive understanding of political pluralism. Freedom of thought necessarily 
concerned both religious and political issues. 
140 C2, 9 December 1726; Cl 19, 12 October 1728; C280, 13 November 1731. 
141 London Journal, No. 748, 27 October 1733, in GM, Vol. III, October 1733, Reel 134. 
142 Dawson, Good Advice: In a Letter to a Friend, Concerning the Modern Way of Free-
Thinking, 1731, 2-3, 8, 47, 63; other defences of freedom of thought include a defender of the 
rights of Dissenters who maintained that every person should judge for himself in religious 
matters, as that would remove heresy and re-establish unity among Christians. Conscientious 
Nonconformity, 1737, 25, 85; In 1739, Annet lectured on freethinking as 'the great duty of 
religion'. Annet, Judging for Ourselves; Or Free-Thinking, The Great Duty of Religion, 
1739. 
143 Dawson, Good Advice: In a Letter to a Friend, Concerning the Modern Way of Free-
Thinking, 1731, 4. 
318 p ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN FREETHINKING AND POLITICAL.. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this study has been to enhance our knowledge on how 
members of the political elite in early eighteenth-century England understood 
the growth of political pluralism. By political pluralism was meant the 
coexistence of rival value systems in political thought and the existence of a 
permanent competition between political parties. In the early eighteenth 
century, a pluralistic society was only in formation, as the traditional ideal of 
religious uniformity and the connected idea of a polity lacking alternatives were 
increasingly challenged. Genuine political pluralism would have meant that 
rival political groupings supporting divergent values were capable of 
coexistence and cooperation irrespective of their continuous disagreements. In 
a pluralistic society, which was certainly not achieved by 1750, diversity of 
views could have been allowed without the fear that the lack of uniformity both 
in religion and politics might lead to the destruction of the entire political 
system. The recognition of such political pluralism proved painful for a great 
majority of the early eighteenth-century political nation. 
The issue of the acceptance of political pluralism in early eighteenth-century 
England concerned much more than the question of the right of existence of 
political parties. Therefore, the above analysis of experiences of political 
pluralism could not be limited to mere party theories. In the early eighteenth 
century, political pluralism was generally conceptualised through terminology 
that was derived from the traditionally dominant religious discourse. This 
politico-religious character of the terminology of pluralism was due to the 
inherited affinity of the spheres of politics and religion. As the amount of 
specialised secular terminology of politics remained limited, familiar terms 
from other areas of discourse provided means for conceptualising political 
pluralism. The study of discourse on political pluralism has thus necessitated 
the study of the parallel and connected discourse on religious pluralism. 
The importance of religious pluralism in contemporary understanding of 
political pluralism was due to the fact that attitudes towards religious dissent 
remained a major factor dividing the political nation. Other traditional areas of 
discourse briefly discussed in this study were those of medicine and warfare. 
An extended analysis of the discourses of law and classical republicanism, 
which also played a role in conceptual change but have been discussed 
elsewhere, has been excluded from this study. Instead, this study has focused on 
religious concepts of pluralism because they clearly formed the prevalent 
paradigm for conceptualising political pluralism, and because they have not 
hitherto received due attention. A wide network of initially religious concepts 
applied in the discourse on political pluralism has been reconstructed and 
analysed. This approach revealed essential features of collective experiences of 
CONCLUSION . 319 
political pluralism which would not have been reached via a more secular route. 
An alternative methodological approach has also been followed in the search 
for early eighteenth-century understanding of political pluralism. The process 
of secularisation in politics and the contemporary understanding of rising 
political pluralism have not been previously examined via concepts as units of 
analysis. The distinctive goals of the history of concepts when compared with 
those of the history of political thought have been emphasised: the history of 
concepts endeavours to reconstruct a whole variety of experiences of political 
change. The conceptualisations of these experiences were conditioned by both 
accumulated meanings of available concepts and the contexts and exigencies of 
the day. Instead of strictly following the programme of Begriffsgeschichte, 
however, this study modified its methods to better accommodate English 
circumstances. It has already been pointed out, for instance, that, despite 
important structural change and notable conceptual transformations, the 
English early eighteenth century does not deserve the name of a `watershed' to 
modernity. The seventeenth-century Civil War or the Glorious Revolution had 
led to no irreversible conceptual transition to modernity. The first two decades 
of the eighteenth century, for instance, brought a significant reversal of any 
such process. The pace of conceptual change did accelerate after 1720, but the 
period as a whole was one of conceptual evolution rather than sudden 
revolution. 
Printed source material of the breadth contained in this study has not usually 
been employed in comparable analyses of the period. Contemporary dictionaries, 
for instance, though conventionally resisting linguistic innovations, proved 
helpful in the reconstruction of the conceptual world of the period. The variety 
of consulted genres in this study was high and was further augmented by an 
application of some electronic textbases in the search for conceptual evidence. 
Electronic databases, however, played only a limited role in searches and 
brought no easy solution to the consultation or qualitative analysis of the 
primary sources. 
The extent of contemporary awareness of both structural and conceptual 
change has been demonstrated to have been relatively high, though readiness 
for innovation in both religion and politics remained nearly non-existent, being 
restricted to tiny radical circles. It was radical authors who expressed particular 
concern about deficiencies in political language which they understood to have 
been caused by the application of ambiguous religious terminology to political 
discourse. Generally speaking, attitudes towards things modern, novel and 
innovative remained deeply suspicious. Whereas innovation continued to be a 
religiously charged pejorative term, defending authentic traditions was what 
mattered. 
The analytical part of this study was opened by discussions on early 
eighteenth-century conceptions of the limits of the political and religious. The 
terminology of the political turned out to have often carried multiple opposing 
meanings accumulated in the course of a clash between classical and modern 
political theories. Several of these meanings were continuously associated with 
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religious indifference. The ambiguity and dependence of political terminology 
on other areas of discourse, religion in particular, which has been underscored 
by Conal Condren with reference to the seventeenth century, thus appears to 
have continued well into the eighteenth century. 
However, secularisation in `polit' vocabulary took significant steps starting 
from the 1720s, as references to Church politics became rarer and a more 
specific secular sense of politics began to emerge. This decrease in associations 
between political activity and religious indifference is best illustrated by the 
step-by-step substitution of the inherently pejorative attribute politic with a 
neutral or even positive adjective political. This conceptual shift is most 
distinctly visible in writings by the opposition to Robert Walpole. Some 
positive references to Niccolö Machiavelli, few at the turn of the century, also 
started to reoccur. Descriptions of politics as a suspect activity might 
occasionally be replaced by references to respectable politicians. As `polit' 
vocabulary was increasingly conceived as secular, it lost much of its former 
strength as vocabulary of abuse. 
As to the debate on the limits of the religious, arguments against clerical 
involvement in political debate, or political divinity, demonstrate a 
strengthened understanding of politics and religion as separate areas of life. 
Throughout the period, political preaching and clerical pamphleteering 
contributed to a conceptual mixture between religious and political 
terminologies. From the early 1720s, however, this tendency was countered by 
anticlerical statements emerging first from the tiny republican circles. By the 
1730s, politics and religion had already become rather generally understood as 
separate but interconnected and parallel areas of life. 
Though distinctions between the spheres of politics and religion began to be 
drawn, and though the frequencies of religious terms in political texts 
decreased, universally understood religious terminology did not lose all of its 
relevance in political argumentation. Even radical authors of the 1720s, 1730s 
and 1740s continued to refer to political uniformity, political conformity and 
political orthodoxy, thus taking a former religious concept and applying it to a 
political context to propagate innovative political ideas in a way that was the 
most likely to legitimate their points. In such conceptual loans, which often had 
an ironic undertone, the sphere of politics already appeared as stronger than that 
of religion, and these expression were understood as more metaphorical than 
had been the case with parallel expressions at the turn of the century. 
The analysis of terminology of religious pluralism in chapters seven and 
eight revealed several noteworthy conceptual developments that were also 
reflected in conceptualisations of political pluralism. For instance, recognitions 
of political pluralism were facilitated by a vague substitution of the traditional 
ideal of uniformity with a more sympathetic concept of diversity. Still, 
uniformity and orthodoxy in both religion and politics remained the ideal for 
most writers. In the early years of the century, terms such as heresy and schism, 
conveying a sense of guilt, found their way into traditionalist descriptions of 
political pluralism. Jonathan Swift, for instance, called Whig and Tory parties 
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civil schisms and a schism in politics. These expressions were not mere 
metaphors but conceptualised a connection between religious and political 
pluralism in a manner acceptable to most of Swift's readers. 
At the end of the period, parallel conceptualisations of political parties with 
terms of religious pluralism would hardly any more have appeared as plausible. 
Ironic uses of religious terminology for descriptions of political pluralism also 
started to appear. To provoke traditionalists, radicals such as John Toland 
suggested that plurality of values in both religion and politics was potentially 
beneficial, and the republicans of the early 1720s defended the right to be 
political heretics. 
Terminologies of religious and political pluralism became considerably more 
distinct in the course of the early eighteenth century. At the beginning of the 
century, the distinction between the pejorative terms sect, party and faction was 
yet far from clear. Consequently, associations between religious sects and 
political parties continued to be unavoidable and could be exploited in political 
allusions by both parties. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, the specific 
character of a religious sect as opposed to a political party had already become 
evident. Parties in politics and sects in religion became increasingly criticised as 
separate — even if frequently intermixed — phenomena. As a result of a more 
specific categorisation of religious and political groupings, the pejorative 
associations which continued to be carried by sectarianism were no longer able 
to prevent an adoption of more positive attitudes towards political pluralism. 
Whatever the potential for conceptual change, the concept of party remained 
basically derogatory throughout the period. The strength of traditional 
discourses such as religion, medicine and warfare contributed to continuity in 
the meanings of party. Nonetheless, some noteworthy semantic developments 
also occurred. As terminologies used to describe political and religious 
pluralism were developing in diverse directions, the previous religion-
dominated concept of party became substituted by a more specific non-
religious concept of political party. After a remarkable delay reflecting a denial 
of the reality of parties, party finally became recognised in dictionaries as a 
political term. After 1730, it became defined in increasingly secular terms and 
its political sense became more precisely presented and distinguished from its 
legal, military and religious senses. The first objective definitions of party as a 
group of people united in a common design date from the 1740s. 
An analysis of party word combinations showed that major mental restraints 
to an acceptance of parties existed. Several combinations were continuously 
derived from traditionally dominant discourses. The religious associations of 
party, though occurring much more seldom after 1720, did not suddenly 
disappear. For instance, `Church' was one of the few attributes capable of 
turning party into a positive phenomenon. On the other hand, synonyms for 
party such as cause, cabal and division built, to a great extent, on negative 
religious associations of the terms. Often combined with organic conceptions of 
society derived from the remnants of Galenic medicine, religious associations 
survived throughout the period. Neither did the military associations of party 
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evaporate, even though party conflict became increasingly interpreted via terms 
of abstract and verbal conflict instead of ones implying a risk of open violence. 
Juridical uses of party remained unambiguously non-political, and the social 
senses remained marginal as to the concept of political party. Significant for 
later developments was the widening use of both party and faction in distinctly 
secular senses after 1720 and the emergence of a clearer conceptual distinction 
between the two. Whereas the continuously derogatory term faction was 
increasingly condemned with secular rather than religious arguments, party 
became free to gain neutral if not yet positive connotations. The rise of more 
sympathetic conceptions of parties later in the eighteenth century may also have 
been facilitated by the existence of euphemisms for party that were derived 
from the traditions of court factions and classical republicanism. 
The names of Whig and Tory, provide an illustrative example of the affinity 
of the spheres of religion and politics and the continuous importance of the 
Civil War in early eighteenth-century conceptualisations of party. For a 
surprisingly long period, dictionary editors refrained from providing these 
widely used but despised terms with proper definitions. Starting only in the 
1720s, forty years after their first introduction, their political senses were listed 
by some editors. The first secular but still not really objective definitions only 
saw day-light in the 1750s. In the course of time, the pejorative content of the 
terms declined as a result of their widespread use, but they continued to be 
applied in ways that often denied the legitimacy of the rival party. In political 
discourse, the confessional or constitutional character of the denominations was 
emphasised as best suited the interests of the writer. Their confessional 
associations were supported by their use as synonyms for the Church parties of 
Low Church and High Church up to at least the 1720s. 
This study has also demonstrated the relevance of the debates on enthusiasm, 
fanaticism, zeal, moderation and toleration to early eighteenth-century 
conceptualisations of political pluralism. Though religious enthusiasm 
continued to be feared, its plausibility as a political insinuation decreased 
radically as a consequence of secularisation. By the 1740s, a positive secular 
sense of enthusiasm had already entered political discourse. Political uses of the 
term fanaticism declined significantly as well, and seems to have become more 
clearly restricted to the sphere of religion. Connecting religious and political 
zeal facilitated both positive and negative arguments and thus formed a 
valuable tool for political polemicists. The concept of moderation, which 
entailed an existence of religious alternatives, first turned into a disputed 
politico-religious concept but later achieved an increasingly positive and 
secular meaning in public discourse. Likewise, toleration was experienced as an 
uncomfortable phenomenon by most writers at the beginning of the century. 
Importantly, however, a conceptual division into ecclesiastical and political 
toleration gained ground, the latter of which could also later be extended to 
concern variety in secular opinions. 
The associations between the semantic field of religious freethinking and 
political pluralism have also been discussed. The meaning of the neologism 
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freethinking, which was defined in only three dictionaries of the period, became 
an object of fierce disputation and was occasionally applied also to 
conceptualisations of political pluralism in expressions such as Addison's 
`freethinker in politics'. Some radical thinkers vindicated universal 
freethinking, allowing differences in religious and political opinions even 
among the common people. Traditionalists also adopted freethinking as a 
polemical device against their political rivals. Of course, such politico-religious 
insinuations of atheism, deism, libertinism and freethinking among political 
opponents lost some of their credibility as secularisation advanced. The 
moderate establishment in turn defended a fiction of an admirable ancient 
freethinking fundamentally different from modern freethinking. This fiction 
did not prevent them from using freethinking in a pejorative sense to criticise 
coffee house politicians, that is, the middling and lower orders actively 
supporting the political rivals of the moderates. Finally, in the writings of 
Ambrose Philips, freethinking was redefined to appear as a beneficial feature in 
the glorified British system. Importantly, this ideal British freethinker did not 
get involved in parties either political or religious. However, no matter how 
critical they were towards political parties, the freethinkers' recognition of 
diversity most probably contributed to the later formation of positive attitudes 
towards political pluralism. 
This study showed that traditional terminologies continued to provide 
political discourse with usable idioms. These were mainly used to oppose 
various signs of political pluralism, but they could also be applied in innovative 
ways to argue in favour of recognition and sometimes even approval of 
diversity in politics. Terence Ball's suggestion that an entrance of specialised 
discourses in the field of political meanings may contribute to conceptual 
change is thus supported by evidence from early eighteenth-century discourse 
on political pluralism. 
Changes in the structure of eighteenth-century English politics are relatively 
well known, whereas the slower conceptual transformation has not previously 
received proper consideration. This study shows that both strong continuity and 
important shifts were manifest at the conceptual level. The conceptual approach 
applied in this present analysis has shown itself capable of producing more 
precise information on contemporary understanding of political parties and thus 
supplements previous work that has emphasised secular explanations — such as 
the role of classical political theory — for the inability of early eighteenth-
century thinkers to accept parties. Without denying the influence of secular 
traditions of thought, this study has revealed a previously neglected aspect of 
the survival of religious associations of party vocabulary well into the 
eighteenth century. Together these interpretations provide a more complete 
picture of the history attitudes towards political parties. 
The findings of this study also give reason to reconsider some conclusions 
drawn in previous research on the history of political parties, particularly those 
claiming that parties had become accepted by 1700 and those doubting the 
importance and genuineness of early eighteenth-century condemnations of 
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parties. Suspicious attitudes towards parties were, in the main, genuine and 
based to a great extent on assumptions of an interconnection between the 
religious and the political. Neither has this study been able to support the 
hypothesis that a transition from organic imagery to contract theory contributed 
to the emergence of positive attitudes towards parties, as far as the early 
eighteenth century is concerned. 
The findings of this study support arguments emphasising the need to 
consider the religious context in the study of early modern political thought, 
including that of the century of the Enlightenment. Religion seems indeed to 
have remained a concern of first importance in public discourse up to at least the 
1720s. On the basis of the analysed material, Jonathan Clark's and Justin 
Champion's suggestion on the central role of religious idioms in eighteenth-
century political discourse proved valid as far as the early part of the century is 
concerned. Likewise, Tony Claydon's point that the patterns of English 
political discourse in the 1690s remained wedded to early Protestant concepts 
can be extended to concern the 1700s and 1710s as well. Clark's hypothesis on 
a connection between religious heterodoxy and radical political thought found 
support as far as linguistic innovation in discourse on political pluralism is 
concerned: early eighteenth-century heterodox thinkers were the most eager to 
apply commonly used religious concepts to political discourse in innovative 
ways. Champion's suggestion of the intimate conceptual connection between 
religious and political issues was made more concrete with this present 
conceptual analysis. The strain between the prevalent thought patterns and 
material progress proposed by Paul Langford and Gordon Schochet among 
others, has been demonstrated to have been to a great extent religion-related. 
This strain is an apt example of what Reinhart Koselleck has characterised as 
differing paces of political change and change in the language of politics. 
The findings of this study, though lending support to much recent work, 
differ from some previous studies in significant aspects. The combination of an 
approach appreciating the role of religion and the conceptual method has meant 
that traditionalist elements have also been analysed, which has led to historical 
development appearing more complex and less linear. A conceptual analysis of 
the early eighteenth-century language of politics shows that the secularisation 
of English political discourse was not completed by the end of the seventeenth 
century, as suggested by some studies. Neither did the dominant status of 
religion in public discourse cease immediately after the Hanoverian Succession 
but continued at least up to the late 1720s. Of course, an understanding of the 
religious and political as distinct gradually strengthened in the course of the 
early eighteenth century. The 1720s, as suggested by several historians, and 
particularly the period after 1730, experienced an acceleration in the 
secularisation of political discourse. Conceptual developments demonstrate 
that the nature of religious controversy then indeed changed decisively: 
religious terms became rarer and less violently applied in texts that, for 
instance, increasingly discussed political issues through the terminologies of 
corruption and patriotism. Even thereafter, however, the religious and political 
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remained parallel in contemporary consciousness: in a society where religion 
continuously mattered, analogies from religion and religious concepts and 
metaphors could easily be applied to political issues. 
The above findings also appear to be supported by studies focusing on the 
later eighteenth century, a period not discussed in this study. The assumption of 
the parallel and united nature of conformity and uniformity in religion and 
politics continued to influence political discourse also after 1750. The 
Hanoverian Church of England, the spiritual home of almost all members of the 
political elite, continued to feel herself threatened by heterodoxy, though not as 
severely as in the beginning of the century. Despite some progress in 
moderation and toleration, full religious liberty remained for long out of 
question.' 
A gradual separation between religious and political discourses was, 
however, taking place. Recent scholarship suggests that this separation 
originated, to a great extent, from within religious discourse. Whereas the 
allowance of limited religious pluralism in the Toleration Act of 1689 had 
caused deep anxiety among much of the clergy, this initially loathsome 
compromise gradually turned into an inseparable element of the much revered 
British constitution in Church and state. Unreasonable religious violence 
became rejected as a cause of needless disturbance in political harmony. 
Religious violence, in turn, appeared to be best restricted by a measure of 
toleration. Warburton (1736) already presented the British combination of 
limited toleration and civil rights to religious Dissenters as a theoretical ideal 
which should have been universally adopted. In the long run, a growing sense 
of security among the clergy contributed to a further increase of moderation 
among them. As the eighteenth-century progressed, the Anglican Church 
gradually ceased to feel herself under constant attack by alternative forms of 
religion. This security was due to the fact that, in reality, the Toleration Act 
never led to any dramatic rise in the numbers of Dissenters. Instead, eighteenth-
century non-Anglican Protestants increasingly found themselves drifting into 
the margins of a predominantly Anglican society.' 
This strengthening feeling of security among the clergy did not immediately 
make them reject political issues from their sermons and pamphlets. Clergymen 
continued to defend the British constitution with citations from the Bible, and 
their texts continued to have a highly political content. Significantly, however, 
the character and application of religious arguments went through a 
transformation at the very end of the eighteenth century. This transformation in 
the 1780s and 1790s was a result of the rising influence of rational and 
empirical thought on Christianity. Critical and scientific methods of studying 
the Bible, for instance, inevitably altered the way religious ideas became 
applied to the questions of the day. The clergy began to turn their attention away 
from political issues and started instead to focus in their sermons on issues such 
as social theory. Importantly, it has been argued that this change in the emphasis 
1 Chamberlain 1995, 209. 
2 	 Walsh and Taylor 1993, 57, 61; Albers 1993, 333. 
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of clerical sermons occurred within Protestant Churches. This secularisation of 
political thought was not a development forced upon the Anglican Church by 
the tiny deist and atheist minorities.3 
In party politics, religious motivation of the Whig and Tory parties did not 
disappear after 1750. In the 1750s, the differences between the parties were 
most easily defined in religious terms. In the 1760s, party division started to 
gain extra impetus from questions of foreign policy, disagreements on domestic 
administration, and problems in the rapidly expanding area of economy. Even 
then, the influence of religious feelings on political identities remained present. 
More particularly, issues such as royal authority and religious toleration could 
hardly be discussed without basing the arguments either on the inherited High-
Church or on the Low-Church and Dissenting traditions. In party-political 
pamphlet literature, the emphasis still continued to be laid on religion by a 
number of writers in the 1770s. Particularly in the localities, parties hardly ever 
became entirely secular in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, the role of 
religion in local party politics may have played a considerable role also in the 
nineteenth century, as nonconformity started to grow again .4 
Even though commonly shared conceptions of the character of politico-
religious divisions remained relatively unchanged throughout the eighteenth 
century, and even though much of the language also continued as it had been, 
political discourse was experiencing some transformation. Jan Albers has 
suggested that politico-religious language, though sincere in its political 
purposes, became more exaggerated and satirical than it had been in the early 
eighteenth century .5 Religious elements in political discourse became step-by-
step less likely to be taken very seriously. Their proportion declined after 1720, 
the violence of the arguments calmed down, and their associations turned more 
playful than they had been in the heated years of early eighteenth-century party 
strife. Robert Hole, Walsh and Taylor have all pointed out that, in English 
political thought, the period from 1760 to 1832 was also characterised by 
decisive changes in the relationship between religion and politics. Historians 
seem to be agreed that, by the 1830s, the English constitution had developed 
towards legally established pluralism, and that the English political system 
already functioned to a great extent on the basis of indifferentism and 
secularism.6 A conceptual approach to the politico-religious terminology of the 
late eighteenth century might also bring more light to this transformation. 
On the basis of the findings of this study, when compared to previous 
research, it can be concluded that the connection or at least the belief in the 
parallel nature of the growth of pluralism in religion and politics remained vital 
among most members of the early eighteenth-century elite. In most cases, this 
interconnection entailed continuity in inherited conceptions of the necessity of 
both religious and political uniformity. However, gradually emerging more 
3 Hole 1989, 4, 7, 11-12; Walsh and Taylor 1993, 60. 
4 Bradley 1990, 111-12, 413. 
5 Albers 1993, 331-2. 
6 Hole 1989, 1-2; Walsh and Taylor 1993, 62. 
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precise definitions for religious terminology strengthened the separate nature of 
the sphere of politics and thereby also that of political pluralism, enabling the 
emergence of more positive attitudes towards political parties. Furthermore, 
innovative conceptions of political pluralism were frequently expressed in 
religious terminology. In a basically religious political culture, this continued to 
be an effective way of introducing conceptual change in the language of 
politics, including a positive understanding of political pluralism. Gradual 
transformations in conceptualisations of political pluralism facilitated the 
emergence of later party theories. The strength of these politico-religious 
conceptualisations does not rule out effects of additional secular 
conceptualisations of political pluralism, but the number of alternative ways of 
conceptualising political pluralism seems to have remained restricted 
throughout the period. 
It should be noted that this study has examined primarily the role of initially 
religious concepts in discourse on political pluralism. This has been done on the 
basis of source material that forms only a limited sample of contemporary texts. 
The results concern conceptual developments within the political elite and do 
not necessarily represent the attitudes of the public at large. The choice of 
networks of concepts of pluralism as objects of analysis has prevented deeper 
analysis of the history of a single concept. 
The consulted source material can, however, be considered relatively wide 
and representative. Major genres and various directions of religious and 
political thought among the elite have been taken into consideration, whereas 
sources revealing conceptualisations among the public at large are few, which 
may be an indication of the restricted nature of political discourse. The analysed 
concepts include the major concepts of pluralism with a religious origin. An 
analysis of several concepts provided a more balanced picture of conceptual 
developments in which changing meanings of one concept necessarily affected 
meanings of other concepts within the same semantic field. Secular concepts of 
politics have been studied elsewhere, though supplementary work could 
certainly be done also in that field. In future work, cooperation with a group of 
historians studying conceptual change in this period would increase expertise, 
so that extended source material could be used and more detailed histories of 
single concepts created. A more extensive study on the theme could also 
provide more exact information on the use of concepts by groups and 
individuals. 
Further research in the history of concepts might focus on the conceptual 
study of other neglected areas of discourse and their potential importance to 
political discourse. These include the languages of medicine, natural 
philosophy and war. More could be said about the influence of early Protestant 
concepts in a predominantly Protestant political culture. A conceptual approach 
might also provide new findings if applied to the study of the secular languages 
of politics such as law and economy. In addition to the study of the history of 
political thought, the study of the history of concepts is also needed. Diversity 
in methodological approaches can create a picture of past thought that 
highlights the complexity of conceptual change. 
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Appendix A 
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON AUTHORS 
Individual letter-writers in collections of correspondence have not been included. 
Several anonymous and pseudonymous early eighteenth-century authors inevitably 
remain, due to the lack of adequate sources, unidentified. 
ACHERLEY, Roger (1665?-1740), lawyer, constitutional writer, and politician, was 
the son of a landowner and studied law in London. This committed Hanoverian expected 
a reward in the form of a government post but, to his great disappointment, he was never 
awarded one. Acherley's reputation was based not so much on his career as a lawyer but 
on his writings on political, legal and constitutional issues. Acherley was a supporter of 
an extreme form of contract theory (DNB, Vol. I, 57-8). 
ADDISON, Joseph (1672-1719), essayist and politician, was son of an Anglican 
clergyman. He studied in Oxford, specialising in Latin poetry, and, due to his highly 
valued scholarship, he was made a Fellow. His grand tour through Europe at the turn of 
the century was supported by the Whig government, the political values of which 
Addison shared. Addison achieved popularity among the leading Whigs, and, as a useful 
propagandist, he was given a government post. Addison's career as a civil servant in 
London and Dublin lasted until the fall of the Whigs in 1710 and again from 1716 to 
1718, when the Hanoverian Succession and Addison's skills as a polemicist supporting 
the Hanoverians brought Addison back to politics to the status of a Secretary of State. He 
was a MP from 1708 to 1719. In addition to poems and a travel book, Addison wrote an 
opera, hundreds of periodical essays, the tragedy Cato that achieved widespread 
popularity due to the classical values expressed in it, and an unsuccessful comedy 
(Sambrook 1986, 259; Hill 1988, 440-1). 
ANNET, Peter (1693-1769), was initially a schoolmaster who lost his employment for 
his deistical writings. He was also a member of the Robin Hood debating society which 
was known for its heterodox theological discussions. Annet's reputation as a deist only 
grew in the 1760s due to his writings, which led to his imprisonment (DNB, Vol. I, 481). 
ATTERBURY, Francis (1662-1732), Bishop of Rochester, was a leading High 
Churchman and Tory. He had gentry background and was educated at Westminster 
School and Christ Church. Atterbury enjoyed being involved in controversies. He 
achieved a promotion to the position of royal chaplain and became close to Queen Anne. 
In his numerous polemical writings, Atterbury attacked values of leading Low-Church 
divines, above all toleration of diversity within Protestantism. For Atterbury, who won 
the support of much of the lower clergy, the Church was divinely ordained, organic, 
independent of political power, and a major supporter of monarchy. In the Sacheverell 
affair, Atterbury was a fervent supporter of High-Church principles, whereas he found 
the Hanoverian Succession uncomfortable. Many of the Tory essays in The Examiner 
were contributed by him. His ecclesiastical career finally brought him the see of bishop 
in 1713; but he was frequently more interested in politics. In politics, he opposed the 
Whigs, and Walpole in particular, and eagerly supported the Tory opposition and even 
the Jacobite cause. This made him isolated among bishops who were mostly Whigs, but 
popular among the Oxford-educated lower clergy and country Tories. Engaged in a 
Jacobite plot in 1721, Atterbury was sentenced to deprivation and banishment, which 
made Atterbury the favourite of the Tory mob and clergy. In 1723, Atterbury went to 
France to join the Jacobite court (Treasure 1992, 18-20). 
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BAILEY, Nathan (-1742), lexicographer and schoolmaster, belonged to the Seventh-
day Baptists. Using Kersey's Dictionarium (1708) as a basis, he first published his 
Universal Etymological English Dictionary in 1721, the sixth edition (1733) of which 
was used for this study. This wordbook became probably the most popular of the 
eighteenth century and appeared in thirty editions by 1802. Bailey's last wordbook, 
Dictionarium Britannicum (1730) was based on George Gordon's work. This work, 
which surpassed in coverage all previous dictionaries, has also been used in this study. 
Johnson used a copy of Bailey's dictionary as the foundation for his own (DNB, Vol. I, 
881; Reddick 1990, 13-14; The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment (BCE) 
1991, 53; Kolb 1991, 124). 
BALGUY, John (1686-1748), clergyman and theologian, was the son of a schoolmaster 
and studied classics in Cambridge. Balguy was a hardworking sermon-writer. He 
supported Hoadly in the Bangorian controversy, was a follower of Clarke's philosophy, 
and, in his writings, he presented deity as benevolent and working through a universe of 
order and beauty. In the late 1720s, he also preached on the question of party spirit 
(DNB, Vol. I, 980; BCE 1991, 53). 
BARON, William (1636—), was Chaplain in Ordinary and Rector of Hamstead, 
Marshall, and Enborne, Berks (Watt/British Biographical Archive (BBA) Card 71, 
Frame 39 (71/39)). 
BAYLE, Pierre (1647-1706), French Protestant author, was originally professor of 
philosophy but left France in 1681 and later taught in Rotterdam. When in Holland, he 
published his Dictionaire historique et critique (1697) which had a considerable 
influence on eighteenth-century freethinking. The numerous editions and translations 
(1710 and the mid-1730s) of this dictionary provided a source for many English writers 
as well. In his dictionary, Bayle argued strongly against fanaticism and intolerance and 
recommended toleration instead (BCE 1991, 57). 
BERKELEY, George (1685-1753), divine and philosopher, was born in Ireland but 
considered himself an Englishman. He studied at Trinity College, Dublin, where he 
became fellow, tutor, and finally lecturer in Greek and Hebrew. After studying Locke's 
texts, he presented his own philosophy in books published from the 1710s onwards. He 
travelled widely on the Continent and America. While in London, he had contacts with 
the leading literary figures of the time and contributed anti-freethinking essays to The 
Guardian. He also wrote on immaterialism, metaphysics, medicine, optics and 
mathematics as well as on ecclesiastical, social and economic issues. Towards the end of 
his life, this clergyman became Bishop of Cloyne (Sambrook 1986, 261; John W. Yolton 
in BCE, 61). 
BILLINGSLEY, John (1657-1722), nonconformist minister, studied at Cambridge and 
published numerous religious tracts (DNB, Vol. II, 497). 
BLACKMORE, Richard, Sir (1654-1729), physician and writer, was the son of an 
attorney. He studied at Westminster and Oxford, worked temporarily as a schoolmaster, 
travelled abroad, and was finally elected Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians. 
Blackmore became physician in ordinary to King William III and Queen Anne and was 
knighted in 1697 for his medical services. Politically, he was a supporter of the 
Revolution of 1688. He wrote poetry and numerous medical treatises (DNB, Vol. II, 
591-3; `Blackmore, Sir Richard', Britannica Online, Accessed 24 September 1997). 
BOLINGBROKE, Henry St John, Viscount (1678-1751), leading Tory politician, was 
born a nobleman and educated at Eton. He held a Tory seat in Parliament from 1701 
onwards and soon achieved a reputation as the best speaker in the House of Commons. 
St John's rise in politics is considered the result of his own ability, not patronage. He 
became the leader of the traditionalist Tories by 1702, and he held many government 
posts including those of Secretary of War and Secretary of State. What was typical of 
Bolingbroke's paradoxical personality was his way of changing political views with 
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changing political circumstances. For instance, though leading Anglican High-Church 
Tories, he was himself a freethinker. Having played a central role in Britain's conclusion 
of a separate peace with France in 1713, Bolingbroke was created viscount. In 1714, he 
briefly became the leading minister but lost all positions with the death of Queen Anne 
the same year. Facing the threat of impeachment, he left the Tories and fled to France to 
work in the Pretender's service for a short period of time. For much of his exile, he 
studied history and philosophy at his country estate. After much petitioning and bribery, 
he was allowed to return to England in 1725 and become an active figure in the 
opposition to Walpole, particularly through his essays in The Craftsman. As an 
opposition leader, he claimed to be above party and capable of freeing Englishmen from 
the Whig party as well, but what he needed in order to accomplish that was a united 
opposition party. These efforts proving unsuccessful, and the failure being fostered by 
Bolingbroke's questionable reputation, he returned to France and lived there from 1736 
to 1743, completing his Idea of a Patriot King, the ideas of which were neither original, 
nor up-to-date, nor very influential. After coming back to England once again, he had 
little political influence (Sambrook 1986, 262; Hill 1988, 423-6). 
BOND, William, the only early eighteenth-century person with this name that can be 
found in the consulted biographical works was originally a gentleman who turned writer, 
dramatist and actor. He died in 1735 (Baker/BBA 124/5). 
BOYER, Abel (1667-1729), writer, was a native French Protestant who had lived in 
exile in Holland and, after 1689, in England. He was a good classical scholar and worked 
as a tutor, teaching the son of Princess Anne, amongst others. Politically, Boyer was a 
dedicated Whig, a fact that may have hindered his advancement in the teaching 
profession and prompted him to writing instead. In 1703, he started to publish an annual 
(later a monthly) register of events. He also edited newspapers and wrote pamphlets 
(DNB, Vol. II, 1015-16). 
BRADFORD, Samuel (1652-1731), divine and bishop, was the son of a London citizen 
and received his schooling at London, Cambridge and Oxford, studying theology and 
medicine. He held several ecclesiastical posts, including that of a royal chaplain. He 
became Bishop in 1718. Religiously he was a committed Protestant and politically he 
was a loyal Whig. A number of his sermons were published (DNB, Vol. II, 1068-9). 
BRAMSTON, James (1694?-1744), clergyman and poet, came from an established 
family of lawyers. He studied at Westminster and Oxford and became a vicar. In 1729 he 
published the satirical Art of Politicks which, possibly due to its contemporary 
references, became a popular poem (DNB, Vol. II, 1115). 
BULLOKAR, John (ca. 1580—ca. 1641), physician and lexicographer, compiled The 
English Expositor (1616) in his youth. Fourteen editions, many of them revised, 
appeared of this wordbook, the last of them in 1731. R. Browne re-edited the twelfth 
edition of his English Expositor Improv'd (1719) which was consulted for this study 
(DNB, Vol. III, 257; `Encyclopaedias as Dictionaries: Dictionaries: Historical 
background: From 1604 to 1828', Britannica Online, Accessed 24 September 1997). 
BURNET, Gilbert (1643-1715), historian and bishop, was a native Scotsman whose 
father had opposed the Episcopalian Church in Scotland. Burnet received an education 
of high quality and travelled in England and on the Continent. His personality has been 
characterised by attributes such as tolerant and moderate, which refer to his opposition to 
attempts to repress Presbyterianism. Burnet belonged to those Scotsmen who, in the 
years of Restoration, endeavoured to find a compromise between Presbyterians and 
Episcopalians. In 1672, Burnet moved to England where he achieved the position of 
royal chaplain (till 1684). Towards the end of the Restoration period, he became a Whig 
sympathiser and even worked in Holland as an adviser to William of Orange. After the 
Glorious Revolution, Burnet, as Bishop of Salisbury, campaigned in favour of the 
Toleration Act, being ready to allow toleration both to Presbyterians and Non jurors. In 
the reign of Anne, he accepted occasional conformity and opposed the views of 
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Sacheverell. As a Low-Church divine he was deeply despised by the Tories (Hill 1988, 
382-4). 
BURROUGH, John (b. 1660/1), was a clergyman of whom little is known. 
BYROM, John (1692-1763), poet, hymnist, mystic, inventor and diarist, who studied in 
Cambridge, became a fellow, travelled abroad and studied medicine. He was a religious 
High Churchman, and politically he was a Jacobite holding strictly traditionalist views 
though he was not particularly active in advocating them. Byrom also became a Fellow 
of the Royal Society (Selections from the Journals and Papers of John Byrom; Treasure 
1992, 89; `Byrom, John', Britannica Online, Accessed 24 September 1997). 
CARPENTER, Nathanael (1589-1628?), an Oxford-educated author and philosopher, 
found an interest in philosophy and mathematics rather than in divinity. His sermons 
entitled `Achitophel, or the Picture of a Wicked Politician' were originally preached to 
Oxford University (DNB, Vol. III, 1070-1). 
CAVE, Edward (1691-1754), printer, started to publish the Gentleman's Magazine in 
1731. He collected essays published in hundreds of London and country half-sheets to 
be printed in the magazine which proved a success (DNB, Vol. III, 1247-8). 
CHAMBERS, Ephraim (-1740), encyclopedist, never went to university but compiled a 
larger and more appreciated encyclopedia than any previously published. Soon after its 
publication in 1728, Chambers was made a member of the Royal Society. As visible in 
some entries of the work, Chambers held views sympathetic to freethinking (DNB, Vol. 
IV, 16-17). 
CHEYNE, George (1671-1743), influential London physician, advocated Newtonia-
nism fiercely, concentrating in his observations and experiments on the questions of diet. 
He was probably the most famous eighteenth-century medical writer to focus on 
questions of the relationship between physical and mental health in a way that applied 
Newtonian mechanics to medicine. He also attempted to synthesise Newtonian science 
and theology (Sambrook 1986, 17-18; BCE 1991, 84). 
CHISHULL, Edmund (1671-1733), divine and antiquary, studied in Oxford, travelled 
abroad, and rose in his ecclesiastical career to the status of a royal chaplain to Queen 
Anne, among other posts. Chishull wrote numerous sermons, some of which were 
published (DNB, Vol. IV, 263). 
CLARENDON, Edward Hyde, 1st Earl of (1609-74), historian and leading Royalist, 
was son of a great landowner and received schooling for the profession of barrister in 
Oxford. As a MP, he was suspicious towards Charles I's measures, and he joined the 
opposition. As a moderate, however, he quitted the rebels once their claims turned 
revolutionary and joined the Royalist side, becoming their leader in the Commons. Later 
he became a leading adviser for both Charles I and Charles the Prince of Wales. Without 
achieving success, Hyde searched for a compromise between the sides in the Civil War, 
supported `constitutional' monarchy and defended Anglicanism as opposed to 
Catholicism. Hyde played a central role in organising the Restoration, became the 
leading minister, and was created an earl in 1661. His career as the chief minister was 
rather unsuccessful and ended with a banishment to France. There he completed his 
History of the Rebellion which he had started already in 1646 and which was printed 
posthumously in 1702-4 (Hill 1988, 100-3). This publication inevitably had a 
considerable effect on early eighteenth-century conceptions of the seventeenth-century 
Civil War. 
CLEMENT, Simon (1695-1720), was a London merchant who worked actively to 
advance the interests of his profession. He also wrote several pamphlets on economic 
issues (Palgrave/BBA 238/252). 
APPENDIX A • 349 
COCKER, Edward (1631-75), arithmetician, teacher, writer and dictionary editor, 
wrote the book Arithmetic which appeared in 100 editions. He also wrote writing 
manuals and a dictionary which was published posthumously in 1704. This and the 
edition 1724 were consulted for this study. Both were re-edited by Cocker's friend John 
Hawkins, a probable successor of Cocker's as a schoolmaster. The edition of 1724 
differs from that of 1704 so that there may have been a third editor in the background, or 
otherwise Hawkins made the changes himself (DNB, Vol. IV, 649-50; `Cocker, 
Edward', Britannica Online, Accessed 24 September 1997). 
COLES, Elisha (1640?-1680), lexicographer and stenographer, was the son of a 
schoolmaster and the nephew of a well-known Calvinist. He studied at Oxford though 
did not take a degree. When living in London, among other employments, he taught 
English to foreigners. This work gave rise to his project of compiling a dictionary which 
first appeared in 1676 and was reprinted at least in 1685, 1692, 1713, 1717 and 1732. 
The wordbook was not particularly original; it built on its predecessors, adding a few 
innovations. The editions of 1701 and 1732 of this dictionary were consulted for this 
study. The latter was revised by Ben. Johnson, but the exact date of revision is not 
known (DNB, Vol. IV, 776; `Dictionary', Britannica Online, Accessed 24 September 
1997). 
COLLIER, Jeremy (1650-1726), nonjuring clergyman, i.e. traditionalist Anglican and a 
defender of the Stuarts, was the son of a divine and linguist. He was educated at 
Cambridge for the clerical profession and held several ecclesiastical posts. After the 
Revolution of 1688, he participated in the debate on the question of the king's 
abdication, opposing so actively the interpretation that the throne was vacant that he was 
prosecuted for his views. Collier continued to oppose the new establishment 
ostentatiously, making use of traditionalist Anglican ceremonies for that purpose, which 
led to his discrimination. In contrast, he rose to the status of the leading Non juror. His 
career in the Anglican Church being barred, he edited The Great Historical, 
Geographical and Poetical Dictionary (Vols. I and II in 1701, III in 1705 and IV in 
1721) which was, to a great extent, translated from the work of the Frenchman Louis 
Moreri. This dictionary became no success, scholars considering it inaccurate (DNB, 
Vol. IV, 797-802). 
COLLINS, Anthony (1676-1729), deist, was educated at Eton and Cambridge. He 
became a disciple of Locke and Shaftesbury, attacking orthodox theologians who 
defended divine mysteries. He defined freethinking in a way that allowed him to reject 
superstition. Questioning the validity of the Bible as a basis for revealed religion, he 
recommended natural religion instead (Sambrook 1986, 32-3). This was an appalling 
view for most contemporaries, and Collins was widely criticised both in England and 
France for his radical defence of freethinking (BCE 1991, 99). 
CONCANEN, Matthew (1701-1749), writer, was Irish-born. He preferred London to 
Ireland and literature to the study of law. In the 1720s, he wrote poems, contributed to 
The Speculatist and was involved in hack-writing, defending the ministry. In the 1730s, 
he continued to criticise Bolingbroke in his writings, to such an extent that he was 
appointed attorney-general in Jamaica (1732) (DNB, Vol. IV, 923-4). 
DAVENANT, Charles (1656-1714), political and economic writer, had an academic 
education, found an interest in theatre, and sat in Parliament. In the early 1700s, he wrote 
numerous popular political tracts criticising the government, the clergy, and some 
leading Whigs (DNB, Vol. V, 549-50). In his pamphlets, Davenant defended both his 
own positions and those of the leading Tories. His texts turned more moderate as he 
achieved a government post in 1703. Classical republicanism played a considerable role 
in his writings. 
DAWSON, Thomas (1676-1740), was probably a doctor of divinity who wrote on 
several religious subjects (Watt/BBA 312/268). 
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DEFOE, Benjamin Norton, the editor of A New English Dictionary (1737, first 
published in 1735). No background information found. 
DEFOE, Daniel (1660-1731), journalist, novelist and government servant, had a 
London middling sort background and studied at a dissenting academy for a career in a 
nonconformist ministry. Quitting theoretical studies, however, he chose apprenticeship, 
preparing himself for a career in business, a career that never became a success. Instead, 
Defoe got involved in political battles in which his position always remained somewhat 
uncertain. He fought on the side of the opponents of James II, and held a minor 
government post under William III. But it was political polemic that was the area closest 
to Defoe's heart. He wrote in favour of the Glorious Revolution, the Protestant cause, 
William III, and toleration. In 1702, his rough irony against Anglican traditionalism led 
to a brief imprisonment, ended by the need of the government to recruit able 
propagandists. Harley, who shared a dissenting background and principles of 
moderation with Defoe, became his major employer in the reign of Queen Anne. Defoe's 
mission was to observe shifts in public opinion around England and to gain the support 
of the Dissenters for the government. At the time of negotiations for the Union, he did 
the same in Scotland. The Review, which he then wrote, was evidently subsidised by the 
government. This journal supported the prosecution of Sacheverell but continued to 
advocate moderate Toryism as opposed to High-Church traditionalism. The Whig 
government imprisoned Defoe twice (1714, 1715) for his associations with Tories. Yet 
Defoe succeeded in coming to terms with the new rulers to such an extent that he was 
later paid by the Whig ministry for editing the leading Jacobite paper so that its readers 
would accept the Hanoverians. At the same time, he produced a huge number of 
pamphlets and some famous novels (Hill 1988, 436-8). As Defoe's figure is one full of 
paradox, not much more can be said about his views other than he was a defender of 
moderation and toleration as opposed to religious extremism. 
DENNIS, John (1657-1734), poet and playwright, son of a wealthy London artisan, 
received his education at Cambridge, completed a typical grand tour to the Continent, 
and obtained a government sinecure through the patronage of the Duke of Marlborough, 
but had little success as a writer (Sambrook 1986, 265). Intellectually he was first a 
Presbyterian but later a radical freethinker (Champion 1992, 187). 
DRAKE, James (1667-1707), political writer, was the son of a solicitor. He was 
educated at Eton and Cambridge, and, in London, he studied medicine and became a 
Fellow of the College of Physicians. However, in the 1700s, he became better known as 
a Tory pamphleteer than as a physician. Drake was prosecuted for his allusions against 
the Whig ministry and Presbyterians. In 1704, he authored together with Mr. Poley the 
famous Memorial of the Church of England which suggested that the established Church 
was in danger (DNB, Vol. V, 1351-2). 
DRYDEN, John (1631-1700), the leading poet, playwright and satirist of the late 
seventeenth century, was educated in Westminster and Cambridge. In politics, he easily 
adapted himself to changing circumstances. In the republican period, this youth with 
Puritan opinions worked at Cromwell's household. In the reign of Charles II, he already 
praised the monarch like one of the best royalists. Dryden wrote admired plays and 
poems, some of which contained severe political satire directed against the Whigs. In the 
reign of James II, this former Puritan, fearing fanaticism and disorder, had already 
converted to Catholicism (Hill 1988, 271-3). 
DUNTON, John (1659-1733), bookseller, was the son of a clergyman. As an apprentice 
to a bookseller, he became interested in politics on the Whig side. He published several 
controversial titles, some of them written by himself (DNB, Vol. VI, 236-8). 
DYCHE, Thomas (died between 1731 and 1735) schoolmaster and priest, taught in 
several schools. He compiled vocabularies and was the original editor of the third edition 
of A New General English Dictionary (1740/1750), which was `finished by William 
Pardon'. The dictionary first appeared in 1735 (DNB, Vol. VI, 282-3). 
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EARBERY, Mathias (1690-1740), a talented Jacobite writer, wrote on deism and 
constitutional issues and suffered much persecution (Allibone/BBA 357/121; Gunn 
1983). 
EVELYN, John (1620-1706), diarist, was bom to a gentry family. He was Anglican and 
a cautious Royalist who left England for the years of the Interregnum. After the 
Restoration, he held a minor government post. His fame is based on his lengthy diary 
which seems to have been written with posterity in mind (Hill 1988, 283-5). Evelyn does 
not appear to have been much engaged in contemporary political controversies; he rather 
observed what was going on in society. 
FENNING, Daniel, was the editor of The Royal English Dictionary (1741) and also 
wrote on arithmetic, geography and astronomy. He published spelling books and various 
other practical reference works. Many of these were published in the 1750s, 1760s and 
early 1770s (Watt/BBA 396/56-7), which suggests that Fenning must have been 
relatively young when compiling his dictionary. Indeed, some catalogues suggest that 
his dictionary was actually published only in 1761, not in 1741 as printed in the copies of 
the book. Little is known about the political opinions of Fenning who is not mentioned in 
most bibliographies and biographies of the eighteenth century. 
FERGUSON, Robert (-1714), nonconformist divine, lost his parish in 1662 because of 
his Calvinism. He plotted first on the side of the Whigs and later on that of the Jacobites 
(Hill 1988, 320). 
FIELDING, Henry (1707-54), novelist, playwright and magistrate, was son of a 
general. He received a classical education at Eton, and studied law at Leiden. Later, as a 
magistrate, he acquainted himself with criminal law and what might be called social 
problems of the day. From the late 1730s onwards, he was the editor of political 
periodicals such as The Champion (1739-41), The True Patriot (1745-6) and the 
Jacobite's Journal (1747-8). Above all, however, Fielding was a great novelist (BCE 
1991, 166; Treasure 1992, 163-8). 
FORD, Randolph, London clergyman, some sermons of whose were published in the 
1710s (Watt/BBA 417/2). 
GIFFARD, John (b. 1676/7), was rector, and his Discourse concerning Family Religion 
seems to have been his only published work (Watt/BBA 452/248). 
GILDON, Charles (1665-1724), writer and clergyman, came from a Royalist and 
Roman Catholic family and was educated in the ecclesiastical profession. After 
economic difficulties, he turned to hack-writing. He abandoned Catholicism in favour of 
deism (DNB, Vol. VII, 1226). 
GILPIN, William (1724-1804), writer, the son of a captain, was educated at Oxford, was 
ordained, and worked as a schoolmaster (DNB, Vol. VII, 1262-4). 
GORDON, George, was the original editor of Dictionarium Britannicum (1730), revised 
by Nathan Bailey. The only George Gordon that published something in the early 
eighteenth century would seem to have written against Newtonian philosophy, on 
navigation, astronomy and geography, all being areas typical of dictionary editors. Most 
of these works were printed in the late 1710s and in the 1720s (Watt/BBA 467/376). 
GORDON, Thomas (-1750), writer, was probably educated in a Scottish university but 
moved to London where he first taught foreign languages. After writing pamphlets in 
connection with the Bangorian controversy, he became an associate of John Trenchard, 
a Whig politician, and contributed to his anti-High-Church periodicals in the early 
1720s. After Trenchard's death in 1723, Walpole gave Gordon a government post (DNB, 
Vol. VIII, 230), which suggests that his writings had been approved by the Prime 
Minister. 
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GREY, Zachary (1688-1766), antiquary, studied at Cambridge and made a clerical 
career. In his writings he attacked Dissenters (DNB, Vol. VIII, 661-2). 
GRIFFIN, Benjamin (1680-1740), actor and playwright, the son of a priest, was at first 
an apprentice but turned to the world of drama in the late 1710s. He himself acted the 
part of Sir John Indolent in his own Whig and Tory (1720). His career as an actor appears 
to have been successful (DNB, Vol. VIII, 668-9). 
GROSVENOR, Benjamin (1676-1758), first Baptist, turned Presbyterian clergyman. 
He supported mutual toleration in accordance with moderate Calvinism (DNB, Vol. 
VIII, 721-2). 
HALIFAX, George Savile, 1st Marquis of (1633-95), statesman and essayist, was born 
the first son of a baronet and received his education at Shrewsbury as well as in France 
and Italy. As a loyal royalist, he rose to the Privy Council in 1672, but, as an independent 
actor ready to change sides, he was not particularly successful as a politician. Though 
supporting Protestantism, he did not support the Whigs during the Exclusion Crisis in 
1680. In his writings, he defended the middle path in politics which made him unpopular 
among fellow politicians, yet the favour of Charles II brought him the status of an earl 
and a marquis. James II dismissed Halifax as a critic of his catholicising policies. Even at 
the beginning of the Revolution of 1688, Halifax remained neutral. Turning his coat at 
the right moment, he became the Speaker of the Lords in the Convention and had the 
honour to formally invite William and Mary to become King and Queen. His new 
political career was a brief one, however, mostly because of distrust felt towards his 
turncoat character by the fellow Whigs (Hill 1988, 314-17). 
HAMILTON, Sir David (1663-1721), physician, born in Scotland, studied medicine at 
Leiden and Rheims and became a successful physician of Queen Anne's. He was also 
diarist who obviously wished his diary to be published. Much of the diary naturally 
concentrates on medicine. Politically, Hamilton was a Whig (DNB, Vol. VIII, 1028; The 
Diary of Sir David Hamilton, 1709-1714, ed. Philip Roberts, 1975). 
HAWKINS, John (late seventeenth century), edited the third edition of Cocker's English 
Dictionary printed in 1724. Obviously, however, the work had been originally published 
much earlier, possibly already in 1678 (`Cocker, Edward', Britannica Online, Accessed 
25 September 1997). Several men carried this name in late seventeenth-century England, 
which makes a more certain and detailed identification impossible. 
HEARNE, Thomas (1678-1735), historian, antiquarian and assistant librarian at the 
Bodleian Library, Oxford, concentrated on editing English medieval chronicles, 
cataloguing the collections of the university library and writing history books. 
Politically, Hearne was an traditionalist Tory and Jacobite, and this was the reason why 
he lost his position in 1716 (Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, Vol. I, vi-vii; 
`Hearne, Thomas', Britannica Online, Accessed 25 September 1997). 
HIGGONS, Bevil (1670-1735), historian and poet, had a gentry background and 
studied at Oxford and Cambridge. His family was sympathetic towards the exiled 
Stuarts, and Higgons also spent several years in France. After returning to England, he 
was imprisoned for some time but later turned to literary work, particularly to 
historiography. His Short View of the English History was first published in 1723 and 
reprinted several times (DNB, Vol. IX, 824-5). 
HOADLY, Benjamin (1675-1761), `controversialist' and bishop, was son of a minor 
priest. Educated in Cambridge, he proceeded to the post of a fellow, and, after being 
ordained, moved to London in 1701. There he became a major figure of the Low-Church 
party, opposing Atterbury among others, and also got involved in politics, as he 
advocated principles shared by Whig politicians. As an embodiment of Low-Church 
Whiggism, and disinterested in ecclesiastical responsibilities, he became an object of 
violent Tory satire. The Hanoverian Succession meant a positive turning point in 
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Hoadly's career. Thereafter, he could freely attack Anglican traditionalists by insisting, 
for instance, that the Church could not exist independently of the state. Such statements 
of disputable, even deistical, doctrinal basis gave rise to a pamphlet war known as the 
Bangorian Controversy, Hoadly then being Bishop of Bangor. A major consequence of 
this episode was the suspension of the Lower House of Convocation. Advocating 
practical views that appear to make the Church an instrument of state, Hoadly became a 
favourite of Queen Caroline and continued to enjoy preferment in ecclesiastical 
appointments (Treasure 1992, 24-6). 
HOBBES, Thomas (1588-1679), political philosopher, was son of a parson, studied in 
Oxford, and became tutor to a nobleman. During the Interregnum, Hobbes's royalist 
fears of anarchy made him stay in France and publish the pro-absolutist Leviathan in 
1651. When he returned to England a year later, he accepted the authority of the 
republican government. He also accommodated himself to the Restoration government, 
though he remained politically suspect. His original political philosophy was 
condemned by all political and religious groups but particularly by the churchmen who 
saw dangerous atheism in his attempts to explain man and society as matter and motion. 
This hostility was also due to Hobbes's suggestion that religion was valuable to politics 
only as far as it created respect for secular arguments (Hill 1988, 186-8; Yolton 199la, 
224-5). Understandably, Hobbes the atheist remained a condemned figure for the great 
majority of early eighteenth-century writers. 
HOLE, Matthew (1639/40-1730), divine, was educated at Oxford and held a number of 
ecclesiastical posts. Many of his sermons were printed (DNB, Vol. IX, 1020-1). 
JOHNSON, Ben., was the re-editor of Coles's English Dictionary of 1732. 
Unfortunately, this person cannot be identified with the available sources. 
JOHNSON, Samuel (1709-84), lexicographer, poet, biographer and essayist, was son 
of a bookseller and sheriff. His mother took the sickly child to be touched by Queen 
Anne, and Johnson wore the touch-piece for the rest of his life, both being testimonies 
for a continuous belief in the divine, and healing, origin of kinghood. Religiously, 
Johnson was an orthodox Anglican who put the value of order first. Politically, he was 
consistently an independent Tory and hater of Whigs. He studied at Lichfield, 
Stourbridge and briefly at Oxford University but only received his doctorate in 1764. In 
addition to various other employments, he contributed to The Gentleman's Magazine 
between 1738 and 1743. It was in lexicography, however, where he found the field on 
which to concentrate between 1747 and 1755. The Dictionary became a pioneer work in 
etymology. The purpose of the compilation was to create standards for the proper use of 
the English language. In his Dictionary, Johnson made use of quotations from a variety 
of sources - sometimes derived from his memory and thus not always trustworthy - for 
illustrating various senses of the terms. He paid particular attention to defining the words 
and was one of the first dictionary editors to attempt to distinguish between the 
differentiated meanings of words, though it might be added that a considerable number 
of his definitions were borrowed from previous dictionaries. Importantly, this task of 
defining commonly used politico-religious terms and choosing quotations for them 
offered possibilities for the editor to enter his own prejudices in the definitions. This 
study contains several instances of how Johnson's traditionalism is reflected in the 
definitions of his Dictionary (see the entries for Whig, Tory and toleration, for instance). 
The Dictionary became the most authoritative of its age and made Johnson an 
appreciated literary figure for the rest of his life (Reddick 1990, particularly 1, 9, 11, 15, 
33-4; Kolb 1991, 123-4; BCE 1991, 252; Treasure 1992, 176-81, 183). It still 
constitutes an essential source for the history of concepts of eighteenth-century England. 
KEITH, William, Sir (1680-1749), governor of Pennsylvania (1717-26), has been 
characterised as 'a desperate intriguer, courting always the favour of the people, and not 
sparing of delusive promises to individuals'. He wrote on colonial issues (Allen/BBA 
636/120). 
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KENNETT, White (1660-1728), divine, bishop, historian and antiquarian, was the son 
of a priest. He studied at Oxford and started anonymous pamphleteering in the early 
1680s. Though first arousing contempt among the Whigs, he defended Anglicanism as 
opposed to Catholicism in the reign of James II and supported the Revolution. He 
returned to research in the 1690s, writing his History of England, for instance. By the 
late 1700s, Tories already criticised him for his independent views which were moving 
towards Whiggism (DNB, Vol. XI, 2-5). 
KERSEY, John, the son of a mathematician, was the first professional English 
lexicographer. He probably edited A New English Dictionary, published in 1702 and 
which sold for the next seventy years. In this study, the third edition from 1731 has been 
used. By 1706, he revised Edward Phillips's 1700 edition of New World of Words 
(originally published in 1658) to such an extent that it is justified to talk of a fresh work. 
The edition of 1706 and the nearly identical one of 1720 were consulted for this study. In 
1708, Kersey published yet another Dictionarium Anglo-Britannicum, an abridgement 
of the Kersey-Phillips dictionary. This was re-edited in 1715 (used in this study) and 
1721 (reprinted in 1731 and used in this study) (Kolb 1991, 124; BCE 1991, 263). 
KING, William (1650-1729), Archbishop of Dublin, was educated in Dublin. In 
religion, he opposed both Catholics and Presbyterians. In politics, he was a zealous 
Whig (DNB, Vol. XI, 163-7). 
KING, William (1663-1712), writer, was the son of a gentleman. He studied at Oxford 
and, in the 1690s, engaged in humorous propaganda on the side of the Tories and High 
Church. He was an active propagandist during the Sacheverell controversy, founding 
The Examiner, the organ of the Tory party (DNB, Vol. XI, 161-2). 
LAURENCE, John (1668-1732), clergyman and writer, was educated at Cambridge and 
held several ecclesiastical posts. Apart from several printed sermons, he was the author 
of texts on gardening (DNB, Vol. XI, 647). 
LESLIE, Charles (1650-1722), Non juror and controversialist, was the son of a doctor 
of divinity. He first studied at Dublin, later turned to law at London, but was finally 
ordained and held both ecclesiastical and judicial posts. Leslie remained loyal to James 
II in spite of the Revolution, refusing to take oaths to the new monarchs. This nonjuring 
attitude, reflected by his visit to the Pretender himself, led to a loss of his post as a 
lawyer. In the 1690s, he started to write anonymous pamphlets against William III and 
the leading Whig clergy, the tone of which provoked the government. He also attacked 
Quakers, deists, Jews and mixed marriages, the relationship between Church and state 
being one of Leslie's favourite, themes in the early years of the eighteenth century. In his 
periodical The Rehearsal, Leslie criticised Locke's political philosophy and advocated 
that of Filmer (DNB, Vol. XI, 956-62). 
LEWIS, John (1675-1747), clergyman and author, was the son of a wine cooper who 
received an education of high quality, including studies at Oxford and Cambridge. He 
first worked as a tutor and merchant but was later ordained. He was appointed to several 
ecclesiastical posts, though sometimes opposed by his audience for his views that were 
openly Whiggish and Low-Church. Towards the end of his life, Lewis turned to writing 
religious history and biographies, carrying out his work with distinct Protestant 
prejudices (DNB, Vol. XI, 1065-7). 
LOCKE, John (1632-1704), physician and philosopher, was the son of an attorney and 
small landowner and grew up in a family where sympathy towards Puritanism was 
commonly felt. Locke studied at Westminster School and Christ Church in Oxford, of 
which he became fellow. Feeling that Oxford's Aristotelian learning could not answer 
his needs, he focused on experimental science, medicine, politics and religion instead. In 
1667, Locke quitted Oxford and moved to London, where he worked as personal 
physician and occasional political adviser for Lord Ashley (later Earl of Shaftesbury and 
the father of the third Earl of Shaftesbury), became a Fellow of the Royal Society, and 
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held posts in colonial administration. In the late 1660s and 1670s he started to write on 
toleration and human understanding. In the late 1670s, Locke's master Shaftesbury 
became the organiser of the oppositional Whig party, but — even though he was on his 
master's side in the Exclusion Crisis, defended the right of resistance in his Two 
Treatises of Government and became surrounded by government spies — Locke's role in 
the birth of the first political party remains obscure. In the 1680s, Locke lived in exile in 
Holland, writing on education, toleration and human understanding, and putting the 
emphasis on reason rather than faith. He supported the Revolution of 1688, returned to 
England, received a government post and had all his major works printed. Locke quickly 
became a well-known but far from universally accepted philosopher. In 1695, he became 
involved in controversy by publishing anonymously his Reasonableness of Christianity, 
which contains Unitarian rather than purely Anglican statements (Hill 1988, 354-8; 
Yolton 1991b, 301). 
LOCKHART, George (1673-1731), author, MP for Scotland, and one of the most active 
Jacobites, inherited a considerable fortune early in his life. He worked as a commissioner 
for the union of England and Scotland in 1707 but secretly plotted in favour of the 
Stuarts. He was imprisoned for several years in 1715. Even after his release, he 
continued to advocate the interest of the Pretender. His memoirs were published without 
his consent in 1714 (DNB, Vol. XII, 45-7). 
LUDLOW, Edmund (1617?-92), ultra-republican, who went to school at Oxford and 
the Inner Temple. He fought for Parliament and was one of those who signed the death-
warrant of Charles I. Ludlow became a leading politician in the republican government. 
After Restoration, being in danger of the death penalty, he fled to Switzerland, where he 
wrote his Memoirs (Hill 1988, 168-9). 
LUTTRELL, Narcissus (1657-1732), annalist and bibliographer, was educated at 
Cambridge. He supported William III's rise to the throne of England. Luttrell spent his 
life studying, chronicling events and collecting a large library. Many of his notes on the 
events of the day were based on newspapers rather than personal observations (DNB, 
Vol. XII, 300-1). 
MANDEVILLE, Bernard (1670-1733), Dutch-born doctor of medicine who acted, with 
little success, as a physician in London from 1692. He wrote poetry, medical works on 
passions and philosophical writings that resemble Hobbes's controversial thought and 
became an object of wide criticism. According to Mandeville, who held deistical beliefs, 
selfish human desires were beneficial to the common good through their economic 
consequences (Sambrook 1986, 271-2; BCE 1991, 310). 
MARTIN, Benjamin] (1704-1782), teacher, mathematician, inventor and collector, 
specialised in Newtonian mathematics and astronomy and compiled several books 
summarising current scientific information and ideas. These include the dictionary 
Lingua Britannica Reformata (1749) which endeavoured to provide multiple meanings 
for words but was not entirely successful in it (DNB, Vol. XII; Reddick 1990, 14, 52). 
MAWSON, Matthias (1683-1770), bishop, was the son of a wealthy brewer. He was 
educated at Cambridge and had a long career as a scholar, including a short period as 
vice-chancellor, but later turned to ecclesiastical appointments. He was bishop of three 
bishoprics. Few of his sermons were published (DNB, Vol. XIII, 111-12). 
MIDDLETON, John, doctor of divinity, studied in Oxford and preached in London 
(Watt/BBA 765/283). 
MILLER, James (1706-1744), play-wright, studied theology in Oxford and worked as a 
High-Church preacher but became famous for his comedies (DNB, Vol. XIII, 410-11). 
MORERI, Louis (1643-1680), was French priest and savant, whose Dictionnaire 
historigue (1673), translated into English by Jeremy Collier at the turn of the century, 
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played a role in the formation of eighteenth-century thought, often through the reactions 
it caused (BCE 1991, 339). 
NAISH, Thomas (1669-1755), was educated at Salisbury and Oxford and became sub-
dean of Salisbury. Some of his sermons were published in the 1700s and 1720s (Watt/ 
BBA 805/126). He played a role in ecclesiastical politics and also kept a religious diary 
until 1728 (The Diary of Thomas Naish, 1, 8-10). 
NEEDHAM, John (b. 1664/5), was a divine, whose sermons were published between 
1710 and 1753 (Watt/BBA 808/241). 
NICOL-SON, William (1655-1727), divine, bishop and antiquary, was the son of a 
clergyman. He was educated at Oxford and travelled in Germany and France. He had a 
successful career in the service of the Church of England, and was also elected a Fellow 
of the Royal Society. As to his political opinions, Nicolson began as Tory but eventually 
changed his views towards Whiggism. He became involved with various ecclesiastical 
disputes (DNB, Vol. XIV, 500-2). 
OLDMIXON, John (1673-1742), historian and writer, had a gentry background. He 
started his career as a writer of poems, then turned to history, and then to writing political 
essays and pamphlets in favour of the Whig party. He later held a government post 
(DNB, Vol. XIV, 1009-12). 
OSBORNE, Thomas (1632-1712), statesman, was son of a Royalist landowner. He was 
elected a MP in 1665. While the leading minister to Charles II, he organised the Court 
party, later known as the Tory party, in Parliament. The basic values of this grouping 
built on royalism and strict Anglicanism. Osborne was imprisoned in the 1670s for 
connections to France. Known as Earl of Danby, he also contributed to the invitation of 
William and Mary to the throne in 1689. In the early 1690s, he returned to the status of 
chief minister, being created Duke of Leeds in 1694. In 1695, however, he was 
impeached for bribery, after which he had little political influence (`Leeds, Thomas 
Osborne, 1st Duke of, Britannica Online, Accessed 25 September 1997). 
PARDON, William, was the editor who `finished' Thomas Dyche's New General 
English Dictionary (1740/1750). No further information on Pardon has been found. 
PARKER, Henry (1604-52), political writer and editor of Charles I's Political 
Catechism which was reprinted in 1710 and 1740, supported the Presbyterians in the 
Civil War but later became an Independent (DNB, Vol. XV, 240-1). 
PAXTON, Peter (-1711), medical writer and pamphleteer, studied at Cambridge and 
Oxford. The DNB only lists his medical writings, but the ESTC suggests that he was also 
the author of Civil Polity (1703) (DNB, Vol. XV, 549). 
PEARCE, Zachary (1690-1774), divine and bishop, was the son of a distiller. As a 
student at Cambridge, he contributed essays to Whiggish periodicals. Pearce held 
several ecclesiastical posts and formed contacts with influential persons including 
Queen Caroline and the opposition leader Pulteney. He also published scholarly works 
and sermons (DNB, Vol. XV, 596-7). 
PHILIPS, Ambrose (1675?-1749), poet and essay-writer, studied at Cambridge and 
became a fellow there. He had various employments, some of which took him abroad, 
and published poems, until he became a member of Addison's literary circle in the early 
1710s. Philips was secretary to the Hanover Club, and, after the Hanoverian Succession, 
this loyalty brought him the posts of justice of the peace for Westminster and that of a 
commissioner for the lottery. In the late 1710s, he wrote, together with Hugh Boulter, 
Richard West and Gilbert Burnet (Jr.), the periodical Free-Thinker. He also published 
poems and a few unsuccessful plays (DNB, Vol. XV, 1058-9). 
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PHILLIPS, Edward (1630-96?), author, was the son of a London civil servant and a 
nephew of the poet John Milton. The famous poet took care of his education. He also 
studied at Oxford though never took a degree. Thereafter, Phillips worked in London as 
a tutor and in the service of booksellers. He wrote poems, novels and, in 1658, The New 
World of Words, a wordbook that John Kersey re-edited for the editions of 1706 and 
1720. Phillips's work had built to a great extent on Thomas Blount's Glossographia, 
published in 1656, but he also employed specialists during the project (DNB, Vol. XV, 
1083-5; `Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries: Encyclopaedias: Encyclopaedias in general: 
Editing and publishing: Authorship', Britannica Online, Accessed 27 September 1997). 
PLACE, Conyers (1664/5-1738), was clergyman and wrote, in addition to sermons, on 
various theological questions. These writings were published between 1702 and 1735 
(Allibone/BBA 881/80). 
PLAXTON, John, was rector of Sutton-upon-Derwent. One of his sermons was 
published in 1746 (Watt/BBA 881/269). 
PYCROFT, Samuel (1682/3-1729), was a fellow of a Cambridge college. His Brief 
Enquiry into Free Thinking (1713) seems to have been his only published work 
(Allibone/BBA 904/187). 
RENNELL, Thomas (b. 1674/5), was clergyman and Fellow of Exeter College. At least 
three of his sermons were published in the 1700s (Allibone/BBA 922/32). 
ROGERS, Thomas, unidentified writer. 
RYDER, Dudley (1691-1756), a London law student and diarist, was to become Lord 
Chief Justice of the King's Bench. He was the son of a mercer, his grandfather having 
lost the family estate for his Puritan views. Ryder studied at a dissenting academy and at 
the universities of Edinburgh and Leiden. Giving up theology, he turned to the study of 
law. Originally a Dissenter, he attended Anglican services as well and joined the Church 
of England during his law studies at London. He made a successful career as a lawyer, 
partly due to the support of another son of a nonconformist tradesman who introduced 
him to the Prime Minister. Ryder also became a MP (1733), though he was unwilling to 
engage in political disputes (DNB, Vol. XVII, 529-30). 
SACHEVERELL, Henry (1674?-1724), High-Church preacher and polemicist, was the 
grandson of a nonconformist priest. During his studies at Oxford, he was known for his 
rabble-rousing sermons in which the union between throne and altar and the danger 
posed to it by the Dissenters were constant themes. Sacheverell has been characterised as 
`unattractive and foolish', being `superficial in mind, intemperate in language, with a 
flair for slightly pompous billingsgate'. In 1709, on the anniversary of William III's 
landing in 1688, Sacheverell preached at St. Paul's a provocative sermon against the 
Glorious Revolution, the Dissenters and the Whigs in general. In printed form, this 
sermon sold 40,000 copies, and it caused a serious political crisis for the Whig 
government. Sacheverell was impeached and suspended from preaching for three years. 
The public and the Queen, however, tired of the war policies of the ministry and sharing 
some concern of the Church being in danger, took Sacheverell as the symbol of their 
hatred towards the Whig ministry. The Whig ministry fell as a consequence of this crisis. 
After 1713, Sacheverell worked as a priest in London without achieving further 
promotion (Hill 1988, 427-9). 
SAGE, John (1652-1711), Scottish nonjuring bishop, was the son of a Royalist captain. 
He was educated at St. Andrew's, worked as a schoolmaster and tutor, and also began an 
ecclesiastical career before the Revolution of 1688. As a Non-juror, his life became 
troublesome after the Revolution, but, in 1705, he was secretly made a bishop without 
diocese. He published anonymous texts but, in most cases, the author was well known to 
the public (DNB, Vol. XVII, 604). 
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SEWELL, George (-1726), `controversialist' and hack-writer, was the son of a clerk and 
received his education at Eton, Cambridge and Leiden, the last giving him a degree in 
medicine. He was never particularly successful as a physician, and this made him turn to 
hack-writing. Politically, Sewell was a Tory who eagerly criticised Bishop Burnet, 
defended the Schism Bill (1714) and engaged himself with various other types of literary 
work. After the Hanoverian Succession, he briefly wrote for Walpole, but this never 
brought him preferment (DNB, Vol. XVII, 1223-4). 
SHAFTESBURY, Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of (1671-1713), was the 
grandson of the first Earl of Shaftesbury (1621-83) who was England's first party leader. 
He was educated under the supervision of John Locke, studied at Winchester, and made 
a grand tour. He was Member of the House of Commons, and from 1699, attended the 
House of Lords as a defender of the cause of William. While in Holland, Shaftesbury had 
contacts with Bayle and Leclerc. He was more interested in philosophy than politics and 
became a leading Whig moralist, sceptic and even deist who opposed enthusiasm, 
fanaticism and intoleration. Holding a relatively positive conception of human nature 
and believing in a universal harmony, he criticised both Hobbes and Locke (Sambrook 
1986, 276; BCE 1991, 489). 
SHIPPEN, William (1673-1743), Tory and Jacobite, was the son of a clergyman. He 
studied at Cambridge, practised law, and was chosen as MP. This choice giving rise to 
opposing Whig petitions, he could take his seat only in 1710, after which he soon 
became a leading High Churchman supporting strictly Anglican policies. After the 
Hanoverian Succession in 1714, this open Jacobite rose to lead the independent 
members of the House of Commons, a group held together by their opposition to the new 
royal family. Shippen spent a few months in prison for his criticism of the House of 
Hanover, but afterwards he became a tolerated representative of parliamentary 
Jacobitism who could occasionally fiercely oppose government measures (Treasure 
1992, 49-50). 
SHUTTLEWORTH, John (1670/1-1750), was clergyman. Only one of his texts, 
Persuasive to Union (1716), would seem to have been printed (Allibone/BBA 999/144). 
SMITH, Elisha (1683?-1740), was a clergyman with a master's degree. He was a 
popular preacher, and dozens of his sermons were published during the first half of the 
eighteenth century (Watt/BBA 1012/185). 
STEBBING, Henry (1687-1763), divine, was the son of a grocer and attended 
Cambridge and Oxford. His ecclesiastical career included appointments such as 
Chaplain in Ordinary to the King (1732). He achieved fame as an eager defender of 
Anglican orthodoxy, having had controversies, among others, with Hoadly and 
Warburton (DNB, Vol. XVIII, 1010-11). 
STEELE, Richard (1672-1729), dramatist, journalist and Whig politician, the son of a 
wealthy attorney, studied in Oxford and rose in the Life Guards to the rank of captain. He 
was principal editor for several periodicals in the 1700s and 1710s, including the official 
Gazette. In his more literary periodicals, Steele cooperated with his friend Joseph 
Addison. Politically, he was an active Whig who lost his parliamentary seat in 1714 for 
writing a seditious pamphlet in which he suggested that the policies of the Tory ministry 
endangered the Protestant succession. Under Whig rule, Steele was knighted, received 
government posts, and he made a career in the world of theatre (Hill 1988, 439-40; BCE 
1991, 504). 
STEVENS, John. This being a rather common name, it is impossible to deduce whether 
this writer was a Catholic captain in the army of James II who subsequently published 
several works and died in 1726, a captain of a ship, Jesuit, book-seller, painter, engraver, 
or, indeed, someone else. 
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STEVENSON, William (1683?-1760), was clergyman whose sermons were published 
in the 1710s, 1720s and 1740s (Watt/BBA 1040/195). 
STORY, Thomas (1662-1742), Quaker, began as an Anglican student of law. But he 
converted to Quakerism in 1689 and soon afterwards started preaching. As an associate 
of William Penn, he found legal employment among London Quakers, before leaving 
for Pennsylvania for sixteen years. After his return, he preached both in England and 
Ireland, becoming a popular figure among his brethren. Some of his sermons were 
written down and published by his followers (DNB, Vol. XVIII, 1318-19). 
STRYPE, John (1643-1737), ecclesiastical historian and biographer, came from a 
Flemish family that had escaped religious persecution to England and started a 
successful business in London. He studied at Cambridge and took holy orders there, 
afterwards holding various priestly posts. He was an eager collector of manuscripts and, 
at an old age, started to publish what has been regarded as badly-written Church history 
(DNB, Vol. XIX, 67-9). 
SYNGE, Edward (-1762), was son of Edward Synge, Archbishop of Ireland. He studied 
in Dublin and made a successful clerical career, becoming a bishop (DNB, Vol. XIX, 
283). 
SWIFT, Jonathan (1677-1745), political journalist and satirist, was an Englishman born 
in Ireland and one educated at Trinity College in Dublin. Together with an ecclesiastical 
career, he chose that of a writer and spent plenty of time in England in the 1700s, coming 
to know literary figures such as Addison and Steele. At this time, he defined himself a 
Whig, but the failure of the Whigs to offer him a suitable post contributed to his drifting 
apart from that party. Once the Tories rose to power in 1710, Harley employed Swift as 
the major writer of the government propaganda machine. For the next four years, Swift 
remained an influential political figure who had close cooperation with the Tory leaders 
Harley and Bolingbroke and whose writings won support for government policies. But 
when the Tories fell in 1714, Swift the political polemicist fell with them. He spent the 
rest of his life in Ireland without having noteworthy political influence. He continued to 
hate Whigs, Jacobites, Low Churchmen, Dissenters and freethinkers, writing bitter irony 
and satire on these and many others (Hill 1988, 432-5). 
TEMPLE, William (1628-99), diplomat, was educated at Cambridge and made a 
successful career in diplomacy in the Restoration period. After the Revolution of 1688, 
he did not accept any office. Temple also wrote on international affairs (Hill 1988, 304). 
TENISON, Edward (1673-1735), an Anglican divine and bishop, came from a family of 
several priests and studied at Cambridge, abandoning law in favour of theology. Some of 
his sermons were published (DNB, Vol. XIX, 536). 
TILLOTSON, John (1630-94), Archbishop of Canterbury, was the son of a wealthy 
Puritan clothworker. He quitted Calvinism in his Cambridge years, and, in the reign of 
Charles II, he became a well-known preacher who underlined the role of reason in 
religion. After the Revolution of 1688, Tillotson supported the Toleration Act and the 
less successful proposal for the comprehension of Dissenters in the Church of England. 
This Low Churchman became Archbishop in 1691 (Hill 1988, 385). 
TINDAL, Matthew (1657-1733), deist, was educated at Oxford to the status of a fellow. 
In the reign of James II, he converted briefly to Catholicism. It was only in the mid-
1700s that he became subject to severe criticism at Oxford and among other traditionalist 
circles due to his attacks on High-Church values. A book of his was ordered to be burnt 
in 1710. In his Christianity Old as Creation (1730), he implicitly questioned the special 
status of Christianity and emphasised the role of reason, thus giving fuel to the deist 
controversy. Tindal defended toleration and natural religion and was seen as a major 
promoter of freethinking (Robbins 1959, 96; BCE 1991, 526; Treasure 1992, 21-2). 
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TOLAND, John (1670-1722), Irish writer, converted to Protestantism and thereafter 
studied at Glasgow, Edinburgh, Leiden and Oxford. Starting with the publication of his 
Christianity not Mysterious (1696), which set reason above revelation, caused much 
controversy and was ordered to be burnt, he later became an antireligious writer. This 
deist founded a pantheistic sect and published radical political views, including those of 
earlier republicans and the third Earl of Shaftesbury. Toland attacked churchmen, 
Tories, Jacobites and the authority of the Bible. Having the reputation of an irreligious 
person, Toland made his living through hack-writing and spying, occasionally enjoying 
the protection of Shaftesbury, another radical thinker (Sambrook 1986, 30-2, 277; BCE 
1991, 526). 
TRAPP, Joseph (1679-1747), poet and pamphleteer, was son of a priest. He studied at 
both Oxford and Cambridge. As a student, he wrote poems, and, from 1708 to 1718, he 
was the first professor of poetry at Oxford. This appointment was approved by Thomas 
Hearne, which is not surprising when the Tory and High-Church principles of Trapp are 
taken into consideration. Trapp assisted Sacheverell during his trial, wrote the 
anonymous pamphlet The true genuine Tory Address and the true genuine Whig Address 
set one against another (1710), and contributed to The Examiner. He held various 
ecclesiastical posts, and his career does not seem to have suffered as a consequence of 
the Hanoverian Succession (DNB, Vol. XIX, 1082-5). 
TRENCHARD, John (1662-1723), wealthy landowner and political writer, studied law 
in London and became a Whig and Commonwealthman who, under William III, 
opposed a standing army. Together with Thomas Gordon, he wrote numerous periodical 
essays in the early 1720s, advocating Country values and criticising corruption, High-
Church opinions and the handling of the South Sea Bubble crisis. He was briefly a MP in 
1722-3 (Robbins 1959, 112, 115; BCE 1991, 529). 
TRUSLER, John (1735-1820), eccentric divine, literary compiler and medical 
practitioner, was the son of a London tradesman. He studied at Westminster and 
Cambridge, taking holy orders, and later continued with medicine at Leiden. He 
compiled The Difference, Between Words, esteemed Synonymous, in the English 
Language; and the proper choice of them determined (1766) (DNB, Vol. XIX, 1195). 
TUFTON, Sackville (d. 1721), colonel, sat in Parliament in the early 1680s 
(Ferguson/BBA 1098/111-12). 
WALPOLE, Horace (1717-91), writer, diarist and wit, was son of the Prime Minister, 
Sir Robert Walpole, received his education at Eton and Cambridge, and lived a 
privileged life. He received sinecures, was elected a MP in 1741, but is best known for 
his literary works and correspondence that contains some references to politics (BCE 
1991, 547; Treasure 1992, 241). 
WARBURTON, William (1698-1779), theologian, philosopher and writer, was 
educated to become an attorney but was also ordained in 1723. He later became chaplain 
to the Prince of Wales (1738) and finally, in 1760, a bishop. He wrote in favour of 
limited religious toleration in his Alliance between Church and State (1736) but got 
involved in religious controversies with deists and Methodists whom, among many 
others, he attacked. Warburton's writings defending the Anglican Church have been 
characterised as intemperate and often paradoxical (BCE 1991, 548; Treasure 1992, 
123-4). 
WARD, Edward (1667-1731), humorist, had little education and made a living by 
keeping pubs in London, frequented by the supporters of the High Church. In 1705, he 
was prosecuted for attacking the government in his writings. His texts are often coarse 
but revealing about their period of writing. These include Fair Shell, but a Rotten Kernel 
(1705) (DNB, Vol. XX, 769-71). 
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WARREN, Langhorn (1710/11-1763), minister of Hampstead and rector of Charlton. 
No further information has been found. 
WESLEY, John (1703-91), priest, evangelist and founder of Methodism, son of a High-
Church clergyman, was educated at Oxford and ordained an Anglican clergyman, 
though he early became a major figure in a group of enthusiastic High-Church 
Christians. After a conversion in 1738, Wesley started to preach outdoors. His well-
organised evangelical movement won popular support but was severely criticised by the 
Establishment. Gradually, Wesley's movement started to distance itself from the 
established Church (BCE 1991, 551: Treasure 1992, 125-9). It was probably the same 
John Wesley who compiled a dictionary first published in 1753. The High-Church 
attitude of a number of entries also point that way. 
WHISTON, William (1667-1752), mathematician, studied and became priest at 
Cambridge, following Newton as professor in mathematics. He applied Newtonian 
learning to the defence of the Bible. Whiston had to leave his position in 1710 on 
account of accusations of Arianism, but he himself was a fierce critic of deists such as 
Anthony Collins (BCE 1991, 551). 
WILLIAMSON, Adam (1736-98), lieutenant-general, was at first deputy-lieutenant of 
the Tower of London. His diary concentrates on military rather than political affairs (The 
Official Diary of Lieutenant-General Adam Williamson, 1912). 
YONGE, James (1647-1721), Plymouth surgeon, traveller and medical writer. Towards 
the end of his career, he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society. Politically, he was a 
Royalist and Tory (DNB, Vol. XXI, 1241). 
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Appendix B 
PARTY WORD COMBINATIONS 1700-1750 
Party word combinations and their users in early eighteenth-century English political 
discourse are presented in chronological order estimated on the basis of the first found 
appearance of the term. The words are listed with a hyphen to demonstrate their 
combination characters. Contemporary users wrote them variably either with or without 
a hyphen. 
Word combination' 	 Users 
Party-distinction 	 Toland 1696, Place c. 1710; Anon. 1710; Smith 1715; 
Shuttleworth 1716; Anon. 1727; Anon. 1733; Anon. 1736; 
Anon. 1736; Acherley 1741; Anon. 1744; Gilpin 1747 
Party-broker 	 Anon. 1701 
Party-man 	 Anon. 1702; Anon. 1705; Hearne 1707; Naish 1707; Place c. 
1710; Whiston 1717; Oldmixon 1714; Defoe 1715; Ryder 1715; 
Mandeville 1724; Anon. 1734; Anon. 1736; Anon. 1740; Gilpin 
1747 
Party-making 	 Mather 1702; Defoe 1709 
Party-pamphleteer 	 Anon. 1703 
Party-virtue 	 King 1705 
Party-quarrel 	 Stanhope 1705; Griffin 1720; Bolingbroke s.a. 
Party-cause 	 Hearne 1705; Addison 1708; Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-author 	 Anon. 1707; Addison 1712 
Party-question 	 Swift 1708 
Party-struggle 	 Addison 1709 
Party-feud 
	
Defoe 1709 
Party-tyranny 	 Defoe 1709 
Party-project 	 Defoe 1709 
Party-trick 	 Defoe 1709 
Party-pique 	 Defoe 1709; Place c. 1710: Anon. 1715 
Party-dispute 	 Steele 1709; Anon. 1718; Anon. 1727 
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Party-agent 	 Bolingbroke 1710; Place 1710 
Party-heat 	 Hamilton 1710; Place c. 1710; Anon. 1715 
Party pocketbook 	 Place c. 1710 
Party judgement 	 Place c. 1710 
Party-name 	 Place c. 1710; Anon. 1710; Anon. 1713; Laurence 1717; Anon. 
1728; Anon. 1729; Anon. 1733; Anon. 1739 
Party-nickname 	 Place c. 1710 
Party-scale 	 Place c. 1710 
Party-shelter 	 Place c. 1710 
Party-design 	 Anon. 1710 
Party-writer 	 Swift 1710; Addison 1714 
Party-coloured 	 Anon. 1710; Addison 1712 
Party-driving 	 Anon. 1710 
Party-air 	 Swift 1711 
Party-rage 	 Addison 1711; Smith 1715; Anon. 1720; Bolingbroke s.a.; 
Warren 1745; Gilpin 1747 
Party-humour 	 Addison 1711 
Party-spirit 	 Addison 1711; Balguy 1727; Anon. 1728; Bolingbroke 1735; 
Anon. 1736; Gilpin 1747 
Party-zeal 	 Addison 1711; Anon. 1722; Anon. 1736; Anon. 1739 
Party-woman 
	
Addison 1711 
Party-notion 	 Addison 1711; Anon. 1727 
Party-animosity 	 Defoe 1711; Trenchard 1722; Anon. 1736 
Party-end 	 Defoe 1711 
Party-lie 	 Addison 1712 
Party-lying 	 Addison 1712 
Party-story 	 Addison 1712 
Party-offender 	 Addison 1712 
Party-spleen 	 Addison 1712; Anon. 1733 
Party-relation 	 Steele 1712 
Party-mad 	 Swift 1712 
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Party-leader 	 Swift 1712; Smith 1715; Rowe 1718; Trenchard 1721 
Party-bigot 	 Anon. 1712 
Party-concern 	 Addison 1713 
Party-matter 	 Hughes 1713; Anon. 1722 
Party-taking 	 Anon. 1713 
Party-word 	 Sacheverell 1713; Toland 1717 
Party-term 	 Anon. 1713 
Party-scribbler 	 Lockhart 1714 
Party-business 	 Billingsley 1714; Defoe 1715 
Party-difference 	 Billingsley 1714; Atterbury 1714; Warren 1745 
Party-arms 	 Defoe 1715 
Party-strife 	 Smith 1715; Balguy 1727 
Party-agitation 	 Smith 1715 
Party-bigotry 	 Smith 1715 
Party-merit 	 Smith 1715; Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-bias 
	
Smith 1715 
Party-division 	 Defoe 1715; Anon. 1718; Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-principle 	 Anon. 1716; Anon. 1739 
Party-account 	 Ryder 1716; Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-measure 	 Whiston 1717; Anon. 1730 
Party-justice 	 Bolingbroke 1717; Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-interest 	 Bolingbroke 1717; Gordon 1721; Bolingbroke s.a. 
Party-fury 	 Blackmore 1718; Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-zealot 	 Pope 1718; Anon. 1722 
Party-deserter 	 Anon. 1718 
Party-depravation [sic] Anon. 1718 
Party-disposition 	 Anon. 1718 
Party-prejudice 	 Anon. 1718; Anon. 1722; Anon. 1733; Anon. 1739 
Party-opposition 	 Anon. 1718; Trenchard 1722 
Party-passion 	 Anon. 1718 
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Party-breach 	 Tindal 1718 
Party-kindness 	 Anon. 1719 
Party-taking 	 Anon. 1719 
Party-champion 	 Griffin 1720 
Party-hostility 	 Gordon 1720 
Party-writing 	 Gordon 1720 
Party-combination 	 Trenchard 1721 
Party watchword 	 Trenchard 1722 
Party-puncto 
	
Trenchard 1722 
Party-regard 
	
Anon. 1722 
Party-scuffle 	 Mandeville 1723 
Party-slavery 	 Byrom 1727 
Party-resentment 	 Stevenson 1728 
Party-denomination 	 Anon. 1728 
Party-badge 
	
Anon. 1728 
Party-madness 
	
Anon. 1729 
Party-song 	 Anon. 1729 
Party-play 	 Anon. 1729 
Party-consideration 	 Anon. 1733 
Party-dream 	 Anon. 1733 
Party-darkness 	 Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-view 	 Bolingbroke 1735; Anon. 1736 
Party-administration 	 Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-king 	 Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-system 	 Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-cunning 	 Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-conduct 	 Bolingbroke 1735 
Party-guide 
	
Anon. 1736 
Party-dislike 	 Story 1737 
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Party-paper 	 Poppe 1739 
Party-adherence 	 Anon. 1739 
Party-reign 	 Anon. 1740 
Party-debate 	 Anon. 1740 
Party-opinion 	 Gilpin 1747 
OED: party; [Toland], Christianity not Mysterious, 1696, xxviii; The Whigs Thirty Two 
Queries, 1701, 8; The Modern Whig Dictator, 1702, preface; A View of the Present 
Controversy, 1703; [Defoe], The Ballance, 1705, preface, 26, 29; Remarks and Collections 
of Thomas Hearne, 2 August 1705, Vol. I, 22, and 8 May 1707, Vol. II, 12; King, The 
Advantages of Education, Religious and Political, 1706, 27; The Diary of Thomas Naish, 24 
November 1707, 59; [Leslie], The Wolf Stript of his Shepherds Cloathing, 1707, 25; Swift to 
Archbishop King, 5 February 1708, Correspondence, Vol. I, 69; Addison to Charles 
Montagu, Earl of Manchester (Venice), 2 March 1708, The Letters, 96; Addison to Charles 
Spencer, Earl of Sunderland (London), Dublin Castle, 20 June 1709, The Letters, 155; 
Defoe, R6/17, 12 May 1709, R6/52, 2 August 1709, R6/81, 11 October 1709, R6/90, 1 
November 1709, R6/94, 10 November 1709; Steele, T114, 31 December 1709, 5521, 28 
October 1712; [Bolingbroke], A Letter to the Examiner, 1710; The Diary of Sir David 
Hamilton, 22 May 1710, 10; Place, The Arbitration, [1710], 3, 6, 10, 12-16, 28; Trapp, Most 
Faults on One Side, 1710, 3, 15, 17, 21; Swift to the Earl of Peterborough, [19] February 
1711, The Correspondence, vol. 1, 211; Addison, S57, 5 May 1711, S125, 24 July, 1711, 
S126, 25 July 1711, S265, 3 January 1712; [Defoe], An Essay on the History of Parties, 
1711, 26, 43; [Swift], Some Advice Humbly Offer'd to the Members of the October Club, 
1712, 77; Swift, Journal to Stella, 18 December 1712, Vol. II, 589; [Addison], S547, 27 
November 1712; [Whiston], Scripture Politicks, 1717, 143, 145; The Humble Confession, 
1712, 13; [Addison and Zachary Pearce], G121, 30 July 1713; John Hughes to Addison, 6 
October 1713, The Letters, 488; Honour Retriv'd from Faction, 1713, 10; Sacheverell, False 
Notions of Liberty in Religion and Government, 1713, 15; [Defoe], Whigs turn'd Tories, 
1713, 10-11; [Oldmixon], The False Steps of the Ministry, 1714, 18; [Defoe], Whigs and 
Tories United, 1714, 30; COPC: Lockhart, Memoirs, 1714: [Billingsley], A Brief Discourse 
of Schism, 1714, 8; [Atterbury], English Advice to the Freeholders of England, [1714], 4; 
COPC: Defoe, An Appeal to Honour and Justice, 1715; Protestant Advice to the Whigs and 
Tories of Great-Britain With Relation to the Present Civil-War, 1715, 6, 13; Smith, The 
Olive Branch, 1715, 5, 8; [Defoe], The Political Sow-Gelder, 1715, 11, 14, 21, 32; The Diary 
of Dudley Ryder, 19 July 1715, 58, 13 February 1716, 181; The Religion of the Wits At 
Button's Refuted, 1716, 49; Shuttleworth, A Perswasive to Union, 1716, preface; COPC: 
Bolingbroke, A Letter to Sir William Windham, 1717; [Toland], The State-Anatomy of Great 
Britain, 1717, preface; Laurence, Christian Religion the best Friend to Civil Government, 
1717, 31; A Sure Way to Orthodoxy, 1718, 9, 18, 20, 42, 60-1, 70, 77-8; Tindal, An Account 
of a Manuscript, 1718, 4; The Church of England Man's Memorial, 1719, introduction and 
13; Griffin, Whig and Tory, 1720, 7, 11, 28; [Trenchard and Gordon], IW22, 15 June 1720; 
Gordon, Dedication for Cato's Letters, c. 1720, xix; [Trenchard], CL20, 11 February 1721, 
CL61, 13 January 1722, CL69, 10 March 1722, CL80, 9 June 1722, CL81, 16 June 1722; 
[Gordon], CL56, 9 December 1721; A Memorial of the Present State of the British Nation, 
1722, v, vii, 19; Mandeville, 'An Essay on Charity, and Charity Schools' (1723) and 'A 
Vindication of the Book' (1724) in The Fable of the Bees, 313, 396; John Byrom to Mrs. 
Byrom, Trinity College, 2 July 1727, in Selections from the Journals and Papers of John 
Byrom, 99; C29, 13 March 1727; C36, 10 April 1727; C57, 5 August 1727; Balguy, The Duty 
of Benevolence, 1727, 18-19; Stevenson, Zeal and Moderation, 1728, 32; An Essay on the 
Christian Name, 1728, title and 3, 48, 50-1; Bramston, The Art of Politicks, 1729, 9, 26; 
C172, 18 October 1729; C213, 1 August 1730; C343, 27 January 1733; C348, 3 March 1733; 
C355, 3 March 1733; C359, 19 May 1733; The Free-Briton, 26 July 1733, in GM, Vol. III, 
July 1733, Reel 134; An Essay on Faction, 1733, 16; London Journal, No. 760, 19 January 
1734, in GM, Vol. IV, January 1734, Reel 134; Bolingbroke, Dissertation upon Parties, 
1735, 23, 33, 52, 56, 72, 83, 98, 156-7, 167, 169; The Present Necessity of distinguishing 
Publick Spirit from Party, 1736, 4, 8, 14, 17, 22; A Dissuasive from Party and Religious 
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Animosities, 1736, 3-4, 9, 18; Story, Thomas Story's Discourse, [1737], 4; Bolingbroke, The 
Idea of a Patriot King, 1738, 398, 403; Bolingbroke, Of the State of Parties at the Accession 
of King George the First, s.a., 433-4, 436-7; Observations on the Conduct of the Tories, the 
Whigs, and the Dissenters, 1739, 5-6, 32, 35, 39; The Craftsman, 4 August 1739, in GM, 
Vol. IX, August 1739, Reel 137; Goldgar 1976, 157; C713, 1 March 1740, BL Burney, Vol. 
349B; The Daily Gazetteer, No. 1627, 5 September 1740, BL Burney, Vol. 351; Acherley, 
Reasons for Uniformity in the State, 1741, 1, 4; Common Sense, No. 360, 7 January 1744, in 
GM, Vol. XIV, January 1744, Reel 138; Warren, Religion and Loyalty inseparable, 1745, 8, 
17; Gilpin, The bad Consequences of Dissention, 1747, 7-8, 11-13, 16-17. 
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132, Bolingbroke, Henry St John, 51-2, 54, 96, 
110-11, 	 132, 	 137, 146, 159, 	 181, 	 187-8, 
156, 194-5, 204-9, 214, 219, 227-8, 236, 259, 
220, 275, 285, 347-8 
Acherley, Roger, 51, 108, 122, 127-8, 
250, 253, 267, 346 
Addison, Joseph, 51, 55, 93, 114, 135, 
185, 187, 189, 192, 194, 202, 218, 
222-4, 241, 249, 256, 270, 290-2, 309-10, 
312-15, 318, 346 
Albers, Jan, 327 
Anabaptists, 157, 260, 263 
ancient constitution, 14, 25, 39, 76, 79, 128, 
161, 235, 245-6 
Anglicanism, 14, 24-5, 28-32, 56n, 71, 74, 
102, 136, 211, 215-16, 233, 237, 250, 271, 
275, 277, 287, 289-90, 305 
Anne, Queen, 62, 102, 140, 159, 168, 231, 
236, 247, 278, 285, 293 
Annet, Peter, 259, 346 
anticlericalism, 28, 72, 82-3, 98, 111n, 112- 
18, 122, 131, 134, 136, 139, 143, 146, 191, 
212, 256, 259, 267-8, 270, 284, 287, 297- 
8, 308, 311, 317, 321 
Aristotle, 86-7, 97 
atheism. 22, 72-3, 98, 105, 107, 109, 115, 
136, 143, 155, 237, 254, 278n, 279, 288, 
290-1, 297-8, 300, 306-7, 310-11, 313, 
315, 324, 327 
and Machiavellism, 92, 100-1, 294 
and party-rage, 293 
and Whiggism, 240, 289, 294-5, 304- 
5, 308 
as a concept, 292-6, 309 
Atterbury, Francis, 53, 57, 78, 105-6, 108-9, 
144, 175-6, 196, 204, 212, 253, 272, 279, 
346 
Augustine, St, 140 
Bailey, Nathan, 50, 347 
Balguy, John, 189, 347 
Ball, Terence, 40, 42, 46, 162, 174, 324 
Baptists, 65 
Baron, William, 347 
Basnage, Jacques, 280 
Bayle, Pierre, 50, 288, 300, 347 
Beattie, Alan, 161 
Begriffsgeschichte, 37, 43-4, 320 
Bentley, Richard, 304n 
Berkeley, George, 303, 309, 311, 347 
von Beyme, Klaus, 161, 165 
biblical language, 83-4, 105, 141, 144-5, 147, 
152n, 175, 215-17, 220 
and politics, 12, 27, 83, 104, 108, 146, 
263-6, 326 
Billingsley, John, 347 
Blackmore, Richard, 51, 259, 347 
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